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1 
SUMMARY 
 
The focus of this thesis is the lithium-brine mining industries developing on three salt 
flats: two in Argentina (Salinas Grandes and Olarozi-Cauchari) and one in Bolivia (the 
Salar de Uyuni). In particular, I focus on the environmental human rights of indigenous 
communities living near the salt flats upon which the mines are located.  
At the heart of their rights is participation in decision-making over mining which is 
likely to affect them and their lives. This includes decisions made by mining companies 
and state authorities that will affect their environment, and the land they occupy and 
use for their traditional livelihoods, such as salt gathering and quinoa agriculture.  
To understand what is at stake, the thesis also examines the potential environmental 
impacts of lithium mining at scale in these regions, particularly in terms of water use 
and contamination. Lithium is a valuable commodity in the emerging low-carbon 
economy due to its increasing use in electric cars and renewable energy storage 
batteries. Over half of the world’s lithium is found in the high Andean plains of the 
“Lithium Triangle”, at the border regions of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile. This thesis is 
based on qualitative socio-legal research conducted 2015–2019, including six months of 
fieldwork in the region in January–June 2017. The research found that little reliable 
information about lithium mining’s environmental impacts have been made available to 
indigenous communities, and that consultation has been weak. Some Argentinean 
communities have organised a successful resistance however, making full use of their 
rights under international law. In Bolivia, the industrialisation of lithium is a key goal of 
the socialist regime (2006–present), meaning an increasingly centralised state project 
and a lack of transparency over potential contamination for communities in the region. 
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“The salt lake is a sacred place for us, a part of our family. We can’t destroy it.” 
 
“Nosotros no comemos batería, se llevan el agua, se va la vida” 
 
Salinero/as of the Salinas Grandes Communities, Argentina 
  
 
 
“We don’t know about it – zero. We don’t have any kind of explanation. We don’t know how much 
lithium they are taking, nor of what quality. It’s worrying for us for lack of water. Long before, many 
years ago, the salar used to have a lot of water and I would take a lot of salt. It’s absorbing all of the 
water from the salar. It lowers the production of salt. It’s a little worrying for us. We don’t blame the 
company, but…” 
 
Salero, Colchani, Bolivia  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis analyses the extent to which the human rights of indigenous communities 
have been complied with, specifically relating to environmental participation rights, 
within the growing lithium industries of Argentina and Bolivia. In doing so, the thesis 
documents the current and potential socioenvironmental impacts of lithium mining on 
communities in this region and contextualises the current lithium mining industry 
within the broader socio-political developments within the sector and region. This 
introductory chapter addresses the importance of analysing lithium mining (and why 
now), before identifying the differing approaches being adopted towards mining 
lithium in Argentina and Bolivia, as well as the wider implications of such natural 
resource extraction for indigenous communities.  
Lithium is probably the most important metal of today, being a crucial primary 
commodity for a future low-carbon economy. However, the benefits of using lithium 
to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels, will not come without a price – and that price is 
likely to be paid by the local indigenous communities living in the vicinity of lithium 
mining in the high Andean plains of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile. Lithium is an 
unusual metal in that it can be extracted in two very distinct ways. One involves 
extraction from rock, which is how it is mined in Australia, the world’s largest 
producer.1 Unusually, it can also be extracted from brines found under salt flats, by 
evaporating brine (drawn from under the salt flat) in pools which have been cut out 
 
1 USGS, ‘Lithium’ (Unites States Geological Survey, 2018), 
https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/lithium/mcs-2018-lithi.pdf. 
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from the salt flat itself. This method is understood to be more economical than 
extraction from rock.2 Further chemical processing is required to separate the lithium 
from other metals contained in the brines. All salt flats’ brines are slightly different in 
composition, requiring a period of testing to check how long the evaporation stage 
might take, and what chemical compounds are needed for further processing. There are 
many lithium-rich salt flats around the world, located in some of the world’s poorest 
and most politically unstable places, such as Afghanistan and Tibet.3 
The largest deposits of lithium are found in the high Andean plateaus, where the 
borders of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile meet (see Map 1), known as the “Lithium 
Triangle”.4 This area is, therefore, where the current study is located.  
This study focuses on three sites: two in Argentina and the third in Bolivia. In 
Argentina’s northernmost Jujuy Province, there are two operational lithium mines on 
the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat. Lithium mining has been proposed on another salt flat, 
the Salinas Grandes. Both salt flats are also surrounded by numerous but geographically 
dispersed indigenous communities. Some of the communities here have used the 
Salinas Grandes for salt-gathering, to use and trade as part of an economic structure 
that has existed since pre-Columbian times.5 On the two mines established on Olaroz-
Cauchari, many communities are currently working closely with or for the lithium 
companies, namely Sales de Jujuy and Exar. On the Salinas Grandes, in contrast, 
 
2 Henry Sanderson, ‘Lithium: The next Speculative Bubble?’, Financial Times, 6 January 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/4fd165d6-d274-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51. 
3 Gabriel Lafitte, Spoiling Tibet: China and Resource Nationalism on the Roof of the World, Asian 
Arguments (London ; New York: Zed Books, 2013); Simon Denyer, ‘Tibetans in Anguish as Chinese 
Mines Pollute Their Sacred Grasslands’, Washington Post, 26 December 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/tibetans-in-anguish-as-chinese-mines-pollute-
their-sacred-grasslands/2016/12/25/bb6aad06-63bc-11e6-b4d8-33e931b5a26d_story.html. 
4 Economist, ‘A Battle for Supremacy in the Lithium Triangle’, The Economist, 15 June 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2017/06/15/a-battle-for-supremacy-in-the-lithium-triangle. 
5 Nina Bertone, ‘Salinas Grandes, Explotación del litio y demandas comunales’, 2013, 
http://repositorio.ub.edu.ar/handle/123456789/2030; Andres Schipani, ‘Hard Life of Bolivia’s “Salt 
Plains Guardians”’, 18 July 2010, sec. Latin America & Caribbean, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
latin-america-10282499. 
   
 
7 
communities have resisted plans to mine lithium since unannounced prospecting took 
place in 2010. 
In comparison to Argentina, neighbouring Bolivia’s fledgling lithium industry 
consists only of one state-owned pilot lithium extraction plant on the Salar de Uyuni. 
The project has been spearheaded by the government’s socialist regime, led by 
indigenous President Evo Morales (2006–present), head of the Movimiento al Socialismo 
(MAS) political party. Pilot plants were completed in 2012 to test potential extraction 
methods of lithium and potassium chloride, a valuable fertiliser, to eventually scale up 
to full exploitation of these evaporate resources. The Salar de Uyuni is the largest salt 
flat in the world and a popular tourist destination in one of the poorest countries in 
South America. Again, there are numerous indigenous communities in the region 
around the coast of the salt flat, mostly engaged in quinoa cultivation, a traditional 
Andean grain dating back to the Inca civilisation.6 Located on the eastern edge of the 
salt flat is one local community that uses the salt flat to harvest common salt to 
maintain their livelihood, similar to the Salinas Grandes communities. While estimates 
vary, Bolivia is understood to contain among the world’s largest lithium deposits.7 
The Salinas Grandes salt flat, the fourth biggest in the world, is also a major tourist 
destination in Argentina, but on a more modest scale than Uyuni. Like Uyuni, however, 
it is used by local indigenous people to “sow and harvest” common salt.8 This means 
 
6 Seema Patel, ‘Resurgence of Interest in Ancient Grain Quinoa (Chenopodium Quinoa): An Appraisal’, 
in Emerging Bioresources with Nutraceutical and Pharmaceutical Prospects, ed. Seema Patel, Applied 
Environmental Science and Engineering for a Sustainable Future (Cham: Springer International 
Publishing, 2015), 91–100, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12847-4_9. 
7 Sagárnaga López, ‘Bolivia’s Lithium Boom: Dream or Nightmare?’, OpenDemocracy (blog), 21 December 
2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/rafael-sag-rnaga-l-pez/bolivia-s-lithium-
boom-dream-or-nightmare; Laura Millan Lombrana, ‘Bolivia’s Almost Impossible Lithium Dream’, 3 
December 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-12-03/bolivia-s-almost-impossible-
lithium-dream. 
8 Marcela Valente, ‘Native People in Argentina Demand a Say in Lithium Mining’, Inter Press Service, 29 
March 2012, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/03/native-people-in-argentina-demand-a-say-in-lithium-
mining/. 
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potentially severe implications for this traditional indigenous livelihood when lithium 
mining damages the salt flats. Lithium prospecting on the Salinas Grandes occurred in 
2010 sparking alarm among the local communities living in the salt flat’s watershed. 
Shortly after this, the communities organised themselves into a “Roundtable” of 33 
concerned communities from the Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc basin and went 
before Argentina’s Supreme Court in 2012 claiming a legal right to be consulted.9 They 
lost the case, but developed a “consultation protocol” for such projects, the principles 
of which are based on their rights as indigenous peoples in international law.10 This 
protocol is thought to be one of the first of its kind in the world.11 
Consequently, the thesis will proceed to assess the legal rights of informed 
consultation in relation to proposed lithium mining projects. In order to determine if 
those rights are being actioned on the ground, between 2015 and 2019, I conducted 
qualitative socio-legal research, including extensive documentary research and a six-
month period of fieldwork at the three sites in Bolivia and Argentina (January–June 
2017). During this time, I interviewed key actors within the industry and members of 
indigenous communities bordering three salt flats: the Salinas Grandes and the Olaroz 
salt flats in Jujuy Province, Argentina and the Salar de Uyuni in the Potosí Department 
of Bolivia. I used observation and semi-structured interviews to help determine 
whether those indigenous communities have enjoyed the right to participate in 
decision-making in respect of lithium mining projects occurring in the territories that 
they have traditionally inhabited. In brief, I aimed to understand the level of 
 
9 Valente. 
10 The 33 Communities of Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc, ‘Kachi Yupi / Huellas de Sal [Footprints in 
the Salt]: Procedimiento de Consulta y Consentimiento Previo, Libre e Informado Para Las 
Comunidades Indígenas de La Cuenca de Salinas Grandes y Laguna de Guayatayoc’ (Jujuy, Argentina, 
August 2015), https://farn.org.ar/archives/20277. 
11 Jael Makagon et al., ‘Balancing the Scales - Community Protocols and Extractive Industries: Lessons 
from Argentina, India, Kenya and Zimbabwe’ (Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa, 19 December 
2016), https://za.boell.org/2016/12/19/balancing-scales-community-protocols-and-extractive-
industries. 
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consultation that had taken place, the level of consent sought, and whether these 
processes had been “free, prior and informed” in accordance with international human 
rights norms. Due to limitations of word length I selected rights to land and 
environment for analysis, however other rights that might be implicated by lithium 
mining include rights to health and water, and potentially the right to life. 
In total I conducted 40 interviews, the bulk of these with community members 
and leaders across 28 communities located in the vicinity of the three salt flats in the 
two countries. I also interviewed three government mining officials, two company 
representatives, the lawyer for the 33 Salinas Grandes communities and three 
independent researchers. Triangulating the data with other studies, my observations, 
documentary sources and interviews have enabled me to draw conclusions regarding 
indigenous environmental participation in lithium mining in the two countries. 
1.2 The importance of lithium in an age of climate change 
Lithium-ion batteries are ubiquitous in modern life in many parts of the world, used in 
mobile phones and other portable electronic devices such as laptops and cameras. 
Lithium-ion battery technology is also used to power electric vehicles, and as a way to 
store energy generated by wind turbines and solar panels,12 meaning usage of renewable 
energy no matter the weather. Although the use of electric cars or storage batteries is 
still not ubiquitous, they are considered an important part of reducing harmful fossil 
fuel emissions and thus climate change, which is the most urgent environmental issue 
facing humanity.13  
 
12 National Research Council Canada, ‘Mining the Green Economy: Working with Lithium and Graphite 
Miners to Strengthen Canada’s Energy Storage Opportunity’, 31 January 2017, https://www.nrc-
cnrc.gc.ca/eng/stories/2017/mining_green_econo.html. 
13 IPCC, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5oC’, 8 October 2019; Justin Worland, ‘UN Warns We 
Are Nowhere Close to Averting a Climate Crisis’, Time, 8 October 2018, http://time.com/5418134/ipcc-
climate-change-report-2030-crisis/. 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in October 2018 issued a 
warning that unless carbon pollution is cut by 45 percent by 2030, and to zero by 2050, 
the world has little hope of staying within 1.5C of warming, the limit agreed at the 2015 
Paris climate talks.14 The consequences of breaching these targets are alarming. 
According to the IPPC, a global shift towards electric transportation is essential for 
achieving this goal.15 Lithium-ion is the only battery technology ready to facilitate this 
transition on a large enough scale. It is therefore being deployed rapidly in the 
development of new vehicles in China (lithium’s biggest market), the US and Europe, 
in both public and private transport, with the dual goals of reducing the carbon 
emissions and urban air pollution from petrol and diesel vehicles. Lithium demand is 
therefore increasing rapidly, and supply is struggling to keep up: The Economist in 
January 2016 reported a trebling in the spot price of lithium carbonate (a common 
compound used in batteries) in the last quarter of 2015, giving an indication of the 
imbalance between demand and supply.16 
Electric transportation has become increasingly popular worldwide. The rapid 
adoption in China of electric bicycles alone is said to be the largest increase in use of an 
alternative-fuel vehicle in the history of motorisation, with numbers going from near 
zero to more than 150 million on Chinese roads between 2005 and 2015.17 It is easy to 
see from such developments how in the first quarter of 2016, the price of lithium on 
the global market tripled.18 The price remains volatile, however, and subject to shocks, 
as more lithium mines come into production (their output unpredictable), and Chinese 
 
14 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5oC’. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Economist, ‘A Plug for the Battery - The Battery Era’, accessed 20 October 2018, 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/01/16/a-plug-for-the-battery. 
17 Christopher Cherry, ‘Electric Bikes: What Experiences in China Can Tell Us| Christopher Cherry’, The 
Guardian, 20 November 2013, sec. Public Leaders Network, https://www.theguardian.com/local-
government-network/2013/nov/20/lessons-electric-bikes-china. 
18 Economist, ‘A Plug for the Battery - The Battery Era’.  
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manufacturing slows.19  
1.3 The South American “Lithium Triangle”  
The three countries of the Lithium Triangle are the Republic of Chile, the Republic of 
Argentina and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The international mining and finance 
media coined the term “Lithium Triangle” due to the large, valuable and relatively 
economically-extractable deposits of lithium found in the brines under the salt flats 
located in these three countries’ high Andean plains. 
The salt flats and communities of the Lithium Triangle are geographically remote 
from the countries’ capitals and urban centres, at the borders between Chile, Argentina 
and Bolivia. Altitude in the region ranges from between 3,500–4,400 metres above sea 
level. They are overwhelmingly indigenous areas in all three nations. While ethnicities 
are often mixed and groupings are hard to determine precisely, Argentina and Chile’s 
indigenous communities in this region self-identify as Atacama and Kolla peoples. The 
2012 Bolivian Census states that around Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni, 54 percent first learn 
the indigenous language Quechua.20 Quechua and Aymará are not specifically ethnic 
groupings, but the two most-widely spoken indigenous languages of Bolivia.21 
Precise reserve figures by country are regularly revised by the United States 
Geographical Survey (USGS) as prospecting, testing and production produces more 
information, but the region is generally understood to be the most lithium-rich on 
 
19 Gabriel Wildau and Edward White, ‘China Manufacturing Gauge Points to Worsening Economic 
Slowdown’, Financial Times, 31 October 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/c5b13c48-dcab-11e8-9f04-
38d397e6661c. 
20 INE, “INE: 54,4% de los potosinos aprendieron a hablar en quechua” (La Paz: INE, 2012), accessed 
22 February 2019 https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/component/phocadownload/category/64-notas-
de-prensa-2016?download=942:ine-54-4-de-los-potosinos-aprendieron-a-hablar-en-quechua 
21 Ricardo Calla Ortega, ‘Impactos de La Producción Industrial Del Carbonato de Litio y Del Cloruro de 
Potasio En El Salar de Uyuni’, in Un Presente Sin Futuro: El Proyecto de Industrialización Del Litio En Bolivia 
(La Paz: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA), 2014). p.41. 
   
 
12 
Earth, with some 54 percent or more of world lithium reserves.22 However, the unusual 
mining technique of extraction-by-evaporation depends on appropriate weather 
conditions over the evaporation period (of a few months to over a year). As such, yields 
can rise and fall unexpectedly, subject to variations in precipitation.23 While the region 
is generally dry, in recent years, El Niño and climate change have disrupted typical 
rainfall patterns, leading to prolonged droughts, flash floods and the unusual 
phenomenon of flowering desert plains in the Atacama Desert, the driest place on 
Earth.24  
In northern Chile, there has been lithium production on the Salar de Atacama 
since the 1980s.25 In northern Argentina, the first company began production in 
Catamarca Province in 1997, the second and the third in Jujuy Province in 2015 and 
2018 respectively.26 In Bolivia, discussions about lithium have been ongoing since 
discovery in the 1970s, with unsuccessful negotiations in the 1990s and a hiatus until 
2010 when the project was boosted by the socialist regime. 
Chile and Argentina both produce lithium for the international market, with Chile 
the most advanced producer. According to the USGS in 2018 Chile produced 16,000 
tonnes of lithium and Argentina produced 6,200.27 Despite this, lithium is not 
considered particularly lucrative in Chile, particularly compared to copper: “in 2011 
 
22 Ellsworth Dickson, Resource World, "Lithium Triangle", 11 May 2018  
23 Frik Els, Lithium price: Weather takes more tonnes off the market, Mining.com, 20 February, 2019, 
accessed 21 February, 2019, http://www.mining.com/lithium-price-weather-takes-tonnes-off-market/  
24 BBC News, ‘World’s Driest Desert in Bloom’, 23 August 2017, sec. Latin America & Caribbean, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41021774; Rosalba O’Brien, ‘Chile Desert Rains Sign 
of Climate Change: Chief Weather Scientist’, Reuters, 27 March 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-weather/chile-desert-rains-sign-of-climate-change-chief-
weather-scientist-idUSKBN0MN2N520150327. 
25 The Economist, ‘A Battle for Supremacy in the Lithium Triangle’. 
26 Futuro Sustentable, ‘Cristina Kirchner Inaugura El Yacimiento de Litio Sales de Jujuy’, Futuro 
Sustentable, 3 December 2014, http://www.futurosustentable.com.ar/cristina-kirchner-inaugura-el-
yacimiento-de-litio-sales-de-jujuy/; TECH2, ‘Minera EXAR Started Its Lithium Production at Cauchari 
Olaroz’, TECH2 (blog), 6 August 2018, https://tech2.org/argentina/minera-exar-started-its-lithium-
production-at-cauchari-olaroz/. 
27 USGS, ‘Lithium’ (Unites States Geological Survey, 2019), 
https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/lithium/mcs-2018-lithi.pdf. 
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copper exports were worth US$43,614 million while lithium accrued just US$204 
million”, according to a government report.28 While there were only two lithium mines 
in Argentina in 2018,  60 projects are due to come online in the coming years, and the 
government suggests that by 2023 Argentina could be producing 290,000 tonnes per 
year of lithium.29 There is no commercial-scale production in Bolivia. However, due to 
the great potential for a central role in a growing world market, there is a large appetite 
for extraction of lithium, and a deal was signed in late 2018 with German ACI to help 
Bolivia exploit its reserves.30 
All three countries of the Lithium Triangle are former Spanish colonies. Nine 
percent of Chile’s population is indigenous; in Argentina the figure is 2.38 percent.31 In 
Bolivia, by contrast, 42 percent of the population self-identify as indigenous.32 This 
figure dropped by 20 percent from the Bolivian Census of 2001 to that of 2012 
following changes in the available categories for self-identification in the census.  
Indigenous communities live across all three countries’ remote, mountainous 
lithium regions, practising subsistence farming, quinoa agriculture and, for some 
communities, salt harvesting from the salt flats. Some communities of the region also 
rely on work in tourism and mining, and migration is common to where work can be 
found. 
 
28 Javiera Barandiarán, ‘Lithium and Development Imaginaries in Chile, Argentina and Bolivia’, World 
Development 113 (1 January 2019): 381–91, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.09.019. 
29 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Argentina, “Argentina’s lithium boom”, 7 November  2018, accessed 
5 October, 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1287322512&Country=Argentina&topic=Economy&linkI
d=100000004025421  
 
30 Mitra Taj, Michael Nienaber, “In the new lithium 'Great Game,' Germany edges out China in Bolivia”, 
January 28, 2019, Reuters, https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-lithium-germany/in-the-new-
lithium-great-game-germany-edges-out-china-in-bolivia-idUKKCN1PM1LS 
31 INDEC, Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010: Pueblos Originarios: Región 
Noroeste Argentino: Serie D No 1 (PDF) (in Spanish).  
32 Bolivian Census 2001 and 2012, INDEC: La Paz. 
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1.4 Differing approaches to lithium industrialisation 
In 2017, The Economist noted that, “[t]hree South American countries have much of 
the world’s lithium” and “[t]hey take very different approaches to exploiting it.”33 
Successive Chilean and Argentinean governments have invited foreign companies to 
mine lithium, continuing to extract within the neoliberal extractive model common 
across Latin America.  
Across Argentina’s Provinces of Salta, Jujuy and Catamarca, around 30 projects are 
being developed across numerous salt flats. On Jujuy’s Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat, a 
lithium industry has been working towards extracting lithium since 2010. Two lithium 
companies, Sales de Jujuy and Exar, have been commercially mining on this salt flat 
since 2015 and 2018 respectively. Ten indigenous communities live within the Olaroz 
basin, near the border with Chile, including the small town of Susques, which sits at 
3,986 metres above sea level. Many members of these communities are working with or 
for lithium companies Sales de Jujuy and Exar. Despite prospecting on Argentina’s 
Salinas Grandes in 2010, there is still no lithium mining taking place on the Salinas 
Grandes when this thesis was finalised in May 2019.  
Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni is a 10,000-square kilometre salt flat that is so large it can 
be seen from space. It has been estimated to have more lithium than anywhere in the 
world, making Bolivia the “Saudi Arabia of lithium” according to a Financial Times 
journalist.34 The socialist government of indigenous former coca union leader Evo 
Morales has funded a Bolivian state mining company to build a small pilot lithium plant 
on the south of the Salar de Uyuni, to explore options for large-scale extraction. The 
Salar de Uyuni is surrounded by numerous communities of native Bolivian peasant 
 
33 The Economist, “The white gold rush: A battle for supremacy in the lithium triangle”, 15 June 2017. 
34 Andres Schipani, ‘Bolivia: The Saudi Arabia of Lithium?’, Financial Times, 7 January 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/ec58385a-fbc7-319f-93a8-4bd5647b10e0. 
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quinoa farmers, with one village, Colchani, traditionally focused on salt gathering. 
Bolivia’s socialist government has taken a different approach to Argentina’s or Chile’s, 
who have invited foreign mining companies to mine private concessions. Despite great 
interest from foreign investors in the large Bolivian lithium deposit, the anti-colonial 
regime has eschewed outside investment and technical help in favour of extracting 
lithium from the Salar de Uyuni through a state-run mining company.  
However, for over a decade, the Bolivian government’s ambitious plans to mine 
lithium without foreign technology or investment have been mired with delays and 
problems. One key problem is Bolivia’s limited experience with industrial development 
(it still imports the most basic manufactured items).35 A second key problem causing 
delays is the prevalence of magnesium in the brines of the Salar de Uyuni, an impurity 
which complicates the standard lithium brine mining process.36  
1.5 Natural resource extraction and indigenous peoples’ 
rights 
Natural resource extraction on a large scale is often damaging to the surrounding 
environment, and the people who depend on it for their survival and livelihoods. This 
is particularly true of indigenous peoples. As well as universal human rights to a healthy 
environment and its composite requirements of clean water, air, adequate food and so 
on, indigenous peoples have special human rights in international law. These rights 
have been enshrined in law to ensure their survival, and, more broadly, the survival of 
indigenous people and their cultures, which are often linked closely to the natural 
 
35 Rebecca Hollender and Jim Shultz, ‘Bolivia and Its Lithium: Can the “Gold of the 21st Century” Help 
Lift a Nation out of Poverty?’ (Cochabamba: The Democracy Center, 2010), 
https://democracyctr.org/archive/bolivia-and-its-lithium/. 
36 Anna C. Revette, ‘This Time It’s Different: Lithium Extraction, Cultural Politics and Development in 
Bolivia’, Third World Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 149–68, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1131118. 
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world.37 While a human right to participation in environmental decision-making is 
arguably universal, indigenous communities also have specific rights to environmental 
participation in the form of informed consultation according to international law.38 
Furthermore, native and rural communities around the world are often the first to be 
affected by the impacts of climate change, and the most seriously, given the close 
dependence on particular lands for their physical and cultural survival.39 
The Latin American continent has a “long history of extracting and exploiting 
natural resources dating back to the colonial era” according to Raftopoulos, and yet 
“the relationship between human rights, extractivism and the environment remains 
under-researched and under-theorised.”40 Samson and Gigoux state that, 
“[u]ndoubtedly, the main driving force of colonialism in Latin America has been the 
quest of all governments to assert sovereignty over indigenous lands.”41 Indigenous 
lands are often natural resource-rich, and as such indigenous peoples have long been at 
a clear disadvantage when governments permit and encourage extraction on their 
territories.42 
Particularly for indigenous, rural and place-based peoples, extraction-based 
 
37 Colin Samson and Carlos Gigoux, Indigenous Peoples and Colonialism: Global Perspectives (Malden, MA: 
Polity, 2017); Laura Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: International and Domestic 
Legal Perspectives, First issued in paperback (London: Earthscan, 2013). 
38 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, IACHR Series C No 79, [2001] IACHR 9, IHRL 
1462 (IACHR 2001), 31 August 2001; Mauro Barelli, “Development Projects and Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land: Defining the Scope of Free, Prior and Informed Consent,” in Handbook of Indigenous Peoples Rights, 
ed. Corinne Lennox and Damien Short (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016).  
39 Paul Havemann, “Mother Earth, Indigenous Peoples and Neo-Liberal Climate Change Governance 
Paul Havemann,” in Handbook of Indigenous Peoples Rights, ed. Corinne Lennox and Damien Short 
(London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016).  
40 Malayna Raftopoulos, ‘Contemporary Debates on Social-Environmental Conflicts, Extractivism and 
Human Rights in Latin America’, The International Journal of Human Rights 21, no. 4 (4 May 2017): 387–404, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1301035. 
41 Samson and Gigoux, Indigenous Peoples and Colonialism. 
42 Samson and Gigoux; Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Elena 
Blanco and Jona Razzaque, Globalisation and Natural Resources Law: Challenges, Key Issues and 
Perspectives (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011); Jennifer 
Huseman and Damien Short, ‘“A Slow Industrial Genocide”: Tar Sands and the Indigenous Peoples 
of Northern Alberta’, The International Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 216–37, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2011.649593. 
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economic “development” is often experienced as disastrous.43 However, increased 
visibility and persistent lobbying by indigenous delegates at the international level, and 
particularly within the UN human rights forum in Geneva,44 has resulted in some gains 
in law, politics and practice for indigenous peoples’ rights.45 Because of the 1989 
International Labour Organisation’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention 169 
(ILO169), for example, states must consult with indigenous peoples in advance of 
mining projects as regards the scope of the project and its environmental impacts.46 The 
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),47 proposes that 
these consultations have the objective of obtaining indigenous “free, prior and 
informed consent” (FPIC) in advance of mining projects that might affect them, 
provided for in UNDRIP Article 32.2.48 Although UNDRIP constitutes only soft law, 
the principle of FPIC is now accepted by many stakeholders as being central in 
negotiations between indigenous communities and mining companies.49  
Similarly, there are a number of global initiatives, driven by UN member states and 
other international organisations such as the World Bank, that aim to curb the worst 
excesses of transnational corporate power. These include the UN’s non-legally-binding 
 
43 Deborah McGregor, ‘Living Well with the Earth’, in Handbook of Indigenous Peoples Rights, ed. Corinne 
Lennox and Damien Short (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 
44 Julian Burger, ‘From Outsiders to Centre Stage: Three Decades of Indigenous Peoples’ Presence at 
the United Nations Julian Burger’, in Handbook of Indigenous Peoples Rights, ed. Corinne Lennox 
and Damien Short (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 
45 Sheryl Lightfoot, Global Indigenous Politics: A Subtle Revolution (Routledge, 2016). 
46 International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, Articles 6 
and 15. 
47 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples : resolution / adopted by 
the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html [accessed 17 May 2019] 
48 Ibid, Article 32.2 
49 Corinne Lewis, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’, 
in Handbook of Indigenous Peoples Rights, ed. Corinne Lennox and Damien Short (London ; New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2016); David Szablowski, ‘Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector? Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of 
Justice’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue Canadienne d’études Du Développement 
30, no. 1–2 (1 January 2010): 111–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2010.9669284; Adem 
Kassie Abebe, ‘The Power of Indigenous People to Veto Development Activities: The Right to Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) with Specific Reference to Ethiopia’ (Mini Dissertation, 
University of Pretoria, 2009), https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/12643. 
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Global Compact (2000) and Guidelines on Business and Human Rights (2009), 
discussed briefly in Chapter 4; the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation’s 
“Performance Standards” for managing social, environmental and human rights risks; 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines and 
associated system of National Contact Points. Due to space and time restrictions, and 
general inapplicability of the latter two oversight mechanisms in lithium projects in 
Bolivia and Argentina, these mechanisms not a focus of this thesis.  
According to Raftopoulos, extraction and exploitation of natural resources in Latin 
America has been driven by “strong international demand for raw materials and a cycle 
of high prices”,50 a trend seen in the lithium market as well as markets for numerous 
other commodities. This dynamic is further exacerbated by “the recent downturn in the 
price of minerals and hydrocarbons” which creates a decline in profits that must be 
“offset by the further expansion of extractive frontiers”.51 Harvey’s concept of 
“accumulation by dispossession” as a form of “new imperialism” is a useful reference 
here.52 He highlights how capital requires new environments into which to expand to 
exploit natural resources, with the effect of dispossessing indigenous and rural peoples 
of their natural heritage and rights to clean water, air and a healthy environment.53 
Oil is a clear example of natural resource extraction which has caused severe 
socioenvironmental and human rights violations all across the world. In Nigeria, for 
example, oil production by Royal Dutch Shell and the Nigerian state company has had 
devastating effects on the environment and people of Ogoniland, resulting in a 
situation where nine Ogoni environmental activists were executed by the military 
 
50 Raftopoulos, ‘Contemporary Debates on Social-Environmental Conflicts, Extractivism and Human 
Rights in Latin America’. 
51 Raftopoulos. 
52 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
53 Harvey. 
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government following an unfair trial in 1995.54 In the Canadian tar sands, the toxic 
environment created by enormous open cast mines of bituminous sands has created a 
health crisis for First Nations communities local to the mines that is so severe 
Huseman and Short call it a “slow industrial genocide”.55 With their land destroyed by 
the largest industrial project on Earth, native communities have little hope of returning 
to their subsistence hunting, trapping and fishing traditions. In Latin America, states are 
also very familiar with the environmental effects of oil extraction, which has severely 
affected the health and wellbeing of rainforest communities in Ecuador, for example.56 
These cases will be examined in detail in the next chapter (Background) and in Chapter 
4 (Law). 
1.6 The contribution of the thesis 
1.6.1 Comparing indigenous environmental rights compliance in two states 
The impact of extraction on the environment, economy and rural or indigenous 
communities has been well researched in recent years, across numerous academic 
disciplines.57 Recent Latin American political shifts to the left and back, and swings in 
 
54 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Shell Complicit in the Arbitrary Executions of Ogoni Nine as Writ 
Served in Dutch Court’, 29 June 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/shell-
complicit-arbitrary-executions-ogoni-nine-writ-dutch-court/. 
55 Huseman and Short, ‘“A Slow Industrial Genocide”’. 
56 Miguel San Sebastián and Anna Karin Hurtig, ‘Oil Development and Health in the Amazon Basin of 
Ecuador: The Popular Epidemiology Process’, Social Science & Medicine 60, no. 4 (1 February 2005): 799–
807, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.06.016. 
57 Raftopoulos, ‘Contemporary Debates on Social-Environmental Conflicts, Extractivism and Human 
Rights in Latin America’; Joanna Morley, ‘“ … Beggars Sitting on a Sack of Gold”: Oil Exploration in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon as Buen Vivir and Sustainable Development’, The International Journal of Human Rights 
21, no. 4 (4 May 2017): 405–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2016.1249140; Linda Farthing and 
Nicole Fabricant, ‘Open Veins Revisited: Charting the Social, Economic, and Political Contours of the 
New Extractivism in Latin America’, Latin American Perspectives 45, no. 5 (1 September 2018): 4–17, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X18785882; Alberto Acosta, ‘Extractivism and Neoextractivism: Two 
Sides of the Same Curse’, in Beyond Development: Alternative Visions from Latin America (Amsterdam: The 
Netherlands: Transnational Institute, 2013), 26, https://www.tni.org/en/publication/beyond-
development; Lisa Laplante and Suzanne Spears, ‘Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community 
Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector’, Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 11, no. 1 (18 
February 2014), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol11/iss1/6; Emma Gilberthorpe and 
Dinah Rajak, ‘The Anthropology of Extraction: Critical Perspectives on the Resource Curse’, The Journal 
of Development Studies 53, no. 2 (1 February 2017): 186–204, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1160064. 
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global commodity prices, have made this area ripe for investigation.58 However, this is 
the first study to comprehensively compare two states’ compliance with international 
law enshrining rights to indigenous consultation and other forms of opportunities for 
indigenous participation in the lithium industry particularly. This is important as the 
industry grows quickly across the Lithium Triangle. Because conflicts between miners 
and indigenous communities can emerge at any time in the life of a mine, an 
understanding of the context and build-up to any resulting grievance or conflict may 
prove helpful for both mitigation and restitution. 
There have been a number of studies focusing on the lithium industries 
developing in Argentina and Bolivia, and in neighbouring Chile. Most have examined 
just one country, focusing on economic issues, potential for conflict or reasons for 
public support. Barros, for example, has focused on impacts on indigenous 
communities’ rights to water and self-determination in the Chilean Atacama Desert in 
respect of both copper and lithium mining. He concludes from this work that  
Latin American states seem now increasingly unwilling to grant the indigenous 
peoples the possibility of effectively vetoing extractive projects, and consider 
that the results of consultation with indigenous peoples is non-binding in legal 
terms.59  
Barros’s study and reflection above are certainly relevant to the thesis that follows. In 
Argentina, both academic and NGO researchers (primarily from FARN – Argentina’s 
Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) have examined lithium mining in Jujuy Province 
with a focus on community benefits and impacts.60 Argento, writing with Zicari, 
concludes that the economic development motive has been effective in sidelining 
 
58 Acosta, ‘Extractivism and Neoextractivism’; Raftopoulos, ‘Contemporary Debates on Social-
Environmental Conflicts, Extractivism and Human Rights in Latin America’. 
59 Alonso Barros, ‘The Fetish Mechanism. A Post-Dogmatic Case Study of the Atacama Desert Peoples 
and the Extractive Industries’, in Handbook of Indigenous Peoples Rights, ed. Corinne Lennox and Damien 
Short (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). p.231 
60 Pia Marchegiani, Elisa Morgera, and Louisa Parks, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Natural Resources in 
Argentina: The Challenges of Impact Assessment, Consent and Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing in 
Cases of Lithium Mining’, BENELEX Working Paper No. 19, January 2019. 
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indigenous community rights in Jujuy.61 Writing with Puente in Fornillo’s volume on 
the developing Argentinean lithium industry, their conclusion is that indigenous identity 
is used strategically by the Salinas Grandes communities, within the framework of 
national and international law pertaining to them, to exert influence over decisions that 
will affect their lives.62 
One Bolivian NGO, CEDLA (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario), 
was able to create a full appraisal of the Bolivian lithium mining project in 2014, and 
the conclusions drawn therein are of central importance here. Revette’s doctoral thesis 
(2016) focuses on the apparent acceptance among local indigenous peasant farmer 
communities of the Bolivian socialist regime’s lithium mining plans, using the concepts 
of the “magical state” and Burawoy’s notion of “manufacturing consent”.63 Bolivian 
economist Sanchez-López focused her doctoral thesis on commodification and 
resource governance in the Salar de Uyuni. The Bolivian situation being particularly 
compelling, due to the scale of the challenge for the country of industrialising lithium, 
and its colonial and neoliberal history of mining and extractivism (which will be 
examined fully in the next chapter), studies have continued to emerge during the 
writing of this thesis. For example, Romero Valenzuela notably used her thesis to focus 
on the “resource curse” and the potential for “green conflict” around the Salar de 
Uyuni in Bolivia as a result of lithium mining.64 
In contrast to the above, this study, with its close focus on indigenous 
environmental rights, is of particular interest because it is able to clearly compare 
 
61 Melisa Argento and Julián Zícari, ‘Las Disputas Por El Litio En La Argentina: ¿Materia Prima, Recurso 
Estratégico O Bien Común?’ 1, no. 19 (2017): 14. 
62 Florencia Puente and Melisa Argento, ‘Conflictos Territoriales y Construcción Identitaria En Los 
Salares Del Noroeste Argentino’, in Geopolítica Del Litio Industria, Ciencia y Energía En Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: El Colectivo, 2015). 
63 Anna Revette, ‘Extractive Dreams: Unearthing Consent, Development, and Lithium in Bolivia.’, 1 
December 2016, https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/files/neu:cj82nr48k. 
64 Janine Romero Valenzuela, ‘Green Cars = Green Conflicts? Governance, Grievances and Conflict 
Dimensions of the Bolivian State Lithium Program’ (Doctoral Thesis, University of Erfurt, 2018). 
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communities’ experiences under two very different regimes, making it distinct from the 
above works. Through the use of original interview data and observations from three 
cases across two countries, triangulated with the above-mentioned studies, conclusions 
can be drawn. These conclusions contribute to a broader understanding of the probable 
socioenvironmental impacts of lithium mining in these regions, and the national and 
international political settings within which indigenous rights can be secured. The wider 
dimensions of the role of lithium in climate change mitigation and questions of 
sustainable development, where there are potentially serious environmental impacts, are 
also highly relevant.65 
1.6.2 The socioenvironmental impacts of lithium mining 
There are two key environmental concerns when mining lithium from brine at scale in 
the Lithium Triangle. The first concern is related to the availability of groundwater. 
One study commissioned by a lithium company examining aquifers in the Chilean 
Atacama suggests a potential lowering of the water table, for example, due to brines 
being drawn for lithium extraction.66 Furthermore, in 2018, a group of scientists wrote 
to Nature over concerns that pollution of limited water sources from lithium mining in 
the Atacama were having knock-on effects on local indigenous communities’ water 
rights.67 The consequences of over-drawing of water for mining in this region can be 
severe communities in this region, as they may have to migrate to where they can find 
water as agriculture becomes unsustainable.68 
 
65 L. Hancock, N. Ralph, and S. H. Ali, ‘Bolivia’s Lithium Frontier: Can Public Private Partnerships 
Deliver a Minerals Boom for Sustainable Development?’, Journal of Cleaner Production 178 (20 March 2018): 
551–60, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.12.264. 
66 David F. Boutt et al., ‘Rapid Recharge of Fresh Water to the Halite-Hosted Brine Aquifer of Salar de 
Atacama, Chile’, Hydrological Processes 30, no. 25 (2016): 4720–40, https://doi.org/10.1002/hyp.10994. 
67 Jorge S. Gutiérrez, Juan G. Navedo, and Andrea Soriano-Redondo, ‘Chilean Atacama Site Imperilled 
by Lithium Mining’, Nature 557 (23 May 2018): 492, https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-05233-7. 
68 Katy Jenkins, ‘Is It All About the Water? Exploring Conflicts between Indigenous Communities and 
the Mining Industry in the Atacama Desert’ (Resource Entanglements: Disparate Narratives on Natural 
Resource Extraction in Latin America, ILAS, Senate House, London, 2016). 
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There is limited independent research on the impacts of lithium mining at scale on 
the environment and communities of the Lithium Triangle. Importantly, my research 
manages to bring the available evidence together, and broadens the question to focus 
on the impacts on the environment and the broader socioenvironmental consequences 
for indigenous communities in these regions, particularly on the level of information 
and participation in decision-making being afforded them. Through interviews and 
observation during fieldwork, and documentary and bibliographic research, I came to 
understand that lithium mining could threaten the supply of fresh water for indigenous 
communities, particularly in a drought-prone region. Furthermore, one extraction 
method being proposed in Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni could contaminate land through 
large amounts of waste product and the additional and cumulative pollution from 
trucks required to remove it. While the research could have focused specifically on 
rights to water, food, health and life, due to time and space restrictions, these are 
included as part of general environmental rights (see Chapter 4). 
1.6.3 Timely research at the early stages of a fast-growing lithium industry 
I was most compelled to undertake this research to provide a substantive contribution 
at an early enough stage that environmental damage, loss or degradation of indigenous 
lands and livelihoods, and the potential for conflict might be limited. International 
indigenous peoples’ human rights law has been developed over the last several decades 
for the very purpose of providing indigenous agency over ancestral lands, environments 
and traditional livelihoods. To effect this, prior informed consultation in these 
communities is crucial. 
All individuals have rights to environmental information and participation, and 
indigenous communities have specific rights to consultation. It follows that a detailed 
assessment of compliance with these rights, and review of the relevant information 
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about potential environmental damage that lithium mining might cause, are significant 
contributions to knowledge about an industry that is only just beginning to grow. If 
lithium is to become as important to the global economy as oil, an understanding of the 
key environmental impacts and the barriers to participation for affected indigenous 
communities is likely to be valuable. 
While the environmental impacts of oil extraction and lithium extraction are not 
necessarily directly comparable, there are wider considerations of sustainable 
development and intercultural fairness to consider. Further, the sheer scale of the 
industrial operations necessary for all the lithium required is likely to be immense. The 
remote and undeveloped regions in which extraction is set to take place are home to 
thousands of indigenous people in hundreds of communities. Their livelihoods and 
cultures are likely to suffer from the resulting impacts on their environment. That this is 
likely to be done in the name of fuelling a low-carbon economy deserves timely and 
careful scrutiny. 
While lithium is only one element in the complex composition of lithium-ion 
batteries, it is clearly essential and used in great quantities. Other parts of a lithium-ion 
battery have also come under human rights scrutiny: cobalt mined by children from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo is also used in lithium-ion batteries that power many 
mobile phones and laptops, for example.69 But there is a sense that lithium is 
particularly interesting because of its capacity to store energy, and energy produced 
from renewable resources, solving an enormous problem for human societies and 
therefore all life on Earth. 
 The research that follows documents the current and potential impacts on the 
 
69 Amnesty International, ‘“This Is What We Die For”: Human Rights Abuses in The Democratic 
Republic of Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt’ (Amnesty International, 19 January 2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=afr62%2f3183%2f2016&language
=en. 
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human rights of native Argentineans and Bolivians to consultation, and the difficulties 
of fair environmental participation in an extractivist setting impacting socially and 
politically disadvantaged communities. It is therefore able to provide some predictions 
of the socioenvironmental costs of the low-carbon energy transition, explored through 
the lens of lithium extraction in the Lithium Triangle. 
1.7 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis locates the legal rights of indigenous communities within their socio-political 
context, to see if rights are being observed in practice. The chapter that follows after 
the three maps (Chapter 2), therefore, examines the socio-political and historical 
contexts within which lithium mining is proposed in the two countries. It focuses on 
the two regimes of governance in place in Argentina and Bolivia and their socio-
political histories, particularly pertaining to mining and indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Included here is background discussion of indigenous conceptions of nature and 
particular vulnerabilities relating to discrimination and environmental degradation.  
Having set out the context to the thesis and the question to be answered, Chapter 
3 details the methodological approach and methods used in the thesis. I first detail the 
process of undertaking preliminary documentary and online research. Then I detail how 
I went about undertaking fieldwork in the high Andean plains of Argentina and Bolivia, 
including ethical considerations. This chapter includes 22 photographs from the 
fieldwork trip. 
The focus of the thesis is on compliance with legal obligations; thus, Chapter 4 
provides an analysis of the international law relevant to the indigenous communities 
living near proposed lithium mining projects in Argentina and Bolivia. The chapter has 
a dual focus: on environmental participation rights more generally, and indigenous 
peoples’ rights to consultation more specifically. 
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Moving from the international legal system to the domestic, Chapter 5 is then the 
first of two chapters based on empirical data gathered during fieldwork interviews and 
observation. This chapter examines Argentinean law and the two sets of communities 
that live around the Salinas Grandes and Olaroz salt flats. It analyses the case of the 33 
Communities of the Salinas Grandes in depth, including their Supreme Court case of 
2012 and Kachi Yupi consultation protocol, which affirms their use of the salt flat for 
salt-gathering.  
Chapter 6 focuses on Bolivia. It analyses recent Bolivian legislation pertaining to 
mining and indigenous peoples’ rights and local attitudes to lithium mining around the 
southwest of the Salar de Uyuni. Here, I set out the potential for severe environmental 
damage from the industrialisation of lithium in the Salar de Uyuni. The socialist 
ambitions of Bolivian government pertaining to the lithium project are also addressed 
in this chapter. 
Having analysed the case studies, Chapter 7 presents the key findings of the study. 
Here, I compare and contrast the data laid out in the country chapters above in the 
form of an analysis that incorporates the concepts presented in Chapters 2 and 4.  
Chapter 8 is the conclusion to this thesis. As well as summarising the key findings, 
it provides recommendations and avenues for future research. It also summarises the 
broader implications of the study for sustainability and indigenous peoples’ rights 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND: THE SOCIAL, 
POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF 
LITHIUM MINING IN ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA 
Introduction 
This chapter provides social, political and historical backgrounds to Argentina and 
Bolivia’s differing approaches to developing their lithium industries. It will focus on the 
relationships between indigenous peoples and governments where mining and 
extraction is proposed or is taking place. The aim of the chapter is to establish the 
commonalities and differences between Argentina and Bolivia, in order that the 
comparison can yield conclusions later in the thesis.  
This chapter has four parts. The first examines the history and development of 
post-independence societies within the two countries, and implications for indigenous 
peoples today. The second examines environmental politics and the extraction and 
industrialisation of natural resources in Argentina and Bolivia and Latin America more 
broadly. The third focuses on indigenous peoples and their relationship with the state 
in Latin America, and the role of international law in securing indigenous peoples’ 
rights. The fourth details the methods used to extract lithium from brine and the two 
countries’ lithium industries so far, with a close focus on the three sites I visited on my 
fieldwork. 
Latin America’s indigenous peoples have been severely affected for five hundred 
years by colonial invasion, the spread of disease, forced labour and ongoing domination 
by settler populations.70 Despite this, the region has a relatively high proportion of 
 
70 Eduardo Galeano and Cedric Belfrage, Open veins of Latin America: five centuries of the pillage of a continent 
(London: Serpent’s Tail, 2009). 
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surviving indigenous peoples. An early definition by Martínez Cobo, the former UN 
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination of 
Minorities, states that indigenous and tribal peoples have “a historical continuity with 
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories”71 and 
“consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on 
those territories”.72 Indigenous peoples make up roughly 10 per cent of the population 
of Latin America as a whole,73 numbering roughly 45 million.74 Some 85 percent live in 
Central America and the central Andes. In Bolivia and Guatemala indigenous people 
constitute over 50 percent of the population75, while in Argentina the figure is just over 
two percent.76 This contrast informs much of the socio-political comparison set out 
below. Argentinean institutions are dominated by non-indigenous Eurodescendents. In 
Bolivia, the election of an anti-colonial socialist government, led by indigenous 
President Evo Morales, has ushered in changes in politics and society. Implications for 
the lithium industry and the securing of indigenous rights are analysed throughout this 
thesis with this distinction in mind. 
2.1 Comparing society and political economy in Argentina 
and Bolivia 
Argentina is a country of around 43.5 million people located in the south and southeast 
of continental South America (see Map 1). At 2.78 million square kilometres, it is the 
largest Spanish-speaking country in the world. Bolivia is a landlocked nation of around 
 
71 This is taken from the first authoritative definition of indigenous peoples, which influenced the 
definition provided in the Convention on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, ILO169 (1989). 
See Samson and Gigoux, Indigenous Peoples and Colonialism. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Rachel Sieder, ed., Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity, and Democracy, Institute of 
Latin American Studies Series (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002). 
74 ECLAC 2014, cited in Samson and Gigoux, Indigenous Peoples and Colonialism. p.36–8  
75 Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America. p.17 
76 INDEC, ‘Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010: Resultados Definitivos: Serie B’, 
n.d., http://www.censo2010.indec.gob.ar/archivos/censo2010_tomo1.pdf. 
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11 million people. While both were established as Spanish colonies in the 1500s, today 
they are very different countries socially, politically and economically. The following 
section presents a brief background history of Argentina and Bolivia relevant to the 
sociopolitics of mining and the relative power of indigenous peoples in each society. 
2.1.1 Brief histories of Argentina and Bolivia 
The Andean region area where this research is focused was a crucial part of the Inca 
Empire, which lasted from the mid-1400s until the arrival of the Spanish in the early 
1500s. In the colonial period the area that became Argentina was part of the 
Viceroyalty of Peru when Spanish explorers came from the capital, Lima, to establish 
communities in what is now Argentina. In 1776, Argentina became part Rio de la Plata 
Viceroyalty, with a collection of adjoining countries now known as Uruguay, Paraguay 
and much of what is now Bolivia (which at the time was known as Upper Peru). The 
country declared independence from Spain in 1819, and a civil war ensued until the 
Constitution of 1853 declared Argentina a republic.77 There were campaigns of 
extermination of indigenous peoples across the country from north to south (especially 
during the “Conquest of the Desert” in Patagonia in the late 1870s) and annexation of 
indigenous lands, diminishing indigenous numbers significantly. According to Sutton, 
this was part of the Argentinean nineteenth-century nationhood project, which was 
geared towards making Argentina more economically powerful, white, and “civilised”.78 
Miller contends that through this, Argentina circumvented the notions of mestizaje 
(miscegenation or mixing of racial groups) common in other parts of Latin America.79  
These racist ideologies influenced the evolution of Argentinean Constitution of 
 
77 Government of Argentina, Argentina (Republic of)'s Constitution of 1853, Reinstated in 1983, with Amendments 
through 1994, translated by Jonathan M. Miller and Fang-Lian Liao (Oxford: OUP), Article 1. 
78 Barbara Sutton, ‘Contesting Racism: Democratic Citizenship, Human Rights, and Antiracist Politics in 
Argentina’, Latin American Perspectives 35, no. 6 (2008): 106–21. 
79 Marilyn Grace Miller, Rise and Fall of the Cosmic Race: The Cult of Mestizaje in Latin America (University of 
Texas Press, 2004), https://muse.jhu.edu/book/3020. 
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1853, which in its Article 25 makes restrictions on immigration illegal for “foreigners 
whose purpose is tilling the soil, improving industries, and introducing and teaching the 
sciences and the arts”.80 Immigration from the Southern European countries was 
encouraged particularly, and as a result, from 1853 to the 1950s, 6.5 million immigrants 
arrived, predominantly from Italy, Germany, Spain and other parts of Europe.81 This 
large wave of European immigration makes Argentina the receiver of the second 
highest number of immigrants of any country anywhere in the world, after the US 
(which received 25 million).82 During this period, the country benefitted from this 
migrant wave through improvements in and moves towards industrial agriculture, and 
high levels of foreign investment compared to other parts of Latin America.  
In modern day Argentina 34 indigenous peoples make up just over two percent of 
the population,83 and they are mainly concentrated in the Andean north and Patagonian 
south. In northern Jujuy Province, 15 percent of households have at least one member 
that identifies as being indigenous or a descendent of an indigenous person. In Chubut 
and Nequén in Patagonia, the figure is 12 percent.84 Indigenous peoples such as the 
Kolla, Atacama and Wichi live across the northern western Salta and Jujuy Provinces of 
Argentina. Jujuy Province, where this study is focused, has the highest percentage of 
households in Argentina where at least one self-identifying indigenous person lives.85 
The provincial capital cities of San Salvador de Jujuy and neighbouring Salta are also 
well-known for having a higher percentage of mestizo86 and indigenous inhabitants in 
 
80 Ibid, Article 25. 
81 Gino Germani, ‘Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina’, Studies in Comparative International 
Development 2, no. 11 (1 November 1966): 165–82, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02800543. 
82 Héctor Hugo Trinchero, ‘The Genocide of Indigenous Peoples in the Formation of the Argentine 
Nation-State’, Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 2 (1 June 2006): 121–35, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520600703008. 
83 INDEC, ‘Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010’. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Mestizo is a term that denotes mixed indigenous–Eurodescendant heritage in Latin America. 
   
 
33 
contrast to the larger Argentinean cities of Central Argentina. I knew from a visit many 
years ago that in Argentina locals pronounced the double “L” in words as a “j” sound, 
meaning Kolla would be pronounced “Koja”, perhaps an approximation of “Quechua”. 
According to the 2010 Argentinean Census, 13,936 people identify as first-generation 
“Atacameño” in Argentina.87 These communities primarily speak Spanish at home, but 
Quechua words are commonly used throughout the region. 
Argentina’s government operates under a federal system, in which the 
responsibility for managing natural resource extraction is devolved to provincial 
authorities. This affects many aspects of governance in the country, including over 
industry, and also provides increased economic motivation for extraction. 
Bolivia is divided by its geography into the Andean west, which includes in its 
north the administrative capital La Paz,88 and the Amazonian lowland east. The 
altiplano89 dominates the west of the country, and is an important geographical–cultural 
region in Bolivian history, society and politics. It is also the long-term home of the two 
most dominant Bolivian indigenous ethnic groups, the Aymara and Quechua-speaking 
indigenous people.90 In Bolivia as a whole, 36 recognised indigenous ethnicities make 
up around half of the population which totals around 11 million people.  There was a 
drop in people self-identifying as indigenous, from 60 to 40 percent, between the 
 
87 INDEC, ‘Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010’. According to the Museo Chileno 
de Arte PreColumbiano (Chilean Museum of Pre-Columbian history) the Atacameños were invaded by 
the Incas in the fifteenth century. The Atacameño indigenous language, kunza, is recently extinct. 
Atacameños only exist in Argentina and Chile, and in Argentina, only in Salta and Jujuy Provinces, and 
Jujuy has far more Atacameño indigenous communities than Salta. See Pueblos originarios de Chile, nd, 
accessed 31 October 2017 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090611024918/http://mod.precolombino.cl/mods/culturas/etno.php?
id=110  
88 La Paz is the world’s highest capital city at 3,640 metres above sea level. 
89 Altiplano means “high plain” in Spanish. 
90 Leonardo Tamburini, ‘Bolivia Censo 2012: Algunas claves para entender la variable indígena’, PUCP | 
RIDEI (blog), 15 October 2013, http://red.pucp.edu.pe/ridei/politica/bolivia-censo-2012-algunas-
claves-para-entender-la-variable-indigena/. 
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censuses of 2001 and 2012.91 According to Fontana, there was talk of “‘statistical 
ethnocide’, referring to the political manipulation of semantic categories to influence 
processes of individual and collective self-identification”.92 There had also been 
significant changes to the Bolivian Census’s question on ethnic self-identification, 
which led to an increase in identification with being a “peasant” rather than native or 
indigenous. The results confirming that Bolivia is no longer majority-indigenous puts 
the dominant category as “mestizaje” (which was excluded as an option from the 
census), which Fontana suggests emphasises  
“the risks implicit in the excesses of indigenism, which would threaten the 
national unity and the principle of inequality (for example through the 
introduction of collective rights to decide on natural resources exploitation)”.93  
However it must be noted here that the collective rights referred to here are already 
present in the 2009 Bolivian Constitution. 
Pre-Spanish Conquest, Bolivian history saw the Aymaran Tiwanaku Empire 
(which was centred around Lake Titicaca near modern-day La Paz in the northwest of 
Bolivia) overtaken in prominence by the Inca Empire in the 1400s. Conquest and 
colonial rule led to a decrease in the indigenous population due to disease and war. 
Post-Conquest there were a number of native rebellions in this region, which produced 
notable indigenous martyr figures still visible in indigenous societies of both countries’ 
Andean regions today.94 For example, in 1782, an Aymaran woman called Bartolina Sisa 
was executed for raising a native revolt, and her name is now used for a national 
indigenous women’s confederation in Bolivia active in Potosí Department. 
 
91 Lorenza Fontana, ‘Why Are Bolivian Indigenous People Statistically Disappearing?’, Siid (blog), 8 
October 2013, http://siid.group.shef.ac.uk/blog/bolivian-indigenous-people-statistically-disappearing/.  
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Tupac Amaru, for example, who was beheaded in Cuzco in 1572, is celebrated in Jujuy’s indigenous 
museums and communities, where images of his face sits alongside that of the revolutionary Ché 
Guevara on murals and flags across indigenous housing projects in Jujuy, Argentina. Helle Abelvik-
Lawson, ‘Field Report from Argentina, on File with Author.’, 2017. 
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Potosí, the capital of Potosí Department where the Salar de Uyuni is located (see 
Map 2), was the Spanish Empire’s greatest source of funding between invasion in 1545 
and Bolivia’s independence in 1825,95 owing to its silver-rich Cerro Rico. One estimate 
suggests that eight million indigenous slaves died in the silver mines.96  
Bolivia experienced a series of wars in the period following independence. The 
most significant of these is the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), in which Bolivia lost its 
entire coastal territory to Chilean invaders.97 Bolivia lost both the valuable natural 
resources of the northern Chilean region, including copper and lithium, and its access 
to the sea, valuable for trading. Economist Collier suggests that landlocked countries 
are more likely to suffer weaker trade and growth and therefore remain poorer than 
those with sea ports through which to trade.98 This is likely to be a factor in Bolivia’s 
poor economic performance historically. Argentina was, by contrast, at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the richest country in the world by per capita income.99 
The nineteenth century saw significant expansion of big European-owned estates 
at the expense of the lands and people of the communities in Bolivia.100 Furthermore, 
from the late 1800s to the early 1900s across the Andean regions of Bolivia, 
Eurodescendent “tin barons” exploited valuable seams of tin in the northern Andean 
region, using the best available mining technology imported from overseas but paying 
the lowest wages to (mainly indigenous) miners.101 This had the effect of entrenching 
 
95 Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”: The Origin of World Trade in 
1571’, Journal of World History 6, no. 2 (1995): 201–21. 
96 Galeano and Belfrage, Open veins of Latin America. 
97 Herbert S. Klein, ‘Bolivia from the War of the Pacific to the Chaco War, 1880–1932’, The Cambridge 
History of Latin America, May 1986, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521245173.017. 
98 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It, 1. 
OUP paperback (Oxford: Univ. Press, 2008). 
99 José Ignacio García Hamilton, ‘Historical Reflections On The Splendor And Decline Of Argentina’, 
Cato Journal 25, no. 3 (2005): 521–40. 
100 Heraclio Bonilla, ‘Peru and Bolivia from Independence to the War of the Pacific’, The Cambridge 
History of Latin America, July 1985, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521232241.015. 
101 Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 5 (Cambridge [England] ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.566–568, p.366–8; Galeano and Belfrage, Open veins of Latin America, 
p.277.  
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social inequality in the extractive sector and delaying Bolivia’s industrialisation 
compared to Argentina. Colonial and post-independence Argentina was far less reliant 
on mining extraction, with beef and leather production for British trading partners 
more prevalent. 
In both Argentina and Bolivia, since independence from Spain in the 1800s, 
government institutions and corporate actors have been dominated by criollo elites, the 
term used to describe “the direct descendants of the Spanish colonial ruling class”.102 In 
North America, Australia and the US, the term “settler” is used to describe the colonial 
ruling class, who retains control of resource governance in the same way since the 
colonial era. Gott states that while the term “settler” is not often used in relation to 
Latin American colonisation, the term “settler colonialism” has relevance to the Latin 
American situation.103 “Settler colonialism”, he suggests, refers “not just to the brief 
period of historical conquest and domination of the indigenous peoples, but to the 
continuing and principal structural characteristic of the former settler state”.104 Both 
countries’ contemporary societies and distribution of land are affected by this historical 
dynamic. However, the settler colonial dynamic is more starkly observable in Argentina, 
with government, legal institutions and the elite classes dominated by Eurodescendents 
to this day.  
2.1.2 Industrialisation and neoliberalism in twentieth-century Argentina and Bolivia  
Argentina’s process of industrialisation started before the 1930s,105 and was boosted by 
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further waves of European immigrants fleeing Nazi rule in Germany. A European class 
structure had developed as a result of these high levels of immigration, with 
concomitant innovation in agriculture, industry and manufacturing. When General Juan 
Domingo Perón was elected in an open poll in 1946, he implemented labour reforms 
that had a powerful impact on the (European) working class, whose numbers were 
growing steadily due to increased industrialisation and urbanisation in the 1930s.106 
Argentina, which had never had a mining economy like Bolivia’s, experienced a period 
of rapid industrialisation between 1935 and 1960, and a decline in its substantial 
agricultural sector.107 This was spurred on by a policy of import-substitution 
industrialisation, which boosted the country’s manufacturing, particularly in heavy 
industry and the automotive industry. The country eventually became an exporting 
nation.108 
Industrialisation did not occur in Bolivia in this way. While the establishment of 
railways in the Andean regions of Bolivia around the Salar de Uyuni enabled the 
Bolivian tin mining sector to thrive well into the twentieth-century, with modernising 
effects on the altiplano population,109 the region remains relatively poor compared to 
other parts of the nation and continent. Following a colonial history predicated on 
mining, Bolivia has remained a primary commodity exporter to this day, without even a 
single smelter in the country until 1976, according to Galeano.110 Furthermore, the 
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country still imports basic manufactured items such as nails.111 
The Bolivian National Revolution of 1952 is a significant event in Bolivian and 
Latin American twentieth-century history. The leaders of the revolution, the Movimiento 
Nacional Revolucionário (MNR), nationalised the country’s largest tin mines, introduced 
universal suffrage and implemented substantive land reforms. These reforms had the 
biggest impact on rural (mostly indigenous) Bolivians. The revolution spurred the 
creation of the native Bolivian identity of native-indigenous campesinos.112 Even prior to 
the revolution, indigenous communities had retained title to around a quarter of the 
country’s cultivated land and had a significant degree of influence over the use of 
more,113 indicating a greater indigenous influence on Bolivian society than in Argentina. 
This influence is still observable in Bolivian society, with native-indigenous rural union 
federations hugely influential in contemporary Bolivian politics.  
Both Argentina and Bolivia suffered numerous coups and military dictatorships 
across the latter half of the twentieth centuries. Violent dictatorship scarred 
Argentinean society between 1976–1983, leaving a legacy of human rights abuses, 
including the “disappearing” of thousands of people.114 In a reconciliation process, as 
of 2016, a thousand of the dictatorship’s killers and torturers had been tried and 700 
sentenced.115 Bolivia too experienced dictatorships, from the 1960s to the 1980s. As in 
other parts of South America, the US supported, funded, supplied and trained political 
and military operatives within these regimes, leaving a legacy of violence, corruption 
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and a growing economic dependence on Washington.116 
Argentina has experienced serious economic problems over recent decades. In 
2001, a severe economic crisis culminated in street riots when citizens were unable to 
access money from the banks following the IMF withdrawing debt financing. This 
financial crisis has its roots in the 1980s, which saw Washington and international 
financial institutions across Latin America implement neoliberal economic policies 
across the continent’s political economies.117 
Neoliberalism is the term used for a governance strategy that favours free-market 
capitalism, deregulation, privatisation and reduced government interference in the 
economy. 118 Neoliberal economic governance has been prevalent around the world 
since the 1980s, but has a particular heritage in Latin America: Chilean economists 
attending the Chicago School in the US brought back the model to test its use within 
their economy, assisted by the US, who supported the implementation of neoliberal 
policy prescriptions.119 This has resulted in neoliberalism being hugely influential on 
subsequent governments in numerous South American countries, including both 
Argentina and Bolivia, particularly in the last decade of the twentieth century.  
The 1990s saw widespread deregulation and privatisation across Latin America, 
with massive foreign investment into extraction of minerals in “mining states” such as 
Bolivia, and severe structural adjustment programmes leading to multiple subsequent 
economic crises in Argentina. The large-scale extraction and export of minerals and 
agricultural products undoubtedly had impacts on state governance over the extractive 
industries and economy. The subsequent commodity booms of the early 2000s,120 with 
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high prices leading to substantial trade surpluses, were instrumental in driving support 
for the election of the explicitly anti-neoliberal, pro-extraction Morales Government in 
Bolivia in 2005, for example. 
Neoliberal trade and investment policies have enabled governments to sell the 
rights to exploit their nation’s natural resources to foreign companies.121 Allowing such 
“foreign direct investment” supposedly increases government revenues from taxes on 
foreign mining profits,122 generates economic activity and enables economic growth and 
subsequent “development” of the economy. However, this is not always the case. 
Auty’s concept of the “resource curse” describes a phenomenon whereby the reverse is 
true. Nations rich in natural resources often find their economies in decline due to a 
failure to diversify away from extraction through investment in education and training 
in other sectors, for example.123 This has been experienced by oil-producing developing 
nations such as Nigeria and Venezuela. Bolivia has also historically struggled with the 
resource curse; it was one of the countries analysed by Auty when developing his 
theory.124 As well as the problem of the resource curse, extraction causes severe damage 
to the natural environment and consequently the livelihoods and cultures of those who 
depend on it. Notably, countries with strong institutions (and no colonial history) like 
Norway, have managed to avoid the resource curse.125 
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2.1.3 Contemporary political economy in Argentina and Bolivia  
In November 2015, Argentina elected the government of multimillionaire Mauricio 
Macri in a narrow victory. Replacing the progressive neo-Peronist governments of 
Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of the 1990s and 2000s, the election of 
Macri was one of two definitive signs (with the 2015 political coup that saw Dilma 
Rousseff replaced by right-wing Michel Temer in Brazil) that the so-called “pink tide” 
in Latin America of the previous decade was turning.126 The pink tide saw left-wing 
governments elected across Latin America in the early 2000s, including in Ecuador and 
Bolivia,127 whose progressive governments also appeared to be more explicitly eco-
socialist and keen to implement pro-indigenous policies. 
Neoliberalism is operationally most effective in states with allegiances between 
right-leaning governments dedicated to participating in globalised free trade and the 
companies willing to profit from the privatisation of national assets such as natural 
resources. Global financial and business elites propagate the model through their active 
participation in national governments. There are many examples of this dynamic across 
the world, and in South American right-wing regimes it is particularly common. Macri’s 
government, for example, comprises contemporary Argentinean landowning and other 
global business elites, including former executives of General Motors, Latam Airlines, 
HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Coca-Cola, and Shell.128 However, Macri’s presidency was 
tested in 2018, when Argentina had to return to the IMF for a USD$57 billion bailout, 
the biggest loan in IMF history, following a 50 percent devaluation of its currency.129 
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Amid this, to encourage much-needed foreign investment, Macri attended the G20 
summit to push investment into Argentina’s two key extractive sectors: lithium mining 
and hydraulic fracturing for natural gas.130 
Bolivia has been governed by the socialist MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) Party led 
by Evo Morales Ayma, since 2006.131 Morales was elected to the presidency in 
December 2005 following widespread political unrest relating to corporate and national 
water, mining and gas extraction contracts. In 2000, indigenous and mestizo peasants 
protested against the privatisation of water supplies in Cochabamba, which led to local 
streams being gated and high fees for access being charged, in what came to be called 
the “Water War”.132 Following this in 2003–2005, protestors in the capital La Paz and 
neighbouring El Alto fought against the neoliberal government in “Gas Wars”, which 
led to demands for the nationalisation of the country’s significant gas reserves found in 
the Eastern Amazonian regions.133 These were triggered by a national debate over plans 
to export gas to the US via Chilean ports, with limited profits remaining in the country, 
perpetuating the mode of extraction in the colonial era. 
Morales announced at his Aymaran presidential inauguration ceremony at the pre-
Columbian archaeological site Tiwanaku: “With the unity of the people, we’re going to 
end the colonial state and the neoliberal model,” which Kozloff describes as “an 
emotional moment for the Bolivian people”.134 The Bolivian socialist government has 
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since succeeded in creating a welfare state, offering payments of pensions to citizens 
and lifting many out of poverty by providing social welfare, electricity, telecoms, 
internet and reliable water supplies to Bolivians who had no access to such services 
before. This is markedly contrasted with the growth of extreme poverty under the 
previous neoliberal governments, which had risen from under two-thirds of the 
population in 1997 to over three-quarters by 2002.135 Under Morales, the poverty rate 
dropped from 59.9 percent in 2006 to 36.4 percent in 2017,136 positively impacting 
Bolivia’s extremely poor indigenous majority.137 
Furthermore, the government has included many native–indigenous officials in its 
ranks and has sought to redress inequalities in other parts of Bolivian society through 
an explicitly socialist economic programme.138 Morales is therefore established as a 
revolutionary leader who has shifted the balance of power in Bolivia away from 
Eurodescendent elites, overseen economic growth of the country through gas exports, 
and enabled that growth to benefit Bolivian society through the socialist redistribution 
of revenues. However, as shown above, the Bolivian economy has for centuries relied 
heavily on natural resources for its economy, and continues to do so today. Therefore, 
putting an “end to the neoliberal model” would likely still require the extraction of 
natural resources, which is likely to continue to affect the country’s numerous 
indigenous peoples. 
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2.2 Environmental politics in Latin America 
The following section analyses environmental politics in contemporary Latin America, 
focusing on natural resource extraction and the state. It examines policies of 
“extractivism” in Argentina and Bolivia, building on the above analysis of each 
country’s political economy and the role of natural resources. It then analyses the 
indigenous notion of “buen vivir” or “vivir bien” (translated as “good living” in English). 
This is an ecological, communitarian cosmovision that has been promoted by 
progressive Bolivian and Ecuadorean governments in recent years. 
2.2.1 Extractivism and neo-extractivism in Argentina and Bolivia 
The modern nation-state is the primary subject of international law and has sovereignty 
over the natural resources contained within its borders. Blanco and Razzaque write that 
“natural resources constitute in most cases the bulk of a country's wealth and their 
exploitation, management and distribution of benefits is closely interlinked with the 
politics of each country and with the groups in power in each society.”139 Governments 
usually seek to exploit such resources, often allowing foreign specialist firms to manage 
exploitation through the agreement of mining or agribusiness contracts, to enable 
economic growth and thus “development” to take place. This model is known as 
“extractivism”, and it is particularly prevalent in resource-rich Latin America.140  
As Acosta asserts, “[e]xtractivism is a mode of accumulation that started to be 
established on a massive scale 500 years ago. The world economy – the capitalist 
system – began to be structured with the conquest and colonisation of the Americas, 
Africa and Asia”.141 As such, extractivism is clearly relevant to Bolivia’s colonial 
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experience. Andreucci and Radhuber provide a useful definition of extractivism as “a 
type of natural resource extraction which (a) is large scale and/or very intensive; (b) is 
oriented primarily towards export, and (c) entails little or no industrial processing,”142 
characteristics which are all relevant to Argentina and Bolivia’s approaches to lithium 
mining. 
In many Latin American nations, the dynamics of extractivism are central to 
internal and external manifestations of state power. This not a new dynamic, and is 
closely related to a continuation of colonial modes of extraction which continue to play 
out in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Ecuador, whose governments 
approve extraction in remote regions through a form of “internal colonialism”.143 This 
propagates the notion of regional differentials in state policy, whereby extractive areas 
become what Svampa calls “areas of sacrifice” considered “empty” by the central 
government powers.144 This can also have impacts internally on the way territory is 
viewed within extractivist countries, closely related to a perception of a right to 
development and progress based on revenues derived from extraction.   
Jessop suggests that state structures “offer unequal chances to different forces 
within and outside that state to act for different political purposes”.145 While these 
chances are varied and dependent on geographical and historical–temporal contexts, 
the state has leverage over its own political and economic strategies (some more 
privileged that others) that result in the exercise of state power. Jessop calls this 
dynamic the “strategic-relational approach”, and modified Marx’s view of capital as a 
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social relation rather than a thing. 
Much state power in Latin America is arguably articulated by their extractive 
agenda, which determines their external trading power and international relations, and 
internal political strategies to maintain social and economic cohesion through the 
provision of work and services. Internally, incoming mining companies creating 
enclaves in those “sacrifice areas” in regions remote from provincial or federal 
government, “ generate new power dynamics where, as investments increase, conflicts 
increase and institutionality develops late and badly”, according to Durand.146 Using the 
Peruvian experience of becoming explicitly a “Mining State”, Durand also contends 
that mining enclaves serve to project global corporate power at the national and 
regional/local levels, with developing social power in national local levels owing to the 
political and social functions performed at each level. 
Although not historically a mining nation, Argentina has recently promoted 
extractivism. In the last three decades it has increased agribusiness operations, 
particularly in soybean production, a key supplier of grain to the global beef industry.147 
These operations have had severe negative effects on the traditional territories of Wichi 
communities in the Argentinean Gran Chaco, located in eastern Salta Province.148 
Furthermore, over the last five years the process of hydraulic fracturing for gas, known 
as “fracking” has been taking place across the Vaca Muerta reserve in the central 
western region of Neuquén.149 In 2017, a report presented to the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) highlighted the adverse economic, 
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social, and cultural rights impacts of fossil fuel extraction at Vaca Muerta on local 
residents and indigenous Mapuche communities.150 Fracking has been causing problems 
for Mapuche indigenous communities, for example, whose livestock have been dying 
from drinking contaminated water.151 These projects demonstrate the Argentinean 
state’s extractive political economy and its impacts on indigenous communities. 
As discussed above, Bolivia has had a much longer history of colonial extractivism, 
and continues to rely heavily on extractivism today. However, extraction in Bolivia 
under the Morales government has for the most part been nationalised, in order that 
revenues can provide for the people within a socialist system. The term 
“neoextractivism” has emerged to describe the same processes of extraction, but in 
states governed by more progressive or left-leaning governments, where extractive 
profits are managed directly by the state.152  
Gudnyas suggests that extraction still persists as a cornerstone of development 
policy in the progressive countries of Latin America, like Bolivia, and that maintaining 
involvement in the international market perpetuates a subordinate position without 
substantive changes to the structure of accumulation.153 Veltmeyer and Petras hold that 
there is a “coincidence of economic interests between the state and capital (resource 
rents for governments, capital for companies)”.154 They hold that, even in the case of 
those governments “oriented towards a policy of anti-imperialist capital”, like Bolivia, if 
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there is “any conflict between the company and the communities directly affected by 
the operations of extractive capital”, the state will “tend to side with capital against the 
communities”.155  
Harvey argues that governments use their operative power to side with capital, and 
their “monopoly on violence and definitions of legality”, to facilitate accumulation by 
dispossession.156 This is observed in Bolivia by Eichler through the criminalisation of 
social protests over mining,157 and by Raftopoulos who notes that, again in Bolivia, 
“government officials now have the power to dissolve any non-governmental 
organisations without using any due judicial process”.158 Raftopoulos further finds that 
the criminalisation of environmental protests and use of the law to silence dissent 
against extraction are highly prevalent across the region.159 These are clear breaches of 
civil and political rights, which have a bearing on procedural rights to environmental 
participation, on which I will elaborate further in Chapter 4. 
2.2.2 Industrialisation of lithium in non-industrial Bolivia  
Since assuming power, the Morales government has been clear on its plans to 
“industrialise” its vast lithium reserves found in the brines under the Salar de Uyuni. 
This means not simply extracting lithium for export but processing extracted lithium 
within the country, manufacturing batteries and eventually even electric cars.160 This is 
certainly an ambitious project, according to Hollender and Shultz, for a country that 
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imports the most basic manufactured goods.161 Nonetheless, successive Bolivian 5-year 
Economic and Social Development Plans emphasise the government’s policy of 
“industrialisation” of Bolivia’s natural resources.162 That policy is found in the 2009 
Constitution, which highlights the need for: 
The industrialisation of natural resources to overcome dependence on the 
export of raw materials and to achieve an economy with a productive base, 
within the framework of sustainable development in harmony with nature. 163 
This clause shows very clearly the intention of the government, which oversaw the 
Constituent Assembly of 2007–2009 and the creation of the country’s radical, 
decolonising 2009 Constitution, to move beyond a dependence on raw materials.  
Following the colonial and post-independence history outlined above, Blanco and 
Razzaque state that countries like Bolivia, 
[h]aving become independent from the colonial powers found themselves in an 
unequal system of sovereign states with rules already drafted and devised to 
satisfy the interest of the old powers. Today they are looking at rapid 
industrialisation and economic development as an answer to their many internal 
poverty and underdevelopment related problems.164 
This is certainly an accurate description of the Bolivian situation, evidenced by 
subsequent policies of the Morales government that aim to keep profits from the 
extraction of natural resources in the country in order to achieve rapid economic 
development. In the case of Bolivia, this economic development is provided through a 
socialist redistribution of revenues. 
At the end of this chapter the developing lithium industries of Argentina and 
Bolivia are examined in more detail. However, it is worth here establishing the 
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difference between Argentina and Bolivia in respect of their lithium industrialisation 
plans. Firstly, Bolivia is widely assumed to have more lithium than anywhere in the 
world. This caused a flurry of international attention in the late 2000s, when newly-
elected socialist President Evo Morales was courted by international delegations of 
governments and mining firms from countries across the globe including France, Iran, 
Brazil and South Korea.165 Foreign government delegations and their national 
automobile industry partners visited the Salar de Uyuni, bolstering Bolivia’s new 
reputation as the “Saudi Arabia of lithium” in the international media.166 While all 
sought a piece of Bolivia’s valuable lithium deposits, beyond a couple of memoranda of 
understanding, the delegations left without any significant deals. Bolivia had considered 
applications for foreign involvement carefully however: one bid from a French 
company was rejected because it ignored the industrialisation aspect of Bolivia’s lithium 
plans, and they had to resubmit.167 
To achieve a further stage on the chain of industrialisation, Bolivia commissioned 
and purchased a battery cathode factory on a “turnkey” (ready for use) basis from a 
Chinese firm. This factory was completed in 2017,168 even before the state mining 
company had begun producing lithium from the Salar de Uyuni. This does however 
signal Chinese interest and involvement in Bolivian lithium.169 Significant Chinese 
involvement in natural resource extraction in Latin America and Africa has led some 
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researchers to describe Chinese influence as the “Beijing Consensus”, echoing the 
neoliberal conception of the “Washington Consensus”.170 
Meanwhile, Argentina has similar goals to manufacture batteries but has been 
slower in implementing them. Its government research agency, CONICET, has 
nonetheless performed research and development into participating in more aspects of 
the lithium-ion battery supply chain.171 However, according to Barandiarán, the Chilean 
and Argentinean governments see lithium as of relative little interest to their 
economies, principally for Chile because one year of lithium sales generates as much 
revenue as copper in one month.172 Although interest in Argentina is growing as 
explained above, what is clear is that Bolivia is more committed than any other of the 
Lithium Triangle states to industrialising lithium, principally for the purposes of 
redistribution under the socialist regime.173  
2.2.3 The Andean indigenous cosmovision of “good living”  
Since the mid-2000s, Bolivian and Ecuadorean governments have been at the centre of 
an international movement espousing the inherent rights of nature and indigenous 
environmentalism encapsulated by the phrase buen vivir in Ecuador and vivir bien in 
Bolivia, both of which translate roughly to “good living” or “living well”. Alcoreza 
writes that since the late 1990s, “indigenous groups have been looking at the etymology 
of the words ‘development’ and ‘progress’ in order to translate them as accurately as 
possible into their native languages”.174 They did so in order to  
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seek to understand the incompatibility of the two different world views: on the 
one hand, policies described as ‘development’ by the state and the international 
aid community, which have had a negative impact; and on the other, the 
indigenous ‘cosmovision’ of co-existence with nature as a new view of 
development.175 
The resulting indigenous language translations, such as the Aymará suma qumaña and 
Quechua sumak kawsay, states Alcoreza, had in common the concept of an “ideal 
life”.176 This was one in which “[m]en and women, together with nature, are part of 
Mother Earth and there is a communion and dialogue between them mediated by 
rituals in which Nature is understood as a sacred being.”177 
Incorporated into Ecuador and Bolivia’s 2008 and 2009 Constitutions, buen 
vivir/vivir bien is understood as an indigenous conceptual paradigm that promotes 
communitarian living in harmony with nature. In Bolivia vivir bien is also found in the 
2012 Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well,  178 
which developed a 2010 Law on the Rights of Mother Earth.179 Buen vivir is also 
prominent in the Ecuadorean Constitution, which also recognises the inherent rights of 
nature,180 a step not taken in the Bolivian Constitution. 
Following the inclusion of this concept in the 2009 Constitution, Bolivia 
reaffirmed its place on the international stage as a pro-indigenous, eco-socialist state in 
April 2012, when the World People’s Conference on Climate Change was held in the 
central Bolivian city of Cochabamba. The outcome of this meeting, designed as a 
“people’s summit” to set the indigenous and environmentalist agenda ahead of the 
Rio+20 Conference on sustainable development a couple of months later, was a 
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Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth.181  
In the years since however, the Bolivian government has become increasingly 
concerned with securing state control over mining projects, most notably through the 
2014 Mining and Metallurgy Law, which (along with another law) criminalises dissent 
against mining.182 The contrast of the outward-facing environmentalism of the early 
years with the internal repression of dissent against extraction more recently, is notable. 
Despite the rhetoric around vivir bien of the earlier period, enshrined in the 2009 
Constitution and law, the Morales government is heavily focused on mining 
extractivism as a way to effect both industrialisation and, subsequently, further 
redistribution. As Coletta and Raftopoulos contend: 
Tensions between Bolivia’s decolonial project and the current extractive model 
of development have become increasingly evident and have brought to the 
forefront critical concerns over the environment and indigenous rights as 
economic growth has been prioritised over alternative environmentalism and 
sustainability.183 
It is against this backdrop that the Bolivian state lithium industry’s relationship with 
local indigenous communities is examined in the following chapters.  
In Ecuador the buen vivir approach is also failing to live up to effective 
operationalisation, where it “has been enacted in the new constitution and laws but 
where old development practices still continue”.184 Nonetheless, the concept of buen 
vivir seeks to challenge the dominant Western concepts of “development” and 
“sustainable development” prevailing in international institutions such as the UN and 
World Bank, by proposing an indigenous alternative that considers the environment 
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and indigenous communities holistically.185  
The integration of these concepts into law and policy has been welcomed, 
particularly, by commentators exploring the negative environmental impacts of 
extraction on indigenous peoples. However, as explained above, Bolivia’s socialist 
government, despite being run by an indigenous leader who has promised an anti-
colonial, post-neoliberal form of development, has become committed to 
industrialisation of lithium, for the purposes of building a strong, redistributive socialist 
economy with industry and manufacturing at its core. 
2.3 Indigenous peoples in Argentina and Bolivia  
This section analyses the relationships between indigenous peoples and the state in 
Argentina and Bolivia. It also highlights the role of international law in securing rights 
for indigenous peoples in Latin America. A final part examines the unique situation of 
some indigenous actors in Bolivia, who are part of politically powerful groups. 
2.3.1 Indigenous peoples and the state in Argentina and Bolivia   
Indigenous peoples in Argentina suffer discrimination on account of being excluded 
from numerous institutions of the state, including the judiciary and organs of 
government. There are also serious issues in Argentina over the realisation of 
indigenous peoples’ rights to land, and land evictions are commonplace. In 2013, 
Amnesty International made the link between extractive and agribusiness industries and 
barriers to securing indigenous land rights in Argentina.186 Furthermore, state actors are 
known to use repression against indigenous communities, for example shooting at 
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protestors resisting plans to build on their ancestral land.187 Violence against indigenous 
people is slow to be investigated,188 and activists who call out failings in compliance 
with indigenous land rights law have been criminalised.189  
The repression extends to non-indigenous activists who campaign on behalf of 
indigenous communities. In August 2017, the disappearance and death of 28-year-old 
(non-indigenous) activist Santiago Maldonado, acting in solidarity with a Mapuche 
community who had just faced a violent raid by the Argentine National Gendarmerie, 
led to widespread protests in Argentina and a call by Amnesty International to 
investigate.190 Despite some progress in the same year with national “spaces for 
intercultural dialogue” opening up, documents emerged reflecting the portrayal by the 
state of indigenous Mapuche as violent terrorists.191  
There is also a background of state repression of indigenous organisations in 
Argentina’s Jujuy Province, the focus of this study. In 2017, Amnesty International and 
the UN condemned the arbitrary arrest and the imprisonment without trial of jujeño 
indigenous leader Milagro Sala for over a year, on unfounded allegations of corruption 
in a local housing scheme. In early 2019 Sala had been acquitted of ordering an 
assassination, and sentenced to 13 years for corruption, against which she is 
appealing.192 
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While repression of specifically indigenous peoples is not as pronounced in 
modern-day Bolivia, socioenvironmental conflict involving indigenous peoples has 
been ongoing. As indicated above, historical and political events have contributed to 
increased land and resource rights for indigenous Bolivians, such as the 1954 
revolution,193 the more recent agrarian reform laws in the mid-1990s,194 and mining 
rights granted to indigenous cooperatives to exploit mines.195 These reforms 
precipitated the creation of “native–indigenous–peasant” unions in Bolivia. These 
unions are formed from traditional indigenous communitarian land governance models 
called ayllus, comprising communities arranged on a parcel of land. Ayllus have been 
losing power since the 1952 revolution, replaced by these local syndicates that are much 
more politically organised, and have come to have relatively powerful political roles in 
contemporary Bolivia, particularly following the election of the MAS government.  
Subsequent to taking office, the MAS government initially worked closely with 
Andean highland indigenous confederation the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del 
Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) and the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB). 
Along with the MAS-aligned Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de 
Bolivia (CSUTCB), a “Pact of Unity” had been established in 2002 to demand a new 
Constitution,196 and continued during the Constituent Assembly that resulted in the 
2009 Constitution.  
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However, MAS government plans to open up the Território Indígena y Parque 
Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS) in the lowlands to a road-building plan caused 
significant ruptures in indigenous peasant unity in 2011. The TIPNIS conflict saw 
CONAMAQ and CIDOB join together to resist the government’s highway project. 
Acting in solidarity with the Tsimané, Yuracaré, and Mojeño-Trinitario indigenous 
communities living within the park, CONAMAQ and CIDOB organised a national 
march in August 2011 from the region to La Paz, which was violently repressed by 
government forces.197 The march itself split the “Pact of Unity” between the two 
confederations, CONAMAQ and CIDOB and three other prominent native–
indigenous–peasant organisations, which included the CSUTCB.  
The split saw the native–indigenous–peasant organisations break into what Albó 
calls the twins, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, who kept independence from the state, 
becoming the main actors during the TIPNIS march, and the triplets, CSUTCB, and 
two other groups known as the CSCIB and CNMCIOB-BS or Bartolina Sisa, who 
continued in close alliance with the ruling party.198 The CSUTCB is relevant to this 
research as the parent confederation of a peasant group active in the early Bolivian 
lithium project. 
With 36 indigenous ethnicities and roughly half of the population self-identifying 
as indigenous depending on which census one consults, it is clear that Bolivia’s 
indigenous peoples’ relationships with the state defy simplification. What is important 
here is the relationship between indigenous political organisations and the MAS 
government. Understanding that the CSUTCB peasant union is a key ally of the 
government is helpful for the analysis in Chapter 6 of local indigenous community 
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participation in Bolivian lithium industry. This confederation is active in the regions 
around the Salar de Uyuni through its regional arm, the Federación Regional Única de 
Trabajadores y Campesinos del Altiplano Sur (FRUTCAS),199 a federation comprising local 
organic quinoa farmers. It is also a key early player in Bolivia’s state lithium project. 
2.3.2 The role of international law in securing indigenous peoples’ rights 
Indigenous people are the subject of international and national constitutional laws that 
protect individual rights. However, they are also subject to international and national 
laws that protect indigenous collective rights to, for example, land, water, their own 
culture, and to determine the methods of their own development.200 Indigenous peoples 
are also often most affected by environmental changes, on account of their close 
relationship to nature for subsistence and maintaining their culture.201 
The most prominent of the laws protecting indigenous rights to consultation on 
such development projects is the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 
169 (1989), a binding international law to which all states of the Lithium Triangle are 
party. The precise rights held by indigenous peoples under ILO169 are detailed in full 
in Chapter 4. The legal chapter also examines in detail the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted in its entirety into Bolivian law in 
the days after it was agreed by the UN General Assembly. While there is controversy 
over the exact obligations bestowed upon states who voted in the UN to adopt this 
non-binding declaration, as it now forms part of Bolivian law, its provisions must be 
implemented in Bolivia.  
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The existence of the ILO Convention 169 (ILO169) and UNDRIP enables 
national and transnational advocacy networks to put pressure on state governments to 
respect the rights of indigenous peoples who may not otherwise garner support and 
assistance. Keck and Sikkink highlight the potential for such transnational networks to 
create what they call a “boomerang pattern”, whereby an international network can 
persuade a state to respect human rights, which is helpful if the communities are unable 
to by themselves.202 For indigenous peoples, UN human rights agencies and 
investigators, and particularly the UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples, 
through high-level reports and country visits, can form part of this transnational 
network. International or bilateral non-governmental organisations (NGOs) often play 
a substantive role in bringing these issues to the attention of these UN bodies. 
There are other international initiatives examining the impacts of extractive 
industries, which often impact the human rights of indigenous peoples. This is known 
as the “business and human rights” framework at the UN, and includes non-binding 
agreements such as the early UN Global Compact (2000)203 and the Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (2011). The latter document seeks to definitively 
outline companies’ duties to respect, protect and remedy the negative human rights 
impacts of their operations as well as states’ duties to ensure the realisation of human 
rights by regulating industry. Companies tend to avoid the language of human rights, 
however, preferring to invest in “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) schemes, which 
offer financial compensation, for example, instead of the informed participation of 
communities. CSR projects pre-date the shift in focus to company-based human rights 
obligations, and often do not adequately address the substantive needs of communities, 
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compounding the lack of community agency on their territories and wasting valuable 
funds.204 As Laplante and Spears point out: “Poor communities are interested in 
economic benefits from extractive industry projects, but, more importantly, desire ‘to 
receive visible, tangible forms of recognition from the mining company’.”205 For 
indigenous communities, this would likely include a recognition of their inextricable 
link to their environments, which are often deeply embedded in their cultural practices 
and traditional livelihoods, practised over centuries across the same geographical 
regions. 
In Bolivia, the extractive industries are increasingly under national control, and 
indigenous peoples’ rights are deeply embedded in the constitution and numerous new 
pieces of legislation, marking some form of success for the international indigenous 
rights movement. However, actual compliance with these rights may be compromised 
by policies to continue extraction (with a view to rapid industrialisation). In Argentina, 
where indigenous communities are marginalised by the state, there is a higher likelihood 
of transnational advocacy networks working for indigenous communities in securing 
their rights, particularly where international visibility is brought to a case such as in the 
example of Milagro Sala in Jujuy outlined above.  
What is clear is that international indigenous peoples’ human rights law provides a 
workable framework within which to document compliance of a developing extractive 
industry. This is particularly interesting to observe in the case of Bolivia, led by an 
indigenous president who has adopted UNDRIP into national law, and who promotes 
extractive development in harmony with nature, for the socialist redistribution of 
revenues across a predominantly poor indigenous population. 
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2.3.3 Bolivia and “speaking like an indigenous state” 
While Morales “has surfaced as an international superstar for the climate justice 
movement” according to Fabricant,206 the use of vivir bien for Bolivia serves more as a 
mechanism that Zimmerer describes as “speaking like an indigenous state”.207 
Zimmerer conceives of this as “indigenous identity-making amid multicultural 
neoliberalism” by building on Scott’s influential idea of “seeing like a state”,208 which he 
summarises as “the dependency of modern state power on the manipulation, 
standardisation, simplification and metaphorical use of visual messaging”.209 In a similar 
vein, Revette attributes Morales’ promotion of large “magical state” projects, such as 
the Teleférico in La Paz – the Swiss-built cable car public transport system that has 
transformed the lives of even the poorest Bolivians by making traversing the mountain 
city incredibly cheap and easy – as the key to widespread support of large industrial 
projects such as lithium mining in Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni.210  
Canessa noted in 2006 following the election of Morales, that “Morales’s 
indigeneity here is a strategic position against which to challenge global capitalism”,211 
giving an early indication of the complex heterogeneity of Bolivian indigenous identity, 
projected differently internally and on the international stage. He elaborates that “Evo 
Morales’s origins are as indigenous as any highland person can claim and his coca-
grower base is overwhelmingly constituted by Quechua and Aymará-speaking peasants, 
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[who are] migrants from the highlands”, yet questions whether Morales is an 
“indigenous leader” just because he is a leader who also happens to be indigenous.212 
Zimmerer’s “indigenous statecraft” and Canessa’s “indigeneity as a strategic 
position” operate conceptually within Bolivian ethnic and political groupings as well as 
on the international stage, serving to blur the lines between Bolivian indigenous 
identities. These divisions are then exploited to advance large projects that go decidedly 
against the concepts of vivir bien and Mother Earth. For example, according to 
Zimmerer, “to Aymará and Quechua peoples supporting the government of Morales 
and MAS the concepts [of vivir bien and Mother Earth] echo their own national political 
power”.213 This is not experienced in the same way by the lowland indigenous 
communities, for example those resisting plans for a highway through TIPNIS. The 
conflict created ruptures within Bolivian society and indigenous identity, disrupting the 
idea of indigenous homogeneity as described above. It also failed to stop the project, 
although the protests did secure a law requiring prior consultation specifically for the 
communities set to be affected by the highway.214 
Lalander links Morales and the TIPNIS conflict directly to prior consultation for 
affected communities, stating that: 
Regarding the right of the affected population to prior, free and informed 
consultation, heavily debated throughout the TIPNIS conflicts, Morales has 
repeatedly expressed that he considers this procedure to be a waste of time and 
money, but that this right of the peoples should be respected.215 
This is an important insight into contemporary Bolivian law and practice over natural 
resource extraction and infrastructure development, and is potentially relevant to 
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Bolivian lithium mining. 
This section has examined the different ways in which indigenous peoples and the 
state interact in Argentina and Bolivia. The socio-political background analysed here 
will aid an analysis of the relevant law in Chapter 4 and provide context for the 
empirical data gathered during the fieldwork in Chapter 5 (Argentina) and Chapter 6 
(Bolivia). It will also aid the analysis of the comparison between the two countries’ 
approaches to developing lithium mining in Chapter 7 (Discussion). 
2.4 Lithium mining in Argentina and Bolivia  
This final section details the technical aspects of lithium mining from brine and 
potential environmental impacts. It will then describe the two countries’ lithium 
industries in turn. The case of Argentina, which has numerous salt flats and foreign 
lithium firms mining across its northern regions, is very different to the single state-
owned pilot project on the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia developed since the mid-2000s. 
This is partly because of the unusual salt-lake terrains where lithium is found. 
2.4.1 Lithium extraction from brine under salt flats 
In a number of mountain plain regions of the world there are naturally-occurring dried-
out salt lakes with a thick top crust called salt flats. Dissolved in the natural-occurring 
brines that are found under the salt flat crusts are metals and minerals, including 
magnesium, potassium, borate, iodine and lithium. The lithium compounds required 
for batteries are lithium carbonate and lithium hydroxide. In order to extract these 
usable lithium compounds for batteries, they need to be separated from the other 
components of the brine salts through a process of evaporation. This is particularly 
economical and efficient in the dry Andean plateau, which has high solar radiation and 
wind vectors. 
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First, millions of litres of brine are pumped out from under the surface of the salt 
flats.216 These brines are then deposited in pools, which can be hundreds of metres long 
and wide. They are often carved out from the salt flats themselves. Then, water 
naturally evaporates from the brine solution, over a period between three to 18 months. 
Following the evaporation of water, the resulting solution is more highly concentrated 
in lithium salts than in the naturally-occurring brine.217 The solution is then chemically 
processed in nearby plants to create lithium carbonate or lithium hydroxide at varying 
quality “grades”, with the purest used in batteries.218 Other compounds obtained from 
evaporating the brines include chemical fertilisers such as potassium nitrate.219  
The underlying brines of each salt flat have a slightly different chemical 
composition. As such, the time taken for the testing phase, and the chemicals required 
for processing into battery-grade lithium, can vary. Mining corporations therefore 
require a period of prospecting and testing in advance of large-scale mining taking 
place. This testing has been occurring in all three Lithium Triangle states over the last 
two decades in slightly different ways. Chile has been producing lithium through a 
privatized state company on the Salar de Atacama since the 1980s, making it the 
second-largest lithium producer in the world. In Argentina, where there are numerous 
salt flats across the three northernmost states, only three of the international companies 
mining lithium have reached the stage of commercial production, with many more 
hoping to follow in the coming years. In Bolivia, only a small pilot plant has been 
completed on the Salar de Uyuni, the only lithium-rich salt flat in the country. Here, no 
 
216 Ibid. 
217 Victoria Flexer, Celso Fernando Baspineiro, and Claudia Inés Galli, ‘Lithium Recovery from Brines: A 
Vital Raw Material for Green Energies with a Potential Environmental Impact in Its Mining and 
Processing’, Science of The Total Environment 639 (15 October 2018): 1188–1204, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.05.223. 
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219 SQM, ‘Production Processes’, n.d., https://www.sqm.com/en/acerca-de-sqm/recursos-
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commercial production is yet taking place.  
Lithium mining is generally assumed to be more environmentally-friendly 
compared to typical forms of mining metal from rock, which can require the use of 
contaminants such as mercury and cyanide to extract the metals. This assumption stems 
from the basic idea that the key extraction stage uses the natural process of 
evaporation; that the “mining” of lithium only uses sun and wind and not fossil fuel-
powered machines or dangerous chemicals. However, the extraction of millions of 
litres of brines, and the evaporation “ponds” that can stretch for kilometres, constitutes 
in many ways a form of open-cast mining, and the high volume of water that 
evaporates suggest likely impacts on the hydrological balance of the surrounding region. 
2.4.2 Environmental impacts of lithium mining 
Lithium mining from brine is a relatively new and different process compared to those 
used in other extractive industries. There is therefore less information available about 
its environmental impacts, particularly when mined at the scale required to meet global 
demand. Lithium mining in Chile, for example, is an important bellwether for potential 
future impacts of lithium mining at scale in Argentina and Bolivia. However, the 
lithium region of northern Chile is also the site of hugely water-intensive copper and 
gold mining, making it difficult to isolate and measure the impacts of lithium mining 
alone. Furthermore, the region’s ecosystem is not well understood by scientists, and is 
simultaneously experiencing climatic changes,220 which also have the potential to disrupt 
lithium mining processes as well as indigenous livelihoods. 
Due to the mining process described above and the dry climate in the Lithium 
Triangle, concerns about impacts on water supplies and chemical contamination of land 
were raised by Friends of the Earth Europe in a 2013 factsheet. This summarises the 
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impacts of lithium mining as follows: 
The extraction of lithium has significant environmental and social impacts, 
especially due to water pollution and depletion. In addition, toxic chemicals are 
needed to process lithium. The release of such chemicals through leaching, 
spills or air emissions can harm communities, ecosystems and food production. 
Moreover, lithium extraction inevitably harms the soil and also causes air 
contamination.221 
This report indicates the potential serious impacts on indigenous communities in the 
high Andean plain regions, which is already a water-stressed area. 
Water is therefore a big concern in lithium extraction from brines. In recent years, 
information has been emerging to indicate that lithium mining companies in Chile are 
offered rights to draw water “with little more than each company’s own data to support 
their sustainability credentials”.222 In 2018, Chilean scientists raised concerns about the 
overexploitation of groundwater in the Atacama, the pollution of water from lithium 
extraction, and consequent impacts on local communities.223 Furthermore, the remote 
salt flats of the Andean high plains support rare wildlife such as numerous species of 
flamingo, including the threatened Andean flamingo.224 Chilean scientists writing to 
Nature in 2018 cited a study suggesting that “harmful cyanobacteria usually eaten by 
these birds accumulate in the water polluted by lithium extraction, putting human 
health at risk as well as threatening the bird populations”.225 
The need for chemical processing of brines, a process which appears opaque from 
lithium company websites, perhaps due to proprietary reasons,226 is also a concern for 
 
221 Joseph Zacune, “LIthium Factsheet” (Friends of the Earth Europe, February 2013), accessed October 
21, 2018 https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/13_factsheet-lithium-gb.pdf. 
222 Dave Sherwood, ‘In Chilean Desert, Global Thirst for Lithium Is Fueling a “Water War”’, Reuters, 29 
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224 Gutiérrez, Navedo, and Soriano-Redondo. 
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the environment. Companies are keen to promote the idea that lithium mining is 
demonstrably less harmful to the environment than mining from rock due to the 
“natural” evaporation process. However, in 2018, Argentinean researchers Flexer et al 
concluded that the process of lithium “extraction is chemical intensive, extremely slow, 
and delivers large volumes of waste”.227 They further state that the “technology is 
struggling with the current surge in demand” as there are only five commercial-scale 
lithium brine projects in operation worldwide.228 
In Bolivia the chemical processing aspect of lithium mining is of particular 
concern, due to the high prevalence of magnesium in the Salar de Uyuni brines. A 
lengthy period of testing has yielded few clear results available in the public domain. In 
Argentina, the fast-growing industry stretches across dozens of salt flats and three 
provinces, suggesting cumulative stressors on the region’s hydrology when lithium 
production peaks. There are likely to be chemical processing concerns in the 
Argentinean provinces as well, but there are also difficulties accessing mining company 
information. 
2.4.3 Lithium mining in Argentina and Bolivia 
In Argentina, the lithium-rich salt flats are located in the country’s three 
northwesternmost provinces: Catamarca, Salta and Jujuy. The firms that have invested 
in Argentinean lithium are broadly transnational firms from the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Europe, Korea, China and Japan.229 Some of these firms, such as FMC 
Lithium,230 are at the forefront of innovation in lithium extraction from brines, 
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attempting to minimise the time spent on evaporation, and thus overall production 
costs. 
Lithium mining first came to Argentina in the early 1990s, when a US company, 
which was then called FMC Corporation, now part of a pharmaceutical and materials 
company called Livent,231 began producing lithium from the Salar de Hombre Muerto 
(Dead Man’s Salar) in 1997.232 Working on the Olaroz salt flat, one of the sites of study 
for this thesis, Australian Orocobre (working under local joint venture Sales de Jujuy), 
became the country’s second producer in 2014.233 They were followed in 2018 by Exar, 
a company that was part-owned by Chile’s Sociedad Química y Minera (SQM) until it 
sold its share to Lithium Americas and Gangfeng Lithium as it reached commercial 
production in the same year.234 Both companies work in partnership with the Jujuy 
Energía y Minería Sociedad del Estado (JEMSE), the state provincial mining company. 
The early Argentinean lithium industry was supported by the leftwing 
governments of Néstor and Cristina de Kirchner in the early 2000s and 2010s. Cristina 
de Kirchner particularly encouraged a national drive towards the industrialisation of the 
primary resource into batteries, through funding research and development 
programmes, as a move towards making portable electronics more accessible to poorer 
Argentineans.235 She “inaugurated” via teleconference the Sales de Jujuy lithium mine 
on the Olaroz salt flat in December 2014,236 the first lithium project to come into 
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production in Argentina in over twenty years. However, foreign investment in lithium 
was limited until Macri’s government took power in 2015, “as investors remained wary 
of the successive leftist governments” of the Kirchners from 2003 to 2015.237 
In one of his first acts as President in 2015, Macri eliminated export taxes on 
mining exports,238 increasing the inflow of foreign mining investment into the northern 
region. Lithium producers and the Argentinean president continue to be optimistic that 
lithium production could grow to the point where the country is the world’s second 
largest producer of lithium, overtaking neighbouring Chile.239 
The lithium boom in the north of Argentina is a complex web of firms at different 
stages of prospecting and exploration. Across these three Argentinean provinces’ high 
Andean plains are dozens of salt flats, large and small, many of which have been 
divided into concessions that have been purchased by foreign firms. These small, 
specialist mining companies are little known outside the lithium mining industry and 
many may exclusively deal in lithium-brine extraction. Concessions are regularly bought 
and sold between holders, even in the absence of viable mining operations, stoking 
fears of a speculative bubble in lithium.240  
Lithium investors are operational in Argentina at multiple levels. Local mining 
companies are owned, funded and operated by staff employed by larger mining firms. 
They also have investment from automobile firms who require lithium for electric car 
batteries. Sales de Jujuy, a key company within this study, was founded in a joint 
venture between Australia and Toronto Stock Exchange-listed Orocobre Limited, 
Japanese trading company Toyota Tsusho Corporation and the mining company of the 
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provincial government of Jujuy JEMSE.241  
The other key Argentinean lithium mining company in this study is Exar, which is 
also a joint venture with JEMSE.242 Exar was formed by Chilean firm Sociedad 
Quimica y Minera de Chile (SQM), a lead player in the global lithium industry that 
operates just over the border from Jujuy in northern Chile. A producer of lithium 
carbonate from the Atacama Desert since 1997, SQM is thought to have been in talks 
to supply lithium to electric-only car company Tesla Motors in early 2018.243 SQM sold 
its share of Exar to Lithium Americas and Gangfeng later in 2018. 
In Bolivia, as indicated by the socialist approach to state neoextractivism and 
industrialisation outlined above, a state-owned pilot lithium mining plant has been built 
on the Salar de Uyuni salt flat, located in the Department of Potosí.244 Following the 
designation of lithium development as a national priority in 2008, the Bolivian 
government created a subsidiary of its national mining company, Corporación Minera de 
Bolivia (COMIBOL), called the Gerencia Nacional de Recursos Evaporíticos (GNRE).245 The 
GNRE was tasked with developing a “pilot plant” to test the parameters of state-
managed lithium extraction. Despite a decade of work, there was still no commercial 
production of lithium from the Salar de Uyuni at the time this thesis was finalised in 
May 2019.  
The construction of Bolivia’s lithium project has been delayed significantly from 
earlier plans and predictions,246 and there are numerous doubts around the Bolivian 
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government’s ability to bring a commercial lithium mine to production, given the scale 
of the challenge for a non-industrialised nation.247 The idea that Bolivia would be able 
to exploit lithium without international finance and technology was widely derided by 
the international mining and financial press in the early 2010s. While delays are 
generally attributed to the struggle to deal with high levels of magnesium in the Salar de 
Uyuni brines, the perceived lack of progress has been compounded by an increasing 
lack of transparency in the project, noted by prominent Bolivian lithium mining analyst 
Zuleta in 2018.248 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview and analysis of the key historical and socio-
political aspects of Argentina and Bolivia relevant to the lithium mining regions and 
developing industries. It has set the two countries apart in terms of their social 
structure, finding that Argentinean indigenous peoples are far more marginalised, 
repressed and neglected than in Bolivia, which is a far poorer country with a long 
history of extraction, but governed by a revolutionary anti-colonial government since 
2006 that is committed to the redistribution of mining revenues. 
The Bolivian socialist government is pursuing state extraction of lithium and even 
its industrialisation up the value chain into batteries and electric cars, despite no history 
of manufacturing using extracted primary materials. Lithium is therefore an important 
aspect of the country’s national development trajectory and resource-nationalist 
“imaginary”, according to Revette and Barandirán.249 Argentina meanwhile has followed 
the more common neoliberal extractivist path of inviting foreign mining companies 
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specialising in lithium mining to mine concessions on its numerous salt flats.  
In Argentina, rights for indigenous peoples are commonly violated or left 
uninvestigated, and this is increasing, particularly as the number of large extractive 
agribusiness projects expand. However, the increase in such violations has the potential 
to result in increased visibility within the international community. For Bolivia, it is 
likely that the reverse is true, due to Morales portraying Bolivia as a pro-indigenous and 
innately environmentalist nation on the world stage. The nature of lithium mining, 
which appears to be more environmentally friendly than other forms of mining, may 
even help Bolivia retain this image. 
As the last part of this chapter details, the method and impacts of lithium mining 
from brines is not yet fully understood and could have serious impacts on the regions 
surrounding the salt flats through water stress and contamination. This study aims to 
document how much or little information was given to local indigenous communities 
about these impacts particularly, and how much indigenous peoples have had the 
chance to participate in decision-making about the industry in their midst.
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Maps (1–4) of South America and key communities in the 
lithium regions in Argentina and Bolivia  
 
Map 1: Map of South America showing the “Lithium Triangle” and Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni (in white) 
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Map 2: The Lithium Triangle at the borders of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile 
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Map 3: Salinas Grandes and Olaroz-Cauchari salt flats and key communities in Jujuy Province, Argentina 
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Map 4: Map of the region around the south of the Salar de Uyuni and lithium pilot plant 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS: QUALITATIVE SOCIO-
LEGAL RESEARCH WITH FIELDWORK IN 
ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to detail the process of conducting preliminary legal and 
documentary research and collecting and analysing the empirical data gathered during 
fieldwork, which form the basis of the thesis. This thesis is based on qualitative socio-
legal research undertaken between 2015 and 2018, including fieldwork carried out 
between January and June 2017 in the high Andean plain regions of Argentina and 
Bolivia. I focused on three sites: two groups of Atacama and Kolla communities 
around two salt flats in Jujuy Province, Argentina, and the predominantly Quechua-
speaking communities around the southern coast of the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia. 
During my six months’ fieldwork trip, and in prior and later triangulation of other 
research, I built a robust picture of the developing lithium mining industries in Bolivia 
and Argentina, and the extent of indigenous community participation in lithium mining.  
I conducted preliminary research throughout the 2015/16 academic year, a process 
which I detail fully below. Between January and June 2017, I travelled to two of the 
three lithium-mining provinces of Salta and Jujuy in Argentina, then to Bolivia’s Salar 
de Uyuni and federal capital La Paz, returning to Salta and Jujuy in Argentina to 
conclude my interviews in May 2017. I transcribed and analysed my data over the 
summer of 2017 and wrote and edited this thesis throughout 2018 and 2019. To aid an 
understanding of the region and some of my observations, three maps and a number of 
photographs are included in this chapter. Map 2 (p.74) shows the entire Lithium 
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Triangle region, including the Atacama in Chile. Map 3 (p.75) shows the two Jujuy salt 
flats and the towns and communities I visited in Argentina. Map 4 (p.76) shows the 
Bolivian communities to the south of the Salar de Uyuni, and the location of the state 
pilot plant on the salt flat near the community of Rio Grande (the dotted line is the 
route I took to interview communities over a two-day trip). Following this chapter are 
the photographs to which this thesis refers, particularly within this chapter and 
Chapters 5 and 6, which examine the Argentinean and Bolivian case studies 
respectively. 
The chapter has six parts. The first part examines the interdisciplinary approach 
and choice of qualitative research methods. The second describes my preliminary 
online, academic, documentary and legal research methods. The third part provides a 
description of the fieldwork sites. The fourth and fifth parts discuss the key methods of 
observation and interviewing I used during fieldwork, as well as ethical considerations 
and reflections on fieldwork challenges. The final part details how I processed and 
analysed my data in the summer months of 2017. Access challenges, time and financial 
constraints and the limitations of the study are also analysed here. 
3.1 Method of inquiry: Qualitative research with fieldwork 
and interviewing 
This first section establishes the interdisciplinary basis for the study, and the choice of 
methods selected. Here I also explain how I selected the cases for the research, and 
how two interrelated sets of research questions informed my fieldwork practice.  
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3.1.1 Interdisciplinary context, approach and method selection  
Interdisciplinary work is pragmatic, showing “the value of choosing the most 
appropriate research method or methods to address specific research questions”.250 My 
approach was generally informed by studies and approaches from diverse disciplines, 
including law, sociology and anthropology, political economy, and Latin American 
studies. Using analytical insights from different disciplines, I used qualitative social 
science methods to answer my research question.  
The intersection between law and a variety of social science and humanities 
disciplines is known as socio-legal studies.251 Socio-legal studies employ sociological and 
other methodological tools and theory for data collection, and sociological methods for 
analysis of law and compliance.252 Critical realists suggest that there is one actual world, 
but this is lived, experienced and interpreted differently.253 The experiences of rights-
holders are crucial evidence in human rights research.254 Relatedly, the perspectives of 
those invested with the power to cause, permit or otherwise enable human rights 
violations (in this case, governments and corporations) are also important evidence in 
research into the causes of actual and probable abuses of human rights. Taking a critical 
realist approach has enabled me to examine and analyse different perspectives on, for 
example, environmental impact reports and consultation protocols produced by the 
corporations and communities respectively. By recording and comparing such 
perspectives, the rise of the lithium industry can be fully analysed in respect of current 
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and probable future impact on indigenous peoples’ rights. Only then can 
recommendations for the successful mitigation of such violations be made. 
Preliminary and online research indicated limited secondary material available on 
the situation of the communities living in these remote lithium regions, necessitating 
fieldwork, with an aim to understand the nature of the relationships between 
communities, lithium companies and state actors.  
Socio-legal researchers draw on social theory to understand how aspects of a 
situation inform how law is conceptualised within it.255 This process has been used to 
provide a methodology for this thesis that generates key findings and situates them in 
their wider socioenvironmental and political contexts. This qualitative socio-legal 
research takes a critical realist approach to understand experiences of consultation and 
other forms of indigenous participation in mining projects compared with that 
mandated by international human rights law. The thesis is thereby able to document 
compliance with that law, interpreted through reconciling the accounts of key 
stakeholders and applying social theories to understand the extent of that compliance in 
its political context. From this a number of conclusions can be drawn, that may 
produce recommendations and allow better socioenvironmental policies and practice to 
emerge which are underpinned by a strong evidence base. 
3.1.2 Selection of cases and fieldwork sites 
Extractive projects are complex, involving a large number of stakeholders. The 
Argentinean lithium industry is geographically far more complex than the Bolivian, 
certainly in terms of key stakeholders: lithium mining is set to affect three north-eastern 
provinces and is being proposed or conducted by a large number of international 
 
255 Snape and Spencer “The Foundations of Qualitative Research”, Barakar and Travers “Law, Sociology 
and Method”. 
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companies in a very remote and difficult-to-access region. Specific community-level 
case selection at the local and regional levels had to be done as the fieldwork 
progressed and more was known about my ability to access these communities.  
Although I originally planned to examine the lithium industries of all three 
Lithium Triangle countries, I initially focused on the Bolivian lithium industry before 
settling on the comparison with Argentina. Due to the shift towards a socialist 
programme of government with a strong neo-extractivist policy, Bolivia seemed an 
outlier in comparison with the neoliberal models of extraction and export continuing in 
Argentina and Chile. It seemed likely that Morales’ anti-neoliberal stance and the 
emergence of vivir bien and indigenous rights in legislation could have some impact on 
how the state lithium industry progressed its aims. Furthermore, Bolivia’s long colonial 
extractivist history appeared to have a complex and compelling influence on 
contemporary resource nationalism, particularly in the case of the early lithium industry.  
However, the Bolivian industry was less advanced than in Argentina, where 
indigenous communities had already mounted a defence of the Salinas Grandes 
following prospecting in 2010. I therefore decided to compare state and industry 
consultation with communities in both countries, measuring compliance with their 
international legal obligations. Comparison can be helpful for research design, enabling 
a level of control over the data collected and benchmarks for analysis. It can help 
“isolating in thought particular aspects of the object under study”,256 which is known as 
abstraction,257 or separating the components into discrete parts in order to analyse them 
separately before looking at the whole. In this case it also enables me to compare the 
treatment of indigenous peoples by two very different political regimes. 
 
256 Practising Human Geography, p.308. 
257 David Harvey, 1989, cited in Paul Cloke, Ian Cook, Philip Crang, Mark Goodwin, Joe Painter, Chris 
Philo, Practising Human Geography, (London: Sage, 2003) p.308. 
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3.1.3 Research questions  
Because intensive, large-scale lithium mining is relatively new in the Andean plain 
region, there was a clear gap in research about its impacts on indigenous communities. 
Early documentary research online and in library databases undertaken in 2016 returned 
very little academic research on socioenvironmental impacts in my chosen regions, or 
in Chile.  
This dearth of research had benefits for formulating a research project, as well as 
drawbacks: there were numerous avenues to pursue, but narrowing the precise topic 
and disciplinary focus was a challenge. 
Eventually, I formulated two dimensions to help answer the central research 
question on indigenous environmental participation in lithium mining: 
1) “What are the socioenvironmental impacts of mining lithium in Bolivia and 
Argentina?”  
• Are community members/leaders concerned about environmental impacts? If 
so, is excessive water use / hydrological imbalance more of a concern, or 
chemical contamination? 
• To what extent do local communities rely on the environment that might be 
impacted by lithium mining? Are these traditional activities? 
• What expectations do community members/leaders have of companies in 
terms of jobs, agreements and economic interventions? How does the 
community–government relationship affect these? 
• To what extent will environmental impacts increase as the lithium mining 
industry grows?  
2) “To what extent are indigenous communities able to participate in decision-making 
in relation to lithium mining projects in Bolivia and Argentina?” 
• To what extent have communities been able to access reliable information 
relating to existing or proposed mines?  
• Have consultations taken place with communities regarding lithium mining 
projects?  
• What role is the government playing in the communities to mediate 
relationships with the companies?  
• How do the companies facilitate local participation in the industry? 
• How do companies and/or governments conceptualise community 
participation in their planning? 
These research questions became the foundation for preliminary documentary research 
and fieldwork preparation, with an emphasis on the second set of questions given the 
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clear legal basis for participation in environmental decision-making, particularly for 
indigenous communities, which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 4. 
Documentary research involved online and academic and legal research. This in 
turn fed in to fieldwork preparation, and interview guides, and the subsequent analysis 
of the fieldwork data, such as the coding of interview transcripts.258 Training in 
interdisciplinary, qualitative research methods, human rights research methods and 
social science research methods involving hidden, marginalised and excluded 
populations was undertaken in preparation.259 
3.2 Preliminary documentary research and preparation for 
the fieldwork 
This second section explains my processes for conducting preliminary legal and socio-
legal human rights research, through legal statutes, academic texts and online searches. 
It also demonstrates how I identified key actors to interview during my fieldwork, and 
how ethical considerations were addressed. 
3.2.1 Legal and socio-legal human rights research  
It is well known that indigenous peoples are often gravely impacted by mining 
developments on their ancestral territories.260 As a result, legally-binding international 
treaties designed to protect their rights to land, culture and participation have been 
created. As such, I researched environmental participation rights and the concept of 
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in international law, and the implications of 
centuries of colonialism on Latin American indigenous peoples’ rights in the context of 
 
258 Practising Human Geography, p.332–356. 
259 Essex University Human Rights Centre Summer School on Human Rights Research Methods, Essex 
University, June 27–5 July 2016.; Essex University Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis, 
“Applied Research Methods with Hidden, Marginal and Excluded Populations”, 25–29 July. 
260 Lewis, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’; Westra, 
Environmental Justice and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Huseman and Short, ‘“A Slow 
Industrial Genocide”’. 
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neoextractivism and the global primary commodity trade. I also examined the literature 
on the “resource curse”, a concept which attempts to understand why many countries 
rich in resources do not necessarily benefit from the generated wealth.261 
What I found particularly interesting at the beginning was that the new 2009 
Bolivian Constitution made clear that Bolivia was a “plurinational” nation that had 
constitutionalised indigenous peoples’ rights. This document and other emerging 
legislation in Bolivia under the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) Government aims to 
respect indigenous peoples and the environment and serve a decolonising function for 
its citizens, who comprise 36 different indigenous ethnicities and constitute around half 
of the population. Argentina, by contrast, has strong constitutional environmental 
rights, but very few laws pertaining to its indigenous peoples. Both are, however, party 
to international law on indigenous rights. The distinction between the two sets up an 
interesting comparative project that the fieldwork data was able to expand upon. 
A number of academic studies were published or became available during course 
of my research. Revette’s 2016 thesis, which focused solely on attitudes in and around 
the Salar de Uyuni to lithium-based “development” for example, helped answer 
questions about why there was little resistance to lithium mining in Bolivia.262 This 
study also provided the background on Bolivian attitudes (indigenous and non-
indigenous) to “development” more generally, and lithium more specifically.263 Studies 
continue to emerge, including one on the potential for lithium to become a “green 
conflict mineral”, invoking the recourse curse thesis.264 
 
 
262 Revette, ‘Extractive Dreams’. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Rodrigo Aguilar-Fernandez, ‘Estimating the Opportunity Cost of Lithium Extraction in the Salar de 
Uyuni, Bolivia’, 4 December 2009, https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/1554. 
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3.2.2 Online and documentary research 
Conducting preliminary research on an emerging issue necessitated good internet 
research skills. I had to continually find the most up-to-date information available and 
monitor ongoing developments. I also had to examine this information in terms of its 
provenance, reliability and possible inherent bias or motivation. I recorded and 
analysed what I found, saving webpages offline and organising them for analysis within 
drafts of this thesis. Using these online research techniques,265 I was able to verify, for 
example, whether there were any key government documents available online, such as 
contracts with companies or environmental impact assessments, and when they had 
been made available. There were none.  
As well as helping with the establishment of the facts, these early searches were 
invaluable in enabling me to assess what information was publicly available, and how 
easy it was to access. As the right to information underpins the right to participation 
(see Chapter 4), this was an important stage of the research in and of itself. 
Simple Google searches helped me understand lithium mining in the region in 
general, particularly in terms of projects being developed and communities that might 
be impacted. I gathered every publication I could find on the subject, including a 2010 
NGO report from the Bolivian-based Democracy Center and a Master’s thesis 
examining the “opportunity cost” of lithium extraction in the Bolivian region that 
produces the world’s highest-quality organic quinoa.266  
The use of Google News and Scholar Alerts helped me ensure I never missed a 
piece of news or a scholarly work published online containing the words “litio” or 
 
265 This involves typing for example “site:gob.bo litio Uyuni”, to find every webpage on the Bolivian 
government server (gob.bo) containing those keywords. 
266 Hollender and Shultz, ‘Bolivia and Its Lithium: Can the “Gold of the 21st Century” Help Lift a 
Nation out of Poverty?’; Aguilar-Fernandez, ‘Estimating the Opportunity Cost of Lithium Extraction in 
the Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia’. 
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“lithium” and either “Argentina” or “Bolivia”. I was alerted in this way when Fornillo 
and his colleagues published their book Geopolítica, about the lithium mining industry in 
Argentina.267 The very act of searching and saving these pages, and the difficulty in 
understanding and analysing the types of content found, gave some clue as to the levels 
of access for indigenous communities to detailed information about lithium mining via 
online news and reports.  
Bolivian government web pages tended to have limited information and were 
older and slower to load than those relating to Argentina. Online resources from 
Argentina were much more accessible, in terms of speed and availability of content, and 
there were more activist-run blogs in evidence than in Bolivia. There are videos of the 
hearing from the 2012 case taken by 33 Communities affected by proposed lithium 
mining to the Supreme Court available on an activist blog site, which I was able to 
download from Youtube.268 As there was plentiful local news available online, I 
searched local newspapers for stories using site-specific search techniques. This was 
helpful in providing historical information and background.  
I was careful to note any probable biases identified from producers of online 
content, and I was made aware of the unstable nature of this preliminary online data. 
My supervisor Dr Jane Hindley advised me to download and save some of the more 
important articles and webpages, as these are often moved or removed at a later date. 
This was excellent advice, as the Bolivian lithium company’s website was overhauled in 
late 2016, and in the process, important pages about community relations and a blog 
post from the then-head of the company became unavailable.  
 
267 Bruno Fornillo, Geopolítica del Litio: Industria, Ciencia y Energía en Argentina (ed) Buenos Aires: Editorial 
El Colectivo, 2015. 
268 Maxo Morer, Prensa Libre Pueblos Originarios: Oro Blanco: La Locura Del Litio - Minería 
Contaminante: Explotación de litio en Argentina -Bolivia -Chile, Prensa Libre Pueblos Originarios blog, 
accessed 30 October 2018 http://prensalibrepueblosoriginarios.blogspot.com/2012/03/oro-gris-
explotacion-de-litio-en.html  
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Google News and Scholar Alerts enabled me to better plan my fieldwork and keep 
abreast of academic research being published about lithium mining. For example, the 
publication in December 2016 of a Washington Post article, “Indigenous people are left 
poor as tech world takes lithium from under their feet”, gave me a wealth of 
information that would have been very difficult to obtain otherwise.269 This article was 
invaluable for its maps and the names of the villages and community association leaders 
who had signed deals on behalf of their communities with lithium companies for access 
to water, land and passage through land.  
3.2.3 Identifying key actors, informants and documents 
Prior to the fieldwork I identified three broad categories of key informants relevant to 
the study: community members and leaders; provincial and national government 
officials; and corporate or industry actors. A fourth category, academics and other 
members of the research community, were also valuable informants for the preliminary 
stages of the fieldwork. These contacts often acted as “gatekeepers” for my eventual 
interviewees, providing essential background and context on their positions in the 
debate. 
In 2016 I came across another doctoral researcher working on lithium mining and 
indigenous peoples’ rights, Pia Marchegiani. Marchegiani works for Argentina’s FARN 
(Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales – Environment and Natural Resource 
Foundation). FARN worked with the 33 Communities of the Salinas Grandes, giving 
legal advice and assisting in the compilation of their community consultation protocol, 
Kachi Yupi: Procedimiento de consulta y consentimiento previo, libre e informado para las comunidades 
 
269 Todd Frankel and Peter Whoriskey, ‘Indigenous People Are Left Poor as Tech World Takes Lithium 
from under Their Feet’, Washington Post, 19 December 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/batteries/tossed-aside-in-the-lithium-rush/. 
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indígenas de la cuenca de Salinas Grandes y Laguna de Guayatayoc.270 It is notable that Kachi 
Yupi was chosen as the title for the protocol. Kachi yupi is a Quechua phrase meaning 
“footprints in the salt”, although the communities in the region mainly speak Spanish. 
Over Skype, Marchegiani was able to give me a good overview of the situation in 
Jujuy Province. She sent me some documents and the name of a representative for the 
33 Communities, who I contacted when I arrived in Salta, Argentina. Salta, which 
neighbours Jujuy, is also a lithium-producing province of Argentina, but there are fewer 
indigenous people and communities in the Salteño cities or highlands than in Jujuy. 
Marchegiani also gave me a copy of a report from the Bolivian NGO Centro de 
Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA – Centre of Studies for Labour and 
Agrarian Development), published in 2014, called Un Presente sin Futuro: El proyecto de 
industrialización del litio en Bolivia [A Present without Future: The Bolivian Lithium 
Industrialisation Project].271 This CEDLA report, compiled with the cooperation of a 
senior manager in the Bolivian lithium project, became a crucial piece of documentary 
evidence of the potential environmental impacts of lithium mining at scale on the Salar 
de Uyuni. It also led me to meet Bolivian academic and expert in the 
socioenvironmental impacts of lithium mining, Ricardo Ortega Calla. Calla authored 
two chapters in this report, one explaining the two proposed methods of extraction and 
their socioenvironmental consequences and the other the complex history of land 
rights in the region.  
 
270 The 33 Communities of Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc, ‘Kachi Yupi / Huellas de Sal [Footprints in 
the Salt]: Procedimiento de Consulta y Consentimiento Previo, Libre e Informado Para Las 
Comunidades Indígenas de La Cuenca de Salinas Grandes y Laguna de Guayatayoc’. 
271 Calla Ortega, Ricardo, Juan Carlos Montenegro Bravo, Yara Montenegro Pinto, Pablo Poveda Ávila, 
Un presente sin futuro: El proyecto de industrialización del litio en Bolivia [A Present without Future: The Bolivian 
Lithium Industrialization Project], (La Paz: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario 
(CEDLA), 2014). 
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3.2.4 Ethics and safety considerations 
Using the University of Essex ethical approval form and following the British 
Sociological Association’s ethics guidelines, I rigorously examined and revised my 
fieldwork plan and its ethical considerations in the months running up to the 
commencement of my fieldwork. I determined how I would store personal details in 
advance of meeting a participant and afterwards when I had further personal details 
and interview data. (See Appendix A.) 
All interviews were conducted with the full consent of the participants. A consent 
form was created in Spanish and was presented to the potential participant before the 
interview with a verbal explanation of the project. The parameters for participation 
were fully explained with the use of an information sheet (which included contact 
details) which the participant could retain (See Appendix A). Every informant read the 
information sheet and signed the consent form. Only one participant chose to use a 
pseudonym, and one participant requested to be anonymous (but gave their name on 
the form).  
These forms were photographed and kept in the bottom of my luggage, which was 
kept locked. Many participants are leaders within their own communities or well known 
for their views on the lithium mining projects occurring in their local areas. However, 
my consent form, which also held a section on risk to participants, promised to 
anonymise published data. I have done this for community members and leaders, 
referring only to their location or broad affiliation. 
I carried a Zoom H4N recorder, two SD memory cards and two plug-in external 
hard drives (one for backup) that both had password protected sections to keep 
interview recordings and scanned forms secure in accordance with the promise to 
participants that their data would be safe. I made sure notes made in my notebook did 
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not include personal information such as names, addresses or phone numbers, in case 
of loss, using post-its for information and securing my smartphone and laptop with 
PINs and passwords. I took guidance from expert academics about my own personal 
and physical safety.  
Potentially being multilingual research, I faced the ethical dilemma of 
misrepresentation due to translations errors. This was fortunately not a problem, as all 
but two of my community informants (in Bolivia) spoke Spanish. When I interviewed 
these two persons, I had a driver to translate from Quechua for me and the interviews 
were short and focused on life in the region generally rather than any aspect of lithium 
consultations. I was concerned about levels of literacy as an ethical consideration, but 
all community participants read the form in front of me and signed it with their name 
and date. 
I exercised great caution when approaching people, proposing an interview and 
interviewing, to ensure that I did not coerce informants or “lead” towards any 
particular answers. This caution was aided in many respects by my intermediate-level 
Spanish. Although I had read up on many aspects of lithium mining proposals and 
international human rights law, I was cautious about telling people directly what I had 
learned, in order not to cause concern. For example, although I had information about 
the potential use of a damaging method of extraction on the Salar de Uyuni from the 
CEDLA report, as the report appeared not to have been circulated, I only sought to 
ascertain whether officials were aware of its content or the proposed extraction 
methods to be used. An official from the Bolivian lithium municipality of Colcha K 
requested a copy of the thesis, which I will send in due course. 
3.3 Description of fieldwork sites 
This central section describes the fieldwork sites, making reference to the maps above. 
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It particularly highlights the similarities between the landscapes, communities and 
natural features of the region, while also identifying some key differences. Here, I also 
focus on the salt mining, quinoa and tourism industries. I conclude by highlighting 
some of the challenges I faced in accessing communities in these remote regions, but 
also what I learned from these challenges. 
3.3.1 The Andean high plains and indigenous communities of Argentina and Bolivia 
The Andean high plateau is commonly referred to as the puna in Argentina and as the 
altiplano in Bolivia. The word puna finds its origins, like many used across the region 
even in Spanish speech and signage, in the Quechua language.272 There are many 
similarities between the sites visited within the Argentinean puna in Jujuy and the 
Bolivian altiplano: the climate, flora and fauna, landscapes, human settlements and 
productive industries have much in common, and these will be described below. 
In Argentina, the first case I researched was a group of 33 indigenous 
communities who have spent seven years resisting lithium mining proposals for the 
Salinas Grandes. The 33 Communities of Salinas Grandes and Guayatoc (an adjacent 
salt flat) live in villages surrounding the Salinas Grandes basin. I visited El Moreno, 12 
kilometres to the south of the main (tarmacked) road that passes through the Salinas 
Grandes, on a dirt road that runs south towards Salta Province. Santuário de Tres 
Pozos (Sanctuary of Three Wells), which I also visited, is located approximately one 
kilometre off the road on the western side of the Salinas (see Map 2). Pozo Colorado 
(Coloured Well) is to the east of the Salinas, on the Guayatyoc side. None are visible 
from the road, but there are road signs pointing to them. Interestingly, pozo means well 
(from which water is drawn), the inclusion of which in two communities’ names hints 
at the importance of groundwater to the region. 
 
272 Puna from Quechua, Wiktionary, n.d., accessed March 19, 2019 https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/puna. 
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I visited the following communities within the administrative region surrounding 
Susques: Huancar, Pastos Chicos, Puesto Sey and Olaroz Chico. These communities 
are not opposed to lithium mining on the Olaroz salt flat. The notable exception is the 
Colectivo Apacheta based in Susques, which has formed a campaign group that 
opposes Sales de Jujuy and Exar’s operations. Olaroz Chico overlooks the Olaroz salt 
flat; the others are located over an hour’s drive away (see Map 2).  
The indigenous people of the area live in small communities, dispersed across vast 
plains where the salt flats are located, flanked by Andean mountain ranges. Some 1,611 
people live in the main town of Susques,273 a small town with only five or six roads; two 
or three general stores; a couple of restaurants or canteens and three hostels or hotels.  
My informants in most of the smaller communities in both countries I visited 
often described their communities in terms of the “number of families”. Using census 
data, where available, I established that 80–100 families would translate as 
approximately 300–500 people. According to my first interviewee in Argentina, an 
organiser for the 33 Communities, the Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc cuenca (basin) 
has a population of 7,000. Near the Olaroz salt flat there are ten communities, who 
have some form of direct involvement in the lithium industry through agreements with 
associated payments to communities and local jobs, making the number living in that 
region approximately 4,000–6,000 people in total, including the town of Susques. I was 
also told that 40,000 people in total live across the puna,274 incorporating the Andean 
plains of Jujuy, Salta and Catamarca Provinces where Argentinean lithium mining is 
taking place.  
In Bolivia, the communities and provinces of interest to the study are located 
 
273 INDEC, ‘Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010’. 
274 Representative of the 33 Communities of the Salinas Grandes. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes 
y Guayatayoc, Jujuy Province, 2 February 2017. 
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along the southern “coast” of the Salar de Uyuni, at varying distances from the pilot 
lithium plant at Rio Grande (see Map 3). Bolivia’s Potosí Department is divided into a 
number of different provinces, with their own capitals, many of which are small 
villages, except Uyuni and Potosí. There are three provinces of interest to this study, all 
located to the southwest of the edges of the Salar de Uyuni. These are Antonio 
Quijarro (capital Uyuni), Enrique Baldevieso (capital San Agustín), and Nor Lípez 
(capital Colcha K). The Bolivian lithium mining operations are established on the Salar 
de Uyuni, but are closest to the village of Rio Grande, which is in Nor Lípez (see Map 
3). 
Uyuni is the largest town in the Bolivian region, with a population of 10,460, 
according to the 2012 census.275 The Salar de Uyuni basin as a whole has a population 
of 42,098.276 The town of Uyuni is estimated to receive upwards of 60,000 visitors per 
year.277 The town has some impressive buildings in its centre including a colonial-style 
town hall building and a large church (Photograph B1). There are also many 
restaurants, hostels and hotels to suit all budgets and requirements. Tourism is an 
enormous part of the economy in this Bolivian region, meaning potential implications 
on livelihoods from large-scale lithium mining on the Salar de Uyuni. 
In the Bolivian highlands, language is a key identifier of indigeneity (see Chapter 
2). The 2012 Bolivian Census suggests that 80–85 percent of the population (over the 
age of six) in the regions south of the Salar de Uyuni speak Spanish.278 Newer data from 
2016 suggests that Potosí Department has the highest level of Quechua speakers in 
 
275 Bolivian Census 2012 Uyuni población, (La Paz: INE, 2012) 
276 Ibid. Official statistics for Bolivia are hard to find, and the Uyuni population numbers here are likely 
to be out-of-date, because the city is growing very fast.  
277 Alejandra Saraiva López and Adam Rua Quiroga, “An Assessment of the Environmental and Social 
Impacts of Chinese Trade and FDI in Bolivia”, in Rebecca Ray, Kevin Gallagher, Andres López, Cynthia 
Sanborn (eds) (2017) China and Sustainable Development in Latin America: The Social and Environmental 
Dimension, p.169 
278 Interestingly, the Uyuni region (to the east of the Salar de Uyuni) has a low proportion of Spanish 
speakers. Bolivian Census 2012 (La Paz: INE, 2012). 
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Bolivia, with 54.5 percent learning Quechua as their first language.279 Most people I 
spoke with were bilingual, with only one woman speaking only Quechua. 
Common salt (sodium chloride) is mined both on the Salinas Grandes in 
Argentina and near Colchani on the southeastern side of the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia. 
In both Colchani and alongside the road through Salinas Grandes I saw diggers and 
piles of salt metres high. In Salinas Grandes, this was being shovelled into trucks by 
men covered head-to-toe in overalls and caps and bandannas over their faces, owing to 
the skin-damaging glare from the reflective white of the salt. Salt mining cooperatives’ 
buildings are indicated by signage. In both Salinas Grandes and Colchani there are stalls 
selling souvenirs and food, with Colchani’s tourism industry much more pronounced 
and organised due to the huge influx of tourists visiting the adjacent Salar de Uyuni. 
The small village of Colchani near Uyuni is home to around 600 people. 
Colchani’s small population is employed in artisanal salt mining and market-trading for 
its daily tourist markets. In the centre is the newly-constructed “Salt and Llama 
Museum”, with photographs and dioramas depicting the traditions of the salt-gathering, 
llama-herding communities of this region (Photograph B2). There are buildings and 
yards that are clearly dedicated to the processing of salt all across the village. I made 
three trips to Colchani, with the objective of speaking to salt-miners. Like all towns and 
villages in the region (including Uyuni) there are no newspapers in the shops. While 
people may have mobile phones, they are unlikely to have internet access or even 
mobile phone signal in many parts of this region. Only very few locals have computers, 
with the obvious exception of business owners in Uyuni, and perhaps Susques. 
 
279 INE, “INE: 54,4% de los potosinos aprendieron a hablar en quechua”, 20 February 2016 (La Paz: 
INE, 2012), accessed 22 February 2019 
https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/component/phocadownload/category/64-notas-de-prensa-
2016?download=942:ine-54-4-de-los-potosinos-aprendieron-a-hablar-en-quechua 
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3.3.2 Challenges of accessing communities in remote salt-flat regions 
From my preliminary research, I knew that there would be a number of logistical 
challenges to overcome in reaching the relevant communities: Google Maps was often 
blank in relation to some of the key access roads in the regions, and there were no local 
bus timetables available online with which to plan ahead. I visited many bus stations, 
spoke to people and photographed timetables. Travel plans had to be made as 
information became available, and often entire days during the fieldwork period were 
taken up with finding out how to get to a village of interest, where (and how long) to 
stay, whether it would be possible to move on from there to somewhere else of 
interest, and how to get back. With infrequent bus services, and no way to know 
whether there would be accommodation in these small villages, in both countries I 
ended up having to pursue quotes for expensive private transport options.  
Transport infrastructure towards and within the communities I visited is generally 
lacking in both countries’ lithium regions. However, there have been moves to 
encourage tourism to visit the salt flats and the “quaint” indigenous villages through 
tourism maps and recently-erected “tourist route” signage.280 While there are many 
paved roads in Argentina, including one through the Salinas Grandes itself, in 
southwestern Bolivia the roads are generally unpaved, except the road out of Uyuni 
towards La Paz. 
It was necessary to hire a car in San Salvador de Jujuy, and stay in Susques, to visit 
the communities of Salinas Grandes and Olaroz–Cauchari. To get there, we drove up 
the steep mountainside, through the Salinas Grandes and for an hour over another 
mountain range. Photograph A1 shows the only road in Jujuy to this region. This 
 
280 Florencia Puente and Melisa Argento, “Anexo: Apuntes sobre el trabajo de campo en Salinas Grandes y 
Susques  
17 a 21 de octubre de 2014”, in Bruno Fornillo, Geopolítica del Litio: Industria, Ciencia y Energía en Argentina (ed) 
Buenos Aires: Editorial El Colectivo, 2015. 
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indicates the general geographical inaccessibility of the communities and the salt flats in 
both Argentina and Bolivia, in the Andes at 3,500–4,500 metres above sea level. The 
region is also challenging to access due to limited public transport and unpredictable 
changes in an already extreme climate. There is little to indicate whether any other 
mining, apart from lithium, occurs here. 
There were many challenges presented by the fieldwork, particularly in terms of 
illness (principally altitude sickness), as well as time, expense and logistical difficulties 
accessing communities. Nonetheless, I was able to conduct 40 interviews, including 
with a number of officials, and gained good insight into life in the communities.  
3.4 Observation  
The discipline of human geography emphasises how observation can determine the 
dynamics between sectors of society and their environments within a distinct 
geographical region.281 In the Andean high plains regions, I set out to observe how 
communities live, work and travel, and their experiences in respect of the new lithium 
mining industry.  
3.4.1 Location, environment and infrastructure observation 
I was able to observe the geographical features of the region as a tourist before 
pursuing interviews. Upon arrival in the Argentina puna region of Jujuy, and Uyuni in 
Bolivia, I was able to go on guided tours of the salt flats. In the Salinas Grandes, I 
toured the natural oyos del salar (eyes of the salt flat), which refers to areas of the salt 
flats open to the turquoise brines beneath (see Photograph A2). If you dipped your 
finger in the brine it was clear from the fine white dust left on your skin as it quickly 
dried that it was extraordinarily salty. Former Mining Minister of Salta Professor 
 
281 Practising Human Geography. 
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Alonso had told me that these brines are over ten times saltier than seawater: 300–500 
grams of salt per litre, compared to seawater at 28 grams per litre. Following the guided 
tour by a former salt miner, I then conducted a short interview with him about the 33 
Communities’ campaign against lithium mining. 
Sometimes there were interesting features observable in the landscape and climate 
that gave an understanding of some of the information gathered from preliminary 
research and informants’ interviews. For example, the dispersed nature of the 
communities and the distances between them and main centres of economic activity 
(such as the San Cristóbal mine in Bolivia) helped my understanding of how 
community members saw their entitlements to work opportunities in tourism or mining 
and public service provision.  
In Bolivia, the recent three-year drought came up regularly in my interviews, 
mainly because it had substantially affected the quinoa crop. The severity of the 
drought was worrying to locals because quinoa naturally needs little water. At the time 
of my visit, the altiplano landscapes in Bolivia were discernibly greener and more 
productive than those visited in the Argentina puna. Quinoa crops were visible, growing 
on a number of mountainsides, the first crop in some years (see Photograph B4). 
Quinoa is a bushy plant a few feet high with green, red and yellow flowers. As it is the 
only place in the world where it is grown organically, they call the quinoa that comes 
from that part of Bolivia quinua real, or “royal quinoa”. Preliminary research suggested 
that the production of quinoa is potentially under threat from the industrialisation of 
the Salar de Uyuni with the development of lithium mining.  
Another economically productive industry that was observable in Bolivia was 
tourism. It is not an exaggeration to say that Uyuni is filled with hordes of tourists at 
any given time. In the kilometre or so between Colchani and the Salar de Uyuni there 
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are two or three luxury “salt hotels”, made largely from salt bricks from the salar. The 
contrast between these polished structures and the collection of crumbling buildings 
that make up nearby Colchani is pronounced. In addition, recent seasonal rains and 
convoys of four-wheel-drive jeeps had pummelled the road through Colchani and out 
towards the salar to being so pocked and bumpy that it was pretty much unusable by 
any other kind of vehicle (see Photograph B8). It was clear that having upwards of 100 
vehicles driving through such a little village would no doubt be affecting the traditional 
fabric of the community, even if they offered a market to sell food and other goods. 
Furthermore, it was clear that the industrialisation of even a small corner of the Salar de 
Uyuni would be likely to have an impact on the tourism industry which is focused so 
closely on the salt flat. 
One of the more extraordinary observations I made while in Argentina staying 
near the Olaroz salt flat occurred when I climbed a small hill near my hotel in Susques. 
Looking southwest, I noted a bank of clouds which seemed to be forming from water 
rising from below, out in the direction of the Sales de Jujuy lithium plant. Knowing that 
lithium was being mined by evaporation in large pools, it appeared incredible to me that 
I could apparently actually see this happening on the horizon (see Photograph A3). 
I also aimed to observe lithium mining operations and signs of the incoming 
industry. It was often clear that communities could not know what the companies were 
doing without direct, culturally-appropriate communications from them. Signs of the 
companies’ presence in Argentina read more like advertising or promotional materials. 
For example, driving through the Salinas Grandes, at the entrance and exit to the road 
that cuts through the salt flat, it was impossible to miss four large Orocobre company 
billboards. They displayed large salt-flat landscape photograph backdrops with large 
words like RESPETO (respect), INTEGRIDAD (integrity), and HONESTIDAD 
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(honesty) (see Photograph A4 and A5). In Uyuni in Bolivia, interestingly, there were 
very few signs of the government’s lithium pilot plant. Notably, although I tried to visit 
the mining operations, I was never able to get any official permission or trip arranged 
to visit either lithium mining facility in Argentina or Bolivia.  
3.4.2 Social and political observations  
Throughout my fieldwork, I looked for social and political clues about the areas I was 
visiting. It was clear through observation while travelling through southwestern Bolivia 
that the country was experiencing an intensely political time. All across the towns of 
Potosí Department there was political graffiti saying “Yes”, often with some sort of 
qualifier, such as “Evo for Development” or “Together for Him, Yes!” (Photograph 
B5). This graffiti was a campaigning tactic deployed by the ruling MAS Government to 
encourage a “yes” result in the referendum that would permit Evo Morales to run for a 
fourth term in 2020. The graffiti was notable in the south by its regular turquoise-and-
red colour scheme (indicating that it was put there by MAS organisers). In other parts 
of the country there was less regularity, and in some places, like on the outskirts of 
Cochabamba, unofficial single-word graffiti, “Yes” and “No”, battled it out bollard by 
bollard across a motorway central reservation.  
Morales lost the referendum vote by a small margin on 21 February 2016. Fifty-
one percent rejected the constitutional amendment. This led to the date of the 21 
February 2016 referendum being dubbed “The Day of the Lie” by the government, 
insinuating that the electorate had “lied” about wanting Morales to run again for 
President. I saw this phrase, with the #21FDíadelaMentira “hashtag” for social media 
campaigning on posters around Uyuni town centre, indicating that the region was 
largely a MAS-supporting area (Photograph B6). 
These kinds of observations were helpful to put local informants’ responses in 
 100 
 
their social context, particularly as regards political affiliations, the types of employment 
available, and the response to changes in Uyuni and the communities resulting from the 
tourism boom. This tourism is not perceived positively by everyone, and in some 
instances served to emphasize relatively severe local poverty. Numerous observations 
reaffirmed this point. In the “train graveyard” outside Uyuni, for example, there was 
graffiti reading “TOURIST GO HOME” (see Photograph B7). The benefit for locals 
of the continuous tourism was questionable. During a tour I took early on to see the 
Salar de Uyuni, my tour-mates were disparaging of the opportunity to buy souvenirs or 
snacks in Colchani, wanting only to get out on to the salar to take photos. This 
indicated one of the many probable difficulties of selling souvenirs as a replacement 
livelihood for salt gathering. It was through these observations of the tourism in Bolivia 
that I came to understand that working in tourism was seen by many of the residents as 
being inferior to working in mining, or indeed in the traditional salt-gathering 
cooperatives in Colchani. 
In Argentina, there were clear signs of a society divided on racial and class lines, 
with the southern city of Salta larger and more well-kept than its equivalent capital in 
Jujuy to the north. I observed that Jujuy is a more indigenous or mestizo province, with 
indigenous housing projects located in San Salvador de Jujuy and in the Valley of 
Humahuaca. In the high plains, the villages become smaller and were almost entirely 
indigenous, with the exception of business-owners and local religious elites. San 
Salvador de Jujuy is, like Salta, a colonial town, with monuments and museums to 
colonial history and settlement. Both lithium companies operating in Jujuy have local 
headquarters in large residential properties in leafy suburbs in Salta and San Salvador de 
Jujuy. 
 101 
 
3.5 Interviews 
Mapping community leaders’ and members’ understanding of the lithium projects and 
their relationship to them was an essential part of the research for this thesis. 
Semistructured interviews enabled me to evaluate whether respondents’ experiences 
contradicted law, stated policy and official government accounts. This section outlines 
my process for interviewing some of the community and “elite” key actors, before 
reflecting on the challenges of access to the region and some of these actors. 
3.4.1 Using interviews in human rights research  
The interviews are central to this study because rights-holders’ experiences are 
necessarily the “data” through which we can understand the extent to which human 
rights have been fulfilled. To make the responses to community interviews in both 
countries comparable, semistructured interviews were conducted with the same 
interview guide across both community sites (see Appendix B). When using an 
interview guide, “the interviewer asks key questions in the same way each time and does 
some probing for further information”.282 I ensured I had as full an understanding of 
my interviewees’ positions ahead of time as possible to generate informed follow-up 
questions. 
Semistructured interviews with officials, state and corporate, were composed in 
advance according to a topic guide generated from preliminary documentary research 
and discussions with academic and NGO contacts. In each interview the final question 
was to ask whether the respondent knew anyone who might be willing to talk to me on 
these topics. This is called “snowball sampling”.283 This method of sampling, however, 
 
282 Sue Arthur and James Nazroo, “Designing Fieldwork Strategies and Materials”, in ed. Ritchie and 
Lewis Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. 
283 Jane Richie, Jane Lewis and Gillian Elam, “Designing and Selecting Samples”, in Ritchie and Lewis 
Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, p.107. 
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often generated leads to people who may not have been willing or able to participate 
(or could not be found), which is when “opportunistic sampling” was useful. This is 
where the sample responds to unforeseen opportunities that arise during the 
fieldwork.284 
I was very concerned with the comfort and safety of the participants in my study, 
many of whom likely had entirely different world views to my own and faced 
difficulties I could never fully understand. I was also aware of my immense privilege at 
being able to travel so far to conduct my research, and I tried hard to consider how this 
privilege might be perceived by my participants. I was keen to mitigate any bias through 
a variety of strategies to ensure typically under-represented voices were heard and 
understood. For example, the interviews were ordered not just by ease of access, but 
also by position within the debate: I interviewed leaders from the communities before 
interviewing the company communications and community relations managers. This 
went some way towards mitigating the potential for the official and “expert” pro-
lithium views to overshadow the complex experiences of neighbouring communities 
within the research.  
3.4.2 Interviewing key actors in communities  
In Argentina I interviewed: five community members or leaders (two from the Salinas 
Grandes basin, three from the Olaroz basin); a representative from the Susques anti-
lithium mining campaign group the Colectivo Apacheta; and the lawyer for the 33 
Communities who worked on the Supreme Court case. While attempts were made to 
interview a representative balance of community leaders in this region (where women 
and younger people were elected as representatives as well as middle-aged men), this 
 
284 Arthur and Nazroo (2003), “Designing Fieldwork Strategies and Materials”, p.78–79. 
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was difficult because of the low interest in being interviewed in this region (discussed 
later in the chapter). A table of key interviewees is available on p.124. 
In Bolivia I interviewed: a salt mining cooperative association member and salt-
gatherer in Colchani; three residents of San Cristóbal, one a former employee of the 
multi-metal mine; two officials in the Colcha K municipality; one resident of Vila Alota, 
two of San Agustin (both villages outside of the Nor Lípez province); the president of 
local union federation FRUTCAS; and one driver working in the Bolivian pilot plant on 
the Salar de Uyuni near Rio Grande. I was also able to interview numerous shopkeepers 
and stallholders near the San Cristóbal mine, along the busy tourist route around the 
Bolivian “southwest circuit”. While again many interviews were with men, I had 
numerous informal chats and a handful of formal interviews with women, who 
appeared overall more concerned about pollution in our discussions. 
Access to informants in the communities in Argentina was negotiated using the 
names from my list of key actors, the Washington Post article, and the snowball and 
opportunistic sampling methods. These were often used in combination, requiring me 
to send additional emails, make phone calls, send WhatsApp messages and knock on 
doors. For example, I Googled the name of the representative of the 33 Communities 
of the Salinas Grandes and found his email address on an anti-lithium mining Facebook 
page, posted by a woman whose profile said she was an employee at Greenpeace 
Andino (based in Buenos Aires). Thinking that he may not have reliable access to his 
emails (this assumption was correct – he only had access to his WhatsApp messages for 
an hour in the morning each day, when I presume he climbed the hill to obtain a signal 
on his phone), I emailed her using the email format I knew from my previous work 
there. We messaged about my project, and she offered as much help as she could, 
giving me phone numbers for the 33 Communities’ representative, and later for the 
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lawyer for the 33 Communities in the Supreme Court case, who I interviewed at the 
end of my trip. 
I deployed the snowball sampling method from my first interview, with the 
representative from the 33 Communities. This led me to the representative of the 
Colectivo Apacheta in Susques, a group that is resisting the lithium mining occurring 
on the Olaroz salt flat. I read the Kachi Yupi consultation protocol document very 
closely before interviewing the representative of the 33 Communities of the Salinas 
Grandes. Following this interview and my referral, I read up on the Colectivo Apacheta 
online overnight so I could understand the group’s position in advance of speaking 
with its representative.  
In Bolivia, I had learned from reading Calla’s chapter in the CEDLA report that 
the union federation FRUTCAS, which has many quinoa-farming members, was a key 
actor in the early years of the Bolivian lithium industry. FRUTCAS, or the Federación 
Regional Única de Trabajadores y Campesinos del Altiplano Sur [the Unified (or Sole) Regional 
Federation of Rural Workers of the Southern Altiplano], is an organisation that works 
using a union-like structure to represent peasant farmers in the Bolivian region around 
the south of the Salar de Uyuni. There are around 40,000 people in this region, similar 
to that of the Argentinean puna, and regular FRUTCAS meetings are held in Uyuni. I 
interviewed the head of FRUTCAS, who was very accommodating even though he was 
clearly busy, travelling frequently in and out of Uyuni. The FRUTCAS offices were 
unavailable for us to use (he did not explain why), so we had to conduct the interview 
in a disused stairwell in a crumbling building near the noisy Uyuni bus terminal. 
3.4.3 Overcoming the challenges of access to informants 
Although I had managed to arrange to meet the representative of the 33 Communities 
of Salinas Grandes in advance, and he gave me two names (in Susques and Tres Pozos) 
 105 
 
to interview next, it took nearly a whole day of driving to find the Tres Pozos contact, a 
former community association leader. The moment I did, she was just on her way out 
to Jujuy in a van, unable to stop to talk with me for more than a few minutes. On her 
suggestion I requested an interview with the local Salinas Grandes tour guide, who first 
took us to see the oyos and salt mining pools. I eventually found an interview with her 
online in an article about lithium mining, however.285 
The Olaroz communities had no visible shops or hostels I could easily visit as a 
customer. People were rarely out during the day, and due to the unpredictable climate 
and terrain it was hard to plan travel at dawn and dusk. The houses often seemed 
locked with not many windows and the doors shuttered up (see Photograph A6). 
However, if I did see someone walking through the village and I had a name, they 
would know instantly where they either lived or where you might find them at that 
moment. In the Olaroz communities I was generally looked upon with some suspicion, 
except in Olaroz Chico, where I was shown to my interviewee by happy schoolchildren 
keen to practice their English with me.  
In order to visit the quinoa-farming (and mining) communities of Nor Lípez and 
Enrique Baldevieso in Bolivia I booked a trip in a private-hire jeep to travel in a loop 
from Uyuni through San Cristóbal, San Agustin, Atocha, Julaca, Colcha K, and Rio 
Grande, ending back in Uyuni after two full days (see the dotted line on Map 3, and 
Photograph B3). The driver proved to be a useful informant, indicating how, compared 
with other work including tourism, mining is looked upon favourably in this region by 
some as a provider of good jobs and health insurance. He was referring to those in the 
region that work for the large opencast, hard-metal mine dominating the village of San 
 
285 Lucila Pellettieri, ‘Mining Firms Seek Argentina’s “White Gold,” But Local Approval Proves More 
Elusive’, News website, Global Press Journal, 19 March 2017, 
https://globalpressjournal.com/americas/argentina/mining-firms-seek-argentinas-white-gold-local-
approval-proves-elusive/. 
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Cristóbal. He also helpfully introduced me to a FRUTCAS-affiliated farmer keen to 
invite copper mining into his home village, and I had an interview with the highest 
official in the Nor Lípez municipality capital of Colcha K, known as the “Capital of 
Lithium”. 
In Bolivia, I struggled to find interviewees in the community of Rio Grande, 
nearest to the Bolivian lithium pilot plant and the eponymous river that discharges 
minerals into the salt flat (Photograph B9). Numerous men in overalls, who looked like 
lithium-plant or other evaporate resource workers, driving trucks in and out of the 
village, were obviously busy and did not want to stop and talk to me at all. Fortunately, 
on our way back to Uyuni we picked up a worker at the lithium plant to give him a lift 
and I persuaded him to answer 20 minutes of questions. This was perhaps the most 
revealing interview, not only because of what he said, but also because he considered 
the invitation for a very long time and decided to remain fully anonymous, indicating a 
secrecy policy within the Bolivian state lithium company I had suspected but had been 
unable to verify.  
3.4.4 Interviewing key elite actors in government and companies 
In Argentina my key “elite” informants included a geologist at the University of Salta, 
who had also been the mining minister of Salta in the 2000s; three company 
community relations managers from Sales de Jujuy and Exar (the two main companies 
operating on the Olaroz–Cauchari salt flat); the mining minister of Jujuy; a legal counsel 
for the Mining Ministry in Salta; and the CEO and three staff members at a US lithium 
mining company based in Salta. My local Spanish teacher acted as a gatekeeper for 
access to the geologist and the lithium CEO. 
In Bolivia my main elite informants were the communications lead for the Bolivian 
state lithium mining company; a former mining minister of Bolivia; the author of the 
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CEDLA report’s chapter on socioenvironmental impacts of lithium mining in Bolivia 
and the MAS government-linked Mayor of Uyuni. In his role as gatekeeper, the author 
of the CEDLA report, Calla, secured the interview with Uyuni’s mayor for me, advising 
me to be aware of his political allegiance to the MAS party when putting forward my 
questions. 
Much of my geological understanding of the Argentinean region came from 
conversations with Professor Ricardo Alonso, a geologist and former mining minister 
of Salta Province (which was not involved in lithium at the time of his service in the 
2000s). Ricardo was generous with his time and first-hand scientific knowledge, 
drawing for me (on napkins pulled from the tabletop dispenser in his regular breakfast 
café) a number of cross-section diagrams of a typical salar amid Andean mountains (see 
Photograph A7). This was very useful to learn ahead of visiting the region by car, where 
I could apply this knowledge to observe much more clearly how the salt flats and 
mountain-chains that surrounded them related to each other. The diagrams show a 
replenishing of minerals from the mountains through rain runoff into the salt lake 
depressions. As a result, fresh water is, according to Professor Alonso in Salta, very 
plentiful underground in the puna.286  
The community relations office for Sales de Jujuy was, oddly, in a Salta suburb. 
The Sales de Jujuy community relations staff were a little reluctant to do the interview 
when they saw it was a legal study that was examining participation of communities, so 
they called their media manager to approve the topics I wanted to discuss. I shifted 
focus to the CSR projects I knew Sales de Jujuy was running in the Olaroz 
communities, and built rapport using flattery: the CEO of the lithium company in Salta 
had told me one of the community relations executives I was trying to interview was 
 
286 Professor Ricardo Alonso. Interview with author, Salta, 10 May 2017. 
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“excellent at what she does”,287 which I duly repeated during our “informal” recorded 
conversation. As a result, I managed to get the lead manager and her assistant talking 
about their community schemes for an hour, and they were both happy to sign the 
form at the end. 
After some difficulty and delays getting in touch with her through a visit to the 
company headquarters and emails, I visited the community relations lead for Exar at 
her home in San Salvador de Jujuy. She gave up three hours of her time for me, on a 
Saturday, and was clearly passionate about the social projects she was launching within 
the communities. Her interview was revealing in its illustration of a potentially growing 
rivalry between the companies for community support. She spoke about resistance to 
lithium as though it was simply unnecessary fear-mongering, calling out the head of the 
Colectivo Apacheta on the basis of him not being “local enough” to be concerned 
about lithium mining in the region around Susques. This in turn reminded me that 
internal migration between the puna and valley was common in this region and in 
Bolivia, out of economic necessity. 
The government interviews in Argentina were very easy to set up and conduct. I 
interviewed the Mining Minister of Jujuy, Miguel Soler, simply by writing him an email 
using an address found on the ministry website; and a lawyer for the Mining Ministry of 
Salta, whose contact details I had from Professor Alonso. I also attempted to get an 
interview with the newly-appointed minister for indigenous affairs in Jujuy, following 
the interview with the Mining Minister, who gave me her number, but in the end this 
could not be arranged. 
I continuously examined my own political biases during interviews, sometimes 
even exploiting them to establish rapport with my interviewee. I often mentioned in 
 
287 CEO of lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 12 May 2017. 
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interviews with elite actors, if prompted, that I am not against lithium mining, as long 
as it is done fairly and with the full participation of local communities in accordance 
with international law. There were points when my own stances on issues such as 
climate change, drawn out at carefully chosen moments, helped build rapport and even 
secure an interview that looked unlikely to happen or that might be cut short. This 
occurred in Bolivia when interviewing the former head of the state mining company. 
Conducted over two days, my interviews with Hector Cordova were extremely friendly 
and informative, but, interestingly, he did not respond to my follow-up messages asking 
to visit the plant on my way back south to Argentina.  
The interviews with officials, conducted towards the end of my stays in both 
Argentina and Bolivia, were very informative in pulling together the picture of a new 
industry I had built up over the time spent in the lithium-rich regions of each country. 
They also gave me insight into how government actors saw their own roles in the 
negotiations.  
3.6. Analysis of fieldwork data and reflecting on challenges 
and limitations 
3.6.1 Transcribing, processing and analysing the data collected 
The recordings and interview notes were transcribed over three months in the summer 
of 2017. With the six substantial field reports detailing each section of the trip; many 
thousands of photos; maps, tickets, receipts, and scribbled-on paper napkins, I had 
amassed an almost unmanageable amount of material with which to work.288 My six 
field reports alone ran to 40,000 words, documenting all manner of details, such as my 
respondents’ reactions to some of my questions. 
To inform these reports I kept a fieldwork diary/notebook, and through this I was 
 
288 Practising Human Geography 
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able to reflect on the way the research was unfolding in real time. By keeping these 
initial reflections and referring back to them as later interviews and events occurred, I 
was able to begin to see patterns – for example in the difficult of accessing 
communities working closely with companies in Argentina, or accessing company 
executives to talk on the topics related to my research. I was also vigilant, both during 
my interview requests in the field and while transcribing completed interviews, for 
evidence that my presence and perceived perspective on the lithium situation may have 
caused my interviewees to adapt their answers based on their perceptions of me as a 
researcher. Furthermore, I mitigated basing my conclusions on potentially unreliable 
information by finding other research to corroborate such facts. 
Following my transcription period and a period of reviewing, editing and tidying 
up the documents, I had a good understanding of the material ready for the analysis 
stage to begin. Checking authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning of 
evidence obtained is a valuable part of the data analysis process,289 and this was done 
throughout the fieldwork and reflected upon in the final analysis of the data gathered.  
The transcripts and typed-up interview notes were “coded” into six broad themes 
with the following headings: Environment, Indigeneity or Regional Identity, Law and 
Information, Mining and Industry, and Government.290 This coding system helped me 
to see patterns emerge and generate the key findings of the study.291 The analysis stage 
was both challenging and exciting, requiring “a mix of creativity and systematic 
searching, a blend of inspiration and diligent detection”.292 
 
289 John Scott, A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources in Social Research (London: Polity, 1998). 
290 Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor (2003) in in Ritchie and Lewis (eds), Qualitative Research Practice: A 
Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, p. 202. 
291 David Silverman, Qualitative Research: Theory Method and Practice, (Sage: London, 2004); Cloke et al 
Practising Human Geography. 
292 Spencer, Ritchie and O'Connor, (2003) “Analysis: Practices, Principles and Processes”, in Ritchie and 
Lewis (eds), Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, p.199 
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Despite having had training on Nvivo, I decided to hand-code the transcripts (and 
selections from my fieldnotes and notebook) using highlighter pens in six colours. This 
decision was made to ensure context for quotations was not lost, and to provide quick 
visual access to the elements I needed for writing up.293 This follows from the 
understanding that categories and entities are not fixed; that we could always be 
working differently with any aspect of the research material at any point; and “that it is 
not somehow ‘natural’ or automatically correct to be identifying certain ones rather 
than others” within any stage of qualitative research.294  
Hand-coding and viewing many or all of the lines, pages and paragraphs 
simultaneously (spread out on the floor, for example) was very helpful not just to bring 
out the richness of the data, but also to be able to “stand back” and see very clearly the 
types of topics different categories of informants spoke about. I also had easy access to 
the more unexpected comments, or moments within interviews that may have been 
overlooked had I computerised the data. I then mapped key responses onto thematic 
sheets, from which I was able to generate key findings around which to build this 
thesis. This method of thematic analysis, followed up with more research into 
environmental participation in the states concerned, gave me a clear picture of 
indigenous community consultation and participation in the lithium mining industries 
in Argentina and Bolivia. 
3.6.2 Reflections on the challenges of fieldwork and the limitations of the study  
The challenges of conducting this research have resulted in a number of limitations to 
the study as a whole, but these are also revealing in nature. Limitations emerged 
continually as the preliminary documentary work and fieldwork progressed. It was 
 
293 Practising Human Geography. 
294 Practising Human Geography. 
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always a struggle to find reliable information, such as independent environmental 
information about lithium mining, or accurate information about how lithium was or 
could be mined. In particular, documents with any detail designating the management 
of relationships with communities in the form of contracts or environmental impact 
assessments were unavailable. My internet search techniques went some way to 
mitigating this issue, as I could always be sure I had access to any information made 
publicly available online. Moreover, the lack of information about lithium mining 
actually becomes part of the key findings, which will be presented in Chapter 7. 
Interviewing scores of representatives from all the communities was not possible, 
given the difficulties I had travelling in the region and due to financial, time and health 
constraints. In the communities near Olaroz by Susques, while still recovering from 
illness, I faced two outright refusals to be interviewed. One community association 
president refused an interview saying he had had problems following an interview that 
he gave to a reporter for the Washington Post article. I told him he could remain 
anonymous, but he again politely refused. He gave me a name in the next village, 
however. The other said he needed to ask the community first before proceeding, and 
that I had just missed the community meeting at which this would have been possible 
by one day. Despite giving my email and phone number, attempting contact through 
another community member on email, and plans to return for a potential second visit 
to the Susques area, the opportunity was clearly lost. This was obviously disappointing, 
but it was an opportunity for me to reflect on the fact that I was an outsider, and that 
granting me access might prejudice their relationships with the companies, as the first 
prospective interviewee had made clear through his refusal. It seemed that giving 
interviews to the Washington Post reporters had engendered a cautious approach. 
I also struggled to interview everyone I wanted to in La Paz, mainly due to time 
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constraints and visa restrictions. Although I was able to secure an interview with the 
communications director of the Bolivian state lithium company, I was unable to 
interview anyone higher up in the company, COMIBOL or the Mining Ministry, 
despite the potential for introductions from elite contacts and a visit to the plant from 
the former head of COMIBOL. This also serves to indicate that there is perhaps 
growing secrecy around the project, something confirmed within my interview with the 
Bolivian state lithium company’s communications director, who said foreign journalists 
were no longer permitted entry to the plant. 
The key limitation of this study therefore is likely its broad focus and the 
generalisation of community views for the purpose of comparison between two 
countries’ lithium extraction plans. I have been able to mitigate these generalisations by 
fully triangulating my interview data with the preliminary data gathered, and using as 
much secondary material as possible from other researchers to test and corroborate my 
findings. Research into numerous aspects of lithium mining is fortunately becoming 
more readily available as journalists and academics publish results from their own 
studies, and I use these throughout to weigh up my findings. 
Despite these limitations, the study still provides a range of perspectives not just 
on lithium mining, but on mining as a source of work or environmental damage; the 
role of government in law and in practice; responses to the impacts of climate change; 
and the position of traditional communities and their own economic and 
environmental practices, and how these are changing. 
This “snapshot” of attitudes is particularly valuable while Bolivia and Argentina 
are likely on the cusp of a lithium-driven resource boom, with consequences for the 
local environment of the Andean regions and the indigenous peoples that live there. 
Another limitation is however related to exactly this idea of the study of a “snapshot”. 
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Because the lithium industry is growing at such a pace, it is likely that this research is 
likely to be quickly outdated. Political and financial upheaval in either country examined 
could change the trajectory of the lithium mining industries. For this reason, the final 
concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter 8, outlines the broader context within which 
this research sits, and makes recommendations for future avenues of research as 
regards lithium mining that this study has identified. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has documented, this thesis is based on preliminary qualitative 
documentary, online, legal and academic research undertaken between 2015 and 2018, 
with a six-month period of fieldwork for observation and interviewing between January 
and June 2017. I benefitted from research from local journalists and academics before, 
during and after my fieldwork to corroborate my findings. I wrote six field reports 
totalling over 40,000 words to record my exchanges and observations and returned 
these initial findings to my supervisors. In addition, I have thousands of photographs 
and a full fieldwork diary. 
Visiting the remote regions enabled me to fully appreciate the extent of the 
communities’ reliance on their environment, whether through salt-gathering, quinoa-
farming or even tourism in the case of Bolivia. Furthermore, as the communities were 
generally very far away from centres with access to shops with newspapers or even 
televisions, it was clear that even publicly-available information about lithium mining 
would be difficult to access for community-members. This helped in assessing access to 
environmental information, a key component of environmental procedural rights which 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
During my conversations across the two regions, respondents alluded regularly to 
their having suffered a three-year drought, and the lack of reliable ways to access fresh 
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water supplies. Although it was difficult to travel in the Andean high plains to these 
communities, it was only through these visits to interview people and observe the 
environment that I came to understand fully the implications of environmental damage 
or water scarcity on communities. These responses, triangulated with prior and 
emerging research, have enabled me to draw conclusions about the socioenvironmental 
implications of lithium mining in the high Andean plains for Argentina and Bolivia on 
indigenous communities. These conclusions in turn enables this study to compare the 
two countries’ regimes and relations between indigenous communities and the state in 
respect of extraction. The thesis is therefore the first to comprehensively undertake a 
comparison of compliance with indigenous environmental rights to participation and 
consultation in the lithium industries of Argentina and Bolivia.  
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Table 1: List of key interviewees and informants in Argentina and Bolivia 
 
*There is a more blurred distinction between community actors and elites in Bolivia. Some of my Uyuni interviewees may be 
considered political elites, but this table is more concerned with their location in relation to the lithium operations.
 Interviewee descriptor  Location + sex/age 
A
R
G
E
N
T
IN
A
 
1 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 a
c
to
rs
 
Former community association leader Olaroz Chico, 
Susques 
M/40s 
2 Former community association leader Puesto Sey, Susques, 
Jujuy  
M/40s 
3 Former community association leader Pastos Chicos, 
Susques, Jujuy 
M/20s 
4 Lawyer for the 33 Communities, Alicia Chalabe San Salvador de Jujuy F/40s 
5 Representative from the 33 Communities El Moreno, Salinas 
Grandes, Jujuy 
M/40s 
6 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta Susques Town, Jujuy M/40s 
7 Salinas Grandes salt gatherer & tour guide Salinas Grandes, Jujuy M/30s 
8 
E
li
te
 a
c
to
rs
 
CEO of lithium company Salta M/40s 
9 Community relations executives at lithium 
company (x 2, 1 white/1 mestizo) 
Salta F/30s 
& 40s 
10 Community relations executive at lithium 
company 
San Salvador de Jujuy F/40s 
11 Legal Counsel, Salta Mining Ministry San Salvador de Jujuy M/30s 
12 Salta Geology Professor and former Salta Mining 
Minister 
Salta M/50s 
13 Community relations for lithium company Salta F/20s 
14 Environmental engineer for lithium company Salta M/30s 
15 Former environmental engineer for lithium 
company (friend of gatekeeper) 
Salta M/30s 
16 Spanish teacher (Gatekeeper) Salta F/40s 
B
O
L
IV
IA
 
17 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 a
c
to
rs
* 
President of rural union federation Uyuni M/40s 
18 Colcha K regional authority official, head of 
productive development 
Colcha K, Nor Lipez M/40s 
19 Truck driver in Llipi plant. Interview with author  Rio Grande, Nor 
Lipez 
M/40s 
20 Market seller Uyuni F/20s 
21 Elderly women in market square  Colcha K, Nor Lipez F/60s 
22 Local woman Vila Alota F/40s 
23 Driver Southwest circuit M/20s 
24 San Agustín farmer (FRUTCAS member) San Agustín M/40s 
25 Colchani local Colchani M/30s 
26 Anonymous salt miner Colchani M/50s 
27 Local shopkeeper near San Cristóbal near San Cristóbal F/50s 
28 Mayor of Uyuni Uyuni M/30s 
29 Local official in Uyuni Uyuni M/50s 
30 Local business owner (originally from La Paz) Uyuni M/40s 
31 Local communications ministry rep (Mayor of 
Uyuni’s brother) 
Uyuni M/30s 
32  Ricardo Calla Ortega, CEDLA report author La Paz M/50s 
33 GNRE Communications Director La Paz M/40s 
34 Former head of COMIBOL La Paz M/ 
35 Economics lecturer (author of a report) Cochabamba F/ 
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Photographs Argentina (A1–A10) 
 
Photograph A1: The road from San Salvador de Jujuy and the Quebrada de Humahuaca Valley to the Salinas  
Grandes and Susques regions of Jujuy, Argentina 
 
Photograph A2: A large “eye” on the Salinas Grandes salt flat. The brine is over 10 times saltier than seawater. 
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Photograph A3: An observation of clouds forming, perhaps by evaporation, from a hill looking southwest from Susques towards the 
Olaroz–Cauchari salt flat where lithium extraction is underway. 
 
 
Photograph A4: Billboard on the roadside with Salinas Grandes in the background reading “INTEGRITY” 
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Photograph A5: Billboard on the roadside looking towards Susques, showing the Orocobre logo clearly 
 
 
Photograph A6: A typical village in the Susques region, where companies are mining on the Olaroz salt flat. 
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Photograph A2: Diagrams drawn for me by a prominent local geologist in Salta showing the process of  
lithium mining from brine. 
 
 
Photograph A8: The billboard signalling the way to the Sales de Jujuy lithium plant on the Olaroz salt flat. 
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Photograph A9: Anti-lithium/mining graffiti on the mountainside road up to the Salinas Grandes and Susques. 
 
Photograph A10: Sales de Jujuy-branded library in Olaroz Chico. 
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Photographs Bolivia (B1–B11) 
 
Photograph B1: Uyuni clock tower and town hall building. 
 
Photograph B2: Board of information about salt mining in Colchani’s “Salt and Llama museum” 
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Photograph B3: Local tourist map with the drawn-on line depicting our route 
Photograph B4: The first quinoa of the season in 2017, and after a long period of yield-limiting drought, being photographed by a local 
San Cristóbal mineworker on his lunchbreak. 
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Photograph B5: Roadside campaigning messages from the ruling MAS Party, promoting support for a change to the 2009 Constitution 
allowing President Morales to run for a third consecutive term. 
 
Photograph B6: Day of the Lie posters suggesting the result of  
the 21 February 2016 referendum was a “lie”.  
  
 
 
125 
 
Photograph B7: Tourists climbing over remnants of railway infrastructure in Uyuni’s “train graveyard” daubed with “TOURIST GO 
HOME” graffiti.  
 
Photograph B8: Colchani village, on the edge of the Salar de Uyuni. Heavy rains and heavy vehicles taking tourists to see the resulting 
“mirror” on the salt flat impact the roads through the village. 
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Photograph B9: The sign for Rio Grande, the river that discharges into the salt flat and the name of the village closest to the Llipi pilot 
plant on the Salar de Uyuni 
 
Photograph B10: School displays for the 23 March 2017 Bolivian “Day of the Sea” 
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Photograph B11: Bolivian Day of the Sea parade in Uyuni
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CHAPTER 4 LAW: THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
MINING PROJECTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 
Introduction 
The focus of this thesis is on the lithium mining industry developing on three salt flats: 
two in Argentina (Salinas Grandes and Olaroz–Cauchari) and one in Bolivia (the Salar 
de Uyuni). In particular, I focus on the environmental human rights of these 
communities. At the heart of their rights is that of participation in decision-making 
over mining which is likely to affect them and their lives. This includes decisions made 
by mining companies and state authorities that will affect their environment and land 
they occupy and use. 
The aim of the chapter is to analyse participatory rights of indigenous 
communities in matters affecting the environment in which they live. To establish the 
extent of participation afforded to indigenous peoples in decision-making necessitates a 
dual focus on environmental rights to participation and, more specifically, indigenous 
peoples’ participatory rights under international law. This chapter analyses the 
international and regional human rights law applicable to the communities living 
around the lithium-rich salt flats of Argentina and Bolivia. The next two chapters will 
examine national law and observed compliance on the ground in each country to 
evidence if those rights are being effectively fulfilled in practice.  
The chapter is split into three sections. The first section explains how 
environmental human rights are conceptualised in international law, focusing on 
“procedural” environmental rights: a subset of environmental human rights law. The 
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second section will analyse indigenous human rights in international law, including the 
right to participate in matters affecting the environment in which they live. This analysis 
necessitates drawing out the link between indigenous collective land rights, cultural 
rights and the environmental human rights examined in the preceding section. The 
third section focuses more specifically on examining indigenous peoples’ rights to 
participation and consultation. It is here that the concept, peculiar to indigenous 
peoples’ rights, of the right of “free, prior and informed consent” (FPIC) is explored 
fully.  
4.1 Participatory environmental rights in international 
human rights law 
Since the late 1980s steps have been taken to identify the link between a healthy 
environment and the realisation of human rights to life, health, food and water, among 
others.295 While a number of these rights have been “greened’ to take account of 
environmental dimensions of those rights, there is no universal “substantive” 
environmental human right, for example to health, in international human rights law 
(IHRL).296 However, “procedural” environmental rights, which relate to participation in 
decision-making in society generally (such as casting a vote in an election), have been 
deduced from key human rights treaties to build a foundation for their provision. 
Procedural rights were originally derived from Article 19 relating to the right to 
freedom of expression and to receive information, contained in both the 1966 
 
295 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights and the Environment. (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2012). 
296 John H Knox, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to 
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/HRC/37/59, January 24, 2018. A 
distinction should be made between International Environmental Law, and environmental rights implied 
within International Human Rights Law. For more on this distinction, see Dinah Shelton, “The 
Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals”, in Romina Picolotti, and Jorge 
Daniel Taillant, (eds) Linking Human Rights and the Environment (Tuscon, AZ: The University of Arizona 
Press, 2003).  
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,297 (ICCPR) and International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).298 Procedural 
environmental rights contain the “three pillars of participation”, which are 1) the right 
of access to environmental information, 2) the right to participate in environmental 
decision-making, and 3) the right of access to justice.299 These provisions are valuable in 
enabling participation in decision-making in matters affecting a citizen’s own immediate 
environment (such as through planning consultations or community meetings).  
These rights are increasingly important as the environment continues to be 
degraded through industrial exploitation of land and natural resources,300 and the 
impacts of climate change.301 This first section examines participatory environmental 
rights in international human rights law, then more specifically focuses on the “three 
pillars” of procedural environmental rights. 
4.1.1 Environmental rights in international human rights law 
Since the mid-twentieth century the emergence of many international and regional 
human rights treaties and strong mechanisms of ensuring compliance has had 
significant influence on the international legal order.302 Once a state has ratified a 
 
297 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. 
298 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3. 
299 While procedural environmental rights are explicit in the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) 2161 UNTS 
447; 38 ILM 517 (1999), the Aarhus Convention only applies within Europe. Elsewhere in international 
human rights law (IHRL) they derived from Article 19 ICCPR and of the ICESCR.  
300 Elena M Blanco and Jona Razzaque, Globalisation and Natural Resources Law: Challenges, Key Issues and 
Perspectives, Cheltenham, UK. (Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2011). 
301 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. 
Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC: Geneva, 2014. See also Boyd, The Environmental Rights 
Revolution; Blanco and Razzaque, Globalisation and Natural Resources Law; Alexander Gillespie, The 
Illusion of Progress: Unsustainable Development in International Law and Policy (London: Earthscan, 2002). 
302 Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale and Williams, Sarah, Cases and Materials on International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). See Shelton, “The Environmental Jurisprudence of 
International Human Rights Tribunals” and Romina Picolotti, “Agenda 21 and Human Rights: The Right 
to Participate” in Picolotti, Romina and Taillant, Jorge Daniel (eds) Linking Human Rights and the 
Environment, (Tuscon, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2003). 
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legally-binding human rights instrument, and that instrument enters into force, the state 
is obliged to give effect to these rights within their national laws.303 A system of regional 
courts and monitoring bodies helps in ensuring that international and regional treaty 
rights are effective in the domestic state context. More specifically in the regional 
context of Latin America, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) offers 
a “court of last resort” for those facing violations of their human rights.304  
Environmental rights in international law are generally understood in terms of 
substantive and procedural environmental rights, both of which function to protect 
other human rights.305 ICESCR Article 12, which provides for a right to the “highest 
attainable standards of physical and mental health”,306 for example, suggests that “steps 
to be taken by the states Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation 
of this right shall include […] The improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene”,307 indicating aspects of a right to a healthy environment. 
Furthermore, it is understood within international legal regimes that a degraded 
environment affects numerous other rights, such as to water and food, that can impact 
upon rights to health and life.308 Thus the “right to a healthy environment” has emerged 
because of the recognition that a healthy environment is a necessary basis from which 
 
303 ICCPR Art.2.2 states that states party to the Covenant must undertake the “necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt 
such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.” 
304 Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, p.78. 
305 Shelton, “The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals”, p.1; Karen 
Hulme, “Environmental Law and Human Rights” in Sheeran, Scott and Rodley, Nigel, Routledge 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); Picolotti, 
“Agenda 21 and Human Rights: The Right to Participate”; Alan Boyle, “Human Rights or 
Environmental Rights? A Reassessment” Fordham Environmental Law Review 12 pp.471–511, 2007, p.471. 
306 ICESCR, Article 21. 
307 Ibid, Article 21 2(c). 
308 Rights to housing, food, life and protection of the family (private life) are found in the 1966 
Covenants. Rights to housing and food are found in ICESCR, Article 11; the right to not be deprived of 
subsistence is provided in Article 1.2 of both ICESCR and ICCPR. Rights to development are not 
explicit but have been implied from within these rights in the Covenants, informing the 1986 Declaration 
on the Right to Development, General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development : resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly, 4 December 1986, A/RES/41/128. 
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the achievement of most other human rights is possible.309 
Some regional human rights systems have gone further, and have included a 
substantive right to a healthy environment, such as the Inter-American regional system. 
However, while the San Salvador Protocol includes an iteration of the right to a healthy 
environment at Article 11,310 several other articles appear to weaken it, according to 
Boyd.311 In particular, not all the human rights in the Protocol are directly justiciable 
before the Inter-American System, for example the many economic and social rights – 
including Article 11.312 Thus, petitions to the monitoring bodies of the Inter-American 
system need to rely on other, justiciable rights, such as the right to life (Article 4) and 
the right to property (Article 21), of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR). The right to property, in particular, has proven to be the most relevant right 
for the claims of indigenous peoples to realise a healthy environment (see section 4.1.2). 
Although not directly justiciable at the Inter-American Court, all the rights in the San 
Salvador Protocol must still be implemented by state parties. Furthermore, only 15 of 
the 24 parties to the ACHR have ratified the Protocol,313 but this does include both 
Argentina and Bolivia.314  
A 2017 Advisory Opinion requested by Colombia of the IACtHR affirmed the 
value of the right to a heathy environment. The Court 
recognized the existence of an irrefutable relationship between the protection 
of the environment and the realization of other human rights, due to the fact 
that environmental degradation affects the effective enjoyment of other human 
 
309 Hulme, “Environmental Law and Human Rights”; Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution. 
310 Organization of American states (OAS), Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador"), Article 11. 
311 Ibid; Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution. 
312 Protocol of San Salvador. 
313 Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, p.85. 
314 Ratifications of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador"), accessed 2 January 2018, 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic6.prot.sn%20salv%20Ratif.htm  
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rights.315 
Furthermore, the Advisory Opinion acknowledged the common classification of 
“environmental rights” into two groups. The first are substantive, as outlined above, 
and the second are procedural, which the Court described as: 
the rights whose exercise contribute to better environmental policies, also 
identified as procedural rights (such as the rights to freedom of expression and 
association, to information, to participation in decision-making and to an effective 
remedy).316 
This thesis is concerned with both classifications, but, given the indigenous profile of 
the communities in the vicinity of the salt flats upon which lithium mining is proposed, 
and the early nature of the industry in Argentina and Bolivia, procedural rights are the 
central focus. 
As suggested by the quotation above, contemporary thinking on environmental 
rights increasingly acknowledges the importance of information and participation for 
the achievement of better environmental policies. In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights and the Environment, John H. Knox, released a set of 16 
Framework Principles on human rights and the environment.317 Like the Colombia 
Advisory Opinion, he extrapolated the right to a healthy environment from within the 
human rights system, making clear links between the environment and human rights – 
some of which are binding obligations via other instruments. These Framework 
Principles include clear procedural environmental human rights, from state provision of 
“education and public awareness on environmental matters” (Principle 6), to explicit 
 
315 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, " Environment and 
Human Rights", OC-23/17, November 15, 2017. 
316 Ibid. 
317 John H Knox, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to 
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/HRC/37/59, January 24, 2018. 
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requirements for human rights impacts assessments of proposed projects (Principle 8) 
and effective public participation in decision-making (Principle 9). Principle 15 is 
concerned exclusively with clarifying state obligations to indigenous peoples and 
members of traditional communities, and includes a specific requirement for 
“[c]onsulting with them and obtaining their free, prior and informed consent before 
relocating them or taking or approving any other measures that may affect their lands, 
territories or resources”.318 This acknowledgment serves to indicate how important 
consultations and FPIC are for indigenous communities, and how interrelated 
procedural rights to education and public participation are to the enjoyment of 
environmental human rights generally. 
According to Christel et al, procedural environmental rights are “most 
comprehensibly defined by the 1994 Ksentini Report, later on incorporated into the 
1998 Aarhus Convention”.319 Fatma Zohra Ksentini, who was at the time a Special 
Rapporteur in the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention on Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities working on human rights and the environment, wrote the 
report as a “review of further developments in the field with which the Sub-
Commission has been concerned”.320 The report for the Sub-Commission, which was 
instrumental in developing the framework for indigenous rights law, contains chapters 
on indigenous peoples and other groups vulnerable to environmental change. There is 
therefore also a very clear historical link between indigenous and minority rights and 
 
318 Ibid. 
319 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 ILM 517 (entered into force October 30, 2001) 
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. See Christel, Lucas G. and Gutierrez, Ricardo A. “Making Rights Come 
Alive: Environmental Rights and Modes of Participation in Argentina”, Journal of Environment & 
Development, Vol. 26(3) 322–347, 2017, p.328 
320 Fatma Zohra Ksentini, (1994) Review of further Developments in field with which the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has been concerned, Human 
Rights and the Environment, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, 6 July 1994. This report was sadly abandoned and 
ignored, but its use in the development of environmental rights generally should be noted. 
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environmental rights from the earliest years of their conceptualisation by the UN. 
Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to… receive and impart information and ideas”.321 This 
provision was subsequently also included in ICCPR Article 19 of ICCPR: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right 
includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other medium of one’s choice.322 
The 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), for example, with 24 
states parties in the region, echoes these words in its Article 13 on “Freedom of 
thought and expression”, which also provides “the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information”.323 Rights under the ACHR are enforceable by the quasi-judicial Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which can refer cases to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).324 Numerous IACHR and IACtHR 
reports and judgments form a large body of case law, with many relating to the 
environmental participation rights of indigenous peoples.325  
For example, oil exploration over a number of years in Ecuador’s Oriente region 
led to contamination of water, air and soil and consequent ill health across the 
indigenous Kichwa people of the region. The IACHR has the authority to examine the 
human rights situation of members of the Organisation of American’ States, and it 
concluded in a report on the situation in 1997 that “[c]onditions of severe 
environmental pollution, which may cause serious physical illness, impairment and 
suffering on the part of the local populace, are inconsistent with the right to be 
 
321 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
322 ICCPR, Article 19. 
323 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", 
Costa Rica, 22 November 1969. 
324 Clara Sandoval, “The Inter-American System and Approach” in Sheeran and Rodley, Routledge 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law, p.427 
325 Shelton, “The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals”; Boyle 
“Human Rights or Environmental Rights”. 
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respected as a human being”.326 The Ecuador report reinforces concepts of procedural 
environmental rights generally, stating that “[t]he quest to guard against environmental 
conditions which threaten human health requires that individuals have access to: 
information, participation in relevant decision-making, processes, and judicial 
recourse.”327 Furthermore, many cases have been brought against the key oil company, 
Texaco, acquired by Chevron in 2001, by indigenous communities living with the 
pollution from their projects, one in which the company was fined USD$19 billion in 
2012 – the largest in damages ever demanded.328 In 2003 the IACHR filed a petition 
before the IACtHR on behalf of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku against Ecuador. In 
the landmark 2012 ruling of Sarayaku v Ecuador329 the Court ruled that “the obligation to 
consult, in addition to being a conventional standard, is also a general principle of 
International Law”.330 
How rights are defined and developed in one regional system is very influential in 
the development of rights in other systems. Similar to the IACHR in the Americas is 
the quasi-judicial African Commission on Human Rights, which has provided 
significant jurisprudence on environmental rights issues through claims brought to 
enforce the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.331 This Charter has 
provisions for a number of social and economic rights, and is unusual in that it 
explicitly links these to the environment it its Article 24: “All peoples shall have the 
right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.”332 It was 
 
326 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, Document 10, Revision 1 (1997) 
327 Ibid. 
328 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, “Texaco/Chevron lawsuits”, n.d, accessed 21 January 
2019, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador 
329 The Kichwa Peoples v. Ecuador, Petition 167/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/04, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004) 
330 Ibid, para 164. 
331 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul 
Charter"), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
332 Ibid, Article 24. The African Charter also stands out in that it addresses the African continent’s 
history of colonialism in its Article 21, which states that states parties to the Charter shall undertake to 
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in the seminal Ogoniland case (2001),333 heard in the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), that the justiciability of the right to a healthy 
environment under the African Charter was first adjudicated.334 The petitioners in the 
Ogoniland case alleged that the government of Nigeria had violated the right to a 
generally satisfactory environment (Article 24), as well as the right to the best attainable 
standards of health (Article 16) of the Charter through involvement in the development 
of oil resources in the territory of Ogoniland (the traditional home of the Ogoni 
people) in the oil-rich Niger Delta.335 In the landmark decision the Commission stated 
that oil contamination had contributed to violations of the rights to food, health and 
thus life.336 The decision found that violations of substantive environmental rights to 
health,337 environment338 and food339 from oil contamination, and government raids on 
Ogoni villages violating the right to housing,340 had cumulatively violated the right to 
life of the Ogoni people. 
Furthermore, procedural environmental rights are binding law in Europe, through 
the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,341 which develops 
procedural environmental rights identified as the “three pillars of participation”. As 
suggested by the title of the Aarhus Convention, they are the right of access to 
 
“individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources” and 
“to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation… so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit 
from the advantages derived from their national resources.” 
333 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 2001, para 56. 
334 Boyle, “Human Rights or Environmental Rights”, pp.474–485. 
335 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria 
336 Ibid, paras 64–66. 
337 ACHPR, Article 16; The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria, paras 50, 52 and 60. 
338 ACPHR, Article 24; The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic 
and Social Rights v. Nigeria, paras 50 and 52. 
339 Ibid, paras 9, 47, and 64–66. 
340 Ibid, paras 1–5, 51–52, 60, 64, 65 and ruling. 
341 Aarhus Convention. 
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information, public participation in decision-making, and the right of access to justice. 
These are the three dimensions of procedural rights commonly used in practice.  
These three dimensions are also found within the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), interpreting the Article 8 right to private and family 
life without interference from public authorities to include broader protections akin to 
a right to a healthy environment. For example, in Taskin v Turkey (2004) the Court held 
that severe environmental pollution could have a direct effect on family life.342 In Guerra 
vs Italy (1998),343 freedom of expression Article 10 was not considered to bestow 
positive obligations on the government to provide information,344 however insofar as a 
lack of information or effecting of procedural rights has an impact on substantive 
rights, there may be violations of other ECHR rights. 
4.1.2 Environmental rights and rights to land in international law 
In recent decades the Inter-American System has arguably heard the most cases that 
relate directly to the substantive environmental rights of individuals or groups to 
matters concerning the use and enjoyment of lands. These cases are often brought to 
the Commission or Court as violations of Article 21 of the ACHR, the right to 
property, which states that “1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his 
property”, but that “[t]he law may subordinate such use to the interest of society.” 
Article 21 further states that “2. No one shall be deprived of his property, except upon 
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the 
cases and according to the forms established by law.” It does not define what might 
 
342 Taskin and Others v. Turkey, European Human Rights Review (2006) Vol 42, para 113. 
343 Guerra v. Italy, 26 ECHR. 357 (1998) 
344 Ibid, para 53: “The Court reiterates that freedom to receive information, referred to in paragraph 2 of 
Article 10 of the Convention, ‘basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving 
information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him’ (see the Leander v. Sweden judgment of 26 
March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 29, § 74). That freedom cannot be construed as imposing on a state, in 
circumstances such as those of the present case, positive obligations to collect and disseminate 
information of its own motion.” 
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constitute public or social interest or the interest of society, but does hold that 
domestic law may enshrine compulsory purchase orders, for example, to effect public 
projects on private property. 
Of the numerous cases that have upheld the rights of indigenous communities to 
land using Article 21, the most prominent is probably Awas Tingni v Nicaragua.345 The 
question for the Court was whether the state had violated the community’s right to 
property (Article 21) by granting timber licences to a foreign company on lands 
traditionally occupied by an indigenous people.346 In finding a violation, the case 
“represented the first time that the Inter-American Court, relying on the San Salvador 
Protocol, made the connection between environmental degradation and human rights”, 
according to Boyd.347 Barelli suggests the case shows that “Article 21 also protects the 
right of the members of indigenous groups to collectively own their ancestral lands”, 
because it “essentially stems from the preliminary recognition of the special relationship 
existing between indigenous peoples and their land”.348 The Court’s ground-breaking 
interpretation was later confirmed in a number of cases, including Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v Paraguay (2005) and serves to indicate the importance of land rights for 
indigenous peoples in international human rights law. 
The right to property is directly linked in a number of cases within the Inter-
American regime to environmental rights, despite these not being made explicit within 
in the ACHR. According to Boyle, both the Inter-American Commission and Court 
have interpreted that the rights to life, health and property to “afford protection from 
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environmental destruction and unsustainable development and they go some way 
towards achieving the same outcome as Article 24 of the African Convention,” found 
to have been violated in Ogoniland.349 
Building on the Ogoni case, furthermore, in a 2010 landmark decision on the case 
of the Endorois, the African Commission found that the Kenyan government’s 
dispossession of the Endorois people’s ancestral land violated their collective right to 
property, enshrined in Article 14 of the African Charter.350 The Commission further 
found that the Kenyan government had violated the Endorois’ right to practice their 
religion, through the eviction of them from their sacred lands, which the Commission 
found to be essential to their cultural practices.351 This case affirms that the African 
regional human rights system draws a clear link between the right to land and the 
cultural practices of a people. While the Endorois case was the first to link collective 
property and cultural practice in this way, the IACtHR system was the first human 
rights body to interpret its Article 21, the right to property, to include the right of an 
indigenous people to communal lands. I will return to the issue of property rights later 
when I analyse the rights of indigenous peoples more specifically in 4.2.3. 
4.1.3 Participatory rights and the right to a healthy environment 
All regional systems recognise the value of participatory rights. However the 
importance of the three pillars of participation are probably best epitomised in the 
African regional system in the interpretation of obligations surrounding the substantive 
right to a healthy environment found in the ACHPR. The Ogoniland case states clearly 
that procedural environmental rights should have been respected to avoid violations of 
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substantive human rights of the Ogoni people.352 The Communication alleges that the 
government “withheld from Ogoni Communities information on the dangers created 
by oil activities”353 and that “Ogoni Communities have not been involved in the 
decisions affecting the development of Ogoniland”.354 The Commission’s decision 
states that in order to comply with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the African 
Charter government action should have facilitated scientific monitoring and 
environmental and social impact studies, and provided “meaningful opportunities for 
individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their 
communities”.355  
The “remarkable” decision, according to Boyle,356 reaffirms how procedural 
environmental rights to information and participation could have protected substantive 
rights to health and environment as provided for in the African Charter. The 
Commission notes that the Nigerian government “facilitated the destruction of the 
Ogoniland” by giving “the green light to private actors, and the oil companies in 
particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of the Ogonis”,357 in violation of Article 
21 of the African Charter, which is the right of peoples to “freely dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources”, and in particular without interference from foreign 
economic powers.358 Boyle notes that the Commission is “unique in applying for the 
first time the right of peoples to dispose freely of their own natural resources”.359 The 
three dimensions of participatory rights will now be analysed. 
Right to Information 
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According to May and Daly, the right of access to information is considered a 
“cornerstone of good governance”;360 essential for political participation and the proper 
functioning of democracy.361 The right of access to information is found across human 
rights instruments and in international environmental law. As Shelton states, “[h]uman 
rights texts, like many international environmental agreements, generally contain a right 
to freedom of information or a corresponding state duty to inform.”362 Where the right 
to “seek, receive, and impart information” is a cornerstone of good governance and 
democratic processes, the right to “seek, receive, and impart information” about 
environmental matters particularly is what underpins the right to participation in 
environmental decision-making, working to ensure people are aware of local 
environmental risks which might impact them. That clear connection between the 
practice of democracy and freedom of expression, and even of freedom itself, was also 
made by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Claude Reyes v Chile 
(2006).  
In Claude Reyes v Chile (2006), the Executive Director of an environmental 
foundation who wanted to “exercise social control regarding the actions of the state 
entities that are or were involved in the development of the Río Cóndor exploitation 
project”,363 a timber plant with a number of environmental impacts.364 Reyes had 
requested information about the project including contracts, identities of foreign 
investors, an assessment from Chilean regulators of the investors’ suitability for 
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involvement in the project and the amounts invested,365 stating that this was 
information “of public interest”.366 Having never received the information, and having 
exhausted domestic remedies, the IACtHR case centred around the right to “seek, 
receive and impart information” as provided for in Article 13 of the ACHR,367 and the 
provision on access to information in the Chilean Constitution.368 Citing the regional 
Nueva León declaration, the IACtHR held that the right of access to information is an 
“indispensable condition for citizen participation”.369 It also cited the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention,370 the UN Convention against Corruption,371 and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.372 
What is interesting in Claude Reyes v Chile is the clear connection made by the Court 
between the practice of democracy and freedom of expression, and even freedom itself. 
Citing previous judgments and an advisory opinion it states that  
freedom of expression represents, in short, the means that enable the 
community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed. 
Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is not a 
society that is truly free.373  
It is clear here the value the Court has placed on the right of information for a 
community in order that it might “exercise its options”. Although the Río Cóndor 
timber exploitation project was never implemented, the Court found that a violation of 
the right to information had occurred and ordered Chile to provide the information for 
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the project regardless. The significance of Claude Reyes is its clear focus on the 
procedural environmental right to information. Similarly, in the European system the 
procedural right to information has been read into Articles 8 (privacy) and 2 (life), such 
that:  
Where a State must determine complex issues of environmental and economic 
policy, the decision-making process must firstly involve appropriate 
investigations and studies in order to allow them to predict and evaluate in 
advance the effects of those activities which might damage the environment 
and infringe individuals’ rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance 
between the various conflicting interests at stake (see Hatton and Others, cited 
above, § 128). The importance of public access to the conclusions of such 
studies and to information which would enable members of the public to assess the 
danger to which they are exposed is beyond question.374 
A key consideration therefore is the notion that people need access to the information 
to assess the level of risk to themselves from industrial facilities and development 
projects located nearby.  
Industrial infrastructure and mining projects are often complex and involve 
numerous stakeholders, including officials of the state, corporate actors and 
communities or individuals living on or near the proposed site for development. 
Mining of primary commodities, in particular, has clear impacts on the environment, 
which are, due to decades of studying their effects, for the most part foreseeable by 
state or corporate technicians and engineers. Thus, as part of the design and licensing 
process for most large industrial projects there is a legal obligation imposed on 
companies to undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).375  
The requirement for an EIA is common within national environmental law, and is 
enshrined in many international agreements, such as the Convention on Biological 
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Diversity376 and the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.377 According 
to Sands, an EIA should do three key things: 
First, it should provide decision-makers with information on the environmental 
consequences of proposed activities and, in some cases, programmes and 
policies, and their alternatives. Secondly, it requires decisions to be influenced 
by that information. And, thirdly, it provides a mechanism for ensuring the 
participation of potentially affected persons in the decision-making process.378 
Best practice now refers not simply to the projected environmental impacts but to the 
broader economic and social impacts of proposed projects on the local community 
(known as an “environmental and social impact assessment”).379 
The presentation of an EIA enables those who are set to be affected by an 
industry or infrastructural development on account of its impacts on their land, water, 
or air quality, or use of other resources for their livelihoods to understand what is being 
proposed. One key challenge for states is in bridging the gap between public 
understanding of environmental issues and the often very technical or scientific aspects 
of an EIA.380 A key criterion, therefore, in undertaking an EIA and in fulfilling the right 
to information is to ensure that EIAs are provided in formats accessible to participants 
and stakeholders, otherwise they may have their rights to “freedom of thought and 
expression” (as provided for by ICCPR Article 19) violated by the state, for failing to 
disseminate clear information.  
Participation in Environmental Decision-Making 
 
376 Article 14, Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992) 
377 Article 4(f) UN General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: resolution / 
adopted by the General Assembly, 20 January 1994, A/RES/48/189. 
378 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law. Vol. 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
379 Bianca Dendena and Stefano Corsi, ‘The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment: A Further 
Step towards an Integrated Assessment Process’, Journal of Cleaner Production 108 (December 2015): 965–
77, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.07.110. 
380 Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution; Boyle “Human Rights or Environmental Rights; Picolotti, 
“Agenda 21 and Human Rights: The Right to Participate”. 
  
147 
The right to participate in decision-making over environmental matters is directly 
linked to the procedural right to information, as shown above in the Ogoniland and 
Claude Reyes cases. However, what constitutes proper public participation in 
environmental decision-making remains ambiguous and unsettled.381 What is clear is 
that public participation in environmental decision-making over issues that may affect 
individuals and communities has clear links to the provision of information. The ability 
to act on that information, as illustrated in the cases above, provides opportunities to 
secure environmental human rights. 
The Aarhus Convention states that public participation shall “include reasonable 
time-frames for the different phases” including for informing and for the public to 
prepare and participate effectively during the environmental decision-making (Article 
6.3), and that the state shall “ensure that in the decision due account is taken of the 
outcome of the public participation” (Article 6.8).382 
Notable to an analysis of environmental participation is Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration, the outcome of the 1992 conference on environment and development,383 
which states: 
Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at 
the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate 
access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. states shall 
facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information 
widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, 
including redress and remedy, shall be provided.384  
Here the link between state provision of information and participation is clearly drawn. 
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The concept of access to information is twice reiterated as essential to participation, 
and the third “pillar” (access to justice) concludes the principle.  
Building on Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, Picolotti lays out four useful 
modalities of participation: Informative participation, consultative participation, 
participation in decision-making, and participation in management. 385 Informative 
participation should not be confused with the right to information, and is the weakest 
of the four modalities where stakeholders have little active role and are simply informed 
about the project.386 Consultative participation can involve consultation in the form of 
public hearings, however the responses are not usually binding on the state.387 
Participation in decision-making creates outcomes that are minimally binding on the 
state; participation in management would involve community members as executors or 
monitors of the project.388 These categories can help in analysing how much power 
participants hold in terms of modifying the project, which is useful when considering 
indigenous peoples’ rights to participation in the form of consultation later on in this 
chapter and thesis. A key point to raise here is that effective participation requires at its 
most basic level the correct identification of participants, or stakeholders, to engage in 
participatory processes when considering implementing any action that would affect the 
environment in which they live or on which they depend.389 Picolotti notes that this is 
particularly important because “the state will naturally rely on its own categorization 
and identification system” of affected actors, which can lead to the “exclusion of 
certain of those social actors, who, although affected, are not viewed or recognized by 
the state, the so-called ‘invisible sectors’”.390 This becomes particularly relevant when I 
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consider the marginalisation of indigenous peoples from the administrative processes 
that are managed by states’ federal or regional capitals, far from the geographical areas 
in which mining projects are necessarily located. 
Access to Justice 
The final pillar, access to justice, is found in ICCPR Article 2.3.a, which states that “any 
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy”,391 even where the violations have been found to have been 
committed by the state. The provision also states that “any person claiming such a 
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities” and that states party to ICCPR shall undertake “to ensure that 
the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted”.392 Fulfilling the 
legal requirements of the right of access to justice entails access to a court system with 
laws on the issue to enforce, and, more practically, funds to access trained lawyers to 
litigate the case in the correct jurisdiction.  
The issues of funding and legal training, and even access to the language spoken in 
the tribunals, obviously can create barriers for indigenous communities, who may have 
their own legal systems and traditions of justice separate from those of the settler 
nation. This issue will be analysed in the final section of this chapter focusing on 
participation rights specific to indigenous peoples. 
Access to justice is particularly well-supported in Latin American states largely due 
to the legal tradition of the “writ of amparo”, which provides protection for 
constitutional rights in certain Latin American jurisdictions. Amparo, literally translated 
as “protection”, enables access to justice for any individual whose rights are protected 
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implicitly or explicitly by their own state Constitution, by customary international law 
and treaty law to which their state is party.393 Furthermore, the Inter-American Human 
Rights System provides access to justice through petitions to the IACHR (following 
exhausting domestic remedies, such as amparo). The IACHR have produced ground-
breaking reports on human rights violations in the region, for example during the 
Chilean and Argentinean dictatorships of the 1980s.394  
4.2 Indigenous peoples’ rights in international human rights 
law 
Across Latin America, there are an estimated 40 million indigenous people,395 living 
within the sovereign territories of states that have long been independent from their 
European imperial powers. This has also meant conflicts with states over decisions 
affecting land to which both have legitimate claims.396 This is particularly pronounced 
around extractive industries. As Chapter 2 makes clear, oil and mining extractivism can 
affect indigenous peoples gravely in Latin America, where extraction has been 
increasing due to upswings in commodity prices and state desire for extractive 
economic development.  
This section outlines international law pertaining to the human rights of 
indigenous peoples, particularly rights to land and natural resources. Expanding on the 
brief introduction provided in Chapter 2, I will first examine indigenous peoples’ rights 
in the 1989 International Labour Organisation’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ 
Convention 169 (ILO169) and the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).397 I then briefly analyse the environmental 
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participatory human rights of indigenous peoples particularly. These are closely linked 
to rights to land and natural resources of indigenous peoples, which I focus on in the 
final section, examining particularly how these rights have been interpreted within the 
Inter-American regime. This section establishes how substantive indigenous peoples’ 
rights are closely linked to their land rights, to enable a full analysis of participation 
rights in the third and final part of this chapter. 
4.2.1 Indigenous peoples in international human rights law: ILO169 and UNDRIP 
The 1989 ILO169, which has 23 states parties (15 of which are in Latin America), 
defines indigenous peoples in its Article 1.2.a as  
peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions.398 
Article 1.2 also stipulates that those defined as indigenous depend on their own self-
identification,399 not identification by the state. This is important because compliance 
with certain rights might rely upon the legal status of communities in respect of land 
they occupy or otherwise use. As determined in Chapter 2 through Harvey’s work on 
neo-imperialism, state governments have a monopoly on definitions of legality, 
meaning they are able to decide who has a legal right to land and resources through 
their laws and institutions established for their compliance. Despite the legal definition 
of self-identification, governments may also deny indigeneity based on their 
assumptions about ethnicity or location in non-ancestral territories. Furthermore, the 
state might assume that land is not occupied or used by indigenous communities when 
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it is in fact is occupied and used by them. As a result, states may not grant property 
rights to indigenous peoples, with repercussions for other rights. 
Indigenous communities often have a deep and long-lasting relationship with the 
territories upon which their people live,400 owing to agricultural or subsistence practices 
and cultural, spiritual or religious practices that have developed as a result of living in 
particular environments or on specific lands. While indigenous people of course have 
rights as individuals, their claims to rights as a collective are important particularly 
because of these shared cultural practices, which are often related to the natural world 
and are passed down from generation to generation. Interruption of these practices by 
mining companies can violate rights to life and culture as well as cause more immediate 
violations of indigenous rights to a healthy environment, such as to food and clean 
water.401 
Indigenous peoples in Latin America often face economic hardship and 
discrimination by dominant criollo (Eurodescendent) elites in government and the 
economy.402 Chapter 2 details these divergent dynamics in Argentina and Bolivia 
throughout the twentieth century. As international law holds that states are sovereign 
over their territories, in many postcolonial societies with non-indigenous settler 
majorities it was long assumed that assimilation of indigenous peoples into the 
dominant society was the most appropriate way to construct societal cohesion.403 The 
result in international human rights law was ILO107 (1957).404 Decades later, a revision 
of this instrument emerged in the form of ILO169 (1989), “with a view to removing 
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the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards”,405 and providing for rights to 
participation across all aspects of public life406 within their states to guarantee respect 
for their integrity, aspirations and ways of life.407  
Environmental rights for indigenous peoples are addressed in ILO169 Article 4(1), 
to the extent that it states that “[s]pecial measures shall be adopted as appropriate for 
safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of 
the peoples concerned.”408 Here, procedural environmental rights are arguably invoked 
by the concept of the need for “special measures” to protect the (substantive) rights to 
“property,… cultures and environment”,409 all of which are found to be closely 
linked.410 In the next section I will focus on the rights of indigenous peoples to land and 
access to natural resources. 
4.2.2 Indigenous peoples’ environmental human rights  
The fulfilment of indigenous peoples’ substantive environmental human rights is linked 
closely to their land rights, or the ACHR’s Article 21 (Right to Property) within the 
Inter-American regime outlined above. Here, an analysis of this link is provided, before 
a substantive analysis of rights to land and natural resources in the following 
subsection. 
Awas Tingni v Nicaragua established the need for indigenous participation in 
procedures that would affect their access to substantive rights to land and natural 
resources, and consequently their substantive environmental human rights. It is a highly 
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significant case in that it was one of the first of its kind, and such “landmark 
judgments”411 like these have created “doctrinally robust”412 case law for the protection 
of indigenous land rights. The groundbreaking interpretation was later confirmed in a 
number of equally significant cases including Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay 
(2005).413 In this case, the Yakye Axa indigenous people were seeking a return to their 
ancestral lands in Paraguay following being resettled elsewhere. In the interim, their 
lands were sold to multinational corporations. The IACtHR ruled that Paraguay had 
violated the Yakye Axa’s right to life, “interpreting right to life broadly as encompassing 
other rights including the right to a healthy environment”.414 
In Saramaka v Suriname (2007) this link is made even more clear.415 Saramaka Head 
Captain Wazen Eduards described his tribal people’s special relationship with the land 
thus: “The forest is like our market place; it is where we get our medicines, our 
medicinal plants. It is where we hunt to have meat to eat. The forest is truly our entire 
life.”416 This is common among tribal and indigenous communities, who may have 
limited other means for subsistence and trade. In this case, the government of 
Suriname granted concessions for logging and gold mining on the Saramaka’s territory. 
The environmental damage caused in the process of gold mining would compromise 
the Saramaka’s environmental human rights, but also to their own use of timber as part 
of their livelihood, to sell as well as use themselves. The case outlines indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ rights to both land and the natural resources (in this case timber) used by 
the community as part of their own economic structure. The restriction of the 
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Saramaka’s customary land rights are permitted  
only if the State ensures the effective participation and benefit of the Saramaka 
people, performs or supervises prior environmental and social impact 
assessments, and implements adequate safeguards and mechanisms in order to 
ensure that these activities do not significantly affect the traditional Saramaka 
lands and natural resources.417 
The next section analyses rights to land and natural resources, with particular attention 
to this case. 
4.2.3 Indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources  
Rights to land 
ILO169 Article 14 provides for the recognition of land rights for indigenous peoples to 
land they traditionally occupy.418 As interpreted in Saramaka v Suriname, Article 14 
further provides for additional measures “to be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard 
the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but 
to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional 
activities.”419 These rights are important because access is required to those lands to 
perpetuate traditional livelihoods for their survival and pass on their ancestral cultures 
linked specifically to that land.  
Rights to agency over priorities for development of indigenous social institutions 
and traditional lands are detailed in ILO169 Article 7.1, which states that indigenous 
peoples “shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of 
development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual wellbeing and the 
lands they occupy or otherwise use”.420 UNDRIP also contains indigenous rights to 
land in Article 26, which gives indigenous communities rights to “the lands, territories 
and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or 
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acquired”.421 Notably in both articles, the wording relates to both “lands they occupy or 
otherwise use”, and there is no requirement of land title. This is further affirmed by the 
rulings in Awas Tingni v Nicaragua (2001) and Saramaka v Suriname (2007), ordering the 
recognition of land rights as well as the requisite consultation and in the case of 
Saramaka, benefit-sharing procedures.  
An interesting point about the Awas Tingni v Nicaragua (2001) judgment is that 
Nicaragua was found to have violated the “customary” land rights of the Awas 
Tingni,422 based on land they lived on following movement there in the 1940s,423 rather 
than “ancestral land” lived on since time immemorial. The state committed these 
violations, according to the IACHR’s communication to the Court, “by considering all 
lands not registered under formal title deed to be state lands”.424 Demarcation of the 
land, with full participation from the community, was ordered as part of the remedy.425 
Similarly, contained within the judgment of Yakye Axa v Paraguay is an interesting 
interpretation in terms of land rights because the land was not continually occupied by 
the group, which indicates that owning title to the land or continual occupation is not a 
prerequisite for having rights to property under the Inter-American regime. In 
Saramaka v Suriname (2007) it is further affirmed that formal land title is not a 
requirement for a community to claim their rights pertaining to a particular territory.426 
The Saramaka tribal people alleged that the state of Suriname violated the group’s 
collective right to property (ACHR Article 21) when concessions were granted for both 
logging and gold mining within the Saramaka’s traditionally-inhabited territories.427  
 
421 UNDRIP, Article 26. 
422 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, para 155. 
423 Ibid, para 80, 93, 96, 115, 120. 
424 Ibid, para 140(j). 
425 Ibid, para 164. 
426 Saramaka People v Suriname.  
427 Ibid. 
  
157 
Indigenous land rights are often linked to their cultural rights. In Awas Tingni v 
Nicaragua, the state had granted a concession on community lands without the 
community’s agreement. The Court noted that “[f]or indigenous communities, relations 
to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and 
spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and 
transmit it to future generations”.428 This reasoning was further cited in a 2004 report 
from the IACHR relating to Maya v Belize judgment,429 indicating a clear development of 
a right to land for indigenous peoples relating to the right to culture. In this case the 
IACHR accepted that logging concessions had threatened long term and irreversible 
damage to the land used by the indigenous community traditionally for subsistence 
agriculture. The IACHR concluded, citing Ogoniland, that Belize had violated the Maya 
Community’s right to property in their ancestral land.430  
Furthermore, in the Awas Tingni case, within which the IACtHR recognised the 
connection between environmental degradation and human rights using the San 
Salvador Protocol,431 Nicaragua had not demarcated the communal lands of the 
indigenous Awas Tingni Community, nor taken measures to protect the property rights 
of the community to the lands they inhabited and the natural resources found within 
them.  
Rights to natural resources  
Article 15 of ILO169 states that “[t]he rights of the peoples concerned to the natural 
resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded” and that these 
“include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and 
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conservation of these resources”,432 demonstrating clear interrelated rights to land 
natural resources and the right to their use. UNDRIP Article 29.1 furthermore contains 
an indigenous “right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the 
productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources”.433 
Saramaka v Suriname provides a helpful demonstration of how indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ rights to natural resources are assessed in the regional human rights 
regime. The two proposed activities of logging and gold-mining were expected to 
interfere with the tribal group’s traditional territories and natural resources used for 
their survival and livelihoods, but were distinguished by the fact that the Saramaka 
themselves rely on timber logging as part of their economic structure.434 The ruling held 
that because any gold mining activity within Saramaka territory will affect other natural 
resources necessary for the survival of the Saramakas, such as waterways, the state has a 
duty to consult with them, in conformity with their traditions and customs, regarding 
any proposed mining concession within Saramaka territory.435 Concessions for two very 
different types of development had been granted – logging and gold mining – and as a 
result the IACtHR had to assess the case based not on probable impacts to the land, 
but the Saramaka’s perception of such activities, which were very different. The Court 
ruled that  
the state should not have granted logging concessions within Saramaka territory 
unless and until the three safeguards of effective participation, benefit-sharing, 
and prior environmental and social impact assessments were complied with.436  
As timber is considered a “renewable” resource, and further one of importance 
culturally to the Saramaka, who also used it for their own economic purposes, the court 
found that the Saramaka had a right to the “three safeguards” described above. 
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Gold mining, meanwhile, has far greater potential to damage the environment, in 
this case the environment upon which the Saramaka rely for their survival. Gold 
mining, unlike logging, was not part of the Saramaka’s own economic system, but could 
affect natural resources that “have been traditionally used and are necessary for the 
survival of the members of the Saramaka”.437 As a result the court found, 
the state has a duty to consult with them, in conformity with their traditions 
and customs, regarding any proposed mining concession within Saramaka 
territory, as well as allow the members of the community to reasonably 
participate in the benefits derived from any such possible concession, and 
perform or supervise an assessment on the environmental and social impact 
prior to the commencement of the project.438 
Here the language of participation is stronger, and begins to show the legal 
developments in procedural environmental rights for indigenous or tribal peoples 
particularly: the state has a duty to hold culturally-appropriate consultations, again prior 
to concessions being officially granted.  
Benefit-sharing is analogous to financial compensation. This complicates the 
terminology of “participation” in Latin America where “participation” can refer to 
economic participation. There is therefore a reminder in Saramaka v Suriname that 
economic benefits – be they from logging or compensation for gold-mining – are a 
necessary consideration. Indigenous communities can often be left on the margins of 
economic society, relying on the “natural resources” existing on their lands to survive. 
As such, compensation payments may well be welcome, but there is a risk of bribery 
and corruption if prior consultation and requirements for EIAs are not made in clear 
culturally-appropriate ways to the decision-makers of the group in question. 
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4.3 The participatory rights of indigenous peoples in 
international law 
This final section identifies the specific rights to participation in environmental 
decision-making of indigenous peoples in ILO169 and UNDRIP. It begins by 
examining the context for the development of FPIC by analysing participation and 
consultation provisions in ILO169. I then analyse the concept of “free, prior and 
informed consent” (FPIC) in detail. This is followed by an analysis of why FPIC is 
controversial to states who see an indigenous “right to veto” mining projects as a threat 
to their permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Finally, the section concludes 
with further reference to the developing right within the Latin American regime, and 
some practical steps taken by both indigenous communities and mining companies in 
negotiations over access to land and resources. 
4.3.1 Rights to participation and consultation in ILO169  
The UNDRIP (2007), while not legally-binding, has had a role in developing 
indigenous peoples’ rights to consultation through the “free, prior and informed 
consent” concept. It also has particular relevance to this thesis, as it was made part of 
Bolivian national law (see Chapter 2). However, participation and consultation are 
dominant themes within legally-binding ILO169. A right to participation of indigenous 
peoples in the protection of their own rights is provided in ILO169 Article 2.1: 
“Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the 
peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples 
and to guarantee respect for their integrity.”439 Furthermore, in Article 6.1(a) 
governments are mandated, “[i]n applying the provisions of this convention”, to “consult 
the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative 
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institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative 
measures which may affect them directly”.440 Interpretations on consultation is clear, 
particularly within the IACtHR. For example, government engagement using 
appropriate procedures and through representative institutions are suggested in the 
Saramaka v Suriname judgment which states that consultations should be culturally-
appropriate.441 
Rights of indigenous peoples to be consulted on any developments pertaining to 
their lands and resources contained therein are provided for in Article 15 of ILO169, 
which mandates the state to establish “procedures through which they shall consult 
these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests 
would be prejudiced”.442 Importantly, Article 15 further affirms that this consultation 
requirement applies even in cases where “the state retains the ownership of mineral or 
sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands”.443 ILO169 
therefore contains a strong right to participation in decision-making over mining for 
indigenous peoples, particularly as states often own the mineral or sub-surface resource 
rights,444 and are thus uniquely able to grant concessions that effectively sell or lease 
those rights to mining firms.445  
Furthermore, Article 15 also provides “a right to participate in the benefits of such 
activities” (benefit-sharing) and to ensure that indigenous groups “receive fair 
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities”.446 
As seen in Saramaka v Suriname, this has a dual purpose: the community are 
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compensated for any damage of their lands, which contains their culturally and 
economically significant resources, and can even benefit from the activity itself. While 
of course fair that communities adjacent to mines should be able to see the positive 
economic impacts arising from mining first, this can become a complex incentivising 
factor. If communities are offered a share in the benefits without having had the prior 
right to informed consultation first, they may be at risk of being bribed to accept 
mining using such incentives. 
As highlighted above, 2007 Saramaka v Suriname affirms the right to land for 
indigenous communities under the Inter-American regime, and consequently the right 
for indigenous communities to be consulted on developments affecting those lands. 
This is despite the fact that Suriname’s legislation did not recognise a right to 
communal property of tribal communities, nor had signed ILO169.447 The ruling from 
the Inter-American Court also included substantial requirements for the participation 
of the Saramaka in the demarcation of their territories and to participate in the benefits 
of the logging taking place on their lands. Interestingly, the Court also ordered that 
Suriname consult with the Saramaka, even though Suriname is not party to ILO169, 
which provides for the requirement to consult indigenous peoples. Orellana states that 
to extrapolate the Saramaka’s land rights and rights to consultation, “the Court referred 
to Articles 1 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”448 
Article 1 of both 1966 Covenants grants a right to self-determination for “all peoples”, 
and ICCPR’s Article 27 provides a “right to enjoy their own culture”.449 
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4.3.2 Free, prior and informed consent in ILO169 and UNDRIP 
The right to participation in the form of consultation to obtain “free, prior and 
informed consent” (FPIC) is found in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).450 UNDRIP was adopted in 2007 by the UN 
General Assembly by a majority of 144 states with four votes against from Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Although soft law, it has proven 
influential in the uutilisation and further development of the right to consultation 
found in ILO169.  
UNDRIP’s Article 32.2 states:  
states shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands 
or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.451 
It is from here that the right of indigenous communities to grant or withhold their 
“free, prior and informed consent” has developed. 
While the right to FPIC appears most clearly in UNDRIP 32.2, the language of 
FPIC has deep roots in ILO169 and arguably its interpretations within the Latin 
American legal regime. The concept of indigenous peoples being able to give or 
withhold “free, prior and informed consent” for developments on their lands emerged 
from within the consultation processes mandated by ILO169, in particular Article 15.452 
This details the requirement of the state to implement procedural rights to the 
consultation of indigenous peoples where extractive developments are planned on 
territories they traditionally occupy, even where subsurface resources are owned by the 
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state.  
Article 6.1 of ILO169 elaborates upon the manner of consultation expected, which 
informs FPIC considerably: indigenous or tribal peoples must be consulted “through 
appropriate measures”, through their “representative institutions”, and they must be 
able to “freely participate, at least to the extent of other sectors of the population, at all 
levels of decision-making in elective institutions”453 responsible for policies or 
programmes that concern them. Article 6.2 reads: 
The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be 
undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with 
the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.454 
The links between and the above and UNDRIP 32.2 are clear when comparing 
“consultations...shall be undertaken…with the objective of achieving consent” in 
Article 6.1 and “states shall consult…in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project” (Article 32.2). 
The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), a high-level advisory 
body to the Economic and Social Council concerned with indigenous peoples’ human 
rights, disaggregated and interpreted FPIC authoritatively in 2005, suggesting a 
“common understanding” of FPIC as follows (Table 1).455 
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Table 2: FPIC defined by the UNPFII International Workshop on FPIC Methodologies.456 
Free Free should imply no coercion, intimidation or manipulation.457 
Prior 
Prior should imply that consent has been sought sufficiently in advance of 
any authorization or commencement of activities and that respect is shown 
for time requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus processes.458 
Informed 
Informed should imply that information is provided that covers (at least) 
the following aspects:  
a. The nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of any proposed project or 
activity;  
b. The reason(s) for or purpose(s) of the project and/or activity;  
c. The duration of the above;  
d. The locality of areas that will be affected;  
e. A preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and 
environmental impact, including potential risks and fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing in a context that respects the precautionary principle;  
f. Personnel likely to be involved in the execution of the proposed project 
(including indigenous peoples, private sector staff, research institutions, 
government employees and others);  
g. Procedures that the project may entail.459 
Consent 
Consultation and participation are crucial components of a consent 
process. Consultation should be undertaken in good faith. The parties 
should establish a dialogue allowing them to find appropriate solutions in 
an atmosphere of mutual respect in good faith, and full and equitable 
participation. Consultation requires time and an effective system for 
communicating among interest-holders. Indigenous peoples should be able 
to participate through their own freely chosen representatives and 
customary or other institutions. The inclusion of a gender perspective and 
the participation of indigenous women are essential, as well as participation 
of children and youth, as appropriate. This process may include the option 
of withholding consent.460 
Consent to any agreement should be interpreted as indigenous peoples 
have reasonably understood it.461 
Developments affecting indigenous peoples such as mining can be complex and 
detailed undertakings, with multiple preparation stages and long lead-in times. The 
UNPFII Workshop Report further elaborates that FPIC  
should be sought sufficiently in advance of commencement or authorization of 
activities, taking into account indigenous peoples’ own decision-making 
processes, in phases of assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, 
evaluation and closure of a project.462  
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These phases may not precisely map against the phases for starting a mine according to 
domestic regulation (such as prospecting, or submission of an EIA), furthering 
ambiguity as to when consultations should be held. “In advance of commencement of 
authorization of activities” suggests prior to any state authority work beginning on the 
project, and “assessment” and “planning” denote that FPIC should be secured within 
these early phases (and continually throughout). 
 In terms of who should be consulted, the UNPFII details that “[i]nformation 
should be accurate and in a form that is accessible and understandable, including in a 
language that the indigenous peoples will fully understand”.  
The legal lineage of FPIC is explicit within two of the three pillars (of rights to 
information and participation in environmental decision-making), when each of its 
component parts are examined. First, the “informed” element comprises the right to 
information found in Article 19 of ICCPR, of “freedom of thought and expression”, a 
right that includes the “freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds”.463 As a core environmental human right, indigenous communities have this 
right both as citizens and as a distinct ethnic collective. However, indigenous 
communities’ dependence on accurate information about potential damage to land they 
use for survival and culture (and often relative lack of access to information more 
readily available in urban areas) enhances its importance. Second, participation in 
environmental decision-making is clearly outlined at the highest levels as a “right to 
consultation” for indigenous peoples in the majority of circumstances relating to 
administrative measures or development projects.  
The contribution of the ILO to the UNPFII workshop on FPIC maintains that 
“[e]ffective consultation is consultation in which those concerned have an opportunity 
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to influence the decision taken”.464 According to the ILO the principle of consultation 
does not mean, however, that a lack of consent will be sufficient grounds under 
the Convention [ILO169] to block a development programme or project. The 
Convention requires that procedures be in place whereby indigenous and tribal 
peoples have a realistic chance of affecting the outcome – it does not require 
that their consent to the proposed measures is necessary.465 
The legal position, therefore, appears to be that consultation procedures should be 
adequate for communities to engage constructively in a discussion; however, consent is 
not required. This position suggests a form of participation in environmental decision-
making that is not as strong as it could be if consent were required, although both 
UNDRIP and Saramaka v Suriname serve to strengthen the requirement for FPIC. 
In fact, a very strong form of FPIC was included in an earlier draft of UNDRIP, 
completed in 1993 by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), part of 
the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.466 The original version of Article 32 in this draft declaration stated that 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and 
strategies for the development or use of their lands, territories and other 
resources, including the right to require that states obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of 
mineral, water or other resources.467  
Compared with the eventual UNDRIP Article 32.2, the draft is therefore much 
stronger, requiring that states actually “obtain” FPIC rather than consulting “in order to 
obtain” FPIC from indigenous peoples, essentially meaning consent is not required. 
They still have the right to “free, prior and informed consultation”, therefore, but not to 
refuse a project completely. But the question still remains: is the right to a consultation 
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where communities cannot veto the project a strong procedural right? I would argue 
that the answer to this lies in the quality of the consultation: if communities can be 
informed and consulted in a culturally-appropriate way, then if there are concerns, at 
least they are fully aware and can litigate through the courts or decide strategies for 
resistance (using transnational legal and activist networks, for example).  
A look at the socio-legal development of FPIC is useful to understand the unequal 
power dynamics at play where states’ sovereignty over natural resources is threatened. 
Barelli recounts that the 1993 draft “was essentially the product of the five independent 
members of the WGIP and indigenous representatives, because states’ delegates did not 
actively participate in the session of this body”.468 When states were invited to 
participate, in the Working Group on the Draft Declaration, it became clear that 
“several states opposed the fact that indigenous peoples could have the power to veto 
development projects allegedly of benefit to the entire country”.469 Canada’s delegation 
explicitly stated their concerns over FPIC read as an effective “right to veto” as the 
reason for not voting to adopt UNDRIP,470 for example, although a decade later they 
agreed to adopt the declaration.471 While the changes could be said to be a weakening of 
the concept of FPIC, there is an argument to be made about acknowledging the state’s 
reticence to agree to an indigenous “right to veto”. In the delicate balance that must be 
struck, a stronger FPIC may have had far more states voting against adopting it at the 
UN in September 2007. Article 32.2 of UNDRIP may have elusive wording, but in 
many ways, it is a decent start to recognising the rights of indigenous peoples without 
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threatening states’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources.  
Numerous examples of conflicts between differing state and indigenous 
environmental priorities (for example in oil and mining resource development on 
indigenous lands used traditionally by a people) have shown that there are challenges 
implementing the protection of rights to consultation and participation for indigenous 
peoples. At the same time, this has meant an increase in indigenous land rights cases 
being heard at the international and regional levels. As indigenous groups become 
legally empowered by international rights to consultation in ILO169, they must exhaust 
domestic avenues to access their rights before taking cases or petitions to international 
and regional bodies to secure respect for their rights. The way in which this has 
happened in the last few decades as shown above is instructive as to the link between 
indigenous peoples’ land and environmental rights. 
4.3.3 Compliance with the right to consultation and developing rights to FPIC  
The above shows clear binding obligations to indigenous and tribal peoples in Article 
15 of ILO169, which gives indigenous peoples the right to be consulted on any 
developments pertaining to their lands and resources contained therein, even in cases 
where “the state retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to 
other resources pertaining to lands”.472 This is significant because states will generally 
claim this, as sovereignty over natural resources is a fundamental principle of 
international law. However indigenous and tribal peoples’ conflicting rights to property 
and traditional use of land and natural resources are considered in the law to override 
the state claim, requiring a consultation process, particularly where state-mandated 
activity would cause damage to indigenous and or natural resources. 
The 2007 Saramaka v Suriname judgment, published in the same year as UNDRIP, 
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strengthens the emphasis found in ILO169 on consultation processes. Further, where 
UNDRIP’s Article 32.2 suggests a state duty to “consult and cooperate in good faith… 
in order to obtain” indigenous peoples’ “free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources”,473 the 
Saramaka v Suriname case is even stronger on the right to consultation and the fullest 
expression of FPIC. It reads: 
regarding large-scale development or investment projects that would have a 
major impact within Saramaka territory, the state has a duty, not only to consult 
with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, 
according to their customs and traditions.474 
This demonstrates that UNDRIP’s FPIC is well-supported in the Inter-American 
human rights regime at the level of the Commission and Court. The direct reference to 
the wording of the right to a consultation process even to the point of withholding of 
consent, which is considered to be the effective “right to veto”, is highly significant 
within the context of developing norms, even as the Court “considers that difference 
between ‘consultation’ and ‘consent’ in this context requires further analysis.”475 
Nonetheless, there is a clear acknowledgement of the importance of at least 
consultation with the Saramaka tribal people “according to their customs and 
traditions” over projects that would have a “major impact”, such as gold mining. 476 
The interpretation of the judgment provided by the IACtHR is notable because it 
outlines further the parameters of consultation ordered by the Court.477 The state of 
Suriname “requested interpretation as to the ‘meaning and scope’ of several issues”, the 
first of which was “with whom must the state consult to establish the mechanism that 
will guarantee the ‘effective participation’ of the Saramaka people ordered in the 
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Judgment”. Specifically, the state asked whether it was required by the judgment to 
consult with only Saramaka leaders, or with every Saramaka individual.478 The Court’s 
response was that the judgment had made clear “that the modes of effective 
participation and the entity or entities that shall participate in decision making are to be 
determined by the Saramaka in accordance with their custom and traditions’ and then 
communicated to the state”,479 and that if the state required clarity on any aspect of the 
participation, it may “communicate with the Saramaka to seek clarity.”480  
There is little evidence that the state of Suriname has complied with the ruling, 
claiming that it will resolve the situation “only as part of a broader reconsideration of 
the place of all Indigenous Peoples and Maroons within Suriname, unilaterally (and 
illegally) postponing compliance with the Court’s judgment.”481 States appear reluctant 
to accept the agency of indigenous or tribal peoples to participate in environmental 
matters, particularly where such participation might have the effect of delaying lucrative 
mining projects, or halting them completely.  
There is evidence, furthermore, that states struggle with the legal empowerment of 
indigenous peoples. In Awas Tingni v Nicaragua, for example, the indigenous claimants 
were represented by lawyers from the Iowa Project, led by James Anaya who was later 
to become the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Writing 
following the submission of the case to the Court by the Commission, Anaya and 
Crider (another lawyer from the Iowa Project) noted that one of the main issues for the 
case was “the recognition by all parties of the status of the indigenous community in 
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question as a full and coequal partner”, as “it conflicts with the ingrained paternalistic 
tendency of many government agencies and politically empowered elites to either 
assume to act on behalf of indigenous groups or to provide at best symbolic 
recognition of their interests”.482 It was particularly difficult for the state actors to 
“recognize the right of the Community to advisors who pursued the Community's 
interests with vigor”,483 referring to the Iowa Project and his own work as legal counsel. 
The experience of Anaya and Crider serves to demonstrate how even with robust 
procedural legislation in place, the sociocultural attitudes and priorities of state actors 
can have a detrimental effect on the realisation of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
In summary, the law requires that indigenous peoples are able to participation 
through free, prior and informed consultations, at a minimum, as stated in ILO169. 
Whether indigenous communities should be consulted in order that they might give or 
withhold consent is still ambiguous. However, the Inter-American regime through 
Saramaka v Suriname has reaffirmed the importance of obtaining consent from the 
people concerned prior to permitting damaging developments (such as gold mining in 
this case) on indigenous lands. This suggests that any proposed activity that 
compromises environmental quality impacting traditional resources of an indigenous or 
tribal people should certainly be subject to free, prior and informed consultations in 
accordance with the people’s norms and traditions, if not their free, prior and informed 
consent. What is clear is that early (and sustained) state–community negotiations are 
necessary in order for projects to proceed without violating the rights of indigenous 
peoples. 
 
482 Anaya, James and Crider, Todd, “Indigenous Peoples, The Environment, and Commercial Forestry in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Awas Tingni, Nicaragua”, Human Rights Quarterly 18:345, 1996, p.365. 
483 Ibid. 
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4.3.4 Indigenous right to remedy 
Indigenous and tribal peoples may have their own political and legal systems 
unconnected to those of the dominant mainstream societies. They may furthermore 
find that they are discriminated against within institutions, providing the basis for such 
developed international law to secure their rights (compared to other minorities, for 
example). As a result, ILO169 Article 12 provides that  
The peoples concerned shall be safeguarded against the abuse of their rights 
and shall be able to take legal proceedings, either individually or through their 
representative bodies, for the effective protection of these rights. Measures shall 
be taken to ensure that members of these peoples can understand and be 
understood in legal proceedings, where necessary through the provision of 
interpretation or by other effective means.484 
Particularly notable is the attention to use of the appropriate language found in the 
implementation guidelines for consultation above.  
ILO169 affirms rights to justice found across Latin America through amparo, and 
universal rights of access to justice, which is also the the third “pillar” of procedural 
environmental rights. For example, in Awas Tingni v Nicaragua, the state was found to 
have granted concessions without permission from the Awas Tingni and did not ensure 
an effective remedy in response to the community’s protests regarding its property 
rights.485 The judgment ruled that the state had committed violations to procedural 
rights to judicial process and remedy provided by ACHR Articles 2 (Domestic Legal 
Effects) and 25 (Right to Judicial Protection).486  
Therefore, as well as unambiguous rights to informed consultation and access to 
justice in environmental matters affecting them, indigenous peoples also have the right 
to have their rights and duties made known to them “measures appropriate to the 
traditions and cultures of the peoples concerned”, in ILO169 Article 30. 
 
484 ILO169, Article 12. 
485 Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, para 2. 
486 Ibid, para 155. 
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4.3.5 Negotiated justice: community protocols and business and human rights  
Despite its inconsistencies FPIC is a central concept “currently invoked by virtually all 
bodies dealing with indigenous peoples rights”, according to Barelli.487 Szlabowski 
refers to FPIC as a “negotiated model of justice” within resource governance,488 and it 
is worth noting that parts of the extractive industry, including the International Council 
of Mining and Metals, an industry association of dozens of global mining firms, are 
engaging with the concept of FPIC through mining best practice guidance,489 in order 
to pre-empt grievances which may cause conflict or delay to mining projects. According 
to Lewis, UNDRIP has been even instrumental in developing the right of consultation 
“into a customary international law standard”.490 
While international human rights law is only binding on states, there is a clear 
responsibility for companies to participate fully in discussions on projects they lead that 
could have social and environmental impacts. Most states require that an EIA is 
approved by them, for example, before activities can commence. This participation 
benefits all stakeholders, by increasing transparency and thereby avoiding conflict. To 
make this point Shift, a group established by the first (and only) UN Special Rapporteur 
on Business and Human Rights, Professor John Ruggie, and the Harvard Kennedy 
School quantified the potential costs of delays to mining projects in a study on mining 
projects called “Costs of Company-Community conflict in the Extractive Sector”.491 
This approach, relying on quantifying the cost of delays due to dissenting communities, 
 
487 Mauro Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead’, The International Journal of Human 
Rights 16, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2011.597746. 
488 Szablowski, ‘Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector?’ 
489 ICMM, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Mining Good Practice Guide.’ (London: International Council on 
Mining and Metals (ICMM), 2015), http://app.knovel.com/hotlink/toc/id:kpIPMGPGS1/indigenous-
peoples-and. 
490 Lewis, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’. 
491 Rachel Davis, and Daniel Franks, Costs of Company-Community Conflict in the Extractive Sector, 
Harvard Kennedy Law School, Shift and the University of Queensland, 12 May 2014, accessed 2 January 
2018, https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/research/Costs%20of%20Conflict_Davis%20%20Franks.pdf  
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exposes the soft law limitations of the UN framework, which mediates between 
powerful profit-seeking companies and determined communities, often fighting for 
their lives. 
Within the developing field of business and human rights, indigenous peoples’ 
rights are acknowledged to be directly affected by development projects sanctioned by 
states and enacted by (often foreign or multinational) corporations. Within the UN 
Forum on Business and Human Rights which now occurs yearly in Geneva, there has 
been a push led by the Ecuadorean delegation for a legally-binding treaty on business 
and human rights, to consolidate the guidelines and protocols so far developed such as 
the UN Global Compact492 and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights.493 Mining and energy companies are a key stakeholder in these international 
discussions as their projects often impact the environment and thus indigenous 
communities’ land rights.  
Where states are unwilling to comply with their duties to indigenous communities 
under IHRL, corporations can avoid conflict by ensuring that their community 
relations strategies are well thought-through, properly funded and staffed. A number of 
strategies have developed as a result, ranging from “corporate social responsibility” 
(CSR), where companies donate to or even deliver wholesale community projects and 
public services,494 to obtaining a “social licence”495 from the community for their 
project.  
 
492 United Nations Global Compact, The Ten Principles UN Global Compact, 2000, accessed 2 January 2018, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles  
493 UN Human Rights Council, Protect, respect and remedy : a framework for business and human rights : report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 7 April 2008, A/HRC/8/5 
 
494 Nicholas Connolly, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Duplicitous Distraction?’, The International 
Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 8 (1 December 2012): 1228–49, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2012.731193. 
495 Juliette Syn, ‘The Social License: Empowering Communities and a Better Way Forward’, Social 
Epistemology 28, no. 3–4 (2 October 2014): 318–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2014.922640. 
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On the community side, communities who might feel under threat from extractive 
projects in their territories are increasingly able to access organisations that can facilitate 
legal education and help them plan a response. As a result, some have developed their 
own “community protocol”, that can help outline their understanding of their rights. 
These take various forms, but often include, according to Lewis: 
a description of the group, including its values, relationship with their land and 
resources, customary laws and governance system; a statement of the 
community’s development aspirations; their rights and responsibilities under 
national and international laws; and the process for obtaining the community’s 
‘free, prior and informed consent’.496 
Lewis’s summary of a typical protocol shows clear overlaps with the binding law on 
indigenous community consultations analysed above. A description of the group can 
enable consultors to understand whom they might best approach to begin to facilitate 
consultations that best represent the interests of the whole group. An understanding of 
the areas of land and resources the group uses can ensure an iterative consultation, 
where the impact information presented is directly relevant to the group’s probable 
concerns.  
The 33 Communities of the Salinas Grandes in Argentina worked with a number 
of national and international NGOs, such as the Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
(FARN) and the Henrich Böll Foundation, to produce a community consultation protocol, 
Kachi Yupi: Huellas de Sal, which has been celebrated perhaps as the first protocol of its 
kind. The next chapter uses fieldwork data and an analysis of the legal case of the 33 
Communities to document the fulfilment of the rights laid out above in Argentina. 
 
496 Lewis, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’. 
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Conclusion 
This aim of this chapter was to analyse the environmental human rights of indigenous 
communities in IHRL and its regional regimes, with a particular focus on procedural 
environmental rights – participation, consultation, access to justice – and specific rights 
to consultation and FPIC for indigenous peoples. It highlighted how indigenous 
peoples are recognised in international legislation and case law as having a particular 
connection with their ancestral territories, showing how this link has informed the 
consultation debate. Numerous cases within the Latin American System have 
demonstrated that the right to consultation and even the right to grant or withhold 
consent for projects is a developing precedent within international law. Alongside this, 
the practice of conducting an EIA prior to a project is widely accepted, is included in 
international environmental law and is commonplace in national law. 
The background to these environmental human rights laws creates the central 
tension of this thesis. While states have the responsibility to respect environmental 
human rights of their citizens, with extra obligations to indigenous collective groups, 
the state has permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The state is itself bound by 
this key principle of international law (permanent sovereignty over natural resources) 
and is obliged to use revenues to raise living standards in the country (ICESCR). Thus, 
the state supports industry by granting concessions and tax incentives to extract or 
develop land and natural resources. This incentive for “development” is supported by 
an international economic system that prioritises growth and profit, often at the 
expense of human rights.497 
The specific purpose of identifying these rights and precedents was to ascertain 
 
497 Helle Abelvik-Lawson, ‘Sustainable Development for Whose Benefit? Brazil’s Economic Power and 
Human Rights Violations in the Amazon and Mozambique’, The International Journal of Human Rights 18, 
no. 7–8 (17 November 2014): 795–821, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2014.946800. 
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which rights apply to the indigenous communities living around the lithium-rich 
Argentinean and Bolivian salt flats, who have been or will soon be living in the vicinity 
of large or multiple lithium extraction zones and associated processing facilities. The 
chapter has established that as indigenous communities, the Kolla, Atacama and 
Quechua communities living around the salt flats of northern Argentina and 
southwestern Bolivia have a right to participation in environmental matters under 
international human rights and environmental law both as individuals and indigenous 
peoples. Whether rights to participation and consultation or indeed the right to give or 
withhold FPIC (in the case of Bolivia) have been fulfilled adequately in each state, and 
to what extent, is the central research question that the rest of the thesis hopes to 
answer.  
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CHAPTER 5 ARGENTINA: KOLLA AND ATACAMA 
PEOPLES’ ENVIRONMENTAL PARTICIPATION IN 
LITHIUM MINING IN JUJUY PROVINCE 
Introduction 
The northwestern Argentinean provinces of Catamarca, Salta and Jujuy are at the centre 
of what the Economist has described as a lithium “white gold rush”.498 In Jujuy 
Province, this is mostly centred around the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat, upon which two 
companies have mines that are currently in production. Sales de Jujuy’s facility on the 
Salar de Olaroz produces 17,500 tonnes of battery-grade lithium carbonate annually, 
although this increasing.499 Founded in 2010,500 Sales de Jujuy is a joint venture between 
Australian mining firm Orocobre, Japan’s Toyota Tsusho, and the Jujuy state firm, 
Jujuy Energía y Minería Sociedad del Estado (JEMSE).501 The company began 
commercial production of lithium in 2014.502  
Operating on Olaroz’s neighbouring (and much smaller) salt flat Cauchari is Exar, 
another joint venture between two foreign mining companies and JEMSE, including 
Lithium Americas, a Canadian company that counts Japanese automotive corporation 
Mitsubishi as one of its shareholders.503 Chilean lithium company Sociedad Química y 
Minera (SQM) owned 50 percent of Exar until late 2018, when it sold to the Chinese 
 
498 Economist, ‘A Battle for Supremacy in the Lithium Triangle’. 
499 Juliana Castilla, ‘Argentina Lithium Projects Seek Financing as Production Seen Tripling’, Reuters, 8 
February 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-lithium/argentina-lithium-projects-seek-
financing-as-production-seen-tripling-idUSKBN15N2VN. 
500 Former leader, Olaroz Chico, Susques Region, Jujuy Province, 6 February 2017. 
501 Sales de Jujuy, ‘About Us’, Sales de Jujuy, n.d., http://salesdejujuy.com/about-us/. 
502 Sales de Jujuy, ‘Sales de Jujuy’. 
503 James Atwood and Jonathan Gilbert, ‘Argentina Eyeing Lithium Superpower Status Amid Battery 
Boom’, Bloomberg, 6 March 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-06/argentina-s-
lithium-superpower-ambition-is-good-news-for-tesla. 
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firm Gangfeng Lithium.504 Exar had not started actually mining lithium at the time of 
my fieldwork, but was working closely with local communities. Their plant came into 
production in November 2018,505 and has an expected output of 25,000 tonnes of 
battery-grade lithium carbonate per year.506  
In order to answer the research question (to what extent have communities had 
opportunities to participate in decision-making over the lithium industry?), compliance with the 
law presented in Chapter 4 is measured through my analysis of the experiences of two 
set of communities in the vicinity of these two salt flats, the Salinas Grandes and 
Olaroz-Cauchari, and one activist group in the based in and around the main town of 
Susques near Olaroz Cauchari, called the Colectivo Apacheta. 
As stated in Chapter 2, Jujuy Province is home to Argentina’s largest indigenous 
population by percentage compared to other provinces.507 In this region, the 
communities are predominantly Kolla and Atacama indigenous communities engaged 
in subsistence farming and, in the case of some of the 33 Salinas Grandes communities, 
the traditional practice of salt-gathering.  
The chapter has three parts. The first analyses Argentinean provincial and federal 
mining, environmental and indigenous rights law. The second examines the 33 
Communities of the Salinas Grandes and the Olaroz Communities, with a focus on 
their relationship with the land and natural resources. It also summarises the key 
concerns of the communities (where there are concerns), which are primarily related to 
 
504 Panorama Minero, ‘SQM Se Retira de Cauchari-Olaroz – Se Conforma JV Entre Lithium Americas y 
Ganfeng Lithium – Panorama Minero’. 
505 TECH2, ‘Minera EXAR Started Its Lithium Production at Cauchari Olaroz’. 
506 MarketWired, Lithium Americas Announces Positive Feasibility Study for Stage 1 of the Cauchari-
Olaroz Lithium Project, 29 March 2017, accessed 14 March 2018 http://www.marketwired.com/press-
release/lithium-americas-announces-positive-feasibility-study-stage-1-cauchari-olaroz-lithium-tsx-lac-
2206125.htm  
507 INDEC, 2001, accessed 14 March 2018 
http://coleccion.educ.ar/coleccion/CD9/contenidos/recursos/datos-mapas/mapa3.html  
  
 
 
181 
water and damage to the salt flats used for the traditional practice of salt gathering (in 
the Salinas Grandes only). The third analyses the extent of consultation based on the 
criteria laid out in the previous Chapter 4.  
This aim of this chapter is to assess levels of community participation based on 
environmental human rights (the three pillars) and rights as indigenous peoples (to 
consultation and free, prior and informed consent) identified and analysed in Chapter 4. 
It also aims to provide an overview of the potential risks to the substantive 
environmental rights of indigenous communities in the northern provinces of 
Argentina, based on the limited environmental impact information available. The 
chapter is the first of two chapters based on primary fieldwork data and background 
legal and documentary research pertaining to the two communities.  
5.1 Mining, environmental and indigenous rights’ law in 
Argentina 
This section outlines federal and provincial law in Jujuy pertaining to mining, 
environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights. Law in Argentina is administered by 
both federal and provincial courts, with federal courts only dealing with cases of a 
national character or where different provinces or inhabitants are parties. The 
provisions set out below form the framework upon which compliance is measured in 
the following sections, which also analyse Argentina’s obligations under the 
international law set out in Chapter 4. 
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5.1.1 Mining and environmental law in Argentina  
Argentina’s 2002 General Law on the Environment No. 25.675 gives effect to the 
constitutional right to a healthy environment (Article 41),508 and a number of provinces 
have adopted such a right into their provincial constitutions. Moreover, this article is 
directly referred to in the national Mining Code Chapter XXII,509 which the Jujuy 
Mining Code further references.510 Many of the Jujuy Mining Code provisions related 
back to the national code, including the article on environmental protection 
standards.511 Chapter XIII, Second Section of the (national) Mining Code elaborates 
upon the environmental obligations of any entity establishing a mine. It applies to 
“individuals and legal entities, public and private, centralized or decentralized entities 
and Companies of the National, Provincial and Municipal state”512 (Article 247) 
developing any of the following activities: 
a) Prospecting, exploration, exploitation, development, preparation, extraction 
and storage of mineral substances included in this Mining Code, including all 
activities designed to close the mine. 513 (Article 249) 
Article 251 stipulates that the miner “must submit an Environmental Impact Report to 
the enforcement authority, before the start of any activity specified in Article 249” 
(above),514 which notably includes both “prospecting” and “preparation”, but these are 
not specifically defined in the law. This report has to meet the standards laid out in Law 
24.585, incorporated into the Mining Code, which regulates environmental protection 
 
508 Government of Argentina, Argentina (Republic of)'s Constitution of 1853, Reinstated in 1983, with 
Amendments through 1994, translated by Jonathan M. Miller and Fang-Lian Liao (Oxford: OUP, 1994), 
Article 41. 
509 Government of Argentina, National Mining Code of Argentina enacted by Law No. 1,919 in 1886 and 
subsequently amended several times since, Chapter XII. 
510 Province of Jujuy, Law 5186 Code of Mining Procedures, 2000, refers to Chapter XII, Article 34 of 
National Mining Code. 
511 Government of Argentina, National Mining Code of Argentina enacted by Law No. 1,919 in 1886 and 
subsequently amended several times since, Chapter XII. 
512 Ibid, Article 251. Author’s italics.  
513 Ibid. Author’s italics. 
514 Ibid. Author’s italics. 
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for mining activities.515 Following this, the enforcement authority issues an 
“Environmental Impact Declaration” to allow the applicant to develop the activities.516 
National Argentinean environment law states that all activities that could modify 
or alter the environment, resources or the quality of life of the population “in a 
significant form” must be subject to the process of an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA),517 although it does not define a “significant” modification. The state 
is responsible for the management of this process,518 the practice of which is devolved 
to the provinces. Furthermore, Argentina’s General Law on the Environment Article 
20 provides for public hearings prior to the authorisation of activities that may generate 
“negative and significant effects on the environment”, again without defining 
‘significant’.519 Article 21 states that 
Citizen participation must be ensured, mainly, in the environmental impact 
assessment procedures and in the environmental planning plans and programs 
of the territory, in particular, in the stages of planning and evaluation of 
results.520 
Although the law again is unclear on exactly when citizen participation must occur, the 
repetition of “planning” suggests that this should be before any substantive mining 
activity takes place. 
Jujuy’s General Law on the Environment’s Article 45 states that  
The regulations shall provide for mechanisms to ensure the proper 
dissemination of environmental impact studies of the projects submitted for 
evaluation, so that they may be consulted by interested parties who wish to 
make observations. Likewise, it will also provide for the holding of public 
hearings in order to submit the project to the community concerned for 
consultation.521 
 
515 Government of Argentina, Law No. 24.585, on environmental protection for mining activities in Title 
XVIII, section 2 of the Mining Code. 
516 Thomson Reuters, ‘Mining in Argentina: Overview’, Practical Law, n.d., 
http://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-572-
8327?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1. 
517 Government of Argentina, Ley General de Ambiente No. 25.675, 28 November 2002, Article 8.2 and 11–
13.  
518 Ibid, Article 12. 
519 Ibid, Article 20. 
520 Ibid, Article 21. 
521 Province of Jujuy, Ley General de Ambiente No. 5063, 1998. 
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Interestingly the language changes here to “studies”, rather than reports, indicating that 
the earlier report is only for the competent authority to approve the activity. These are 
what are supposed to be taken to interested parties. 
Taken together there are clear rights for environmental participation at some point 
in advance of the establishment of mining projects in Jujuy, including obligations on 
the mining company to present an EIR at the earliest stages to the enforcement 
authority, and for studies to be presented to “the community concerned” in public 
hearings. 
5.1.2 Environmental impact assessments and the right to consultation 
Above I established that the national Mining Code (referenced in the Jujuy Mining 
Code) requires an EIR submitted to the enforcement authority before any kind of 
activity takes place, including prospecting. The Province of Jujuy’s General Law on the 
Environment No. 5063 outlines the process for producing and disseminating an EIA. 
This process is partially outlined in Article 42, which states that:  
In the planning of works or public or private activities susceptible to produce 
environmental deterioration the accomplishment of prior studies of 
environmental impact will be obligatory in all the provincial territory.522  
Furthermore, Article 43 of Jujuy’s environment law states that: 
The projects of works or activities included in the stated regulations must be 
communicated, before the beginning of their execution, to the enforcement authority 
or to the corresponding competent provincial organs, which determine, within 
the term the regulations establish, whether or not they should be submitted for 
the environmental impact assessment.523 
The “prior” submission of the request here is key: the company must communicate to 
the mining authority before beginning work, in the form of an EIR, the projected 
“environmental deterioration”. Then, the “competent provincial organs” decide on 
 
522 Ibid, Article 42. 
523 Ibid Article 43. Emphasis added. 
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whether the activity needs an EIA. The distribution of the EIA is determined by Article 
45 above, which includes public hearings “in order to submit the project to the 
community concerned for consultation”.524  
The Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN), an Argentinean NGO that 
worked closely with the 33 Communities on legal education following the prospecting 
on the Salinas Grandes in 2010, interprets Jujuy’s environmental law as follows. 
According to FARN, there are four stages of submitting and presenting an EIA to the 
public, which are: 1) the presentation of the Environmental Feasibility Request with the 
Environmental Impact Study (EIS); 2) the Public Hearing (where the community is 
informed of the contents of the study); 3) the Environmental Feasibility Report, that 
can approve or reject the project (and can also submit modifications or conditions); and 
4) in the case it is approved, the Environmental Aptitude Certificate.525  
The Jujuy Law on Public Hearings No. 5317 further stipulates that contents of the 
EIS must be made known to affected parties in advance of the public hearing. It also 
requires that the public hearing must be publicised and be held in a place, on a day and 
at a time that is convenient for its expected audience to attend. 526 These are similar 
provisions to those found in supporting conditions for the enactment of consultation 
of indigenous peoples under ILO169.527 However, there is nothing in the law to suggest 
that responses should be taken into account. Therefore, the modality of participation 
could be seen as weak, according to Picolotti,528 as responses from communities heard 
 
524 Ibid Article 45 
525 Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN) EIA en Jujuy, presentation from workshop in 
Abra Pampa, 25 August, 2008, accessed 2 January 2018, http://farn.org.ar/wp-
content/uploads/2008/08/taller_jujuy250808.pdf  
526 Ibid. 
527 Barelli, “Free, prior and informed consent in the aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples”. 
528 Picolotti, “Agenda 21 and Human Rights: The Right to Participate”. It is also worth noting that new 
legal instruments are being developed to account for the unique way lithium resources are exploited (i.e. 
due to brine resources needing to be shared between two or more mining companies) and in order to 
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within “public hearings” are unlikely to be binding on the state.  
Environmental participation rights are however well represented in Jujuy’s 
environmental law, as outlined above. However, the requirement to present an EIA to 
an audiencia pública (public hearing or meeting) is determined by the authorities’ 
assessment of the EIR and whether damage will likely be significant. Even where an 
EIA is required, it appears that the community’s opinion is not likely to be binding. 
5.1.3 Indigenous peoples’ rights law in Argentina 
The Argentinean Constitution mentions indigenous peoples only once. Article 75.17 of 
the provides that “The Congress shall have power… [t]o recognise the ethnic and 
cultural pre-existence of indigenous Argentine peoples” and “to recognize the legal 
standing of their communities, and the possession and community property over lands 
they have traditionally occupied”. Moreover, Congress also has power to “to assure 
their participation in the related administration of their natural resources and of other 
interests affecting them”.529 The article concludes that “[t]he Provinces may exercise 
these powers concurrently.530 While this appears to grant rights to indigenous peoples 
to legal recognition, property and participation, it could be assessed as weak: the 
article’s opening clause grants that “Congress shall have power” to “recognise the legal 
standing of their communities” and other rights; it does not grant the rights themselves.  
There are two national laws of note on the rights of indigenous peoples. The 1985 
Law on Indigenous Policy and Support for Aboriginal Communities No. 23.302 
recognises indigenous communities (Article 2), creates the National Institute of 
Indigenous Affairs (Article 5), and commits to, inter alia, land allocation (Articles 7–13), 
 
administrate in cases where a salt flat crosses provincial borders as is the case with the Salar de Hombre 
Muerto (Catamarca–Salta) and Salinas Grandes (Salta–Jujuy), according to the Salta legal counsel. 
529 Government of Argentina, Constitution of Argentina 1853 (1994).  
530 Ibid. 
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education (Articles 14–17) and health (Articles 18—21) for Argentina’s indigenous 
populations.531 The second is the Indigenous Land Law No. 26.160,532 which was 
established as an emergency law in 2006 for only four years to suspend evictions and 
register land rights for over 1,500 indigenous communities in Argentina.533 To date, 
only around 500 communities have been granted rights to their land,534 evictions have 
continued and indigenous protests for land have been violently suppressed by the 
state.535 As recently as September 2017, representatives of communities from across 
Argentina camped outside Congress to demand the extension of the law, which was 
granted.536 It is still temporary (or “emergency”) legislation however.  
Article 50 of the Jujuy Constitution (developed from the constitutional reforms 
that occurred in 1986) states that “[t]he Province shall protect the aboriginals by means 
of adequate legislation that drives their integration and social and economic 
progress”.537 The use of the outdated “aboriginals”, and the drive for “their integration 
and social and economic progress” recall the assimilationist principles within ILO107, 
in force at the time of this reform (1986), before the updated ILO169 (1989).538  
 
531 Government of Argentina, Ley No. 23.302 sobre Política Indígena y apoyo a las Comunidades Aborígenes 
 [Indigenous Policy and Support for Aboriginal Communities], 1985. 
532 Government of Argentina, Ley No. 26.160, Declárase la emergencia en materia de posesión y propiedad de las 
tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan las comunidades indígenas originarias del país, cuya personería jurídica haya sido 
inscripta en el Registro Nacional de Comunidades Indígenas u organismo provincial competente o aquéllas preexistentes, 
2006. 
This law was approved in 2006 for an initial period of four years, extended to a total of 11 years. 
Following protests, marches and an encampment, and some months after the forced disappearance of 
Mapuche indigenous activist Santiago Maldonado, the law was extended for another four years in 
September 2017. 
533 Giacoppo, Silvia, “Ley 26.160: una deuda historica con los pueblos indigenas”, Telam, January 2, 2018 
at http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201709/207406-le.y-26160-una-deuda-historica-con-los-pueblos-
indigenas.html  
534 Ibid.  
535 Amnesty International, ‘Indigenous Peoples in Argentina’. 
536 Resumen Latinoamericano, “El Senado aprobó la prórroga de la Ley de Tierras para los Pueblos 
Originarios/ Representantes de las cuarenta comunidades originarias acamparon frente al Congreso”, 
September 27, 2017, accessed January 2, 2018,  
 http://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2017/09/27/argentina-el-senado-aprobo-la-prorroga-de-la-
ley-de-tierras-para-los-pueblos-originarios-representantes-de-las-cuarenta-comunidades-originarias-
acamparon-frente-al-congreso/  
537 Province of Jujuy, Constitucion de la Provincia de Jujuy, 1986, Article 50. 
538 Translation by author. Original: Article 50: “La Provincia deberá proteger a los aborígenes por medio de una 
legislación adecuada que conduzca a su integración y progreso económico y social” 
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Although ILO169 is present in national law in its own discrete piece of legislation, 
the mining authorities in the region see their obligations under international indigenous 
human rights law as not requiring the seeking of consent from indigenous communities, 
nor that they are bound by any prior consultation. The Salta legal counsel I interviewed 
told me that 
in practice, the communities in Jujuy may confuse what is consultation (free prior and 
informed), with consent. A consultation may be binding or not. Consent, which means that the 
community does or does not want it, this can close or develop the project. In Canada, if the 
community does not want it, it isn’t developed. In Canada there is consent. In Argentina, 
these laws do not require prior consultation.539 
The idea that Canadian First Nations have a “right to veto” is erroneous, but there is a 
certainly a lack of clarity within the Salta Mining Ministry as to whether consent should 
be sought, or consultations performed at all (and whether if they are, they should be 
binding).  
Notably Jujuy has no specific laws relating to the rights of indigenous peoples in 
the province, and their special status pertaining to land rights is not acknowledged in 
provincial or environmental codes. Despite this, the legal counsel for the Salta Mining 
Ministry, however, told me that (presumably like anyone else set to be affected) 
indigenous communities in Salta and Jujuy must be informed: 
From the first stage. From prospection, it is already required. It’s like a ladder of 
requirements. The more the project advances towards exploitation, the greater the requirements 
for social issues, and the links between the company and the community must become bigger. 
Larger meetings, larger public hearings.540  
The response is vague, indicating that the process for involving communities is 
primarily through increasingly larger meetings, and that this is considered a “social 
issue”. Notably, the government mining officials I spoke to in both provinces were 
keen to point out that Argentinean law stipulates that it is the state that owns any 
 
539 Legal counsel, Salta Mining Ministry. Interview with author, Salta, 18 May 2017 
540 Ibid. 
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subsurface resources, not the owners of the land.541 Argentinean Constitution Article 
124 affirms that “[t]he original ownership over natural resources existing in their 
territory belongs to the Provinces.”542 This is a common claim by states, and exactly 
why it is referenced in ILO169 Article 14, which grants a right to consultation for 
indigenous communities even where the state claims ownership of subsurface 
resources.543  
In sum, there is no evidence in the law in Jujuy that indigenous communities are 
afforded any special protection measures (such as a right to consultation clearly 
provided for in international law) when a mine is being proposed.  
This conclusion reflects a general sense that Argentina’s indigenous peoples 
struggle to access their rights. Ruteere, the UN Special Rapporteur on racism and 
related intolerance, has stated that Argentina’s indigenous people are “largely invisible 
in society and are excluded from the country’s senate, congress and judiciary”.544 It is 
notable that across Jujuy, in the suburban indigenous communities of the Humahuaca 
Valley, there are evident problems with discrimination and indigenous rights violations. 
These include the imprisonment without trial for over a year of indigenous leader 
Milagro Sala on spurious allegations of corruption, a case which drew attention from 
 
541 Ibid; Salta Geology Professor and former Salta Mining Minister, Interview with author, Salta, 10 May 
2017; Mining Minister of Jujuy Province. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 22 May 2017. 
542 Government of Argentina, Argentina Constitution 1853 (with revisions to 1994), Article 124. 
543 This is further compounded in the lithium triangle states by their categorization of lithium as also a 
“strategic” mineral, a line that was used by one of company community relations’ lead. According to 
Fornillo, it was “[t]hrough the Governmental Decree No. 7592 of March 2011, the government of Jujuy 
declared lithium a ‘strategic natural resource’, forcing exploration and mining exploitation projects to be 
subject to prior study by a Committee of Experts for the Comprehensive Analysis of Projects of 
Lithium.” Bruno Fornillo, “Del salar a la batería”: Política, ciencia e industria del litio en la Argentina”, in 
Bruno Fornillo, Geopolítica, 2015, p.72 (fn 11). There is little detail as to what that might mean in practice 
for the communities. The implication is that the state’s claim to the resource is strengthened, and that 
consultation processes or FPIC for indigenous communities, even those that own the land, do not apply 
in Argentina. 
544 Mutuma Ruteere, “Full text of the press statement delivered by the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 23 May 2016, accessed 2 January 2018, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20005&LangID=E 
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Amnesty International and the United Nations (see Chapter 2).545 
5.2 Communities around the Salinas Grandes and Olaroz-
Cauchari salt flats 
The following section primarily uses data gathered during fieldwork to set out the legal 
interest of indigenous communities of the high Andean plains of Argentina’s Jujuy 
province in land and natural resources in the region. While this naturally focuses on the 
salt gathering communities of the Salinas Grandes, responses of both these and the 
Olaroz Communities to lithium mining are also explored in full. The section concludes 
with a brief overview of the environmental concerns surrounding lithium mining in 
Argentina. 
5.2.1 Kolla and Atacama communities’ use of the salt flats and surrounding land 
Jujuy has been home to Kolla and Atacama indigenous communities since 500AD.546 
Their reliance on the environment for their survival, particularly reliable access to water 
in an arid region, and traditional livelihoods creates a natural tension with the incoming 
mining companies. As the Mining Minister of Jujuy told me “We are the capital of mining. 
We are capital of the Pachamama as well.”547 Pachamama is the Quechuan and Aymaran 
indigenous word for the Inca “Mother Earth” fertility goddess,548 and also refers to 
“mother nature” generally. Jujuy’s status as the “Pachamama Province” is used in 
tourism advertising, such as on billboards promoting the province’s natural attractions 
that span north towards Bolivia along the UNESCO World Heritage-recognised 
 
545 Amnesty International, “Argentina: further information: arbitrarily detained for over a year: Milagro 
Sala”, 2 February 2017, Index number: AMR 13/5612/2017, accessed 31 October 2018, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr13/5612/2017/en/; James Anaya, Report to the Human 
Rights Council on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Argentina, 4 July 2012, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/21/47/Add.2. 
546 Wikiwand, Atacama people, nd, accessed 12 January 2019 
http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Atacama_people#/History  
547 Mining Minister of Jujuy Province. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 22 May 2017 
548 Lira, Jorge A. Diccionario Kkechuwa–Español . Tucumán, Argentina, 1944. “La” Pachamama, which is 
what Miguel says here; this usually denotes nature rather than the goddess herself. 
  
 
 
191 
Quebrada de Humahuaca valley.549 These natural attractions include the Salinas 
Grandes, the fourth largest salt flat in South America.  
The Kolla and Atacama indigenous communities in the puna generally comprise a 
few hundred people per community, and are widely dispersed across the landscape, 
often many kilometres apart. The communities self-organise through monthly meetings 
led by a community association leader, who is democratically elected every two years by 
the community.550 Decisions are made at these meetings by consensus, and enacted by 
the leader who is often supported by a smaller committee.  
The communities have similar subsistence traditions to their counterparts in 
neighbouring Chile and Bolivia. This includes grazing llamas and other camelids for 
meat, milk and wool as well as rearing goats and donkeys for food and transport. For 
some of the communities in the Salinas Grandes basin, salt harvesting is a very 
important part of their economic history and culture.551 A traditional activity of the 
communities here since pre-Columbian times, salt is still cultivated on the Salinas 
Grandes salt flat and harvested according to a seasonal pattern of salt “growth”, which 
depends on stable water cycles. In an economic structure that goes back to before the 
Spanish Conquest, salt is then transported to the valleys to trade for other goods.  
The salt harvest relies on the natural hydrological cycles of the salt flat. As salt 
production has occurred for centuries on the Salinas Grandes, it is not only 
economically but also culturally and even spiritually significant to these communities. 
 
549 This is a UNESCO World Heritage site as it follows the line of the Camino Inca (Inca Way), a major 
cultural route that has been used over the past 10,000 years as a crucial passage for the transport of 
people and ideas from the high Andean lands to the plains”, and is “the most important physical linkage 
between the high Andean lands and the extensive temperate plains in south-eastern South America.” 
UNESCO World Heritage List, at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1116 
550 It is notable that there seem to be few demographic barriers to entry for this role, and numerous 
social groups were represented: many communities I visited elected leaders who were women, very 
young, or who lived with a disability, for example. 
551 Göbel, 2013: 144. Göbel describes this region as a space of transition and socioeconomic articulation 
between highlands and lowlands that is characterized by a high degree of social fragmentation (cited in 
Fornillo, Geopolitica, 2015). 
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When a news reporter interviewed a former leader of a community near the Salinas 
Grandes called the Santuário de Tres Pozos, she said: “The salt lake is a sacred place 
for us, a part of our family. We can’t destroy it.”552 Of the 33 Communities who live all 
across the Salinas Grandes and Lake Guayatayoc watershed or basin, many of them 
(but not all) are actively involved in salt-gathering through three cooperatives. 
Nonetheless, the salt flat appears to be culturally and even spiritually important to most 
if not all of the communities. The representative of the 33 Communities told me that 
it is important that the work of the community is recognised ... because if not it is like it’s just 
in the air. We said that we wanted to take into account that many activities are done in the 
Salinas, because they were not talking about our use of the salt.553 
He continued that the land also “has the theme of water, issues of pasture, the issues of the 
cycle…” he continues, referring to a cycle of salt “growth” that occurs in a seasonal 
pattern, which is detailed in the Kachi Yupi consultation protocol (see Appendix A). 
According to my informant from the 33 Communities, only some have official 
communitarian land title from the state. Although I was unable to visit them all to 
verify either way, it appeared that more of the Olaroz Communities had had their 
communitarian land rights regularised by the state. In contrast to the Salinas Grandes 
communities, none of the Olaroz Communities are directly engaged with salt gathering 
practices. Interestingly, despite their proximity to the Olaroz salt flat, none of the 
inhabitants of Olaroz Chico practise salt gathering or use the natural resources from the 
Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat as some of the Salinas Grandes communities do. This is not 
for want of trying: “We tried [mining] iodine once, but it didn’t work”, I was told by the 
former community association leader.554 
In this region the unifying geography is not just the salt flat but the watershed, or 
 
552 Pellettieri, ‘Mining Firms Seek Argentina’s “White Gold,” But Local Approval Proves More Elusive’. 
553 Representative from 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
554 Ibid. 
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basin. Although the communities are widely dispersed, this can mean that a community 
many kilometres away from the salt flat can still be concerned for its integrity, for 
environmental as well as economic, cultural or even spiritual reasons.  
5.2.2 Responses to lithium mining company proposals around the Salinas Grandes 
In 2010 a team from a company called “American Salar” arrived in Salinas Grandes and 
started prospecting for lithium, by drilling holes in the salt flat. According to my 
interviewee, and other studies in this area, there was no information sent in advance to 
the communities by either state authorities or the company. Even by 2017, lithium 
mining processes were unclear to my informant: 
We do not really know, nor have we seen how lithium is exploited. When American Salar's 
workers were doing a little exploitation... the people who were working there were lunatics! 
They looked like they were extra-terrestrials, with all this equipment. If it is not polluting, 
why there near their encampment was the sign with the mask that says it was forbidden to 
pass on danger of death?!555  
Seeing the workers in hazmat suits and the skull-and-crossbones signs was clearly 
alarming to community members. He said that the people in his village, located around 
12 kilometres from the main road that runs through the salt flat, only found out about 
the activity when the salt cooperative workers felt that neighbouring villages needed to 
be aware, and so sent a local on a mule to notify them.556 The prospecting by the 
company, known to community members as “American Salar”, spurred the 
communities into organising and forming the Mesa de comunidades originarias de la Cuenca 
de Salinas Grandes y Laguna de Guayatayoc para la defensa y gestión del territorio. According to 
their lawyer, this provided them with “institutional weight within the provincial government”.557 
Eight of the 33 Communities are located in Salta Province; the rest are in Jujuy, and 
 
555 Representative from 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
556 Ibid. 
557 Alicia Chalabe, Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 
February 2017. 
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these communities have a population totalling approximately 6,500 people.558 
Interestingly, the Mesa was only formed in response to lithium prospecting, to 
galvanise allegiances between widely dispersed communities in pursuit of a common 
goal. It bears repeating that only some communities are engaged with salt gathering, but 
it is clear that concerns over damage to the salt flat are not restricted to those who use 
the salt directly. As the lawyer for the 33 Communities noted:  
the environmental impact not only passes by one community, but also by the basin – because 
that is what will take all the impact, right? It’s not just impacting a single community, but the 
whole basin.559 
This framing of the basin as a collective area of impact matches with the indigenous 
communitarian importance of “living well” in harmony with nature and others. This 
was elaborated by the representative of the 33 Communities:  
Buen vivir has to be with nature. You cannot live without nature in accordance, really. If 
you do not have… if you take everything out of nature, what are you going to do, what are you 
going to have? You don’t have anything. You do not have shade if you do not plant the trees to 
make the shade. The idea [buen vivir] means consolidating and accompanying nature.560 
Interestingly, he invokes the indigenous cosmovision more commonly associated with 
Bolivia and Ecuador (see Chapter 2), as a defence against lithium mining on the Salinas 
Grandes. 
In 2011, following the arrival of lithium prospectors on their traditional territories 
a year earlier, the 33 Communities took a legal case against the Jujuy and Salta 
Provinces to the Argentinean Supreme Court.561 The case put forward a demand for 
 
558 Comite ́ de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Informacion Paralela Al Comite De Derechos 
Economicos, Sociales Y Culturales Con Respecto Al Tercer Informe Periodico De Argentina (Un Doc. 
E/C.12/Arg/3) Segun El Pacto Internacional De Derechos Economicos, Sociales y Culturales, 
Preparada por la Mesa de comunidades originarias de la Cuenca de Salinas Grandes y Laguna de 
Guayatayoc para la defensa y gestión del Territorio, Con el apoyo de la Comisión Internacional de 
Juristas, 47a Sesión, 14 de noviembre – 2 de diciembre de 2011. 
559 Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017. 
560 Representative from 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
561 Supreme Court of Argentina “Comunidad Aborigen de Santuario Tres Pozos y otros c/ Jujuy, 
Provincia de y otros s/ amparo” December 18, 2012 C.1196.XLVI accessed January 2, 2018, 
http://public.diariojudicial.com/documentos/000/020/091/000020091.pdf  
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consultation, clearly based on the belief that they were entitled to be consulted based 
on their traditional use of the salt flat and occupation of the surrounding areas. They 
lost this case, on the grounds that the prospecting activity was unlicensed, and did not 
affect the communities directly.  
However, the communities had commissioned a report stating that following the 
prospecting activity, which included the drilling of at least 47 perforations in Salinas 
Grandes, the area had become contaminated.562 Elaborating on this during the case, 
one of the lawyers participating in the lawsuit, Solá, said of the prospecting company: 
They drilled the aquifer. And they committed a double wrong. They contaminated 
the aquifer from where [the communities] obtain water for animal husbandry and 
orchards. And, worse, the fresh water that rose to that part of the salt bank ruined 
the salt, so it cannot be cut and sold anymore.563 
This shows that there were impacts from the prospecting activity, although it was 
denied by the judges in the case taken to the Supreme Court that these impacts had 
affected the communities directly.564 
Following the prospecting in 2010, national and provincial indigenous and 
environmental NGOs such as FARN began to assist the communities in helping them 
identify, understand and mount a legal challenge demanding their rights. This assistance 
developed into community-centred meetings and workshops, and the publication of the 
community consultation protocol Kachi Yupi: Huellas de la Sal: procedimiento de consulta y 
 
562 “Consideraciones ambientales en relación con la construcción de pozos de prospección minera y/o 
hidrogeológica en las Salinas Grandes” [Environmental aspects of drilling wells for mining or 
hydrogeology prospecting in Salinas Grandes], cited in Valente, ‘Native People in Argentina Demand a 
Say in Lithium Mining’. 
563 Dario Aranda,, “Lithium Fever,” Página 12, June 6 2011, accessed March 11, 2019, 
https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/sociedad/3-169555-2011-06-06.html. 
564 The communities were not able to “demonstrate […] that the alleged grievances affect them in a 
‘sufficiently direct’, or ‘substantial’ manner; that is, that they [the grievances] possess ‘sufficient 
concreteness and immediacy’ to be able to procure said process.” “Comunidad Aborigen de Santuario 
Tres Pozos y otros c/ Jujuy, Provincia de y otros s/ amparo”, para 6. 
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consentimiento previo, libre e informado para las comunidades indígenas de las Salinas Grandes y 
Laguna de Guayatayoc (see Appendix A).565 This protocol establishes the communities’ 
interest in the Salinas Grandes salt flat and surrounding watershed for their subsistence 
and traditional activities. Interestingly, “Kachi Yupi” is Quechua for “tracks in the salt”, 
despite Quechua not being widely spoken across these communities.  
The 33 Communities continue to resist lithium mining proposals, staging protests 
in which “No comemos baterías, se llevan el agua se va la vida” has become their rallying 
slogan.566 There are small signs of this ongoing resistance, in the form of anti-mining 
graffiti on the long road from San Salvador de Jujuy to the Salinas Grandes (see 
Photograph A9).  
The Salinas Grandes communities has received some attention from international 
human rights institutions, most notably when the former Special Rapporteur to the 
Secretary General of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples James Anaya visited the region in 2011. 
His report stated that 
it is feared that the proposed extraction of lithium will reduce the water level in 
this arid region, where water is needed to raise sheep, goats and llamas and is 
also essential to salt production and harvesting, an important activity within the 
traditional economy in the area.567 
This visit was effective in providing international attention, highlighting the traditional 
salt economy and warning that substantive environmental rights might come under 
threat from proposed lithium mining on the Salinas Grandes. 
While there was no lithium mining taking place on the Salinas Grandes by 2019, a 
 
565 The 33 Communities of Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc, ‘Kachi Yupi / Huellas de Sal [Footprints in 
the Salt]: Procedimiento de Consulta y Consentimiento Previo, Libre e Informado Para Las 
Comunidades Indígenas de La Cuenca de Salinas Grandes y Laguna de Guayatayoc’. 
566 Darío Aranda, ‘“No Comemos Baterías”: Reclamos Por La Avanzada En La Explotación de Litio’, 
Página12, 16 February 2018, https://www.pagina12.com.ar/96013-no-comemos-baterias. 
567 James Anaya, Report to the Human Rights Council on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in 
Argentina, 4 July 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47/Add.2  
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complex web of concessions on the salt flat have been bought and sold by various 
companies since the industry arrived there in the mid-2000s. Orocobre, the Australian 
firm actively now mining at Olaroz-Cauchari through Sales de Jujuy, acquired a 
company called South American Salar in 2008,568 and bought concessions in Salinas 
Grandes which were then sold in 2017 to LSC Lithium. In 2016 Dajin Resources also 
signed a deal to share the concession with another lithium firm, Lithium S, who now 
owns 51 percent of the concessions on Salinas Grandes.569  
While the above indicates that there was little notification about the prospecting 
activity, a full analysis of whether and how the Province of Jujuy breached the 
communities’ rights to consultation is found in the third section of this chapter.  
5.2.3 Responses to lithium mining around the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat 
Upon turning north off the westbound border-crossing road towards Chile, a large 
Sales de Jujuy billboard signals the presence of Jujuy’s first lithium mining plant, 
situated on the edge of the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat. The billboard reads “From Jujuy 
to the world” (see Photograph A8). This marks the turning to the mine and also the 
village of Olaroz Chico, the closest village to the salt flat upon which Sales de Jujuy has 
its lithium mine, established in the early 2010s.  
I learned from company officials that ten communities around the Olaroz-
Cauchari salt flat region were working with or for Sales de Jujuy; six of these ten with 
Exar.570 Further away from the salt flat, but closer to the town of Susques, are three of 
these communities: Huáncar, Pastos Chicos and Puesto Sey. In contrast to the 33 
Communities of the Salinas Grandes who have resisted lithium mining since 
 
568 Relationship Science database, South American Salar Minerals Pty Ltd., nd, accessed 14 March 2018, 
https://relationshipscience.com/organization/south-american-salar-minerals-pty-ltd-1651427  
569 Dajin Resources, Projects, 2017 at http://dajin.ca/en/projects [Accessed 28 October 2017] 
570 Argentina Municipal, Seis comunidades jujeñas trabajan en torno a proyecto de litio, 7 January 2016, 
accessed 14 March 2018 http://argentinamunicipal.com.ar/argentina/?p=22208 
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prospecting took place in 2010, these communities appear to have long-standing 
relationships with one or both of the two companies, Sales de Jujuy and Exar. 
Although it was hard to ascertain the nature of these relationships due to being refused 
interviews in two of these three communities, the relationships appear to comprise 
three key elements: 1) contracts called servidumbres, 2) company jobs, and 3) funding for 
community projects.  
Although the nature of the relationships was difficult to determine clearly, I was 
able to establish some basic facts: The first company arrived in 2004, and the 
communities have generally viewed the companies favourably since, perhaps due to the 
actual and potential work opportunities for community members they provide. 
Furthermore, the communities have signed contracts agreeing company access to their 
lands and resources such as water, in exchange for cash payments, known as 
“servidumbres”. Servidumbre is the Spanish word for “easement”, a legal term granting the 
right to pass through or use land or resources for a specified purpose, granted by the 
owner of that land. In this region many of the communities, presumably having 
communitarian title to their land, have signed servidumbres with either Sales de Jujuy or 
Exar.571 
Long before reaching the community of Olaroz Chico, which sits on the hill 
overlooking the Olaroz salt flat, the scale of the lithium mining operation in their midst 
is clear. The community is a good twenty minutes’ drive from the plant, so although the 
salt flat is visible from the community, the plant itself is not. I conducted a detailed 
interview with a former leader of Olaroz Chico, who explained the timeline and what 
the company did, albeit with some confusion over whether the company first arrived in 
 
571 The word servidumbre, which I will continue to use in the original Spanish, directly translates as 
“servitude” or “bondage”, which is particularly interesting given the postcolonial context within which 
they are currently being used. 
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2004 or 2006: 
They arrived in 2006. Well, I’ll tell you… I believe the community already had title. It was 
organised that they would do a presentation of the environmental impact, which the community 
waited for around two years… two years waiting for authorization to enter the community to 
work. […] The company is came in 2004. Yes. The company came in 2004, of course 
empowered with a lawyer. They left a folder and in 2006 were authorised to enter to work. 
But this… they did the whole process as it has to be done in the province, let’s say.  
Notably, it seems that the community had only just received title to its land when the 
company arrived. This title may have encouraged the stated deliberate engagement of 
the community as per provincial legislation. That the company were “of course empowered 
with a lawyer” may suggest that the process was done precisely according to Jujuy’s 
environmental law. Notably, he did not mention the community having its own lawyer.  
There was no indication that early mining activities had caused any concern 
amongst the community, perhaps as they do not use the salt flat in the same way as 
some of the 33 Communities of the Salinas Grandes area. To the communities in the 
vicinity of the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat, which include Olaroz Chico, and (at a greater 
distance from the salt flat) Huáncar, Pastos Chicos and Puesto Sey, lithium mining is 
seen as a decent option for local work, which is generally scarce. As a former leader of 
Puesto Sey, and now Exar employee, told me, “in the puna, there’s only raising animals, for 
our own sustenance, and mining. There’s not much else”.572 My informant in Olaroz Chico 
echoed this, saying that the only source of work is “mining and cattle; a little crafts, but very 
little”.573 The economic benefits of cash from mining companies through servidumbres 
and salaries is already apparent in this community: reporters from the Washington Post 
came to Olaroz Chico in 2016 and interviewed the local primary school teacher who 
had “noticed new wooden windows and doors on some of the mud-brick homes in 
 
572 Former community association leader, Interview with author. Puesto Sey, Susques Region, Jujuy 
Province, 5 February 2017 
573 Former community association leader, Interview with author. Olaroz Chico, Susques Region, Jujuy 
Province, 6 February 2017 
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Olaroz Chico”, and that “[h]er schoolchildren appear better dressed than before”.574 
However not all who live in this area are happy with the arrival of lithium mining. 
Based in the region’s capital, the town of Susques (which is perhaps quadruple the size 
of any of the communities by population), a small anti-mining collective called the 
Colectivo Apacheta was founded in 2012 in response to the lithium mining proposals. 
An activist group comprising a few farming families that lived in and around Susques, 
their concerns over environmental impacts on traditional livelihoods align closely with 
the concerns of the 33 Communities.  
The name for the collective, apacheta, is fundamentally linked to the Andean 
indigenous experience. An apacheta is a small stone mound to which passing travellers 
add stones for good luck. It grows slowly but surely with each passing traveller, and this 
is how the head of the group characterises the movement. He said they are only five 
now, but this will grow “because we believe a lot in Pachamama. Mother Earth generates 
everything. And buen vivir. Yes, we believe in that. A lot.”575 The use of the Andean concepts 
of the apacheta, Pachamama, and buen vivir further signify an indigenous paradigm for the 
resistance to lithium mining, also apparent in the approach of the 33 Communities. The 
head of the Colectivo Apacheta told me that: 
The Colectivo Apacheta does not agree with the development of mega lithium mining. Why 
not? It worries us, the consumption of water. The consumption of water, because according to 
what they say it uses two hundred litres per second.576 
He does not accept that lithium mining uses only brine. He says, “brine is water; it’s liquid 
for us.”577 In a dry region, where groundwater is extremely important for survival, the 
position is understandable.  
 
574 Frankel and Whoriskey, “Indigenous people are left poor as tech world takes lithium from under their 
feet”, Washington Post, 16 December 2016. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta. Interview with author, Susques, Jujuy Province, 3 February 
2017. 
577 Ibid. 
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This respondent is well-known locally for the anti-mining group he has founded. 
He is referred to as an anti-mining “catastrophist” by one lithium company’s community 
relations executive. She questions his anti-mining stance, and even his right to 
comment on regional development on the basis that he is a “false representative” who 
“grew up in San Salvador” (the capital city of the province) and only came to Susques 
because he identified “the possibility of becoming a leader”.578 However, the motivations he 
himself gave for the protection of the territory were typical of someone with 
indigenous ancestral claims to a particular area: 
Our grandfather has left us these fields. Tremendous fields. And we have to take care of them. 
Because it is thanks to that countryside we are able to live. Because my grandfather lived there; 
my grandfather, my mother, and so did we. So let's see it as what has given me life for a long 
time, year after year. They talk of the [Susques cactus-beam] chapel that is 500 years old. 
Like this, it’s 500 years that my grandfather lived here.579 
Furthermore, his interest in the land of his grandfather has directly influenced his 
opinion over lithium mining’s potential impacts on water levels: 
We are afraid as we live in the countryside... From the level of water, the amount that they are 
taking out, the level of our water will go down. Our fear is to lose the field and lose our 
livestock, be it the llama, the goat. And we survive from our animals. For example the meat, 
the wool, they are... this is primordial for us. Talk about history... This has been the life of 
our grandfather.580 
He insisted that “the fight has to continue because, more than anything, water is a common good for 
all human beings, animals and plants. If there is no water, no one exists, not rich nor poor.”581 What 
this demonstrates is that although the issues of disruption to salt gathering may be a 
concern to some communities, water is the primary concern, and one relevant to all 
communities in the region. 
 
578 Community relations executive at lithium company. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 20 
February 2017. 
579 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta. Interview with author, Susques, Jujuy Province, 3 February 
2017. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Ibid. 
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5.2.4 Concerns over mining contamination and water use  
A three-year drought in the region has made measuring the impact of lithium mining 
on water supplies difficult. There was simultaneous concern in communities over the 
drought as well as the incoming lithium industry. As the representative for the 33 
Communities told me: 
We have always been raising the issue of land use, and water issues. And we see, and we 
know, that the water in the area has got very low. Now more than ever, it has not rained… 
we are in February. If it rained, it rained millimeters; very little or nothing, so this is what 
worries us the most. And we see, we really know that the water is lower. We are doing 
constant surveys on how the water levels are dropping, now, while [lithium] exploitation isn’t 
happening.582 
Echoing the above, the head of the Colectivo Apacheta also acknowledged to me that 
“we are suffering a drought” and “can accept that the drought is down to nature, but we do not know 
how much”,583 reflecting similar concerns within the 33 Communities around impacts to 
fresh water availability. 
Although the communities believe that the three-year drought experienced across 
the Andean plains, including in Bolivia, “is not because of the mining”,584 the 33 
Communities and the Colectivo Apacheta are concerned about current and future 
water usage by lithium miners, who draw out millions of litres of brines from 
underneath the salt flats for the pool evaporation stage. Through visits organised by 
national NGOs, some members of the 33 Communities have seen the effect of 
operational lithium mines on the salt-flat landscapes in Chile. My informant saw what 
he called a “flood” stretching kilometres and kilometres, inundating the salt flat’s 
surface.585  
 
582 33 Communities representative, interview with author, Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy Province, 
2 February 2017. 
583 Ibid. 
584 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta, Interview with author, Susques, Jujuy Province, 3 February 
2017. 
585 Delegations from Salinas Grandes and the Olaroz-Cauchari communities have both been to see 
Chilean lithium mines, the former with an NGO and the latter through a trip arranged by the company. 
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Argentinean geologist Díaz states that: “One might estimate that for each tonne of 
lithium extracted around two million litres of water evaporates, clear evidence that the 
mining of lithium in salares is a mining of water”.586 That lithium is essentially “mining 
water” is refuted however by a prominent local geologist and the former mining 
minister of Salta, who told me that “water is basically not a problem” and that “lithium mining 
only uses a cupful of water”.587 In his view, brine is unfit for human or animal consumption, 
and I was repeatedly told this by other government and company interviewees.588 
However, studies have suggested that excessive drawing out of brine from under the 
salt flats can lower the water table, impacting local fresh water supplies.589 Impacts on 
water supplies in these dry regions by lithium mining have also been acknowledged by 
researchers monitoring the Chilean situation. The Chilean situation is an important 
indicator for what might lay ahead for communities in both Argentina and Bolivia, 
should lithium mining impacts on aquifers continue to be poorly understood and 
managed.  
5.3 Compliance with the right to informed consultation in 
Jujuy’s lithium industry 
The final section of this chapter sets out the extent of informed consultation in advance 
of lithium mining activities taking place in Jujuy. This includes an extended analysis of 
the Salinas Grandes communities’ demands for consultation, as well as an appraisal of 
 
33 Communities representative, interview with author, Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy Province, 2 
February 2017. 
586 Fernando Díaz, cited in No a La Mina, “Cuales son los impactos ambientales y en la salud de la 
explotación de litio?, at https://noalamina.org/general/item/9585-cuales-son-los-impactos-ambientales-
y-en-la-salud-de-la-explotacion-de-litio, cited in Julian Zicari, “El mercado del litio desde una perspectiva global: 
de la Argentina al mundo. Actores, lógicas y dinámicas” (fn 16), in Fornillo, Geopolitica, 2015, p.46. 
587 Salta Geology Professor and former Salta Mining Minister, Alonso, Ricardo, Prof. Interview with 
author, Salta, 10 May 2017. 
588 Ibid. 2017; Mining Minister of Jujuy Province, Miguel Soler. Interview with author, San Salvador de 
Jujuy, 22 May 2017. 
589 A study by Boutt et al, funded by lithium company Albermarle, cited in the Washington Post article, 
suggests this. Frankel and Whoriskey, ‘Indigenous People Are Left Poor as Tech World Takes Lithium 
from under Their Feet’. 
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the relationship between the Olaroz Communities and the lithium mining companies 
operating on the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat. This includes details of the Colectivo 
Apacheta’s concerns over a lack of consultation in Susques, and a section detailing the 
development of the groundbreaking Kachi Yupi consultation protocol. 
5.3.1 The extent of free, prior and informed consultation in the Salinas Grandes 
communities 
One of the more striking things about interviewing the representative from the 33 
Communities was his repeated insistence that there has been no information about 
lithium given to them by the government, even since the company “went directly to the salt 
and directly to exploit” 590 (this is a notable misunderstanding as the company were only 
prospecting at the time): 
Still we haven’t come to know… we do not know what lithium even is. We only know by the 
media, by the newspaper; we only know what the government says, that lithium is for batteries, 
but not… We as the Salinas Grandes basin do not… we have not clearly had a document 
from the state. Nor were we informed.591 
He emphasised the role of the media in helping them understand the value of lithium: 
“It’s called white gold and many other things. But it was from media communication [that we know 
this], not because the state or company came to the community”.592  
Fieldwork observations demonstrated that access to information through the 
“usual” channels such as the media is much more difficult for these geographically and 
socially marginalised communities. For example, there are no shops that sell 
newspapers in the region. However, through regular travel to the provincial capital 
(where there are newspapers), and their active pursuit of information following the 
2010 prospecting, the 33 Communities we able to acquire information about lithium 
 
590 Representative from 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
591 Ibid. 
592 Ibid. 
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from the media and NGOs, leading to an informed resistance to lithium mining. 
During our interview the 33 Communities’ representative lamented that the 
government’s response to their concerns over lithium mining was “that there was nobody 
there, that we did not exist... But we are almost seven thousand in the [Salinas Grandes] basin”. He 
continued: 
Look how they said in the Supreme Court of the Nation that it was an uninhabited area. Of 
course it looks uninhabited because it is large, it is 200 square kilometres. Here in my village 
we are over 400 people, but you will not see even three or four because they are all scattered. 
The state says there are no communities; no people who are alive. But we in the basin have 15 
primary schools and seven secondary schools. It is not that there is no one here. They are poorly 
informed or do not want to understand, the state.593 
Here, he views the state as “poorly informed” about the numerous communities of the 
region, in an inversion of the concept of the state’s legal obligations to inform 
communities about lithium mining.  
Furthermore, the idea that Salinas Grandes was taken for a “uninhabited area” 
recalls a classic concept of colonialism popularised under the “terra nullius” principle in 
Australia, which served to justify invasion and resource capture by the imperial power. 
The invoking of a resource frontier as terra nullius, Latin for “land belonging to no one”, 
echoes through numerous indigenous land rights conflicts. The idea that resource-rich 
land is uninhabited is commonly used by the state to ignore indigenous peoples’ right 
to information, consultation or participation, and to justify the development of natural 
resources.594 
Although the law does not make clear whether the state should have informed the 
communities about the prospecting activity, the denial of the existence of communities 
in the 2012 case indicates with some certainty that they would not have been 
approached for consultations anyway. In our interview, the Mining Minister of Jujuy 
 
593 Ibid. 
594 Abelvik-Lawson, ‘Sustainable Development for Whose Benefit?’ 
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acknowledged the lack of compliance and critiqued the previous government’s way of 
handling the situation (as it occurred before his tenure began with the new government 
in 2015).“In fact, we believe that a large part, and the objections that are opening up has been because 
of a total absence of the state, and the lack of transparency due to lack of control.”595 This “absence 
of the state” was made clear to me when my 33 Communities informant asked me if I 
knew of any sources of funding for his community to fix his village’s water pipe, saying 
that they do not want to have to ask the government.  
As established above, there are no laws in Jujuy to manage the relationship 
between the state and explicitly indigenous communities in respect of mining licensing. 
The 33 Communities’ lawyer acknowledged in our interview that the Argentinean 
Mining Code was first developed a century ago, and that “[a]t that time the government's 
objective was to eradicate them!”.596 She further explains how the indigenous communities 
are at an obvious disadvantage in a consultation processes, regardless of when 
companies might approach them:  
Because there is an innate inequality, it is always going to be negotiated in a disproportionate 
way […] the company is going with all its employees to a meeting with the communities that 
do not have information or their own technicians.597  
There is also a clear compliance gap in the idea that the company goes to the 
community – within international human rights law that it is the state that has the duty to 
coordinate prior informed consultations with the communities. Furthermore, this 
“innate inequality” has clear impacts upon the right to information and informed 
consultation.  
The company will always have more information about their own proposed 
 
595 Mining Minister of Jujuy Province, Miguel Soler. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 22 May 
2017. 
596 Alicia Chalabe, Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 
February 2017. 
597 Ibid. 
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mining activity. However, the reports from the EIAs, the lawyer told me, were 
unintelligible, even to educated professionals: 
There is a deficit in relation to the indigenous communities because the communities do not 
have their own technicians; they must evaluate very long technical projects that are often 
incomprehensible to anyone – I am a lawyer and I do not understand that document. It’s huge 
– full of formulas, for example.598  
While Chalabe suggests here that EIAs were presented to the communities (presumably 
once it was established that they existed), the state is still clearly in breach of their 
international obligation to facilitate informed consultations if the community cannot 
understand the documents. 
The lawyer pinpoints the problem in terms of the inequality between the 
communities and company as stemming from a lack of legislation in Argentina that 
enshrines indigenous communities’ rights (as they are established by international law): 
There’s huge inequality. Both of information and the possibility of studying it to make a 
decision… and then with this I am asked, ‘how can it happen that the exploration licenses 
have followed the Mining Code to the letter and they have granted it, without considering the 
indigenous communities and their rights?’ I insist that it is a deficit of legislation.599 
She is correct: neither the Argentinean Mining Code nor environmental law mentions 
the requirements of informing nor consulting indigenous communities specifically, and 
there is no indigenous rights law to clarify the obligations in the terms required to be 
compliant with international human rights law.  
The communities went to the Supreme Court, as per the summary in the 
judgment, “to correct omissions that the aboriginal community claimants attribute to 
the provinces of Jujuy and Salta and the National State”, and to order an arbitration of 
the  
necessary measures so that they can make effective their rights of participation 
and consultation and, consequently, express their free, prior and informed 
consent on the prospection or exploitation programs of the natural resources 
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599 Ibid. 
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existing in the territories they occupy in the area of the Guayatayoc Lake–
Salinas Grandes, in particular in relation to those administrative proceedings in 
the process related to the granting of exploration and exploitation permits for 
lithium and borate.600  
As Argentina is party to ILO169, the above refers to Article 6.1 (right to consultation 
on administrative or legislative measures which may affect them directly).601 The 
judgment clarifies what it sees as the basis of the application, namely that it was  
not of an environmental nature, but of an indigenous nature, since the purpose 
of the claim is to implement a consultation process with its representatives that 
complies with international standards and within the framework of human 
rights.602 
This is relevant because it establishes that the Argentinean authorities have obligations 
to international standards specifically pertaining to indigenous peoples’ rights. The 
communities lost the case, due to lack of legal standing, with the Judges also ruling that 
the measures did not affect them directly. The state also claimed that the prospecting, 
as it had not been approved by the province, was illegal.603 
The Salta Mining Ministry’s legal counsel was the most willing government 
informant to discuss with me Argentina’s obligations under Article 14 ILO169: 
As a community that owns the land, it has greater participation in the management of natural 
resources, as required by Article 14 of Convention 169 of the ILO, which requires that 
recognised aboriginal communities that have rights to their lands to participate in the 
management of natural resources.604 
Crucially here he states that only a “recognised aboriginal” community that “owns the 
land” have such participation rights, referring to government land titling as the 
 
600 Supreme Court of Argentina, C.1196.XLVI “Comunidad Aborigen de Santuario Tres Pozos y otros 
c/ Jujuy, Provincia de y otros s/ amparo”, Buenos Aires, 18 de diciembre de 2012, para 1 [author’s 
translation]. Original: “…las medidas necesarias para que puedan hacer efectivos sus derechos de 
participación y consulta y, en consecuencia, expresar su consentimiento libre, previo e informado sobre 
los programas de prospección o explotación de los recursos naturales existentes en los territorios que 
ocupan en la zona de Laguna de Guayatayoc – Salinas Grandes, en particular en relación a aquellos 
expedientes administrativos en trámite vinculados con el otorgamiento de permisos de exploración y 
explotación de litio y borato.”] 
601 ILO169, Article 6.1 
602 Supreme Court of Argentina, C.1196.XLVI “Comunidad Aborigen de Santuario Tres Pozos y otros 
c/ Jujuy, Provincia de y otros s/ amparo”, Buenos Aires, 18 de diciembre de 2012. para 3. 
603 Ibid. 
604 Legal counsel, Salta Mining Ministry. Interview with author, Salta, 18 May 2017. 
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benchmark standard. As Chapter 4 details however, it is not the case that communities 
must be “recognised” or have official title to their lands to have rights to environmental 
participation as indigenous communities.  
A final point on the 33 Communities’ case illustrates how the legal empowerment 
of indigenous communities presents an unusual dilemma for lithium mining firms with 
plans to mine in the region. Salinas Grandes concession-holder Dajin Resources’ chief 
operating officer stated in a 2017 news article that: “The Kachi Yupi has no consultative 
process. It’s a document that says, ‘You need to consult with us,’ but it doesn’t say how 
you do that. We’re waiting for some clarification on that.”605 This is technically untrue: 
the document outlines Argentinean law applicable to those impacted by environmental 
projects, and details the discrete components of free, prior and informed consultation 
developed in ILO169. However, its “comparative table”, that details how the 
communities respect the hydrology of the Salinas Grandes to harvest salt, may be 
somewhat confusing for the non-indigenous reader. Ironically, the common scenario 
that faces indigenous people – where EIA documentation presented to them is “full of 
formulas”606 and scientific jargon – is here inverted: the company cannot see the 
relevance of the comparative table, where the stages of salt cultivating, harvesting and 
gathering are compared with their desired stages of consultation. Therefore, 
understanding the process by which the communities wish to be consulted relies upon 
an understanding of an indigenous cosmovision that company operatives may be 
unable or unwilling to learn about.  
The above point establishes what the spirit of indigenous consultation law 
 
605 Catherine Hickson, Dajin Resources, COO, cited in Pellettieri, Lucila (2017) Mining Firms Seek 
Argentina’s ‘White Gold,’ But Local Approval Proves More Elusive 
 https://globalpressjournal.com/americas/argentina/mining-firms-seek-argentinas-white-gold-local-
approval-proves-elusive/ 
606 Alicia Chalabe. Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 
February 2017. 
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requires: that the company must try to understand the perspective of the community 
first, particularly their economic, cultural and even spiritual interest in the land and its 
resources, in order to put the consultation documents in terms the community would 
both understand and be able to appreciate. Doing this would also serve to help the 
company appreciate the environmental and social impacts the mining activity might 
have on the community. In doing so, the company may be more likely to have 
community buy-in for the mining project. Of course, detailing the destruction of the 
landscape in any way at all may have the opposite effect, generating motives for 
pursuing a “right to veto”. 
5.3.2 The extent of free prior and informed consultation in the Olaroz Communities 
One of the companies’ community relations managers was keen to emphasise in our 
interview that they were in the communities long before their lithium mining project 
even existed: 
We have initiated a process of participation and consultation with the communities since before 
having a project, that is to say that we have worked with them in all the stages of the 
process.607 
She was effusive in her insistence that everyone is able to participate, but (reflecting the 
above concluding point), she also acknowledged that some topics will not be familiar to 
community members, which provided a way to improve company processes: 
There is an active participation of the members of the community, although they do not know 
something at first. They did not know how the monitoring is carried out. This is interesting 
because we can also know how to improve our own monitoring.608 
In a similar manner to the former leader of Olaroz Chico, the community relations 
manager and mining secretary, this interviewee also acknowledges that “the best way to 
break down fears and doubts is talking” and “putting ourselves in front of the community in general so 
 
607 Community relations executives at lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 15 May 2017 
608 Ibid. 
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that all these doubts and questions do not come out”.609 The lawyer for the 33 Communities, 
however, suggests that this relationship is inappropriate: “What is inadmissible that it [the 
fulfilment of communities’ human rights] is subject to the will of the companies, and moreso that 
companies undertake their own community negotiations.”610 There is merit to the lawyer’s 
argument, as companies undertaking their own negotiations, particularly with offers of 
work and cash payments, would likely prejudice opinions. This does not then constitute 
a “free” consultation, as outlined in the law in Chapter 4. 
It did appear that any form of early company–community contact with the Olaroz 
Communities seemed predicated around offers of work, and payments for servidumbres. 
The former community association leader of Olaroz Chico told me that 
This consultation, where they did not ask us, that explains the context of the project, what 
will be done, what work there will be, how many people they will be taking, what work there 
will be in principle, what is the objective of the work. That was two years.611 
The “consultation” is qualified by the leader above as one being where the community 
were not directly asked for their opinions. Finally, the emphasis within this 
“consultation” appeared to be heavily weighted towards work: “what work there will be, 
how many people they will be taking, what work there will be in principle, what is the objective of the 
work”.612 
The Mining Minister of Jujuy confirmed to me that generating work is a legal 
obligation for companies wishing to mine in the province: “We have a national and 
provincial law that says the owner of a mining property has the obligation to create work. If you do not 
create work, you have to go”.613 This, he says, is what the people in the province need: “when 
 
609 Ibid. 
610 Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017. 
611 Former community association leader, Interview with author. Olaroz Chico, Susques Region, Jujuy 
Province, 6 February 2017 
612 Ibid. 
613 Mining Minister of Jujuy Province, Miguel Soler. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 22 May 
2017 
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one speaks with the communities many, many ask for health, education – and they ask for work”.614 
State authorities are naturally is keen to support the development of work 
opportunities, which drive tax revenues. The mining secretary cited the example of the 
nearby Piriquitas mine, that “gave employment for over nine years to more than 600 people”,615 
before starting to calculate the tax revenue gained from these jobs during our interview.  
This legal obligation perhaps works well for companies in these lithium regions 
due to the harsh environment that would necessitate a period of adaptation to the 
altitude and extreme temperatures by a labour force of outsiders. In what seems like a 
mutually beneficial arrangement, 80 percent of the population of Olaroz Chico is 
employed by Sales de Jujuy.616 The benefits of these salaries are noted by the 
schoolteacher above.617 There is also a library with Sales de Jujuy-branded signage (see 
Photograph A10), and a significant part of the village seemed to be under renovation or 
construction at the time of my visit. 
My informant in Olaroz Chico explained to me how community decision-making 
over mining issues works in his village: “[t]he community, we have meetings every thirty days. 
We have an extraordinary meeting, in which is handled all these issues, such as mining.”618 
According to one of the companies’ community relations executives, the communities 
that have a relationship with the company are given constant streams of information 
about lithium mining: 
Because leaders change every two years and you taught them everything, you explained 
everything to this commission of 12 people and at two years this changes, everything is new. 
Then you start again and go to a village meeting… So many times, so many times; I 
 
614 Ibid. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Former community association leader, Interview with author. Olaroz Chico, Susques Region, Jujuy 
Province, 6 February 2017 
617 Frankel and Whoriskey, ‘Indigenous People Are Left Poor as Tech World Takes Lithium from under 
Their Feet’. 
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explained it so many times.619 
This account indicates that the leaders and their committees are those who are required 
by law to sign the servidumbres; when they change, the information must be transferred. 
It is unclear whether a new servidumbre is signed in these instances.  
Notably, there has been a backlash against the Jujuy Law No. 5915 of 
Administrative Servidumbres,620 for violating the rights of indigenous peoples in the 
province.621 This law, which allegedly deepens the dispossession of indigenous 
territories through the installation of renewable energy projects, has already damaged 
the credibility of the Province’s new Indigenous Secretariat, according to online 
reports.622 The suggestion that servidumbres have been responsible for violating 
indigenous rights in Jujuy adds an interesting dimension to the question of free, prior 
and informed consultation or consent debates in Jujuy. As there is little indication that 
there are national or provincial laws that protect indigenous consultation rights, it 
follows that the procedures governing the law of servidumbres also do not respect or 
allow for the realisation of such rights. 
Promises of regular work have clearly been attractive to community members and 
their elected leaders, and by hiring them the company can not only fulfil their 
obligations to provide work during a period of low activity (as Exar was still at 
exploration and testing stage), but also exact influence in the community for the 
acceptance of the ongoing relationship. However, this could be seen as a form of 
 
619 Community relations executive at lithium company. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 20 
February 2017. 
620 Government of Jujuy, Law No. 5915 de servidumbres de electroducto y el régimen para el desarrollo 
de proyectos de generación de energía eléctrica, Jujuy Province, at 
http://www.justiciajujuy.gov.ar:802/legpro/5915.pdf 
621 Jujuy Al Momento, “Comunidades piden derogación de la ley de Servidumbre”, 26 July 2016, at 
 http://www.jujuyalmomento.com/post/54684/comunidades-piden-derogacion-de-la-ley-de-
servidumbre 
622 El Federal, “Pueblos Originarios de Jujuy se oponen a la ley de Servidumbre Electrica”, n.d. at 
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bribery, coercing acceptance of the project through the provision of much-needed 
funds and wages. One community relations manager admitted to me that the servidumbre 
payments are likely to be “more money than they’ve ever had”, and that the communities 
have had trouble adjusting to the income, and in some cases have not been able to 
spend it effectively.623 
Olaroz Chico was always set to benefit more than the other communities from 
company information and jobs, due to its proximity to the plant. However, the flow of 
information appears controlled by the company, and participation mediated again 
through offers of employment. When I asked whether the agreement detailed 
community participation in the project, my informant in Olaroz Chico answered “yes, we 
signed an agreement, of particip… of collaboration”. Notably, participation gives way to 
“collaboration”. He further stated that they had had: 
many consultations, particularly on the issue of work, because they started with the 
exploration, well… it was like this until they arrived now in production. But always 
consulting. I believe this was important. 
Here, as above, consultations, which were apparently plentiful, appear to have 
particularly focused on the work available. With this focus, it is unclear whether 
consultations therefore would have been free, prior and informed in compliance with 
international obligations.  
Furthermore, monitoring is a big part of the project at Olaroz Chico, but the 
details of the agreements were not fully known by my informant: 
There is state control over the project. It’s called monitoring. It’s called monitoring and just 
now a while ago a new guy came, a coordinator. In the monitoring the state participates, the 
company and community participates. […] They have a... there is one... I do not know what 
to call it but it has the state, signed, it has a... to see, an amount of extraction, both the brine 
water and fresh water that must be extracted. And the state controls it every three months. 
 
623 Community relations executive at lithium company. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 20 
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While there is an acknowledgement of the participation of all three parties (state, 
company and community) in this activity of monitoring, there is perhaps an inequality 
in the provision of information, a risk identified in the previous section of this chapter. 
The theme of the three stakeholders’ equal participation became an important one 
in the final parts of the interview with the representative from Olaroz Chico, where he 
also assumed that if there had been any reticence on the part of the community, the 
project would not be allowed to go ahead: 
I think we are clear, very clear, because ... if not, they would not like to come here and I do not 
think there would be a contract if the communities are not in agreement [...] Because everyone 
has the right, they as a company, the state, and as a community. […] 
There are three fundamental parts: the state, the company, and the community. The 
community is fundamental, because we know that we have... we are the owners of the land and 
if it’s not authorised, nobody comes here.  
For a community so close to the plant, with clear benefits in terms of work and 
confirmed ownership of the land affording them some form of negotiation, accepting a 
project (and the benefits that come along with it) appears uncontroversial.  
In the three communities of Huáncar, Pastos Chicos and Puesto Sey however, at 
approximately 30, 60 and 90 kilometres from the plant on the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat 
respectively, the presence of the lithium companies is more subtle, but has clearly been 
influential on their attitudes towards lithium mining. The December 2016 Washington 
Post article made clear that payments are made by companies to communities, through 
the signing of servidumbres, some of which I was able to view at the Mining Ministry. 
These contracts agree payments – upon signing and for the first year, for example, and 
ongoing (annual) payments thereafter – for rights of water use, right of occupation and 
passage through their land over a number of years. It was unclear how and to what 
extent these communities had been consulted on the lithium companies’ proposals in 
exchange for signatures on the servidumbre contracts, particularly as interviewing here 
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was difficult. 
Informal discussions in these communities, however, and even the interview 
refusals themselves, indicated that numerous community members, including former 
leaders, appear to have paid roles within the mining company, Exar.624 As the company 
was not yet producing lithium at the time of my visit, it is unclear what was required of 
employees in these roles beyond community relations work. Nonetheless, I witnessed a 
meeting of a handful of community members and the community relations official 
from Exar take place in my hostel, quite a way from the communities, suggesting that 
perhaps such opportunities were not open to everybody. 
The 2016 Washington Post article suggests that those who negotiated the 
servidumbre payments were too uninformed to negotiate a good deal,625 and that 
community members who made decisions on behalf of the company have since faced 
accusations of conflicts of interest on account of the mining company posts they hold. 
One such figure in Puesto Sey was a community association leader who went to work 
for the company as soon as the document was signed, for example. Her successor was 
reported saying that “she works for Exar — she had a personal interest” and that “[t]he 
community is mad at her now.”626 I was able to see the servidumbre signed by this 
individual in the provincial mining office. Signed in 2011, it promises the community of 
Puesto Sey US$28,000 for signing the contract; US$35,000 seven days after the 
agreement; US$90,000 at the start of construction and US$110,000 every year in 
exchange for rights to water, passage through community lands, and occupation of 
 
624 A young former community association excitedly emailed me from his computer in his office, telling 
me he was at “work” and thus had access to his email.  
625 Quispe, Carlos, interviewed in Frankel and Whoriskey, “Indigenous people are left poor as tech world 
takes lithium from under their feet”, Washington Post, 16 December 2016. 
626 Frankel and Whoriskey, ‘Indigenous People Are Left Poor as Tech World Takes Lithium from under 
Their Feet’. 
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those lands.627 Other communities’ servidumbres I saw showed similar and smaller 
amounts depending on which rights were granted.  
The common understanding of the communities’ position in society gleaned from 
the community relations executives is that they have been somewhat forgotten by the 
government; that they “had fewer opportunities and did not have a close relationship with 
government institutions”.628 Community members who are approached with offers may 
thus have increased interest in working with the lithium companies who have become 
“their closest neighbour”.629 As a result, one company’s “Shared Value” framework, 
comprising 5 pillars of “education, health, transparency, empowerment and this… production and 
natural resources”,630 was presented as a solution, providing an interesting insight into the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities occurring around lithium mining in 
Jujuy. The company representatives see their role as beneficial to the communities:  
How will they have grown without such… [“development” – interjects her colleague quietly] 
…with more development? Because we have... This [Olaroz Chico] is the first community 
that we have started working where relationships have been much stronger and also because we 
have also found people who wanted to change. 
[…] 
We invest a lot of time and money in working with the community; and we say investing 
because we really see today that it is worth that… that investment because today is really the 
stage that communities have continued to grow.631 
As the above quotations show, the financial language surrounding the idea of 
“development” (growth, investment) is pervasive. Work however does seem to be a key 
driver of both the company enthusiasm to engage the communities, and the 
communities’ positive response to the companies. One company representative told me 
that that they provide work “so that the community does not have to migrate to the eastern 
 
627 From notes taken after interview with Dr Miguel Soler in the Jujuy Province mining office, on file 
with author. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Community relations executives at lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 15 May 2017. 
631 Ibid. 
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cities”.632 This could be perceived in a way to provide community cohesion, as well as 
economic opportunity. 
Mining has provided jobs for local people before in Jujuy, and the overall 
impression from within my fieldwork observations and informal discussions was that 
the Olaroz Communities were changing for the better due to an increase in income, a 
point naturally echoed by the community relations managers for both Sales de Jujuy 
and Exar. The community relations women at both companies told numerous 
anecdotes about projects they had started, such as the attempt to have the community-
members grow quinoa (a failure) or learn how to knit handicrafts. There was also a tacit 
admission that community relations activities also serve as marketing tactics: one 
company executive complained that the other company’s reps were known to arrive at 
community celebrations and gatherings only “at the last moment to take the pictures!”,633 also 
suggesting that perhaps the companies are in some competition for community (and 
provincial government) approval and support.  
This collection of responses from community representative and the companies’ 
community relations officials, taken together with the previous detail on company 
relationships with the Olaroz Communities, indicates that there is no conflict currently 
between companies and communities in this area. However, according to the 
Washington Post’s report, and the likely event of uneven distribution of work and 
funding, there is certainly scope for developing resentments within and between 
communities. Furthermore, if increased lithium mining does become a problem for 
water supplies and the contamination of the surrounding land, conflict may yet emerge, 
and the early development of relationships based on poor consultation processes may 
 
632 Community relations executive at lithium company. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 20 
February 2017. 
633 Ibid. 
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warrant greater scrutiny.  
Importantly, the community members to whom I did manage to speak with 
insisted that there had been no problems with water thus far, despite the regionwide 
drought. However, the Washington Post piece does refer to a problem with a water 
pump during the drought in Huáncar, which was eventually remediated by the 
provincial authority after a riot broke out.634 
5.3.3 The Colectivo Apacheta and the lack of free, prior and informed consultation in 
Susques 
According to the leader of the Colectivo Apacheta, the town of Susques signed an 
agreement that violates their rights to FPIC (consultation), and clearly pollutes the 
environment through the heavy use of lime (calcium carbonate): 
It seemed very bad to us. Very bad. Because from the beginning we did not do any free, prior 
and informed consultation. It was politically dominated, everything here [in Susques], by the 
head people in the community, and free, prior and informed consultation is not that way. The 
free, prior and informed consultation has to go to everyone who lives in the field: this Señor or 
Señora, this so and so; and they should not lie. It has been double the lie: That there will be 
work, that there will be many things. If it has benefited us; some have benefited, others have 
not. Of the community as a whole, 80 percent will not benefit. Negotiators will benefit, and 
the workers who work there and no one else. It is not… It is not something that is beneficial 
to the community.635 
Furthermore, he maintains that Susques agreed to the lithium mining through a 
politically-managed process, “not an informed consultation”, but “a political meeting”.636 He 
says the process “didn’t start with a document from the government” and by the end of the 
process, “a community that has 2000 inhabitants has 35 that signed for it”. This is 
corroborated by Fornillo, who documents the meetings that took place in Susques to 
approve lithium mining within the administrative region for which it is the capital.637 
 
634 Frankel and Whoriskey, ‘Indigenous People Are Left Poor as Tech World Takes Lithium from under 
Their Feet’. 
635 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta. Interview with author, Susques, Jujuy Province, 3 February 
2017. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Bruno Fornillo, ed., Geopolítica del litio: industria, ciencia y energía en Argentina, Colección Chico Mendes 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial El Colectivo, 2015). 
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The leader of the Colectivo Apacheta says the studies they commissioned show 
the water “going down”, but “with a year of drought, we have not been able to make the 
comparison”.638 Uniquely within my responses, he also demonstrated concern for what 
then happens to the vast quantities of water that evaporate from the lithium mines, 
suggesting that he is wary of unintended impacts of industrial-scale extraction: “because 
of the amount of water that evaporates here, it will fall elsewhere.”639 This is a fascinating insight 
not just into the nature of the activity in his immediate environment, but concern over 
its wider climatic ramifications.640 
Contamination is also a clear concern for the Colectivo Apacheta. My interviewee 
told me that the others in Susques have not been paying attention: “So what I see as bad, I 
say… Because one that does not look does not see the 30 truckloads of lime per day… That lime 
disappears!”.641 He continues with further concerns: 
To take water from the brine will also take other minerals. It won’t only take pure lithium. 
Because it will leach lime, caustic soda, sulfuric acid. This is contaminating. And they say it 
won’t contaminate anything?642 
It is unclear the amount of information provided in advance of the political agreement. 
The Colectivo Apacheta believes a “profound study” of the environmental impacts is 
required, particularly for the communities that have agreed to lithium mining on their 
territories – emphasising that “we do not want to lie to them”.643 What this indicates is that 
there was little in the way of independent information made available to the people of 
 
638 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta. Interview with author, Susques, Jujuy Province, 3 February 
2017. 
639 Ibid. 
640 I was reminded of this comment when in month following our interview Peru suffered the worst 
floods in living memory, when ten times the usual amount of rain fell, killing 67 people and causing 
billions of dollars’ worth of damage. Dan Collyns, “How can Peru prepare to withstand more devastating 
floods and landslides?”, Guardian, 13 April 2017, accessed 2 February 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/apr/13/peru-prevent-
floods-landslides-climate-change  
641 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta. Interview with author, Susques, Jujuy Province, 3 February 
2017. 
642 Ibid. 
643 Ibid. 
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Susques and surrounding communities. This, with the concern over the relatively few 
people that signed on behalf of the whole community, indicate a lack of proper 
consultation in Susques. 
5.3.4 Kachi Yupi and the demand for consultation 
Kachi Yupi outlines Argentinean law on mining and environment; constitutional rights 
to water; and minimum standards of the indigenous right to free, prior and informed 
consultation as found in ILO169. The core consultation protocol is in the form of a 
“comparative table” (see Appendix A, p.30–31), that uses the traditional indigenous 
practice of salt-harvesting on the Salinas Grandes to demonstrate two things. Firstly, it 
embeds within the protocol how economically and culturally crucial the Salinas 
Grandes salt flats are to the 33 Communities. Secondly, it shows that to the 
communities, an effective consultation process relies on a relationship of mutual 
respect, similar to the relationship the communities have with nature, and its productive 
sowing and harvest cycles that comprise their traditional practice of salt cultivation. 
Kachi Yupi is considered a great success, as “the first document that there is in the Province 
of Jujuy on the right of consultation”,644 and indeed, one of the only examples of such a 
protocol in existence across the world.645 It was a challenge to develop, as my 
interviewee explained:  
Yes really, it was a... challenge at first because we did not know… Because the state did not 
force us to see how we could do the consultation protocol. And at that time the state said that 
it is going to be part of the fund, to put the technicians, the lawyers ... all those knowing about 
human rights to work with the communities as well. And when we had the assembly the 
people, the communities, the representatives said, no – the Kachi Yu... the consultation 
protocol has to be from the communities, and has to be done by the communities. If we let the 
state in we know that they are going to put what they want. And if we put the company 
 
644 Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017. 
645 Makagon et al., ‘Balancing the Scales - Community Protocols and Extractive Industries: Lessons from 
Argentina, India, Kenya and Zimbabwe’. The process of developing Kachi Yupi is examined in some 
detail in this report, which collected four such community experiences of creating consultation protocols 
around the world. 
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inside, they will also put what the company wants, and not us.646 
This process was therefore undertaken with an understanding that it must be 
independent of the state and company. Kachi Yupi, according to the communities’ 
lawyer, “has worked as a kind of precautionary measure, because the demand is more cautious; 
because they know that there is an organisation that is vigilant.”647 Indeed, the response from 
Dajin Resources, while confused, indicates some respect for the process not often seen 
in cases where communities and companies are in conflict over mining. 
The document was recognised by the National Ombudsman in May 2016, 
providing some degree of recognition from the state. I was enthusiastically shown a 
copy by the Mining Minister of Jujuy just prior to our interview. He suggested that the 
Jujuy authorities would also like to officially recognise the protocol, but that this is not 
within the remit of the Mining Ministry but the newly-established Secretariat of 
Indigenous Affairs. He said, “When the government changed the intention was to create this 
secretariat to specifically address the issues the communities, and really look after them.”648 The 
communities’ lawyer acknowledges that the province might think they are solving the 
problem through this newly-established authority, but the effects are as yet not 
meaningful: 
There was a change that some could have seen as beneficial, as Governor Morales, the new 
government, had created in the ministerial ranks the secretariat of indigenous peoples. This 
secretariat for indigenous peoples has an indigenous authority to address the issues that concern 
the communities, but so far it has not had much effect day-to-day…649 
Clearly, compliance with international human rights law obligations are greatly 
dependent on strong institutions with clear national legislation determining their 
 
646 Representative from 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
647 Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017. 
Chalabe here refers to the Mesa of the communities of Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc Lake. 
648 Mining Minister of Jujuy Province, Miguel Soler. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 22 May 
2017. 
649 Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017. 
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activities. As there are few pieces of legislation backing up the remit of new Secretary of 
Indigenous Affairs, and international indigenous rights law is not considered very fully 
even within the judgments of the Argentinean Supreme Court, implementation of pro-
indigenous measures is likely to be slow.  
While it is unclear precisely what has halted lithium exploration on the Salinas 
Grandes, visits from the UN Special Rapporteur, the bringing of the case to the 
Supreme Court, and the publication of Kachi Yupi have certainly led to a sense of legal 
empowerment within the 33 Communities. During our interview, my informant 
repeated the phrase “prior consultation is binding” (“consulta previa es vinculante”) and that 
“Kachi Yupi is binding”, numerous times. I got the impression that the fear of lithium-
prospecting “extra-terrestrials” had dissipated, replaced by a trust in international 
human rights law and those that had worked to help them demand that the state 
recognise their rights. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has established that free and informed consultations have not taken place 
in Jujuy in advance of lithium mining projects being established. While prospecting on 
the Salinas Grandes may not have required an elaborate consultation process, there is 
nothing to indicate that the company or state had informed communities that mining 
activity was being planned. Indeed, the state admits in the Supreme Court proceedings 
that it was unaware of the presence of communities at all. When information was 
shared (and if it was, as this is not totally clear either), it was not in a format the 
communities (or their lawyer) could understand. 
The Olaroz Communities on the other hand, had received information from the 
company prior to mining taking place, and opportunities to participate in the 
development of the lithium project. It is clear however, that due to the nature of the 
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relationship between the companies now, that these opportunities were predicated on 
the availability of work and payments to communities in exchange for servidumbre 
signatures.  
In retrospect, it appears the two situations may even be related. The Salta-based 
office reception room wall where I visited community relations executives for one of 
the lithium companies was branded with signage saying, “South American Salar”, a 
company I had not come across during my research. The company executives stated 
early on in the interview that “we have not had any complaints for lack of prior consultation, we 
do not; this area does not”.650 Here, the community relations official implies that perhaps 
the company has not had complaints for lack of consultation in “this area”, meaning 
the Susques–Olaroz area they had ended up working in. Analysing the transcripts, I 
came to realise that there may be a link between the Orocobre billboards at Salinas 
Grandes and the company my interviewee from the 33 Communities said was the 
company that came, “American Salar”,651 which does not appear to exist. South 
American Salar however, is an Orocobre subsidiary. 
This indicates that it was actually South American Salar that had prospected on the 
Salinas Grandes in 2010, triggering the response that resulted in resistance of the 
communities, including the Supreme Court case and the Kachi Yupi consultation 
protocol. Their success in halting mining might be attributed to the use of the 33 
Communities of the salt for salt gathering, a practice that does not occur on Olaroz-
Cauchari. This appears to be a relevant distinction between the two sets of 
communities. However, the grounds for the resistance mounted by the 33 
Communities and the Colectivo Apacheta is also largely based around concerns of 
 
650 Community relations executives at lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 15 May 2017 
651 Representative from 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
  
 
 
225 
excessive drawing out of water in an arid region. This clearly demonstrates a region-
wide indigenous interest in free, prior and informed consultations over lithium mining, 
particularly containing information relating to impacts on water. 
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CHAPTER 6 BOLIVIA: LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE 
STATE-RUN LITHIUM PROJECT ON THE SALAR DE 
UYUNI 
Introduction 
In order to answer the research question (to what extent have communities had opportunities to 
participate in decision-making over the lithium industry?), this chapter analyses levels of local 
community participation in the fledgling Bolivian state lithium mining industry. The 
predominantly Quechua-speaking Bolivian communities living around the Salar de 
Uyuni generally work in tourism, hard-metal mining (in the San Cristóbal mega-mine) 
and the two key traditional industries in the region such as quinoa farming and salt-
gathering. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess participation levels for local indigenous 
communities in the Southern Bolivian Altiplano in the region around the Salar de 
Uyuni. This involves an analysis of the change in political regime and in mining, 
environmental and indigenous rights laws, many resulting from the new 2009 Bolivian 
Constitution. I also examine the potential socioenvironmental impacts of industrial-
scale lithium mining on the Nor Lípez region of the Department of Potosí, along the 
south “coast” of the Salar de Uyuni. Extraction of lithium carbonate from this salt flat 
is complicated by high magnesium levels in the brines.  
The chapter is split into four parts, following roughly the same structure as the 
prior chapter. The first part analyses the complex socio-political history of the Bolivian 
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lithium project, and the potential socioenvironmental impacts of lithium mining in 
Bolivia, particularly the need for a special process to remove the high levels of 
magnesium found in the brines in the Salar de Uyuni. Bolivian national law pertaining 
to mining, environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights, including the 2009 
Constitution, is analysed in the second part. In the third part I examine the 
communities around the Salar de Uyuni and their livelihoods in terms of their use of 
the land and natural resources. The final part analyses levels the extent to which 
communities have been informed and consulted, and the wider political and social 
ramifications of the state lithium mining project in the Salar de Uyuni. 
The chapter starts with the history of the Bolivian state lithium project because 
this aids analysis in the later sections determining local community support and levels 
of consultation. It is also worth foregrounding the complex socio-political context of 
Bolivian lithium mining. At the time of my fieldwork in the first half of 2017, the 
Bolivian lithium project was still only at the “pilot plant” stage. Two small-scale plants 
had been constructed on the Salar de Uyuni by the state company, over a period of 
about a decade, to test the extraction of lithium carbonate and potassium chloride, a 
valuable fertiliser. When I visited the office in La Paz in early 2017 to interview the 
state company’s Communications Director, 25 international firms had already bid for 
the industrial plant construction contract. 
 
6.1 The history of the state lithium pilot plant 
Here I outline the history of Bolivian lithium mining, identifying the key actors in the 
state lithium project from its inception in the mid-2000s following the election of 
President Evo Morales. I will also introduce the key problem with Bolivian lithium 
mining, the high levels of magnesium in the Salar de Uyuni. This is compounded by a 
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lack of industrial infrastructure resulting from Bolivia’s historically colonial and 
neoliberal primary commodity export economy.652 This section will also examine the 
potential ways around this problem. 
6.1.1 History of the Bolivian lithium mining project 
Bolivia’s lithium strategy stretches back to 1974, when the Bolivian government 
declared the Salar de Uyuni and parts of its coastline a “fiscal reserve”.653 This “gives 
the Bolivian state basic ownership of the Salar and the legal right to exploit and 
administer all of the natural resources within the reserve’s boundaries”,654 and a 2007 
Presidential Decree further confirmed these rights of the state.655 The boundaries of the 
fiscal reserve have been changes dozens of times in the decades since its establishment, 
without community consultation, raising questions of land rights for some of the 
communities that live on and farm the land around the salt.656  
There has only been one major attempt to mine lithium from the Salar de Uyuni 
prior to the Bolivian state project. Between 1990 and 1992, the government of 
President Jaime Paz Zamora attempted to negotiate two contracts for the exploitation 
of lithium with US firm LITHCO (which later became FMC).657 The proposed 40-year 
access contract for FMC–LITHCO was opposed by local organisations, the reason 
being that projected revenues for the region would have amounted to only two percent 
 
652 Galeano and Belfrage, Open veins of Latin America. 
653 Daniela Sanchez-López. “From white desert to strategic resource: commodification of the Uyuni salt 
flat in Bolivia”. Presentation at the Anglo-Bolivian Society lithium mini-conference, Senate House, 
London: UK. 5 April 2018. López and Rua Quiroga, ‘An Assessment of the Environmental and Social 
Impacts of Chinese Trade and FDI in Bolivia’. p.33. 
654 Hollender and Shultz, ‘Bolivia and Its Lithium: Can the “Gold of the 21st Century” Help Lift a 
Nation out of Poverty?’ p.20 
655 Bolivian Government, Supreme Decree No 29117, 1 May 2007, accessed 21 August 2018 
http://www.evaporiticosbolivia.org/WEB-INF/Documentos/Legislacion/DS_29117.pdf  
656 Hollender and Shultz, ‘Bolivia and Its Lithium: Can the “Gold of the 21st Century” Help Lift a 
Nation out of Poverty?’ p.21 
657 In local responses, pre-Morales governments are commonly referred to as “neoliberal” governments. 
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of the company’s profits from extraction, which was deemed insufficient.658 The 
Bolivian government in 1992 then tried to make a series of modifications to the 
contract, in response to opposition from the Potosí Civic Committee and the local 
Federación Regional Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Altiplano de Sur (FRUTCAS), to 
make the deal more palatable to local organisations.659 In 1992, the company 
denounced the modifications, the deal collapsed, and FMC–LITHCO left Bolivia for 
Argentina’s Salar de Hombre Muerto, where it is now one of the top lithium producers 
in the world.660 
FRUTCAS therefore is an important actor in the region. It is a union federation 
that works under the umbrella of Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos 
de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB is one of three indigenous social and labour 
organizations in Bolivia known as “the triplets” that have a close relationship with the 
MAS government, and which actively work to influence policy in La Paz.661 According 
to its president, FRUTCAS organises and represents 40,000 agriculturalists in and 
around the Salar de Uyuni in the administrative regions of Enrique Baldevieso, Daniel 
Campos, Nor Lípez, Sur Lípez, and Antonio Quijarro.662  
There was no notable progress towards developing lithium from the 1990s until 
the election of Morales in 2006, following which a number of “foreign corporations 
and governments, including Brazil, Canada, Japanese automakers and the French 
electric car manufacturer Bolloré… lobbied the Bolivian government for access to the 
 
658 Sanchez-López, “From white desert to strategic resource: commodification of the Uyuni salt flat in 
Bolivia”.  
659 Revette, ‘Extractive Dreams’. 
660 López and Rua Quiroga, ‘An Assessment of the Environmental and Social Impacts of Chinese Trade 
and FDI in Bolivia’. 
661 Anna Krausova, “Indigenous resistance to indigenous claims”, Presentation at the Bolivian Day of the 
Sea conference, IALS, Senate House, London, UK, 23 March 2018. 
662 President of rural union federation. Interview with author, Uyuni, 23 March 2017. 
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lithium resources”,663 according to López and Quiroga. These proposals were ultimately 
rejected by President Morales, who in 2009 had ordered the establishment of a 
“Scientific Committee”,664 appointing Guillermo Roelants, a Belgian Marxist665 and 
FRUTCAS ally, to supervise analysis of the potential for exploitation of lithium from 
the brines of the Salar de Uyuni.666 Ricardo Calla Ortega, an expert on the region and 
author of the socioenvironmental impacts chapter of the only major Bolivian report 
into the project, told me: 
The government gave them [the Scientific Committee and FRUTCAS] a bit of money, and 
they started, you know, the initial phase of the project. The hard phase. […] it must have 
been very harsh. And the peasant organisation [FRUTCAS] was there the whole time, it 
was the main actor.667 
Calla makes it clear that it was FRUTCAS, the “peasant organisation”, that drove the 
initial stages of the state lithium project, likely through its close links with the MAS 
government through its affiliation with the CSUTCB. The Mayor of Uyuni also 
explained to me FRUTCAS’s role in the inception of the Bolivian state lithium project: 
In the first stages it had been fundamental. When this initiative started, this social 
organisation [FRUTCAS] of which I was a part in those days… So, since 2006, and even 
before, the region was already thinking about industrialising this resource, but there were other 
governments, neoliberal, between us, so our voice, our thoughts had no forum. However after 
2006 when a progressive government entered, with President Evo, with the MAS 
[Movimiento Al Socialismo], then the organization [FRUTCAS] started feeling empowered 
in government, shall we say. Then the President made this order [to start the lithium project] 
that for many years had been delayed.668 
The Mayor here suggests that FRUTCAS is a strong local community organisation with 
links to the MAS Government, and that it was a key institution in the early stages of the 
lithium project.  
 
663 López and Rua Quiroga, ‘An Assessment of the Environmental and Social Impacts of Chinese Trade 
and FDI in Bolivia’. 
664 Bolivian Government, Ministerial Resolution No. 109-A, 31 August 2009. 
665 Seth Fletcher, Bottled Lightning: Superbatteries, Electric Cars, and the New Lithium Economy, 1st ed (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2011). p.172 
666 Ricardo Calla Ortega, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017 
667 Ibid. 
668 Mayor of Uyuni. Interview with author, Uyuni, 21 March 2017.  
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The impact of FRUTCAS’s political relationship with the MAS government was 
made clear to me by a local official in Uyuni.669 He told me that I should speak to 
FRUTCAS if I wanted to know about lithium, and told me that they were “a part of 
government”.670 He also said that while there may have been some form of community 
consultation on the project as a result of this relationship, “most of what the President says is 
already approved.”671 This statement perhaps indicates that President Morales is 
uninterested in implementing consultation procedures that could offer a veto. This is 
reflected in the way he is described as perceiving consultation within the Territorio 
Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS) struggle in 2012. According to 
Lalander: “Morales has repeatedly expressed that he considers this procedure [FPIC-
consultation] to be a waste of time and money, but that this right of the peoples should 
be respected”.672 
The president of FRUTCAS (at the time of my visit) is a quinoa farmer who lives 
in a small village to the west of the Salar de Uyuni near the border with Chile, far from 
the lithium pilot plant (which is in the south-east). Following a mention of the history 
of the failed contract with FMC–LITHCO in the 1990s, he explained the ideological 
reasons for the union’s strong institutional support of the Bolivian state-run project: 
Neoliberal governments wanted to favour transnational companies more than anything, and 
they wanted to take advantage of the use of water and many bad laws, right? Take advantage 
of our water resources in this region, our natural wealth… We as FRUTCAS, as farmers, 
we have always bet on nationalization and not the incursion of transnational companies.673 
 
669 Government of Bolivia, Law No. 341 of Participation and Social Control. The Law No. 466 of Public 
Enterprises has a relevant Social Control clause: “The social control of public companies shall be subject 
to the provisions of the Political Constitution of the state, Law No. 341 of February 5, 2013, of 
Participation and Social Control and other applicable regulations; and it will be exercised to promote the 
transparent management of public companies.” 
670 Local official in Uyuni. Interview with author, Uyuni, 24 March 2017. 
671 Ibid.  
672 Lalander, ‘Ethnic Rights and the Dilemma of Extractive Development in Plurinational Bolivia’.  
673 President of rural union federation. Interview with author, Uyuni, 23 March 2017. 
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This discursive narrative – that Bolivians no longer want foreign firms to influence 
their extractive politics – strongly echoes the rhetoric of President Morales, who rose to 
power on a promise of increasingly nationalised natural resource management, and 
indeed, the right of Bolivia’s indigenous communities to an improved standard of living 
through the paradigm of vivir bien.  
Interestingly, Calla suggested to me that around 2010 there had been an effective 
“coup” against the peasant farmers union FRUTCAS,674 and thereafter they were no 
longer directly involved in the project. He maintains it was then fully taken over by 
central government, and the Scientific Committee was disbanded.675 In the years since 
2010, increasing state investment into the Bolivian lithium project has seen the 
construction of pilot plants for the evaporation of brines for the extraction, processing 
and production for lithium carbonate and the potassium chloride fertiliser. It is thought 
that the government has invested around USD$900m into the project,676 using revenues 
from gas projects in the eastern lowlands. 
Following the completion of the pilot plant, and during my first visit to Uyuni 
during my fieldwork in early 2017, a bill was passed in the Bolivian Parliament that 
separated the state lithium miner subsidiary (the Gerencia Nacional de Recursos Evaporíticos 
or GNRE) from state mining company COMIBOL to form the Yacimientos Bolivianos de 
Litio (YLB).677 The YLB is managed under the auspices of the newly-created Ministry of 
Energy, headed by Luis Alberto Echazú, the former manager of the GNRE. By mid-
2017 the state firm was examining bids for the construction of the industrial scale 
lithium plant.  
 
674 Ricardo Calla, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017. 
675 Ibid. 
676 Sagárnaga López, ‘Bolivia’s Lithium Boom’. 
677 The name of this state-owned corporate entity reflects naming conventions across South America for 
national extractive operations. The Bolivian petroleum company is called YPFB (Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos), for example. 
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6.1.2 The two lithium extraction methods for mining lithium in the Salar de Uyuni  
While it is thought that Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni contains the bulk of the world’s lithium 
(see Chapter 2), the lithium is contained in brines that have a high magnesium content. 
This presents a unique barrier to the extraction of a large, valuable reserve of an 
element in high and increasing demand. In 2014 Bolivian NGO the Centro de Estudios 
para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA), published a report with information about 
two potential methods of lithium extraction that had been researched by the Scientific 
Committee.678 These are known as the sulfato and the encalado methods. 
Calla’s chapter in the CEDLA report exposed potentially serious negative 
environmental consequences from the “encalado” method of lithium extraction. Encalado 
could be translated to “liming” as it uses large amounts of lime, or calcium carbonate 
(cal in Spanish).679 The lime is added to the brine early in the evaporation stage to enable 
the separation of magnesium (in the form of magnesium hydroxide) from the lithium to 
create lithium carbonate. Calla explains this process thus: 
CEDLA’s collection of information also shows that the separation of Mg from 
Li through ‘liming’ [encalado] in the first stage to achieve an industrial production 
of the projected magnitudes would require about 1,000 tonnes per day of 
moistened lime or “lime slurries”, which would generate – according to 
available information – about 4,000 tonnes per day of mud or sludge from 
residual brines mixed with calcium sulphate and magnesium hydroxide; that is 
to say, in a year, Llipi would generate the crazy amount of 1,460,000 tonnes of 
sludge with the mentioned content and they must be dealt with in some way.680  
The key figures in the quotation above are estimates from Calla’s anonymous 
informant, a chemist who had been on the Scientific Committee. They predict a high 
amount of waste product that would have to be dealt with in some way – either 
 
678 Ricardo Calla Ortega, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017; 
Ricardo Calla Ortega, “Impactos de la producción industrial del carbonato de litio y del cloruro de 
potasio en el salar de Uyuni” in Calla Ortega, Ricardo, Juan Carlos Montenegro Bravo, Yara Montenegro 
Pinto, Pablo Poveda Ávila, Un presente sin futuro: El proyecto de industrialización del litio en Bolivia (La Paz: 
CEDLA, 2014) 
679 This is also translated as “whitewashing”. 
680 Ibid, p.29 
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through local processing and disposal or trucking out to another disposal site, both of 
which would likely represent further pollution and contamination. It is also worth 
noting that industrial lime production emits high levels of carbon dioxide through the 
drying and calcining of limestone, the basic raw material in lime production.681 “A basic 
calculation indicates that the industrial lime plant would produce 930 t of Carbon 
dioxide per day”,682 which at proposed levels of usage would increase total Bolivian 
carbon dioxide emissions by two percent. 
The GNRE manager and lead author of the CEDLA report said in his 
introduction to the same that the project may well use both methods, the encalado and 
sulfato, to lessen the impacts of the former. He writes “the lime process is not the best 
option, and will only be used for less than 60 percent of the total production”.683 At the 
projected magnitude of full production, 60 percent of 4,000 tonnes per day is still a 
large amount of waste however, and at the time of the CEDLA report there was “no 
in-depth study or a defined strategy to address the treatment or disposal of sludge by 
the GNRE”.684 The report recommends a study into the “alkalinisation process of soils 
provoked by the dissemination of magnesium hydroxide [which] could affect the rural 
production of quinoa in the regions bordering the Uyuni salt flat”.685 The “opportunity 
cost” of allowing lithium production to squeeze out the region’s traditional quinoa 
agriculture was analysed in a 2010 Master’s thesis.686  
In the introduction to the CEDLA report it is noted very clearly that Calla is 
 
681 Calla Ortega, “Impactos de la producción industrial del carbonato de litio y del cloruro de potasio en 
el salar de Uyuni”, p.33–34  
682 Ibid. 
683 Juan Carlos Guzman Salinas, “Introducción: Elementos para encarar el debate”, in Calla Ortega et al, 
Un presente sin futuro, p.17 
684 Ricardo Calla, “Impactos de la producción industrial del carbonato de litio y del cloruro de potasio en 
el salar de Uyuni” p.30 
685 Ibid, p.31 
686 Aguilar-Fernandez, ‘Estimating the Opportunity Cost of Lithium Extraction in the Salar de Uyuni, 
Bolivia’. 
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concerned that the encalado method of extraction could have serious impacts on the 
environment and communities of the area: 
For Calla, the encalado process could constitute a very serious and dangerous 
environmental threat to the fragile ecosystem, in accordance with his interviews, 
he found that the alkaline nature of the magnesium hydroxide contained in the 
residues would increase the alkalinity of the soils of the southwest of Potosí, 
affecting the sustainability of the ways of life of the communities and the 
biodiversity, and would suppose an impact that should be evaluated and about 
which the population should be informed.687 
The CEDLA report explains how the encalado method is one of two alternatives that 
could be used to separate the lithium from the magnesium. The other process is the 
sulfato method (this process uses sulphates to achieve lithium carbonate), but it is 
unclear how far the Scientific Committee got in this line of enquiry, as they were 
allegedly disbanded at the time of the so-called “coup” removing FRUTCAS.688 The 
environmental consequences for this alternative extraction method are therefore not 
well known, but Calla’s expert informant, the chemist who had been on the Scientific 
Committee (and notably wished to remain anonymous), apparently believed they could 
also be severe.689  
GNRE Annual Reports recently made available online confirm that the extraction 
method to be used will indeed be the encalado – or rather the 2016 document confirms 
the use of the synonymous “lechadas de cal”.690 This was also confirmed to Bolivian 
economist and researcher Sanchez-López in her interviews with the GNRE,691 although 
it was denied to me in my interview with the Communications Director of the 
GNRE.692 
 
687 Guzman Salinas, Juan Carlos, “Introducción: Elementos para encarar el debate” in Montenegro et al, 
Un presente sin futuro, 2014. 
688 Ricardo Calla, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017 
689 Ibid. 
690 GNRE, Memória 2016, La Paz: GNRE, p.66 
691 Sanchez-López, “From white desert to strategic resource: commodification of the Uyuni salt flat in 
Bolivia”. 
692 GNRE Communications Director. Interview with author, La Paz, 11 April 2017. 
  
 
 
236 
6.2 Mining, environmental and indigenous rights law in 
Bolivia  
The great changes in Bolivian politics that have occurred over the past 10 years have 
triggered a substantive overhaul of the country’s legislation pertaining to indigenous 
peoples’ rights, environment and mining. Bolivia’s legislative landscape has developed 
significantly in recent years to include numerous social and environmental laws 
including a new Bolivian Constitution (2009), a controversial Mining Law (2014) and a 
new Law on Mother Earth and Living Well (2012).693 There is also an older Law on the 
Environment from 1992 still in force.  
This section analyses this legislation in detail, in order that compliance with them 
can be measured out of responses gathered during my fieldwork. It is worth noting 
briefly that, like the historical detail and other aspects of the Bolivian lithium project 
above, information on environmental cases and compliance procedures (particularly 
with the newer legislation) is difficult to find in Bolivia.  
6.2.1 Mining and natural resources law in Bolivia  
The importance of natural resources to the economy is clear from the 2009 Bolivian 
Constitution’s Article 349, which declares that the natural resources are owned by “the 
Bolivian people” but controlled by the state “on behalf of their collective interest”.694 
Article 369.II reaffirms that “[t]he non-metallic natural resources existing in the salts, 
brines, evaporations, sulphurs and others substances are of strategic character for the 
country.” 695 Together with the declaration of a “fiscal reserve” 1974 and the 2007 
Presidential Decree outlined above, it reaffirms state rights to manage and own the 
 
693 Bolivian National Congress, Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien N° 300. 
There is an associated ministry, the “Plurinational Authority on Mother Earth” which manages Bolivia’s 
climate change planning. 
694 Government of Bolivia, Bolivia (Plurinational State of)'s Constitution of 2009 (Oxford: OUP, 2009)  
Article 349. 
695 Ibid, Article 369. 
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resources for the benefit of the whole country, and further in a special category for the 
sector described as “strategic”. “Strategic sectors” in Bolivia, such as lithium and 
hydrocarbons, are given particular attention in Article 311.II.4 of the 2009 Bolivian 
Constitution, providing that “[t]he state may intervene in every part of the chain of 
productivity in the strategic sectors, seeking to guarantee its supply in order to preserve 
the quality of life of all Bolivians”.696 This hints plans to industrialise lithium, and 
echoed in Article 346, which declares that “natural assets are of public importance and 
of strategic character for the sustainable development of the country”.697 This 
management of natural resources for “sustainable development” for preserving the 
“quality of life of all Bolivians” is the central foundation Bolivia’s neo-extractivist 
model. Furthermore, the “strategic” status appears to further confirm that the resource 
is under sole control of the state, even obliging the government to extract it as per the 
provisions above for the benefit of all citizens’ “collective interest”.698 
The Bolivian Constitution clearly provides for a right to consultation for 
indigenous peoples in its Article 30.2(ii). For those identified in Article 30.1 as a 
“nation” in Bolivia, which includes all indigenous peoples and the Quechua-speaking 
native peasants around the Salar de Uyuni 
the right to prior obligatory consultation by the state with respect to the 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in the territory they inhabit 
shall be respected and guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement.699 
Article 30.2(iii). further grants the right “[t]o participate in the benefits of the 
exploitation of natural resources in their territory”,700 echoing the rights to consultation 
and benefit-sharing as found in ILO169. Notably the provision is for extraction of 
 
696 Ibid, Article 311.II.4 
697 Ibid, Article 346. 
698 Ibid, Article 349. 
699 Plurinational state of Bolivia, Constitucion Politica Del Estado, Article 30(2)ii 
700 Ibid, Article 30(2)iii. 
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“non-renewable natural resources”.701 Presumably lithium falls under this category, 
although some confusion about this emerged in my interviews with local and national 
experts. 
As well as echoing the provisions of international legal documents pertaining to 
the rights of indigenous peoples in the Constitution, in 2007 the Bolivian government 
adopted the entire text of UNDRIP into its own national legislation, with the result that 
all the provisions of UNDRIP are now adopted into Bolivian Law No. 3760.702 This 
means that there are very clear specific national rights to prior informed consultation in 
Bolivia which should have the aim of obtaining free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).  
Bolivia’s 2014 Mining Law, echoing sections of the Constitution set out above, 
reaffirms strong state control over all mining activities. It also provides a framework for 
consultation: the Mining Law’s Article 211.II states consultations should be done “in a 
maximum of three (3) meetings, that must be carried out in the place closest to the 
execution of the mining exploitation project”.703 These restrictions mean the provision 
is in breach of Bolivia’s domestic UNDRIP Law No. 3760, which would require as 
many meetings as necessary in seeking to obtain FPIC, and held in a place convenient 
for affected community members to attend. 
It is unclear how provisions for consultation in Bolivia’s 2014 Mining Law apply to 
the pilot lithium project, as the law states in its Article 207.II that prior consultation 
does not apply to mining exploration or prospecting phases, both of which the pilot 
 
701 Plurinational state of Bolivia, Constitucion Politica Del Estado (CPE), 2009, Articles 30(15), 290(I), 293(I) 
and Article 303(I) on consultation with indigenous or rural native communities. 
702 Bolivian National Congress, Ley N° 3760 elevando a rango de Ley de la República los 46 artículos de la 
Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos humanos de los pueblos indígenas, 2007. Law No 3760 states 
“Pursuant to Article 59, 12th attribution of the Constitution of the state, rising to the rank of Law of the 
46 articles of the UN Declaration on Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted at the 62nd Session 
of the General Assembly of the Organization of the United Nations (UN), held in New York on 
September 13, 2007.” 
703 Ibid, Article 211. 
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plant might be considered to fall under.704 Article 73 of the 2014 Mining Law 
specifically covers evaporate resources, of which lithium is one. It is not substantial, 
perhaps reflecting the early-stage nature of the Bolivian state lithium project when it 
was composed, the pilot project having only been inaugurated in 2012.705 Article 73 
states that COMIBOL will manage the 100 percent state-run production and 
commercialization of the evaporates, and that COMIBOL can create a subsidiary to 
handle production and commercialisation.  
The law does however guarantee continuing rights to terceros (third parties) such as 
salt miners operating on the salt flat. Article 73.VI states that third party rights to 
concessions on the Salar de Uyuni should be “evaluated” within two months of the 
publication of the 2014 law.706 It is unclear whether this was done. 
6.2.2 Bolivian environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights law 
Environmental policy in Bolivia is based upon rights provided in the Constitution, five-
year Economic and Social Development Plans,707 and the 1992 Law on the 
Environment No. 1333.708 Bolivia’s 1992 Law on the Environment (No. 1333) provides 
a legal framework for most industrial activity, and this is regulated centrally by the 
government Ministry of Environment and Water. It requires local authorities to 
establish a National Information System for Environmental Information to facilitate 
 
704 Article 207(II), Ley de Minería y Metalurgia N° 535. 
705 López and Rua Quiroga, ‘An Assessment of the Environmental and Social Impacts of Chinese Trade 
and FDI in Bolivia’. 
706 Ibid, Article 73(6). 
707 See, for example, Decreto Supremo Nº 29272, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social 
(PDES) "Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democrática para Vivir Bien"2009–2014 
 [Bolivian National Development Plan “Dignified, Sovereign, Productive and Democratic Bolivia to Live 
Well”], 2009; Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social en el Marco de Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, 
2016-2020, available at http://www.boliviawdc.org/images/publicaciones/PND.pdf [accessed 30 
December 2017] 
708 Jorge Inchuaste and Zoya Galarze, “Environment & Climate Change Law 2017 (Bolivia)”, International 
Comparative Legal Guides, available at  
 https://iclg.com/practice-areas/environment-and-climate-change-law/environment-and-climate-
change-law-2017/bolivia [accessed 30 December 2017] 
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the right to environmental information.709 Environmental permits are only granted at 
the completion of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), with the extent of the 
studies determined by the regulator on the basis of the level of environmental damage 
likely to be caused.710 Article 27 of this law states that the National Secretariat of the 
Environment is the authority that determines whether and what kind of EIA is 
necessary.711 They range from requiring (before the investment stage), a comprehensive 
analytical EIA to not requiring an EIA at all.712 
Usually an EIA would not be required prior to the prospecting stage of a project 
(one reason being that the prospecting and early-stage research generates the 
information that would go into such an impact study). It is still unclear to me whether 
and how the pilot lithium plant complies with this law, however two Bolivian 
researchers, Calla and Sanchez-López, both suggested that no EIA has been completed 
for the project.713 I have not been able to find evidence either way. Perhaps an EIA 
would only be deemed necessary in advance of the industrial-scale plant becoming 
operational, and this is still some years away. It has furthermore been acknowledged 
that “Bolivia’s environmental protection laws are notoriously flimsy”.714 Where strong 
commitments are in place, they are relatively new and untested.715 
The right to a healthy environment appears in the 2009 Bolivian Constitution’s 
Article 33, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to a healthy, protected, and 
 
709 Bolivian National Congress, Ley de Medio Ambiente No. 1333. 
710 Ibid. 
711 Ley de Medio Ambiente No. 1333, Article 27. 
712 Ibid, Article 25. 
713 Ricardo Calla, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017; 
Sanchez-López, Daniela. “From white desert to strategic resource: commodification of the Uyuni salt flat 
in Bolivia”. 
714 Jessica Szarek, ‘Bolivia’s Massive Supply of Lithium, and the Implications for the Local Community of 
Potosi’, Upstream Journal (blog), 22 May 2018, https://www.upstreamjournal.org/bolivia-lithium/. 
715 Government of Bolivia, Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien No. 300, 
La Paz: Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2012 
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balanced environment.716 Article 34 provides access to justice on environmental matters 
particularly, stating that  
[a]ny person, in his own right or on behalf of a collective, is authorized to take 
legal actions in defence of environmental rights, without prejudice to the 
obligation of public institutions to act on their own in the face of attacks on the 
environment.717 
This is an important clause as it contradicts the spirit of the 2014 Bolivian Mining Law 
(Articles 99–101) which seek to criminalise social protest against mining. These assert 
that public force will be used against those protesting against mining, and that 
protestors will be held liable for economic damages caused in actions against the 
mining operators.718 
The 2009 Bolivian Constitution was composed by a Constituent Assembly in the 
former capital, Sucre, between 2006 and 2007. The process was fractious, divided on 
national geopolitical lines between the highland elites (represented by the newly elected 
MAS government) and the lowland criollo or Eurodescendant elites who have 
historically had political control over extraction in the hydrocarbon-rich lowland areas 
of Bolivia.719 As well as declaring Bolivia a “plurinational” state, meaning many 
“nations” or indigenous ethnicities are acknowledged as innately Bolivian in 
constitutional law, the 2009 Bolivian Constitution offers significant advances in 
indigenous rights. Article 30.1 defines a nation thus:  
A nation and rural native indigenous people consists of every human collective 
that shares a cultural identity, language, historic tradition, institutions, territory 
and world view, whose existence predates the Spanish colonial invasion.720 
 
716 Government of Bolivia, Bolivia (Plurinational State of)'s Constitution of 2009 Trans. Max Planck Institute 
(Oxford: OUP, 2009)  
717 Ibid, Article 34. 
718 Government of Bolivia, Ley de Minería y Metalurgia No. 535, Articles 99–101. See Angela Cuenca 
Sempértegui, ‘Resisting the Mining Law in Bolivia’, War Resisters’ International, 29 August 2014, 
https://www.wri-irg.org/en/story/2014/resisting-mining-law-bolivia. 
719 Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing , Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change, Austin (TX: University of 
Texas Press, 2014.) 
720 Bolivian Constitution, Article 30.1. 
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This marks the 2009 Bolivian Constitution as a significantly progressive document, 
codifying such numerous rights for indigenous peoples that cannot all be listed here. It 
should be noted however that while the rights granted in the Constitution are 
significant, implementation and compliance measures are frustratingly slow and often 
wholly ineffectual.721  
As well as engaging substantially with indigenous rights, the Bolivian Constitution 
in its Article 8 also incorporates the indigenous principle of vivir bien (“living well”), 
suma qamaña in Aymara and sumak kawsay in Quechua. This concept of development in 
harmony with nature and society rooted in Andean indigenous cultures is found in both 
the Bolivian and Ecuadorean Constitutions. However, as Chapter 2 noted, the idea of 
vivir bien as a communitarian, indigenous sustainable development paradigm could be 
said to be in direct conflict with natural resource exploitation plans in neo-extractivist 
Bolivia. 
What is clear is that the 2009 Bolivian Constitution grants rights to “rural native 
indigenous communities”722 to both consultation and participation on a number of 
matters.723 Interestingly, where the 2009 Bolivian Constitution is thought to have been 
influenced by the provisions of UNDRIP, the previous Bolivian Constitution (1994) 
was similarly thought to have been influenced in its progressive attitude towards 
indigenous peoples by ILO169 (1989).724  
While there is scant evidence that cases have been brought under the provisions of 
these new mining or environmental laws or rights contained in the 2009 Bolivian 
Constitution, there are, however, a number of academic studies on consultation 
 
721 Robert Albro, “Confounding Cultural Citizenship and Constitutional Reform in Bolivia”, Latin 
American Perspectives 37, Iss. 172, No. 3, 2010 71-90. 
722 See Bolivian Constitution. 
723 Ibid, Chapters IV and VII. 
724 Albro, “Confounding Cultural Citizenship and Constitutional Reform in Bolivia”. 
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procedures.725 These have found consultations to be state-managed processes lacking in 
genuine participation from stakeholders,726 commonly excluding certain 
demographics.727 A Chapter 4 makes clear, consultations have to be accessible to all 
members of a community who might wish to attend, and participants should be free 
from state or company coercion or manipulation in order to be considered “free” (see 
Table 2, p.XX). 
In 2011 major protests over a highway through the Amazonian Territrio Indígena y 
Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS) national park where 14,000 indigenous people 
live won some protection for the park and its peoples through the promise of a 
consultation process. Perhaps as a result, the indigenous peoples protesting the highway 
through TIPNIS were granted their own specific rights to consultation in an entirely 
new law.728 Furthermore, while there is a consultation procedure provided for within 
the 2005 Hydrocarbon Law, studies have found that this is not well-implemented.729 As 
noted in Chapter 2 and above, President Morales has publicly stated a number of times 
that he believes that while the process of consultation is necessary to respect the rights 
of indigenous peoples, it is a waste of time and money.730  
 
725 Ricarda Flemmer and, Almut Schilling‐Vacaflor, “Unfulfilled promises of the consultation approach: 
the limits to effective indigenous participation in Bolivia’s and Peru’s extractive industries”, Third World 
Quarterly, 37:1, 172-188, 2016; Havard Haarstad , “Cross-scalar Dynamics of the Resource Curse: Constraints on 
Local Participation in the Bolivian Gas Sector”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 50, No. 7, 977–990, 2014. 
726 Jessika Eichler, The Vernacularisation of Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in the Bolivian Extractive Sector, 
2016. 
727 Ibid, p.131 
728 Bolivian Government, Ley de Consulta a los Pueblos Indígenas del TIPNIS No. 222, 10 de febrero de 2012. 
729 Eichler, Jessika, The Vernacularisation of Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in the Bolivian Extractive Sector; 
Haarstad, Havard, “Cross-scalar Dynamics of the Resource Curse: Constraints on Local Participation in 
the Bolivian Gas Sector”; Flemmer and Schilling‐Vacaflor, “Unfulfilled promises of the consultation 
approach: the limits to effective indigenous participation in Bolivia’s and Peru’s extractive industries”.        
730 Observatorio de Industrias Extractivas y Derechos Colectivos/OIEDC, “Evo: En la consulta previa 
se pierde mucho tiempo”, 13 July 2015, http://oiedc.blogspot.se/2015/07/evo-en-la- consulta-previa-se-
pierde.html  
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6.3 Communities around the Salar de Uyuni  
The next section will examine the communities around the Salar de Uyuni, and their 
traditional use of the land. This will aid the final section where I aim to understand 
whether there have been breaches of Bolivian national law pertaining to environmental 
and indigenous land rights in respect of the lithium mining project. 
6.3.1 Rights to land in southwest Potosí Department 
This region is one of the poorest in Bolivia but has been relatively economically 
successful in recent years, thanks in part to the tourism-boomtown of Uyuni, the large 
San Cristóbal mine, increased government spending and a generally strong economic 
trajectory nationally. The communities in the region are mainly Quechua and Aymará, 
and Quechua is widely spoken across the region over Spanish, with some older people 
speaking mainly or only Quechua.731 This is important because of the way Bolivian 
society and its Constitution defines “indigenous”. While lowland peoples are more 
commonly referred to as “indigenous” in Bolivia (see Chapter 2), despite being a 
majority ethnic group Aymará and Quechua campesinos are nonetheless included within 
the “nations and rural native indigenous peoples” designation in the 2009 Bolivian 
Constitution.732  
In terms of land rights, Calla outlines the influence of FRUTCAS on land titling of 
the Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCOs) or Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos 
(TIOCs) in his second chapter about the communities in the CEDLA report. He states 
that FRUTCAS made a deal with the government (to which they were closely aligned at 
 
731 Local shopkeeper near San Cristóbal. Interview with author, Culpina K, 3 April 2017; Driver. 
Interviews with author, 3–4 April 2017. 
732 This means that the communities surrounding Uyuni, as those living on “rural native indigenous” 
territory, have a “right to land, to the use and exclusive exploitation of the renewable natural resources 
under conditions determined by law” (note renewable), “to prior and informed consultation” and to 
“participation in the benefits of the exploitation of the non-renewable natural resources that are found in 
their territory” according to Article 403 of the Bolivian Constitution. 
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the time) in 2008 that would “cede to the State all the rights of use and exploitation of 
the salar and to fully recognise the fiscal reserve of the salar” on the condition that  
the State, through INRA [National Institute of Agrarian Reform], accept and 
carry out the rapid titling of TCOs or TIOCs in the Bolivian high plateau, 
including the titling of both the giant TCO or TIOC of Nor Lípez and, taking 
advantage of the urgent need on the part of the State to clear the question of 
the titles of dominion over the salar, of two other giants previously not 
demanded, those of the TCOs or TIOCs of Enrique Baldivieso and Sur 
Lípez.733 
This resulted in the Nor Lípez administrative region having title to the one of the 
largest (“unprecedented”734) TCOs in Bolivia, at over two million hectares,735 but no 
rights to any of the land determined as part of the fiscal reserve of the Salar de Uyuni.  
As the TCO is based on the fiscal reserve boundaries, it notably does not include a 
25–30-kilometre (50 at its widest parts) section of the coastline directly south of the 
Salar de Uyuni, around of the coastal area near to where the pilot plant is located. The 
government’s “urgent need” to title this land, according to Calla, was because it had “to 
consolidate the giant extension of this major salar as exclusive territorial domain and 
fiscal reserve of the Bolivian State for purposes of the industrialisation of its evaporitic 
resources.”736 The TCO has likely ramifications for the application of the domestic law 
laid out below, as to those considered entitled to consultation by the state.  
6.3.2 Use of natural resources and traditional livelihoods 
The people of the region are engaged in a number of productive activities including 
organic quinoa farming, salt-gathering, tourism, and both large and small-scale mining 
(of silver and other metals in the San Cristóbal mega mine, and of borax and ulexite 
 
733 Ricardo Calla Ortega, ‘Impactos de La Producción Industrial Del Carbonato de Litio y Del Cloruro de 
Potasio En El Salar de Uyuni’. p.50 
734 Ibid, p.49 
735 Ibid. 
736 Ibid, p.66 
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from the salar coastline areas).737 The region of Nor Lípez is home to one of Bolivia’s 
largest foreign-owned hard metal mines, San Cristóbal. The capital of this region, 
Colcha K, is close to but does not have direct access to the salt flat, due to impassable 
terrain. The villages closest to the salt flat are Rio Grande (directly south of the lithium 
plant) and Colchani. Many locals are involved in tourism, likely living in Uyuni for this 
work. 
Salt gathering is practised by the inhabitants of one village called Colchani. 
Colchani is located on the eastern edge of the Salar de Uyuni, on the main route on to 
the salt flat for tourist vehicles travelling from Uyuni (see Map 3). It is very clear from 
visiting Colchani that their salt harvesting work is a traditional activity that has been 
undertaken for centuries on the Salar de Uyuni. This is evidenced by the newest 
building in Colchani, a government-funded structure with permanent stalls for 
souvenirs, located in a circle around a central “Salt and Llama Museum”, which 
contains historical images and dioramas depicting the traditional way of life of the 
village’s people (see Photograph B2). My key interviewee in Colchani expressed a desire 
for more information to give to tourists about their salt gathering and llama husbandry 
traditions. This made me consider that, certainly compared to Argentina, there was little 
in the way of tours for the experience of seeing the salt production. The companies 
focused on tours across the Salar de Uyuni and to the coloured lakes (home to three 
species of flamingo) and unusual rock formations across the Eduardo Avaroa Nature 
Reserve southwest of Uyuni.  
Quinoa farming and llama husbandry are the main agricultural activities in the 
coastal regions of the Salar de Uyuni. The region is known as the only place growing 
organic “royal” quinoa, a source of regional and national pride (see Photograph B4). 
 
737 Colcha K regional authority official, head of productive development. Interview with author, Colcha 
K, 4 April 2017  
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Quinoa is a hardy plant that does not need much water, but even so production fell 
substantially in 2014–7 due to the persistent drought that affected the whole region.738  
Salt gathering, practised here (like in the Salinas Grandes) since pre-Columbian 
times, is also seriously affected by drought. Without a regular cycle of precipitation, salt 
crystals cannot form. Drought also affects the availability of drinking water for local 
communities and their animals too. As one informant from the salt-gathering 
community of Colchani told me: 
in the community we are suffering a lot with a lack of water. We are lacking. And if there’s 
no water, there is a lot of sickness. The drought these last years is very strong. Before we didn’t 
know drought. The salt was lovely back in the day. If there’s no water, the animals suffer.739 
Across the region, a common response to my question about the immediate needs of 
communities was for a reliable way to harness the region’s natural hydrology to provide 
communities fresh water. This is perhaps because of the recent experience of the 
regionwide drought that led President Morales to declare a State of Emergency in 
2016.740 Although not as dry as the Atacama in Chile, reliable water supplies are clearly 
important in the region around the Salar de Uyuni. 
6.3.3 Responses to the lithium mining project 
There is little knowledge among most community members in the region about lithium 
mining. Many of those that had heard about it were generally keen to see it happen. In 
San Agustín, notably farther from the salt flat than most of the communities I visited, I 
spoke to an elderly man who asked me a few times, “when do you think we can start selling 
it?”. He said to me, “Let’s hope we can sell it soon,” as we parted ways, after a conversation 
which included him lamenting about how the young people often have to go away to 
 
738 President of rural union federation. Interview with author, Uyuni, 23 March 2017. 
739 Anonymous, Interview with author, Colchani, 16 March 2017 
740 Reuters, ‘Bolivia Declares State of Emergency over Worst Drought in 25 Years’, The Guardian, 21 
November 2016, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/21/bolivia-drought-
state-of-emergency-water-shortages. 
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Chile to work in mining.741 I noted palpable frustrations across the region at the delays 
in the project, perhaps because for most people it represents a potential source of 
employment and increased government funding. Improved transport infrastructure, 
such as a road from Colcha K to Rio Grande (only a four-wheel drive can cross the 
mud flat between the two communities) would make employment at the mine feasible 
for those living in Colcha K, who perhaps could not find an income in quinoa any 
more. 
The quinoa farmer President of FRUTCAS stated quite unequivocally that quinoa 
was not the future for the region: “Quinoa is a very delicate agriculture. It is not very 
sustainable, it is affected by climate change constantly and it is fragile. They are not a safe bet, quinoa 
and livestock”. This, he said, is why FRUTCAS supported the Bolivian state lithium 
project. That, and because the communities “have the right to have technological 
development”.742 He sees the lithium project as many do in the region, as the way to 
achieve vivir bien: “that is why, as we say, we also have the right to have a better quality of life, 
suma qamaña; with quinoa, we will not have that.”743 His enthusiasm for the government 
mining project on these terms was particularly interesting given FRUTCAS’s historic 
links to the Bolivian government regime. 
Municipal officials in Colcha K, the capital of Nor Lípez, appeared relatively 
trusting that the state lithium project will not cause huge environmental damage, as the 
assumption is that it will be properly managed and extraction will be carefully 
controlled. The municipal secretary for economic and productive development in 
Colcha K, in response to whether lithium mining will affect the environment in and 
 
741 San Agustín resident. Interview with author, 4 April 2017. Also, Local shopkeeper near San Cristóbal. 
Interview with author, Culpina K, 3 April 2017. This was a common theme raised in discussions with 
young men looking for work and mothers who wished they did not have to travel so far away to find it. 
742 President of rural union federation. Interview with author, Uyuni, 23 March 2017. 
743 Ibid. 
  
 
 
249 
around the salar, said: 
If we do not make a controlled or rational exploitation, if it can be affected. So, that’s why, as 
I was saying a while ago, as a municipality, we are not going to let an exploitation that, say, 
expands out to, for example, all over the salar. It would have to be well controlled, in a 
certain space. Not all over the salar. That’s going to take care of us as a municipality, because 
this wealth attracts many tourists from the world to our territory. So we're not going to let it be 
exploited like that, in an extensive form, let’s say. But, something limited. So with that we are 
not opposing, but rather, making an exploitation of wealth in a controlled manner based on 
the laws of the environment that we have as a country.744 
For the municipal authorities in the region, the balancing of number of productive 
(economic) interests, including tourism, is necessary for the “rational exploitation” of 
an important national resource.  
It was unclear whether the local authority officials understood that there had been 
a deliberation over the method to be used or knew about the waste that would be 
produced by the encalado method. As the Salar de Uyuni is 10,000 square kilometres, it is 
likely that locals are unconcerned about environmental impacts, unless they work 
directly on the salt, as salt gatherers or tour operators. Nonetheless, the processing or 
removal of 4,000 tonnes of alkaline sludge per day from the use of the encalado method 
might have ramifications for the region more broadly, such as through an increased use 
of trucks on dirt roads that can become unstable after heavy rain. 
On the drive back from Rio Grande, the community nearest to the Llipi 
encampment and lithium pilot plant, we picked up a man who had worked in the plant 
on the salt flat since the very early days of the project. He told us there was “a lot of 
work driving trucks in the salt flat”,745 particularly shifting loads for the landscaping of 
the plant. When I asked him whether a lot of lime was used in the process he 
responded: “Arta cal! [So much lime!] In the first phase here we brought lime from all over, 
including Potosí [the capital of Potosí Department].”746 This indicates that the method had 
 
744 Colcha K regional authority official. Interview with author, Colcha K, 4 April 2017. 
745 Truck driver in Llipi plant, Interview with author, Rio Grande, 4 April 2017. 
746 Ibid. 
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been tested within the pilot plant. I asked him for his thoughts on potential 
contamination of the environment more generally. His reply was unequivocal: 
Yes it will affect the environment. It could affect environment and tourism, with the 
contamination that you can see there inside with the toxic parts. It could affect the 
surroundings of the salar. For example I live in Rio Grande, it’s close to the salar, so it can 
arrive first in Rio Grande. Contamination will arrive. It can happen, you know? The 
residents and also the tourists, because they pass through the middle of the salar, taking 
photos. All that, and with this contamination there will be damage… there will be 
contamination.747 
While he is clearly not a scientist, it is very clear that he fears that contamination will 
affect not only the salt flat and its tourism industry, but that it will also spread and 
“arrive” on the coastal areas, including in communities such as Rio Grande.  
He was concerned too about pollution from the trucks that are currently moving 
in and out of the local village to service the plant: 
In Rio Grande there is contamination now because of the trucks. They are in great herds and 
ohhh they make a lot of pollution when they start up. The fumes are toxic for the children. So 
many huge trucks [in the plant], around two hundred. I enter the community every day, each 
day they work with around fifty per day. Every day fifty, fifty, fifty, fifty.. In the salar they 
work with almost… over a hundred.748 
The CEDLA report also warns that the encalado method would require large-scale truck 
operations to deal with the waste, citing “a flotilla of fifty trucks” as a minimum in the 
following passage: 
To have in circulation and in running for eight hours, day after day – for years 
and years – a flotilla of even fifty tipper trucks on the dirt roads of the 
Southwest of Potosí, would mean, in any case, of course, levels of dust critical 
for the human population, for the fauna and for the development of the 
vegetation cover in the affected environment. To this must be added the 
economic and environmental high cost in diesel, gasoline and oils that would 
stay in the Southwest of Potosí, and even reach beyond it, creating a massive 
flood of decay for decades.749 
 
747 Ibid. 
748 ibid. 
749 Calla Ortega, Ricardo, “Impactos de la producción industrial del carbonato de litio y del cloruro de 
potasio en el salar de Uyuni” p.37 
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That there are already an unmanageable amount of trucks passing through Rio Grande 
does suggest that there will be contamination from even partial use of the encalado 
method. It also appears that the contamination will take various forms: the carbon 
dioxide from the lime production; the fourfold output of alkaline magnesium hydroxide 
itself (for each tonne of lithium carbonate); and emissions and dust from the trucks that 
will be necessary to bring in the lime and dispose of the waste. 
When we met in London, Bolivian researcher Sanchez-López indicated that she 
had interview evidence from the GNRE that the process of the encalado would in fact 
be used,750 and pointed me to the 2016 and 2017 GNRE Annual Reports that stated 
this fact.751 This was a revelation to me, because the GNRE Communications Director 
had insisted in our interview that the encalado would not be used. This was also the 
impression I had from Calla during our interview in La Paz, and from a blog article 
written by the head of the GNRE in response to the CEDLA project, which will be 
fully examined in the final section of this chapter below. 
6.4 Extent of prior consultation in communities around the 
Salar de Uyuni 
Having analysed the relevant Bolivian law and the potential socioenvironmental 
impacts of the Bolivian lithium mining project, I now turn to the experience of prior 
consultation of communities around the Salar de Uyuni. Not all communities close to 
the Salar de Uyuni are likely to be affected by lithium mining, particularly given the size 
of the salt flat. Therefore, this section focuses on the quinoa-farming communities of 
the southern coastline and the salt-gathering-focused community of Colchani to the 
east, both of which require a healthy environment for their traditional livelihoods.  
 
750 Sanchez-López, 2018. I wrote to Sanchez-López for clarification on the evidence contained within the 
documents. 
751 GNRE Memoria 2016, p.66 
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6.4.1 Access to information about lithium in and around the Salar de Uyuni 
Conducting interviews within the region it emerged that even the highest authorities in 
Nor Lípez had not read nor heard about the CEDLA report or the encalado method. 
The provincial delegate in Colcha K told me that he had not seen it (and his manner 
suggested he was not aware of it generally).752 Our interview ended with him asking me 
about the environmental impacts of lithium mining in Argentina. This suggests interest 
in the topic but few avenues for further research.  
In general, the region has no newspapers and very few televisions, even in Uyuni 
town: there would often be a crowd gathered outside the one shop with a television in 
central Uyuni to watch a football match, for example. Many in Uyuni town and the 
salar’s surrounding villages told me that they have no knowledge of the current state of 
the project at all. If they had heard about it, it would have been from “hearing some 
commentaries”,753 which I took to mean word-of-mouth talk. 
A lady living in a village called Vila Alota in the region of Enrique Baldevieso had 
said she heard nothing about lithium because, “it is located in another province”.754 She also 
said that, “only in Rio Grande [had people been informed about the lithium project]. No commission 
has arrived here, not here in the village nor in the school. Maybe in their province [Nor Lípez].”755 
This was a common response for those outside Nor Lípez. 
Interestingly, when asked about the involvement of FRUTCAS in the project, of 
which she and her husband were members, she said: “In 2010 there was a conflict between 
FRUTCAS and the government… From the leaders [of the project], or through FRUTCAS. It is 
not known very well, but I heard it was about some corruption.”756 She was concerned that 
 
752 Colcha K regional authority official. Interview with author, Colcha K, 4 April 2017. 
753 Author conversation with Uyuni street market stallholder. Uyuni, 1 April 2017. 
754 This was a response received in Colchani, too, which is located in Antonio Quijarro Province along 
with Uyuni town. Colchani local. Interview with author, 16 March 2017. 
755 Local woman. Interview with author, Vila Alota, 4 April 2017. 
756 Ibid. 
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lithium mining might contaminate the salt: “Yes [I am worried,] because what is going to be 
contaminated is the salt. We live from the salt, we are consumers of the salt”.757 This was 
surprising, as Vila Alota, being far from the salt flat, is not a salt gathering community. 
It is however a beneficiary of adventure tourism centred around the Salar de Uyuni, 
catering for one-night stays of tourists exploring the region in four-wheel drives. 
What her responses suggest is that only those living in Nor Lípez would have 
information about the Bolivian lithium mining project. However, numerous responses 
indicated that there was a lot of secrecy around the lithium project, even in that in the 
region. The provincial delegate for Colcha K, the capital of Nor Lípez told me, for 
example: 
Well, it's a bit more ... it's a little confidential, the work they are managing, it's not easy to 
have clear information. But it's a state company, no? In another way… I think in general 
they will inform us, right? They will inform us all.758 
This is an acknowledgement, from the highest official in the municipal authority of 
Colcha K, capital of Nor Lípez (where the closest coastal village to the plant, Rio 
Grande, is located), that details for the project are not readily available. This is justified 
locally by the idea that there is confidence in it because it is state-run. This is seen as the 
key to being better informed. The main frustration this official expressed is that the 
work was probably delayed, and he reasoned that this was perhaps why information 
was not forthcoming.759 
Information was clearly difficult to come by even for well-connected researchers 
working from La Paz. During our first meeting, Calla told me that learning about the 
Bolivian lithium project would not be typical PhD research but more “like detective 
work”.760 Indeed, CEDLA’s own research was only made possible through the hiring of 
 
757 Ibid.  
758 Colcha K regional authority official. Interview with author, Colcha K, 4 April 2017. 
759 Ibid. 
760 Ricardo Calla, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017. 
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Juan Carlos Montenegro, who was high up in the GNRE at the time, and was 
eventually made the manager of the YLB in early 2017, when Luis Alberto Echazú was 
made Energy Minister. 
6.4.2 No information about lithium in salt-gathering community Colchani 
Colchani, the salt gathering community right next to salt flat on the eastern edge, is the 
one community that seemed to know nothing at all about the project. My anonymous 
Colchani informant, a salt miner, repeatedly stated that the community had had no 
contact from the government about the lithium project. When asked if the community 
knew much about the lithium plant he said: “No. We have not been to visit it. We don’t have 
much knowledge here in Colchani. It belongs to Nor Lípez, we are Antonio Quijarro.”761 He said 
that “we only participated in the years of Jaime Paz Zamora”,762 referring to the Bolivian 
president of the time of the LITHCO contract.  
Throughout our interview this informant insisted that there had been no 
information or opportunity for participation in the state project since then at all: 
We don’t know about it – zero. We don’t have any kind of explanation. We don’t know 
how much lithium they are taking, nor of what quality. It’s worrying for us because of lack of 
water. Long before, many years ago… the salar used to have a lot of water and I would take 
a lot of salt. It’s absorbing all of the water from the salar. It lowers the production of salt. It’s 
a little worrying for us. We don’t blame the company, but we think… [he trails off]763 
Without any information about lithium mining there was a suspicion among salt miners 
that the mining activity might have something to do with lower salt yields.  
Nonetheless, he also reaffirmed state ownership of the Salar de Uyuni, while also 
giving an indication of the salt gatherers’ relationship with the state: 
The salar belongs to the state. It’s a fiscal reserve. We have a small area of production rented 
from the state through COMIBOL. We pay monthly to use it, but not much. But if we don’t 
 
761 Anonymous salt miner. Interview with author, Colchani, 16 March 2017. 
762 Ibid. 
763 Ibid. 
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produce much salt… [again he trails off]764 
Here, he confirms that the salt cooperatives rent areas of the salt flat from the state. 
This recalls reminder of the provision in Article 73 of the 2014 Bolivian Mining Law of 
the need to guarantee the rights of third parties to the concessions on the salt flats. 
That there has been no company contact with this one community that relies on 
salt gathering as a traditional livelihood was a clear violation of their right to have their 
traditional livelihoods strengthened and protected.765 I asked my respondent numerous 
times about any information he might have had about lithium, and repeatedly he said 
there had been nothing. I asked a few people in the village square if they knew anything 
about the lithium project, and only one – a young girl – said that someone had come 
and showed them a video about electric cars. My anonymous informant said that this 
must have been in school, because no such thing had happened in the community.766 
These responses indicate that no form of consultation process about the Bolivian 
lithium project has taken place in Colchani, despite it being the one community that 
depends on the salt flat for their traditional livelihood. This is a breach of international 
law, as indigenous communities have the right to be consulted on projects affecting the 
lands they occupy or otherwise use, and natural resources found on those lands used as 
part of their traditional economic structure. 
6.4.3 Selective consultations in the form of “socialisations” in 2010–11 
The old website (publicly accessible until 2017) of the former GNRE, a subsidiary of 
state mining firm COMIBOL, suggests that between 2010 and 2011, community 
meetings were held that are collectively understood as “socialisations” of the lithium 
 
764 Ibid. 
765 Article 23, ILO169. 
766 Ibid. 
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project.767 In sociology, “socialisation” is generally understood as the means by which 
people internalise societal norms.768 This definition refers to the individual as the 
subject that is “socialised”, not the project or law, as it is in Bolivia. The Bolivian 
Chamber of Senators website has a subpage title “Socialización”,769 which lists numerous 
changes to the law that will be “socialised” through meetings about them, usually led by 
senators and committee members associated with the law in question. Sanchez-López 
told me that a “socialisation” is a common form of sharing information with local 
communities about a project in Bolivia, which is reflected in my interview data.  
This is interesting considering the legal developments that criminalise dissent 
against mining, and the likely socio-political pressures on Bolivians to accept industrial 
or infrastructure projects.770 However, given the 2009 Constitution’s use of 
“consultation”, and that UNDRIP is national law, it is perhaps notable that 
“consultation” is not more widely used.  
As the Community Management section of the now-offline website of the GNRE 
stated (in early 2017): “Between the 2010 and 2011 administrations, different 
socialisation activities were carried out in South West Potosí communities, as well as 
educational and other institutions.”771 The GNRE community relations webpage 
continues: 
A very important aspect is the direct relationship with the inhabitants of the 
area, creating in this way an environment of mutual trust between the GNRE 
and the communities, this fact allows executives, managers, technicians and 
workers to carry out their tasks with the certainty that together, a project is built 
that will benefit all Bolivians.772  
 
767 “Gestion comunitaria [Community management]”, GNRE webpage, n.d., on file with author, accessed 
15 March 2017, http://www.evaporiticos.gob.bo/?page_id=112  
768 John J Macionis, Sociology (15th ed.) Boston: Pearson, 2013, p.126; Clausen, John A. (ed.) Socialisation 
and Society, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1968). 
769 “Socialización”, Plurinational Legislative Assembly of Bolivia, Chamber of Senators website, n.d. 
accessed 22 October 2018, http://senado.gob.bo/etiquetas/socializaci%C3%B3n  
770 The multiple pressures on communities to accept the TIPNIS highway is a good example of this. 
771 Author’s italics. “Gestion comunitaria” 
772 Ibid. 
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It is difficult to know precisely what a “socialisation” entails from this alone, but 
presumably it is a process designed to create “an environment of mutual trust” between 
companies and communities.  
The GNRE Annual Reports from 2011 and 2012 each mention “socialización” of 
the project with local communities once. The 2011 Annual Report states the aims of 
the Community Management of the GNRE, which has the following objectives: “To 
make known the aims, scope and objectives of GNRE”; to “Guarantee the social 
sustainability of the industrialisation of evaporitic resources”; “Participate in the follow-
up and supervision of the project” and “Support in community projects (drilling of 
wells for drinking water, maintenance of roads and others).” Following this, it states 
that, to achieve the above objectives 
socialisation activities have been carried out in different communities, and 
educational institutions. Among the 33 communities and institutions visited, a 
total of 1,689 participants are registered, where 1,007 are male and 682 are 
female.773 
While the numbers suggest that there was clearly a lot of socialisation activity, there is a 
lack of clarity here as to which communities and educational institutions were visited, 
or what the meetings entailed.  
The 2012 Annual Report, which has a section entitled “Socialisation of the 
community project of Colcha K”, is a little clearer on the information shared. It states:  
At the request of the community of Colcha K, the GNRE provided a detailed 
report on the progress of the project [which explained] the characteristics of 
Lithium, its main uses, main reserves of Lithium, scope of the reserves of 
Lithium in Bolivia, background and the Strategy for the Industrialisation of 
Evaporate Resources and the phases of the project.774  
It is notable that this was provided “at the request of the community of Colcha K”, and 
not as part of any state-led consultation process. The section quoted above appears to 
 
773 Author italics. GNRE Memória, (La Paz: GNRE, 2011) p.97  
774 GNRE Annual Report 2012, p.81 
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take the provision of the detailed report to the community as a form of “socialisation” 
in itself, as reflected in the heading of the section. 
Furthermore, the 2012 Annual Report also has a section on “Public Consultation” 
which states: 
Public Consultation – As part of the Specific Analytical Environmental Impact 
Assessment Study (EEIA-AE) for the Modular and Industrial plants of KCl 
[potassium chloride], the corresponding Public Consultation has been carried 
out in the facilities of the Llipi camp. This event has not only served the 
purpose of obtaining the corresponding Environmental License, but has also 
allowed a fraternal approach with the Regional Federation of Peasant Workers 
of the Southern Altiplano (FRUTCAS) and other social organizations, having 
expressed their full support for the lithium industrialisation project in Bolivia.775 
This statement provides some evidence that an EIA was produced for the potassium 
chloride (KCl) industrial plant. The mention of FRUTCAS here is notable not just 
because it confirms their support for the lithium project, but also because it states 
above that a “public consultation” was carried out as part of the EIA for the 
production of the fertiliser (KCl). 
The above is interesting, particularly because there is no evidence that a 
consultation was carried out as part of an EIA for lithium. It is unclear why this is from 
these reports, but perhaps it was because the state company was still deliberating over 
which lithium extraction method would be used. It appears that this was still unclear at 
the time of the publication of the CEDLA report in 2014. The president of the local 
union federation told me, in response to my question about consultation: “there has not 
been a recent socialisation, but technologically we cannot contribute much, they didn’t explain to us 
which method would be more healthy, to not damage the environment.”776 This lack of clarity at the 
time means the “socialisations” could not have been particularly informative as to the 
specifics of the lithium project and its environmental impacts.  
 
775 Ibid, p.94–95 
776 Ricardo Calla. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017 
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6.4.4 The Bolivian state lithium project’s compliance with national law 
Numerous interview responses suggested that any kind of access to information or a 
socialisation process would be predicated on the municipality in which the community 
was located. As shown above, the region closest to the mine, Nor Lípez, was able to 
request information from the state company. It is likely that the communities in this 
region, given their large area of titled land that excluded the coastal region nearest to 
the lithium plant, were not considered by the government to be entitled to prior 
consultation. However, given the lack of an EIA, potential for widespread 
environmental damage from the use of the encalado method, and the trucks required to 
remove the waste, the decision over who should be consulted based on regional 
boundaries does appear somewhat arbitrary.  
Studies have shown that in Bolivia consultation legislation is both new and poorly 
implemented where it is in place.777 While there are provisions in Bolivian law for EIAs 
and strong provisions for consultation of indigenous peoples through its adoption of 
UNDRIP as Law No. 3760, it has been hitherto unclear whether, how and when this 
applies to lithium mining on the Salar de Uyuni. It is unclear whether this is because of 
lithium’s designation as a nationally-owned resource “of a strategic character” in the 
Constitution,778 or the protracted nature of the state pilot project, for which, being at 
prospecting or exploration stage, a full EIA or consultation may not be required. It is 
common for EIAs to be performed only after prospecting has ascertained the level of 
damage that could be caused. However, the pilot plant was completed in 2012. Given 
the scale of the proposed industrial zone on the Salar de Uyuni, it would be unusual if 
 
777 Eichler, The Vernacularisation of Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in the Bolivian Extractive Sector; 
Haarstad, “Cross-scalar Dynamics of the Resource Curse: Constraints on Local Participation in the 
Bolivian Gas Sector”; Flemmer and Schilling‐Vacaflor, “Unfulfilled promises of the consultation 
approach: the limits to effective indigenous participation in Bolivia’s and Peru’s extractive industries”; 
Roman Bushel and Scott Fletcher, TIPNIS Highway Consultation, 27 February 2017, Participedia, 
accessed 2 January 2018, https://participedia.net/en/cases/tipnis-highway-consultation  
778 Bolivian Constitution, Article 369(II) 
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the National Secretariat of the Environment did not determine that an EIA was 
necessary for the project as per the 1992 Law on the Environment No.1333.779 
Furthermore, consultations are mandated by the Bolivian Constitution in Article 
30.1 which provides for “the right to prior obligatory consultation by the state with 
respect to the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources”.780 I was surprised 
during my fieldwork to learn that this provision was perhaps overlooked on the 
grounds that lithium is in fact viewed as a “renewable” resource. The former head of 
COMIBOL confirmed to me that lithium was being “renewed” by the Rio Grande 
river discharging into the salt flat: 
Lithium, potassium, all that is in the mountains and around the salt, each year naturally 
provides a small supply [into the salar]. As it has been thousands of years of accumulation, 
we have the biggest lithium reserve in the Salar de Uyuni. But it is still being renewed…781 
One could of course say the same for oil, for example, but the idea that lithium is a 
renewable resource is interesting given the wording of the law, which states that 
the right to prior obligatory consultation by the State with respect to the 
exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources in the territory they inhabit shall 
be respected and guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement.782 
For the Secretary of Productive Development in the municipality of Colcha K, there 
was also confidence in the notion that lithium is essentially renewable, that it can be 
“regenerated”. He said it was important to know “if the same amount is being regenerated or is 
not regenerated in each phase of the management, and in what time or what time it takes, let’s say, to 
regenerate this resource that is being exploited.”783 The president of the rural union federation 
also understood lithium to be innately renewable, telling me that “but lithium is a 
renewable metal, we know, if the brine is stirred with the water it is regenerated”. This is an 
 
779 Law No.1333, Article 27. 
780 Ibid, Article 30.I 
781 Former head of COMIBOL. Interview with author, La Paz, 25 April 2017. 
782 Bolivian Constitution, Article 30.15. 
783 Colcha K regional authority official,head of productive development. Interview with author, Colcha 
K, 4 April 2017. 
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interesting detail to emerge from the interview data, particularly as the law stipulates 
that “prior obligatory consultation” should be used in the exploitation of non-
renewable resources only.784  
The situation laid out above suggests a question as to whether the Bolivian 
Constitution itself is correct to suggest consultation is only required when the resource 
is non-renewable. UNDRIP makes no such distinction, with Article 32.2 stating clearly 
that FPIC must be sought (although not necessarily obtained) “prior to the approval of 
any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other 
resources.”785 Furthermore, as Chapter 4 has shown, case law from within the Inter-
American system unequivocally provides that consultation is a right for communities 
(even those without land title) prior to the extraction of both renewable and non-
renewable resources, including those which the communities utilise within their own 
economic systems themselves.786 
Given that UNDRIP is also part of Bolivian law, and that the lithium project 
(although still at pilot stage) appears to be effectively approved at the very highest level, 
I conclude here that the government is in breach of its own UNDRIP law. This grants 
rights to FPIC for “any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, 
water or other resources”.787 While the Nor Lípez and Colchani communities’ land does 
include any area of Salar de Uyuni, or coastal area south of the plant (which belongs to 
 
784 Bolivian Constitution, Article 30.15. 
785 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) resolution / 
adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. Adopted 143-4-11, 107th plenary 
meeting Issued in GAOR, 61st sess., Suppl. no. 49."Annex: UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples": p. [1]-11, Article 32(2). 
786 Saramaka People v Suriname, IACHR Series C no 172, IHRL 3046 (IACHR 2007), 28th November 
2007. 
787 UNDRIP, Article 32.2 
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the state’s “fiscal reserve”), it is clear that the salt gatherers’ resources (salt) are 
extremely likely to affected by the industrial-scale project’s use of the encalado method. 
Furthermore, communities engaged in traditional organic quinoa agriculture are also 
likely to be impacted by the contamination and water use of lithium mining, even at a 
distance from salt flat. 
6.5 Wider social and political context of the Bolivian lithium 
project  
This final brief section examines the wider social and political context of the developing 
Bolivian lithium project. It will first examine the lack of transparency over the use of 
the encalado method. I will then analyse what the use of the encalado method for the 
Bolivian lithium project might mean, according to Calla. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of international involvement in the project. 
6.5.1 Lack of transparency in Bolivian lithium mining 
In a now-offline blogpost, the former head of the GNRE and now Minister of Energy 
Luis Alberto Echazú wrote a scathing criticism of the 2014 CEDLA publication.788 It 
starts by pointing out that CEDLA’s “Energetic Platform” is funded by IBIS, a Spanish 
bank, and goes on to say that the report 
it is not, as we will demonstrate, either a scientific, technical or even informative 
contribution, on the contrary it misinforms the people, distorts reality and lies 
grossly about the production process of Lithium and Potassium salts and the 
consequent waste.789 
It takes aim particularly at Calla’s chapter in the report, which is careful to explain 
exactly where the information came from about the two extraction methods, which in 
one case is from within an interview with Echazú himself.  
 
788 Perhaps owing to the website redesign as the GNRE became the YLB. 
789 Luis Alberto Echazú Alvarado, “El Litio y las calumnias del CEDLA”, GNRE website blogpost, 
2014, on file with author, accessed 22 September 2016, http://www.evaporiticos.gob.bo/?p=1622  
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A key point that emerges from this blogpost is the strong nationalistic and anti-
colonial language driving the reaction to the revelation of the method to be used. 
Echazú continues: 
Repeating old practices of the scribes of the antipatria, who came in the past to 
even dismiss the installation of smelting furnaces in Bolivia with supposedly 
technical and scientific arguments, CEDLA aims to discredit the project of 
industrialisation of evaporate resources and generate distrust in the population 
about its viability.790 
His first point does have a basis in history, in that there were few opportunities for 
Bolivia to industrialise its resources in the past – particularly in the case of tin at the 
turn of the twentieth century (hence the reference to the smelter). What is interesting is 
how he sets CEDLA against the industrialisation of Bolivia’s lithium. Echazú concludes 
his blog post: “The people and the revolutionary process are stronger than internal and 
external enemies. The industrialisation of our natural resources is unstoppable.”791 
Interestingly, Echazú’s post implies (through referring to IBIS funding) that 
foreign influences are in some way trying to “sabotage” the project. The GNRE’s 
Communications Director admitted to me that they had stopped allowing foreign 
journalists to visit the Llipi plant because “[t]he international press is very critical of the 
Bolivian state in this project” and these critiques “do damage to our country”,792 indicating a lack 
of transparency and growing distrust of any entity willing to critique the process of 
industrialising lithium. While it will be difficult to draw conclusions about the damage 
to the Salar de Uyuni nearby communities from lithium mining until the industrial-scale 
project is in production, the reaction to the CEDLA report denying the use of the 
encalado and attacking the critique do point to an increasingly secretive, perhaps even 
paranoid, lithium state project leadership. 
 
790 Ibid. 
791 Ibid.  
792 GNRE Communications Director. Interview with author, La Paz, 11 April 2017. 
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6.5.2 The Salar de Uyuni as a “sacrifice zone” for capitalist countries 
While local leaders expect some inevitable environmental damage from lithium mining, 
at least, they contend, the revenues will remain in Bolivia: 
The benefit of all this is that everything, everything, everything that we are going to generate is 
going to be for us to have. But if a private company comes, they will pay us well, but they will 
loot it. All that profit they will try to take elsewhere.793 
With such a focus on the revenues, which could yet take half a decade still to 
materialise, local leaders are already in the difficult position of trying to negotiate with 
central government for a better share for their regions. It has been calculated by 
Sanchez-López that the local municipality Nor Lípez will only receive two percent of 
the royalties according to the law governing the distribution of lithium profits. This is 
equivalent to the amount offered to the region by LITHCO in the 1990s.794  
The FRUTCAS president proudly and repeatedly referred to the “100 porciento 
estatal” status of the project as being a way to improve life for Bolivians. For him, 
lithium extraction is about the right to development, to suma qumaña or vivir bien, which 
cannot be achieved from quinoa alone. He told me it was “not right” that  
the other countries of the First World have all the development, and we are castigated without 
a right to development. We here in Bolivia think in terms of communitarian socialism. And 
the political revolution we have had in this country has given us this certain level of economic 
development. We have seen in these last 10 years with the nationalisation of our natural 
riches, we have achieved an acceptable standard of living. At least we are dignified people. 
Before it bothered us, that we were seen as Third-Worlders, ignorant Indians, and now we are 
on par – we have technology, we have mobile phones, a satellite, we have almost full electricity 
service in the country. The little villages on the border with Chile, even they have electricity! 
The FRUTCAS president is naturally pleased with increased access to technology and 
economic development in his region, and this perhaps influences his view of the MAS 
government and the project. But it is not clear whether the crucial detail of the 
potential environmental damage – that would likely affect his livelihood as a quinoa 
 
793 Colcha K regional authority official. Interview with author, Colcha K, 4 April 2017. 
794 Sanchez-López, “From white desert to strategic resource”, 2018. 
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farmer (he said he would not give up quinoa to work in mining, but that he might want 
his son to be able to do so) has been made clear to him in the “socialisations”.  
Lithium mining activity is not yet causing major environmental problems in the 
region, except some pollution from trucks. But with the use of the encalado method the 
impacts could quickly become overwhelming. This is what led Gúzman Salinas to cite 
Calla in the introduction to the CEDLA report, stating that, for Calla,  
continuation of the project under the technological definitions of the encalado 
does not only represents danger for the ways of life of the region, but could 
convert it, in environmental terms, into the “sacrifice zone” for the energy 
transition for the capitalist centre countries.795 
The research presented here shows that this is a possibility, even without a host of 
foreign firms entering the country to mine, as is occurring in Argentina and Chile.  
It is interesting to consider the relationship between the communities living 
around the Salar de Uyuni and “capitalist centre countries” (including China), who will 
likely be the consumers of the extracted lithium carbonate. It is, firstly, ironically only 
because of climate change that there is a market for lithium in the industrialised North 
that has made the Salar de Uyuni so desirable for lithium mining. Furthermore, if 
mining lithium on the Salar de Uyuni will cause so much damage it could be considered 
an environmental “sacrifice zone”, it is clear that the FRUTCAS president’s dreams of 
development under the MAS regime of communitarian socialism are somewhat 
misguided. The trust he has placed in his leaders to manage the project responsibly 
come from his lack of clear information and direct participation about the 
industrialisation of lithium.  
 
795 Juan Carlos Guzmán Salinas, ‘Introducción. Elementos Para Encarar El Debate’, in Un Presente Sin 
Futuro: El Proyecto de Industrialización Del Litio En Bolivia (La Paz: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo 
Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA), 2014). p.18 
  
 
 
266 
6.5.3 International and bilateral influences on Bolivia’s lithium project 
China consumes so much lithium carbonate that the global spot price of the 
commodity depends in large part on movements in their lithium-ion technology 
economy.796 China has also become Bolivia’s largest bilateral creditor, with USD$7 
billion of infrastructure loans made by China to Bolivia approved in 2016.797 Only 
USD$70,000 of lithium carbonate has been reportedly produced and sold so far, in 
2016 to China.798 However, full production from Bolivia could flood the market, 
causing global lithium price destabilisation.799 The former head of COMIBOL told me 
that this concern led to Bolivia contracting a Dutch firm to facilitate its entry into the 
global lithium market, expected in 2022–3.800 He also told me that Bolivia had made 
some attempt to negotiate the establishment of an Organisation of Lithium-Producing 
Countries (OLEC), modelled after the equivalent petroleum group, but Chile and 
Argentina had rejected the proposal. 
The geopolitics of lithium are a particularly important part of Bolivia’s resource 
nationalism. Bolivia’s 2017 contestation at the Hague of Chile’s capture of Bolivian 
territory during the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) concerns precisely the areas of large 
lithium reserves in the Atacama (see Map 2, p.74). Morales has maintained that, had 
Bolivia retained its sea coast, it would have had sovereignty over the Salar de Atacama 
and the significant copper reserves of the northern Chilean State of Antofagasta.801 The 
issue over this lost sea coast and land is a huge one in Bolivia, and has been for many 
 
796 Martim Facada, “Industrial Minerals: lithium market, prices and the Bolivian future”, Presentation at 
the Anglo-Bolivian Society lithium mini-conference, Senate House, London: UK. 5 April 2018; Former 
COMIBOL head. Interview with author, La Paz, 25 April 2017. 
797 Reuters, ‘Bolivia Says China to Lend $7 Billion for Energy, Transport...’, Reuters, 19 October 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-china-loans/bolivia-says-china-to-lend-7-billion-for-energy-
transport-infrastructure-idUSKCN0SD2A420151019. 
798 Andres Schipani and Henry Sanderson, ‘Bolivia Makes First Shipment of Lithium to China’, Financial 
Times, 17 August 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/78be1902-645c-11e6-a08a-c7ac04ef00aa. 
799 Facada “Industrial Minerals: lithium market, prices and the Bolivian future”. 
800 Former head of COMIBOL. Interview with author, La Paz, 25 April 2017. 
801 Ministry of Communication, “Bolivia plantea a Chile restablecer relaciones con el Papa como garante” 
Discurso Presidencial, 30 July 2015. 
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years (long pre-dating the MAS government). It is tradition in Bolivia that on 23 March, 
the “Day of the Sea”, the “Bolivian Navy” marches through towns and cities, and 
children draw maps and pictures to commemorate the loss of the sea coast and 
associated landmass. This was observed with quite some build-up and fanfare in Uyuni 
particularly, being so close to the re-drawn border (see Photographs B10 and B11). 
Throughout the 2006–2012 period, during Morales’ first term as President, there 
was a huge push for bilateral investment partnerships, similar to those encouraged by 
various governments. French, Korean, German, Japanese and Chinese firms and 
diplomatic delegations courted President Morales for a share in Bolivia’s lithium, and 
numerous memoranda of understanding were signed.802 Former COMIBOL minister 
noted the “aggressive” nature of these overtures, particularly in relation to France,803 
and indicated that there was palpable surprise from within the international community 
when the Bolivians 
rejected offers of France, of Korea, of Japan, of the Chinese, who wanted to join the project 
immediately, and (as always) take out the raw material and leave, as always. We rejected 
everything and they could not believe it, our foreign friends, this very firm position of the 
Bolivian state. We have maintained it and we continue to maintain it.804 
However, there is a potential disconnect between the narrative put out by this 
government, and absorbed and repeated by the officials in the local municipalities and 
FRUTCAS, and what appears to be actually happening in terms of foreign firms’ 
involvement in lithium. In particular, there is evidence to suggest that there is 
increasing Chinese involvement in the construction of the lithium carbonate and 
potassium plants – and in national infrastructure and development projects more 
broadly.  
 
802 GNRE Annual Report 2012, p.35. The encalado method is described here, but not its environmental 
impacts. It is questionable that these were available on the website at the time of the publication of the 
CEDLA report – I was not able to find them in my preliminary research. 
803 Former head of COMIBOL, Interview with author, La Paz, 25 April 2017 
804 Ibid. 
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As the full “industrialisation” of lithium along the supply chain is a highly technical 
project, there has been some Chinese involvement, such in the construction of cathode 
factories. However, very heavy Chinese involvement in the mining projection the Salar 
de Uyuni could prove yet another source of local resentment, as it has done elsewhere 
in Latin America,805 and particularly if the chosen method produces severe 
environmental damage in the region.  
López and Quiroga have examined the growth of China’s involvement in mining 
projects in Potosí (including lithium). According to them “this growth can be explained 
by the affinity that the Bolivian government has demonstrated for China, since it has 
shown support for Bolivia’s process of political change”.806 Indeed, there is a notable 
political–ideological parallel between the governments of Bolivia and China, even 
where there is no geopolitical power parity. In conversations with López and a local 
civil engineer in Cochabamba, it was clear that the influence of China is felt across 
Bolivian society, particularly in the tendering of contracts to construction firms such as 
China’s CAM-C.  
Finally, it does appear from my interview data that CAM-C are also directly 
involved in the lithium project. My anonymous Rio Grande informant said that, “Yes 
CAM-C, they are working with the plant. This is directly for export.” When I asked if it was 
export of lithium, he replied, “Of lithium”. He also said that “[t]here are other small 
companies, like from Mexico, Brazil, there in the Rio [the Rio Grande lithium plant]. Working on 
the area of cement. For the industrial plant”.807 When asked if he had seen many foreigners in 
his years working in the plant he said: “[i]n the company, when I go inside, there is only one 
 
805 Nathaniel Parish Flannery, ‘How China’s Relations With Peru Explain Its Approach to Diplomacy’, 
The Atlantic, 12 September 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/how-chinas-
relations-with-peru-explain-its-approach-to-diplomacy/279618/. 
806 López and Rua Quiroga, ‘An Assessment of the Environmental and Social Impacts of Chinese Trade 
and FDI in Bolivia’. 
807 Truck driver in Llipi plant, Interview with author, Rio Grande, 4 April 2017. 
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Chinese company, CAM-C, no more. The foreigners are from China CAM-C.”808 I noticed the 
name of the company more readily during the fieldwork due to a scandal that was 
unfolding in the national press. It involved a young Bolivian woman who was alleged to 
have been in a relationship with President Morales, and who had also worked for 
CAM-C. Although there is little evidence to suggest substantive involvement of China 
in Bolivian lithium mining as yet, the details above perhaps signify that the “100 
porciento estatal” label may be used a means to consolidate continuing support from local 
and provincial communities.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed Bolivian law pertaining to the rights of indigenous people 
living near proposed lithium mining on the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia. Analysis of the 
historical and socio-political dimensions of the project have revealed a determination to 
pursue lithium mining by the government, despite potential ramifications for local 
communities due to contamination from the use of the encalado method. 
The violations of both Bolivian national law and international human rights law 
are clear: the right to information has remained unfulfilled, and environmental 
participation has been weak, primarily conducted as “socialisations” in 2010–11, that 
concluded long before accurate information about potential environmental 
consequences was confirmed by the company in 2016. However, despite being 
seemingly approved at the highest levels of government, the project is still in its pilot 
stage, meaning there is still time for an EIA and consultation process to be 
implemented.  
Furthermore, support from the local social organization FRUTCAS and the 
 
808 Ibid. 
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national anti-colonial, “revolutionary” rhetoric used to promote the state-owned project 
has no doubt helped in securing local and regional acceptance. Naturally the prospect 
of revenue has helped, even though information about the project’s progress has not 
been forthcoming, and thus local frustrations are emerging. The increasingly centralised 
and secretive nature of the lithium project, and the strong reactions of the state 
company to critique suggest a determination to proceed regardless of the potential 
environmental damage. 
What is clear however, is that the proposed use of the encalado method, producing 
4,000 tonnes of waste material a day, even at only 60 percent of full production would 
cause huge contamination of the Salar de Uyuni and surrounding areas, and also 
through the amount of trucks required to remove it. There remain serious concerns 
over how large-scale lithium production will affect the local livelihoods of indigenous 
communities in the southwest of Potosí, particularly given the confusion over the 
methods to be used and their impacts, and the complete lack of knowledge of the 
process among local officials and community members. This is particularly concerning 
for those in the traditional salt-gathering village of Colchani. The damage that may be 
caused by the possible use of the encalado method is deeply troubling, and my qualitative 
field research makes clear that it is not (and has not been) widely understood in the 
region as a prospective method for the industrial-scale lithium plant. If indeed the plant 
is to be constructed soon, this information should be made available to communities, 
who should also be consulted according to Bolivian law.  
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION: COMPARING 
ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA’S COMPLIANCE WITH 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND INDIGENOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
Introduction 
As this thesis has so far detailed, two salt flats in Jujuy, Argentina, and the Salar de 
Uyuni in Bolivia are either currently being mined or will soon be mined for lithium. 
There have been different responses and levels of participation from surrounding 
communities. There are also different potential environmental impacts, with water a 
key concern in Argentina, and contamination from encalado waste and pollution from 
trucks a particular concern in Bolivia. To answer the central research question: “To what 
extent do indigenous communities have the opportunity to participate in lithium mining in their 
ancestral regions in the high Andean plains of Argentina and Bolivia?”, I had to ascertain how 
compliant Argentina and Bolivia are with international and regional legal regimes, and 
their own law, policies and environmental procedures. 
In both countries, the indigenous communities make similar use of the salt flats 
and surrounding lands, with some focused on rearing livestock, some on cultivating 
quinoa and others on salt gathering. Tourism and mining are also common options for 
work, particularly in Bolivia, and economic migration is common. The region, at high 
altitude and with an (increasingly) extreme climate, lacks infrastructure such as reliable 
roads, public transport, water supplies and healthcare. The communities are widely 
dispersed, with relatively low socioeconomic status and weak political power, although 
this is more complex in Bolivia, where the local union federation is closely linked to the 
government in power.  
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This chapter is split into four parts, which present the key findings of the study. 
The first section addresses the indigenous human right to a consultation process in 
both countries. The second analyses compliance in both states with the broader 
environmental participation law, focusing on the right to information. The third section 
examines the potential environmental damage from lithium mining in both regions. 
Together, these three sections answer the central research question of the thesis. The 
fourth and final part builds on this conclusion to examine both governments’ 
justification of extractivism in the case of lithium particularly. 
There are growing concerns among researchers and indigenous people that 
industrial-scale lithium mining will impact the ecological and hydrological balance 
required for the traditional indigenous activities of salt gathering, quinoa and animal 
agriculture across the region. Furthermore, the impacts of climate change are increasing 
across the high Andean plateau, evidenced by a recent severe drought. Lithium mining 
at scale is likely to make these impacts worse. This is alarming to indigenous 
communities that rely on reliable seasonal temperatures and rainfall to sustain their 
livelihoods. There is some irony in the fact that this commodity is found in great 
abundance in a region already suffering from the impacts of climate change, which are 
likely to be exacerbated by the impacts of mining lithium.  
7.1 Indigenous peoples’ rights to consultation in advance of 
lithium mining  
All communities living in close proximity to Argentina and Bolivia’s lithium-rich salt 
flats are indigenous. This means that they possess rights to consultation on projects 
likely to affect their lands, livelihoods and cultural traditions, provided for in 
international human rights law analysed in Chapter 4.  
An assessment of compliance with international indigenous human rights law is 
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crucial to determine not just the extent of participation in practical terms, but if and 
how the quality of participation complies with international norms relating to 
indigenous peoples’ rights. This section presents a key finding of the study: that moves 
to mine lithium are already causing violations of indigenous peoples’ rights in Argentina 
and Bolivia through lack of free, prior and informed consultation provided for in 
ILO169 (and UNDRIP in Bolivia). 
7.1.1 Compliance with rights to free, prior and informed consultation and consent 
ILO169 is binding on both Argentina and Bolivia and interpretations of these 
obligations are commonly drawn upon within the decisions of the Inter-American 
Commission and Court of Human Rights.809 The provisions in ILO169 that should be 
read in tandem are Article 7.1. and Article 15.810 Article 7.1 provides indigenous 
communities the rights to  
decide priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, 
institutions, spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and 
to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and 
cultural development.811 
This combined social, cultural and economic development is closely linked to 
indigenous use of land.812 In these cases the communities have a claim to the land on 
and around the salt flats as they use it for salt harvesting (the Salinas Grandes and 
Colchani communities), llama grazing, and for quinoa farming (in Bolivia only). 
Chapter 4 established that even without land title, indigenous communities have rights 
to land they occupy or otherwise use for traditional activities. 
Furthermore, Article 15 states that, even in cases where “the state retains the 
 
809 International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention C169, 1989 
(ILO169), Article 7(1) 
810 UN PFII, International Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 
New York, 17-19 January 2005, PFII/2005/WS.2/4 
811 Article 7.1, ILO169 
812 Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
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ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to 
lands”,813 governments are obliged to  
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these 
peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests 
would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the 
exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands.814 
The final part of ILO169 Article 15 maintains that indigenous communities “shall 
wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair 
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.”815  
Traditional indigenous interests are likely to be prejudiced by the development of 
lithium in both Argentina and Bolivia in a number of ways. In the short term, drilling 
and pool-construction on the salt flats might affect areas traditionally used for salt 
harvesting. Longer term, a reduction in water supplies from excessive drawing out of 
brines from salt flats could affect all areas around salt flats where industrial-scale 
lithium mining takes place. Specifically in the case of Bolivia, contamination of the Salar 
de Uyuni and the quinoa-focused agricultural lands surrounding its southern coast 
could result from the proposed use of the encalado method for all or part of the 
proposed production. Lithium mining may also affect community members’ work in 
tourism, which, while not traditional, is a particularly large industry in the Salar de 
Uyuni. 
Procedures to consult indigenous communities in both Jujuy and the southern 
Bolivian altiplano have not complied with their own domestic laws or state obligations 
under ILO169. In Argentina, unlicensed company activity on the Salinas Grandes 
meant no warning for communities in advance of the prospecting activity, and the 
impact studies eventually submitted were incomprehensible to the communities. In 
 
813 Article 15, ILO169 
814 Ibid. 
815 Ibid. 
  
277 
Olaroz there are regular meetings and the community is involved in some forms of 
environmental monitoring, but it is unclear how much the community were able to 
influence the early stages of the project. In the town of Susques, according to the 
Colectivo Apacheta, the municipality approved mining in an unrepresentative way, with 
35 signing for a community of over 2000, without free, prior and informed 
consultation. In Bolivia, “socialisations” were held instead of informed consultations, in 
selected communities and educational institutions. These meetings were presumably 
held too early to communicate the ramifications of the encalado method to quinoa 
farming communities on the southern coast of the salt flat, who require a healthy 
environment for their traditional agricultural activities. East of the Salar de Uyuni, the 
salt-gathering community of Colchani has not been informed at all about the lithium 
mining project. This is despite a clear reliance of the community on the salt flat for the 
traditional practice of salt gathering. 
As detailed in Chapter 4, the concept of FPIC has evolved from the same sources 
as the right to free, prior and informed consultation provided for in ILO169.816 To 
briefly recap, the “common practical understanding” of FPIC from the UN Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII),817 “free” means decisions are free from 
coercion, manipulation or intimidation; “prior” that consultation and/or the seeking of 
consent should be sought prior to any licensing or the commencement of activities; and 
“informed” that information received should be satisfactory in relation to key areas.818 
The overlap between indigenous peoples’ environmental rights and rights to 
participation and FPIC is apparent in the specification of the right to be “informed” in 
 
816 The ILO suggests that the ILO169 consultation articles already contain the principle of FPIC. 
UNPFII, International Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 
Contribution of the ILO, New York, 17-19 January 2005, PFII/2005/WS.2/4. 
817 UNPFII, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples (New York, 17-19 January 2005), Fourth Session, New York, 
16-27 May 2005, E/C.19/2005/3.  
818 Ibid. 
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order to participate through meaningful consultation (or give/withhold consent in the 
case of FPIC).  
While certainly strengthened by the case law from the Inter-American System, and 
associated through its content to other UN treaties, UNDRIP is only soft law, except in 
Bolivia, where it exists as a statute in national legislation. Despite this fact, and 
numerous other clauses in the Bolivian Constitution that provide for rights to 
consultation, it is clear that there have been no consultations at the standard required 
by UNDRIP in Bolivia in respect of their state lithium project. 
7.1.2 Meaningful consultation rights and the “right to veto” controversy 
While it is generally accepted that indigenous peoples have a special relationship with 
their ancestral land,819 it is also accepted that states own subsurface resources and have 
a right to develop these resources on behalf of all nationals. As well as being a common 
refrain from officials in both countries during my fieldwork, this is a fact also accepted 
by several community members I spoke to, many of whom were unaware of their 
environmental rights and rights as indigenous peoples. The former leader of Olaroz 
Chico told me that all three parties in the arrangement – the state, the company, and 
the community – “all have rights”,820 confusing mining rights with human rights. This 
statement prompts the following questions. Do all three parties understand their rights? 
Are the rights equally balanced? Communities appear to have far less knowledge of 
their rights than either the state authorities or companies (who have greater economic 
resources enabling access to information and legal assistance). This results in companies 
and state officials being able to deny a local community’s right to information, and 
rights to raise any concerns in advance of any mining activity taking place. (The notable 
 
819 Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’. 
820 Former leader, Olaroz Chico, Susques, Jujuy Province, 6 February 2017. 
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exception here is the 33 Communities of the Salinas Grandes, who were able to access 
legal education through NGOs following lithium prospecting in 2010.)  
This unequal power dynamic (where the state has a monopoly on definitions of 
legality821), is observable very clearly in the development of FPIC at the UN. An earlier 
draft puts a clear obligation on the state to actually obtain consent to mine. The 
eventual formulation adopted, of an obligation only to “consult… in order to obtain” 
FPIC was heavily influenced by state delegates who wished to ensure UNDRIP did not 
offer an indigenous veto to natural resource development. It is likely that the idea of 
meaningful, informed consultation with communities prior to any mining activity taking 
place is generally unacceptable to states because it might amount to allowing 
communities to refuse the project, or having a “right to veto”. However, the former 
UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, has specifically said that 
FPIC should not be “framed in terms of whether or not indigenous peoples hold a veto 
power that they could wield to halt development projects”.822 This is presumably to 
ensure indigenous delegations maintain an open dialogue with states at the highest 
levels, which is arguably what has occurred in Argentina in the case of the 33 
Communities.823 
Furthermore, having a right to refuse a project will have implications for the 
process of consultation more broadly. As reflected in the comment from Anaya above, 
states generally argue that the power of veto is an unacceptable level of power for 
indigenous communities to wield.824 Rights granted to communities “must be balanced 
by the need for governments to own or regulate resources in the interests of all their 
 
821 Harvey, The New Imperialism. 
822 James Anaya, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People’ (15 July 2009), UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 48. 
823 The acknowledgement of Kachi Yupi in the mining authority and National Ombudsman demonstrates 
the open dialogue.  
824 ibid 
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citizens.”825 As Barelli explains, “[t]his means that indigenous peoples should not have 
the power to block projects that are considered of strategic importance for the 
development of the entire country”.826 In attempting to understand how and why 
consultation has been so lacking around Argentina and Bolivia’s lithium-rich salt flats, 
the idea of a “strategic” extractive project is important. This will be analysed in the final 
part of this chapter where I consider national development as a motivator for state 
violation of indigenous rights to consultation. 
7.1.3 Bolivian indigenous rights law obscuring potential industrial damage 
One of the most interesting findings from my research is that, despite the distinct 
political ideologies in Argentina and Bolivia (see Chapter 2), and particularly the latter’s 
rhetorically anti-colonial, pro-indigenous and pro-“Mother Earth” stance, the 
fundamentals of resource governance relating to non-compliance with indigenous 
peoples’ rights are very similar. These fundamentals are that the lithium belongs to the 
state, and the state has the power to decide how it is managed. This power is effective 
in denying communities meaningful consultation, albeit in breach of international 
human rights law.  
In Bolivia, where indigenous rights law is stronger, the law has failed to protect 
indigenous communities’ procedural environmental rights. Socialisations, where they 
were held, provided little opportunity for communities to participate meaningfully. The 
potential socioenvironmental damage of the proposed encalado method has therefore 
been hidden from the communities it would likely affect. And yet, local support for the 
project is strong, bolstered primarily through the influential local union federation 
 
825 This point was highlighted by the representative of New Zealand during the negotiations on the text 
of the declaration. Cited in Barelli, 2012. Report of the Working Group on the Draft Declaration on its 
5th session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84, para. 93.  
826 Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’. Emphasis added. 
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promoting the communitarian socialist “development” narrative of the central 
government, and particularly by espousing the (potentially inaccurate) “100 percent 
state-owned” profile of the project.  
My finding reflects Burman’s finding on Bolivian hegemonic indigeneity, one that 
is “intimately tied to notions of Bolivian nationhood and a strong Bolivian state”,827 
reflected in support across the region for the state lithium project. In the absence of 
reliable information about lithium mining, the project’s parameters are reasonably 
assumed to be based on the decolonising, pro-indigenous development model of the 
MAS government, incorporating the concept of vivir bien, present in the 2009 
Constitution and the 2012 Law on Mother Earth and Living Well. This is hugely 
problematised by the concern that the project could produce up to 4,000 tonnes of 
alkaline waste per day. 
It is also interesting to analyse pro- or anti-lithium mining stances in the context of 
the political allegiance to the MAS of FRUTCAS, part of the CSUTUB, a group who is 
closely aligned with the MAS government. Given this link to the central government 
regime, one might assume that indigenous communities are able to influence decision-
making about their region in a meaningful way. However, it cannot be assumed that 
FRUTCAS, even if they had been provided adequate information, speaks for all the 
potentially-affected communities of the region. Moreover, although the federation 
played an important role early in discussions, evidence from Calla and others suggests 
they have been increasingly marginalised since 2010 when they were pushed out in a 
“coup”.828 
There are also signs that the Morales government has becoming increasingly 
 
827 Anders Burman, ‘Now We Are Indígenas! Hegemony and Indigeneity in the Bolivian Andes’, Latin 
American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 9, no. 3 (2014): 247–71. 
828 Ricardo Calla Ortega, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017. 
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authoritarian, such as the law criminalising mining protests, and the presumed 
suppression of the CEDLA report that revealed the waste from the encalado method. 
The case of the Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB) eviction is another 
case in point. CEDIB, which according to Director Marco Gandarillas is “a human 
rights organisation that has been denouncing human rights violations by transnational 
companies – including Chinese ones”, were asked to move out of their premises to 
make way for a Chinese institute.829 The threat to remove them with “the help of the 
security forces” came from the MAS-linked rector of Cochabamba University – giving 
the impression that the government is working across numerous channels to shut down 
criticism of extractivism and the work of organisations focused on social and 
environmental research. This is reflected in contemporary research on Bolivia.830 The 
conclusion is that, despite an optimistic start to the project with close involvement with 
the local indigenous peasant union, not even the “anti-colonial” MAS government is 
willing to submit to a process – to which they have subscribed through the national 
UNDRIP law – which may result in opposition to (or a right to veto) lithium mining on 
the Salar de Uyuni. 
7.1.4 Indigenous land title in Argentina and Bolivia and its bearing on consultation 
Indigenous land rights are complex in both countries. Indigenous communities in the 
region have a history of self-organisation and traditional practices on ancestral land, 
which are considered by the Inter-American human rights regime to confer customary 
land rights, even where the state has not granted title. There are indications in both case 
study areas that land ownership (according to state title) is a factor in indigenous access 
 
829 David Hill, ‘Top Bolivian NGO Facing Eviction - given Just Days to Move Archive’, The Guardian, 8 
April 2017, sec. Environment, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-
amazon/2017/apr/08/top-bolivian-ngo-faces-forced-eviction. 
830 Coletta and Raftopoulos, ‘Counter-Hegemonic Narratives and the Politics of Plurality’; Raftopoulos, 
‘Contemporary Debates on Social-Environmental Conflicts, Extractivism and Human Rights in Latin 
America’. 
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to company information. For example, the Olaroz Communities are entitled to 
payments from servidumbres on account of their communitarian land title. 
In the case of the Salinas Grandes, the very existence of indigenous communities 
was called in to question. Puente and Argento refer to the Argentinean Supreme Court 
hearing, where  
state Treasurer Alberto Matuk … was concerned to clarify that where the 
effective explorations were taking place it was in the area of the department of 
Susques (Jujuy), in the Salar de Olaroz, where there was consent from the 
inhabitants. The affirmation underlying this statement was that where the 
consultations had not been carried out, it was because there were no native 
peoples living in the area.831 
They conclude the point by stating that “the link between ‘existence’ and registration in 
state bodies, suggests that by not being registered… many of the Salinas Grandes 
communities were considered ‘nonexistent’”.832 Puente and Argento’s commentary 
certainly reflects the experience relayed to me by the 33 Communities representative, 
who told me that there were 40,000 people living in the puna region of Jujuy and 
Salta.833 However, not all of the 33 Communities had title to their land, suggesting they 
were “unregistered”. This shows starkly the wide power gap between government 
bodies and indigenous communities. In echoes of terra nullius, government officials 
deny the very existence of the communities, leading to a denial of rights. And yet, it is 
the state itself that has not registered their occupation of their ancestral land. This is 
one of the reasons the Supreme Court case was rejected: the judges believed they had 
no jurisdiction in a provincial matter, and particularly one where those bringing the 
claim had irregular communitarian land title.834 
 
831 Florencia Puente and Melisa Argento, ‘Conflictos Territoriales y Construcción Identitaria En Los 
Salares Del Noroeste Argentino’. p.134 
832 Florencia Puente and Melisa Argento.  
833 Representative from the 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
834 Supreme Court of Argentina “Comunidad Aborigen de Santuario Tres Pozos y otros c/ Jujuy, 
Provincia de y otros s/ amparo” December 18, 2012 C.1196.XLVI accessed January 2, 2018, 
http://public.diariojudicial.com/documentos/000/020/091/000020091.pdf  
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The unequal power dynamic recalls the right to comprehensible information from 
the state. This problematic is well expressed by Scott, who describes modern property 
law as “mediated through the state and readily decipherable only to those who have 
sufficient training and a grasp of the state statutes.”835 He further acknowledges that 
state myopia when it comes to land “value” is best represented by the fact  
that the cadastral map and assessment system considered only the dimensions 
of the land and its value as a productive asset or as a commodity for sale. Any 
value that the land might have for subsistence purposes or for the local ecology 
was bracketed as aesthetic, ritual, or sentimental values.836 
Of course, for indigenous communities, there is far more to their relationship with the 
land than can be contained in its commodification – it is the foundation upon which 
life itself is sustained, and the basis of their environmental rights. It is notable that in a 
majority-indigenous state like Bolivia, rhetorically committed to vivir bien, this appears to 
have been overlooked in favour of the industrialisation of lithium. 
In Bolivia, Calla writes in the CEDLA report, FRUTCAS had been lobbying for 
the titling of their communitarian land around the southern coast of the salt flat since 
the 1990s.837 This process was completed in 2008, when the Bolivian government 
required the land issue to be resolved urgently for the proposed industrialisation of the 
salt flat for lithium mining. Calla writes that FRUTCAS, therefore, was effectively 
“taking advantage of the urgent need on the part of the state of to clear the question of 
the titles of dominion on the salar” to secure their land titles.838 It is significant that the 
relationship between FRUTCAS and the MAS government appeared to have broken 
down in the years immediately after the titles were granted, with inadequate 
information shared with communities, many of which will be affiliated with FRUTCAS.  
 
835 Scott, Seeing like a State. p.63 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ricardo Calla Ortega, ‘Impactos de La Producción Industrial Del Carbonato de Litio y Del Cloruro de 
Potasio En El Salar de Uyuni’.  
838 Ricardo Calla Ortega. p.66 
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The Bolivian case provides an example of Scott’s argument above. Despite the 
clear perceived differences between regions in the area as regards rights to consultation, 
that the Salar de Uyuni “belongs to the state” was a fact accepted by the communities, 
including in Colchani (the salt gathering community), and particularly by officials in 
Colcha K. Some community members in Bolivia appeared to believe they had no rights 
to information or participation as they did not live in Nor Lípez.839 In both Argentina 
and Bolivia, state-administrated boundaries are what appear to determine the 
dissemination of information or invitations to participate from the company or 
government as mandated by law.840 Both the servidumbres and socializaciones appear to 
work this way – only communities within official, registered boundaries determined by 
the state to be “near” or “bordering” the coast of the salt flat where lithium operations 
are taking place are afforded these processes, regardless of their use of the salt flat. This 
has meant the exclusion of important communities from the process of establishing 
mining, such as the traditional salt-gatherers of Colchani and Salinas Grandes. 
Furthermore, the regularisation of indigenous land rights in Argentina has been 
seriously problematic, leading to numerous protests and sit-ins in Buenos Aires since 
the temporary “emergency” 2006 land titling law was promulgated (but not confirmed 
into law or enforced with any consistency).841 The two Olaroz Communities’ leaders I 
managed to speak with reported they had communitarian land title. It is likely that, for 
example, the Argentinean communities who were offered the chance to sign 
servidumbres, were only given that chance because the provincial authorities had them 
registered as holders of communitarian land title. However, as Chapter 4 explains, the 
 
839 Colchani local. Interview with author, 16 March 2017; Local woman. Interview with author, Vila 
Alota, 4 April 2017; Local business owner. Interview with author, Uyuni. 30 March 2017. 
840 Legal counsel, Salta Mining Ministry. Interview with author, Salta, 18 May 2017. 
841 Government of Argentina, Ley No. 26.160, Declárase la emergencia en materia de posesión y propiedad de las 
tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan las comunidades indígenas originarias del país, cuya personería jurídica haya sido 
inscripta en el Registro Nacional de Comunidades Indígenas u organismo provincial competente o aquéllas preexistentes, 
2006. 
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numerous indigenous rights cases heard at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
make it clear that there is a customary right to land title (through the right to property in 
the American Convention of Human rights) for indigenous peoples.842 This means that, 
indigenous peoples have rights to land they “occupy or otherwise use” as stated in 
Article 7.1 of ILO169, and subsequent rights to consultation, regardless of state title.  
7.2 The three pillars of participation and lithium mining 
Any individual likely to be impacted by mining have a right to environmental 
participation comprising the “three pillars” – the right to information, the right to 
participate in environmental decision-making, and the right of access to justice. This 
section analyses the main findings of the study using the three pillars as a guide, 
focusing in on the right to information, as a particularly complex aspect of the case of 
lithium mining and compliance with indigenous peoples’ rights. 
7.2.1 Access to information  
While reliable, independent information about lithium mining is scarce,843 details are 
emerging suggesting serious hydrological impacts from lithium extraction in Chilean 
operations,844 and potentially severe damage from the use the encalado method of 
extraction in Bolivia.845 Meanwhile, the lithium industries are growing quickly in an 
already arid region that has suffered from water stress due to a three-year drought. In 
 
842 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, IACHR Series C No 79, [2001] IACHR 9, IHRL 
1462 (IACHR 2001), 31 August 2001; Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on 
Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, Article 21 
 
 
843 Barandiarán, ‘Lithium and Development Imaginaries in Chile, Argentina and Bolivia’. 
844 Gutiérrez, Navedo, and Soriano-Redondo, ‘Chilean Atacama Site Imperilled by Lithium Mining’. 
845 Ricardo Calla Ortega, “Impactos de la producción industrial del carbonato de litio y del cloruro de 
potasio en el salar de Uyuni” in Calla Ortega, Ricardo, Juan Carlos Montenegro Bravo, Yara Montenegro 
Pinto, Pablo Poveda Ávila, Un presente sin futuro: El proyecto de industrialización del litio en Bolivia, (La Paz: 
CEDLA, 2014) 
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the next three sub-sections I focus on three dimensions of the right to access to 
information, notably who provides it, when and how much. 
Available information about lithium mining  
In Argentina, there is contradicting evidence on the scale of lithium mining’s water use. 
Geologist Díaz explains: “It can be estimated that for every ton of lithium extracted, 
about two million liters of water evaporate, clear evidence that lithium mining in salt 
mines is a mining of water”.846 This is echoed by Chilean salt flat expert Ingrid Garces, 
who also sees lithium mining as “mining water”.847 Professor Alonso, who is also a 
geologist, insists that the use of fresh water in the process of mining lithium is not an 
issue: lithium mining uses “only a cupful of water”,848 and that lithium brines are 
inappropriate for human consumption.849  
This contradiction shows clearly that realising a right to environmental 
information is not straightforward, as there are often conflicting views and evidence in 
science as to the nature and scale of environmental impacts. However CONICET, the 
national Argentinean scientific research council, was by 2014 working with authorities 
in the Province of Jujuy “to enhance research projects that seeks to extract lithium with 
the least possible use of water”.850 This suggests that there are at least nominal concerns 
within the Argentinean government about levels of water use in lithium mining. In 
terms of contamination, the work of the Bolivian “Scientific Committee” produced 
some information about the two options available to the state project to reduce the 
 
846 Fernando Díaz, from No a La Mina, “Cuales son los impactos ambientales y en la salud de la 
explotación de litio?, at https://noalamina.org/general/item/9585-cuales-son-los-impactos-ambientales-
y-en-la-salud-de-la-explotacion-de-litio, cited in Julian Zicari, “El mercado del litio desde una perspectiva global: 
de la Argentina al mundo. Actores, lógicas y dinámicas” (fn 16), in Fornillo, Geopolitica, 2015, p.46. 
847 Sherwood, ‘In Chilean Desert, Global Thirst for Lithium Is Fueling a “Water War”’. 
848 Salta Geology Professor and former Salta Mining Minister, Alonso, Ricardo, Prof. Interview with 
author, Salta, 10 May 2017. 
849 Ibid. 
850 Fornillo, Geopolítica del litio. 
  
288 
levels of magnesium in the lithium-rich brines, the encalado and sulfato “lines”.851  
The way the two industries have been managed by the state within the two 
countries has had a direct impact on the realisation of environmental rights. Extractive 
companies tend to have a monopoly on the information about their industry, much like 
states have a monopoly on definitions of legality.852 This is particularly true of the 
lithium industry. Lithium from brines is not gold, or oil; it has not been extracted for 
centuries with known parameters of environmental damage in different geological 
contexts. Due to the “experimental” nature of the industry, there is a lack of available 
independent information on the processes required to extract lithium from each salt 
flat. Communities must therefore rely on information from mining companies. Then, 
where information (independent or otherwise) does exist, there is the crucial matter of 
the communities’ access to this information.  
Access to information about lithium mining methods and companies 
Information on lithium mining impacts may be unavailable at the very early stages of a 
concession, as it is first created by the companies, and may belong to them, particularly 
if they take out a patent for a particular type of extraction.853 Companies should share 
this information with the state, but this does not guarantee it will reach the 
communities. This is likely to apply to some of the companies currently exploring for 
brines to test in laboratories in Argentina. In Bolivia, as it is a state company that has 
been developing extraction methods, one might expect better dissemination of 
 
851 The use of the term “lines” by Calla in our conversations perhaps suggest that these are still 
considered “lines” of enquiry: Indeed it was not clear to Ricardo which option had been chosen by the 
company. 
852 Harvey, The New Imperialism. 
853 This is particularly the case in the Catamarca–Salta Provinces’ Salar de Hombre Muerto, in which 
Canadian firm FMC-LITHCO uses a special technique that is said to require much less evaporation time 
from the typical 18-24 months. Like many details in the chemical processes required to mine lithium, is 
unclear how this has been done, and the technique is patented so cannot be used by another company. 
Alonso, Ricardo, Prof. Interview with author, Salta, 10 May 2017 
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information. In this case however, there may be political reasons for withholding 
information. 
In both countries, my data shows that the little information that does exist has not 
reached the communities, which (to compound the issue) are lacking in 
communications infrastructure. Furthermore, as the lawyer for the 33 Communities of 
Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc stated, the communities “must evaluate very long technical 
projects that are often incomprehensible to anyone – I am a lawyer and I do not understand that 
document. It’s huge; full of formulas, for example.”854 Like most people, the communities are 
lacking the specialist education required to comprehend complex technical information 
about a varied chemical mining process that differs from brine to brine. 
In this case, there is also a point to be made about access to information about the 
companies themselves. The 33 Communities discovered industry interest in lithium 
mining and the company’s prospecting activities on the Salinas Grandes “through 
anecdotal information, such as news outlets, and because people they did not know 
were digging holes in the ground”.855 The representative with whom I spoke from one 
of these communities, told me a local came to their village on a mule to report that a 
company was drilling on the Salinas Grandes salt flat.856 As the fieldwork progressed it 
became clear that this representative, even after seven years and a Supreme Court case, 
was unaware of the link between the prospectors from the company he knew as 
“American Salar”, and the company mining in Olaroz–Cauchari, Orocobre (parent 
company to “South American Salar). During our interview, I asked about the Orocobre 
billboards visible by the side of the road through the Salinas Grandes (see Photograph 
 
854 Alicia Chalabe, Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017. 
855 Makagon et al., ‘Balancing the Scales - Community Protocols and Extractive Industries: Lessons from 
Argentina, India, Kenya and Zimbabwe’. 
856 Flores, Clemente. Interview with author. El Moreno, Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy Province, 2 
February 2017. 
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A4 and A5). He insisted that those billboards, which showed images of Olaroz–
Cauchari overlaid with words like “RESPECT” and “INTEGRITY”, were “not from 
here, these communities. They are of Cauchari” where “many people are in agreement [with the 
mining]”.857 Once I had seen the “South American Salar” logo on the wall of the Salta-
based reception of Sales de Jujuy, I checked online to find that “South American Salar” 
was a subsidiary of Orocobre, the owners of Sales de Jujuy (and the billboards). I also 
quickly confirmed that there was no company called “American Salar”. Orocobre’s 
subsidiary was the prospector in the Salinas Grandes. This was suggested in my 
interview at Sales de Jujuy, whose community relations staff told me that, “we have had 
no complaints from communities… not in those parts”,858 implying that there had been 
complaints elsewhere (like from the 33 Communities of the Salinas Grandes). 
Therefore, opaque company ownership structures had obscured the fact from the 33 
Communities altogether that the two companies were linked, demonstrating a lack of 
access to the most basic information for the communities about who is prospecting and 
operating in the region. 
In fact, both country cases demonstrate that companies are able to switch public 
identities depending on which is more expedient for their purposes. This can obscure 
which key actors are required to comply with national and international law, and can 
further affect which companies can be held liable in the case of environmental damage, 
and within which jurisdictions cases can be brought.859 For example, the Bolivian state 
lithium company known as the GNRE (which was before January 2017 a subsidiary of 
 
857 Representative from the 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
858 Community relations executives at lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 15 May 2017. 
859 This is commonly a problem in environmental disputes, where companies buy and sell subsidiaries 
and are thus able to argue in court that previous entities had caused environmental damage. Chevron–
Texaco in Ecuador is an example of this. Sara Randazzo, ‘Tribunal Condemns Ecuador’s $9.5 Billion 
Ruling Against Chevron’, Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2018, sec. Business, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tribunal-condemns-ecuadors-9-5-billion-ruling-against-chevron-
1536337680. 
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COMIBOL), is now the YLB, and part of an entirely new Ministry of Energy. On a 
very basic level, this makes it unclear to which law Bolivian lithium mining is subject. 
There is only one article related to lithium in the 2014 Mining Law, which appears out 
of date as it only deals with the establishment of a separate company within COMIBOL 
(the GNRE).860 This company effectively no longer exists, and therefore it is unclear 
who is subject to the obligations specified in the Mining Law’s Article 73, most notably 
to regularise third party rights for salt miners. 
In terms of access to information about extraction methods in Bolivia, the 2010–
11 socializaciones were held by the state company, that, according to the head of 
FRUTCAS, “did not explain to us which methods are the healthiest… for not damaging the 
environment ” (while also acknowledging that “technologically we cannot contribute much”).861 It 
is therefore unclear whether the communities had any knowledge of the high-waste 
output of the prospective encalado method, or its alternative. Certainly in my interviews, 
no local community official in Nor Lípez, nor the head of FRUTCAS quoted above, 
had read or even heard of the CEDLA report which calculated the encalado waste 
output.862 That this information had not been made available to the Uyuni communities 
raises questions of when the information should be provided (should it be only once 
the method is decided?) and who should provide it. 
Providers of information 
In both countries, and internationally, the law stipulates that information should be 
provided to affected communities in advance of the approval of a project, not including 
prospecting or exploration stages. In the case of the Salar de Uyuni, the pilot project 
perhaps therefore falls into the “pre-approval” stage, although as one Uyuni local 
 
860 Government of Bolivia, Ley de Minería y Metalurgia No. 535, Article 19. 
861 President of rural union federation. Interview with author, Uyuni, 23 March 2017. 
862 Ibid; Colcha K regional authority official. Interview with author, Colcha K, 4 April 2017. 
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official opined, “most of what the President says is already approved.”863 This perspective, 
triangulated with material on the Bolivian regime’s growing frustration with 
requirements for consultation,864 is indicative of a regime determined to pursue 
industrialisation of lithium. 
In the case of the Olaroz Communities, it appears that all of the prior information 
came from the companies, who came to Olaroz Chico “of course, empowered with a 
lawyer”,865 according to the former leader. It was not clear whether the communities also 
had a lawyer at these early meetings, or indeed if they were “empowered” themselves – 
by being aware of their rights to independent information, and to proper participation 
through consultation. According to the community relations manager for Sales de 
Jujuy, the company “began a process of participation and consultation with communities since before 
having a project, i.e. we have worked with them at all stages of the process”.866 While this is 
corroborated by then-leader of Olaroz Chico, who said the community works closely 
with the company on ongoing environmental monitoring, he did not indicate that any 
independent information was provided to the community. 
Even where the law suggests prior information (to affect informed consultation) is 
not required at the prospecting and exploration phases, industrial actors arriving 
unannounced can engender fear in communities. As the representative from the 33 
Communities told me: 
They looked like they were extra-terrestrials, with all this equipment. If it is not polluting, 
why there near their encampment was the sign with the mask that says it was forbidden to 
pass on danger of death?!867 
 
863 Local official in Uyuni. Interview with author, Uyuni, 24 March 2017. 
864 Lalander, ‘Ethnic Rights and the Dilemma of Extractive Development in Plurinational Bolivia’.  
865 Former community association leader, Interview with author. Olaroz Chico, Susques Region, Jujuy 
Province, 6 February 2017. 
866 Community relations executives at lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 15 May 2017 
867 Representative from 33 Communities. Interview with author. Salinas Grandes y Guayatayoc, Jujuy 
Province, 2 February 2017. 
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This reaction illustrates the logic of the state arranging the provision of prior, 
independent information to communities, in order to ensure advancement of the 
project through transparent engagement with potentially-affected communities. 
Ignoring the rights of the people set to be affected by mining can ultimately result in 
greater opposition due to a lack of transparency, and demands for consultation based 
on their rights in international law, which is ultimately what occurred in Argentina.868 
In sum, this research has found that in both Argentina and Bolivia, information 
provided to communities has been lacking, incomplete or difficult to understand. 
Furthermore, the information that was provided came directly from the companies, 
with a focus on jobs and economic development rather than socioenvironmental 
impacts. Crucially, important information about water and contamination either does 
not fully exist or has been withheld from communities, a factor which diminishes the 
strength of any ongoing participation processes such as monitoring. 
7.2.2 Participation in environmental decision-making  
Meaningful environmental participation is clearly compromised by a lack of 
information. There are stronger laws in Argentina relating to the requirement for public 
hearings to present environmental impact assessments (EIAs) than in Bolivia. Jujuy’s 
General Law on the Environment No. 5772 clearly states the process of presenting an 
EIA in public meetings, and this process is set within a context of strong 
environmental governance in Argentina more generally. However, if the information 
presented within these meetings does not contribute to the communities being 
 
868 This dynamic has been analysed in a report from the research institutes to which the former special 
rapporteur on the business and human rights, John Ruggie, is associated: Davis, Rachel and Franks, 
Daniel, Costs of Company-Community Conflict in the Extractive Sector, Harvard Kennedy Law School, Shift and 
the University of Queensland, available at https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/research/Costs%20of%20Conflict_Davis%20%20Franks.pdf [accessed 2 January 2018] 
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adequately “informed” – in order that they might raise questions or eventually re-shape 
aspects of the project – then the right to information and participation are both weak.869  
In Bolivia, a country with a long mining tradition, the “socialisation” of a project is 
a commonly-accepted form of environmental participation for communities. These 
socialisations only took place in one of the regions bordering the salt flat, Nor Lípez. 
Adequate information was not provided at these meetings. While full information may 
not have been available, the socialisations seem to have had the effect of bolstering 
support for the Bolivian lithium project (through promises of jobs and local 
development) before any resistance or demand for information or consultation could 
have been mounted. There are many indicators that the Bolivian state lithium project is 
lacking the form of strong participation for indigenous peoples mandated by Bolivian 
Constitutional and national law. These include the use of “socialisations” instead of 
prior informed consultations and the failure to update communities on the progress of 
the pilot project in any meaningful way since they took place in 2010–11. Furthermore, 
the idea that there had been a “coup” ousting FRUTCAS from involvement in the 
project suggested by Calla,870 and the backlash from the head of the project at the 
release of the 2014 NGO report revealing the details of the encalado method’s waste 
levels, also indicate increasing state control over lithium mining.  
In the Olaroz Communities it appears that a weak form of participation is ongoing 
in the form of employment, monitoring and payments to communities. Where there are 
structured programmes that manage the interaction between company and community, 
such as Sales de Jujuy’s “Shared Value” initiative,871 this is more indicative of a 
 
869 Romina Picolotti, “Agenda 21 and Human Rights: The Right to Participate”in Picolotti, Romina and 
Taillant, Jorge Daniel (eds) Linking Human Rights and the Environment, Tuscon, AZ: The University of 
Arizona Press, 2003. 
870 Ricardo Calla Ortega, author of CEDLA report chapter. Interview with author, La Paz, 23 April 2017. 
871 Community relations executives at lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 15 May 2017. 
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corporate social responsibility (CSR) plan than an opportunity for the communities to 
effectively participate in decision-making over the activities taking place on the Olaroz–
Cauchari salt flat. Despite the well-meaning work of community relations staff, they are 
not chief executives nor operations managers. They work in service of a company 
whose main goal is to create profit and protect the investments made by numerous 
external actors, including private (and state) mining and transnational investment 
companies. While the “cost of conflict with communities” may run high if there are 
disputes,872 if the community is on-side and benefitting financially from very early on in 
the project, there is less likely to be the conflict in the first place.  
It is also worth pointing out here that communities are not homogenous: there will 
be differing opinions within any community on the way projects such as these should 
be handled. In my interview with the Mining Minister of Jujuy, I was reminded that 
although the 33 Communities had eventually formed an organisation to oppose the lack 
of participation afforded to them, there would be some members of some communities 
(and indeed some entire communities – he cited four of the 33) that “wanted” lithium 
mining on the Salinas Grandes.873 This perhaps misses the point of the demand by the 
33 Communities. As the communities feel strongly that they are the keepers (if not the 
owners) of the Salinas Grandes, which they consider sacred,874 any form of 
unannounced prospecting was always likely to have been seen as an “invasion” of sorts. 
Furthermore, if full-scale mining occurs without consultation, would be a violation of 
their customary land rights under the Inter-American regime. It will be interesting to 
see if and how the case progresses in the regional system. 
 
872 Rachel Davis and Daniel Franks, Costs of Company-Community Conflict in the Extractive Sector, 
Harvard Kennedy Law School, Shift and the University of Queensland, 12 May 2014, accessed 2 January 
2018, https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/research/Costs%20of%20Conflict_Davis%20%20Franks.pdf  
873 Mining Minister of Jujuy Province, Miguel Soler. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 22 May 
2017. 
874 Pellettieri, ‘Mining Firms Seek Argentina’s “White Gold,” But Local Approval Proves More Elusive’. 
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7.2.3 Access to justice and the right to seek legal remedy 
Without information and participation rights, communities are left unaware of potential 
problems and will thus be unlikely to seek remedy unless environmental impacts occur, 
or they are made aware of their rights. As the lithium industries are still in their very 
early stages in both countries, I will use the demand of the 33 Communities to analyse 
the lack of demand for consultation elsewhere.  
As stated above, the fear of the prospecting company’s operatives drilling on the 
salt flat (that many use for salt-gathering) motivated the 33 Communities into accessing 
their rights. The 33 Communities were able to learn about these rights through the 
Argentinean Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN), who arranged visits to 
lithium operations in Chile, and through a visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2011.875 It is likely that these experiences, and the 
development of a national and transnational network generally, furthered the 33 
Communities’ demand for justice in the Supreme Court.  
Meanwhile, Bolivian community members and local officials are lacking in ways to 
access information and consultation about lithium mining in Bolivia or elsewhere. This 
means that they are unaware of the potential environmental damage that might be 
caused. This was evidenced by requests I had for information about what was 
happening in Argentina,876 and for a copy of this thesis when it was finished.877 There 
was furthermore a clear lack of awareness of the CEDLA report in the Nor Lípez 
 
875 Alicia Chalabe, Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017; Carlos Guzman, 
Interview with author, Susques, Jujuy, 3 February 2017; Anaya, James, Report to the Human Rights 
Council on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Argentina, 4 July 2012, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/21/47/Add.2 
876 Colcha K regional authority official, provincial delegate. Interview with author, Colcha K, 4 April 
2017. 
877 Colcha K regional authority official, head of productive development. Interview with author, Colcha 
K, 4 April 2017. 
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region, even among local officials.878 This evidence poses the question: would the 
Bolivian communities pursue their rights to information, consultation and justice if they 
knew the potential impacts of the encalado method to be used? And how would this be 
received, given the Bolivian government’s increasingly authoritarian control over 
mining dissent? 
In Argentina, the 33 Communities lost their case in the Supreme Court, due to 
jurisdictional concerns,879 and a “lack of the minimum of factual and evidential support 
that requires legal action of the required characteristics” (i.e. the right to consultation as 
indigenous peoples in advance of prospecting).880 This suggests that there was not 
enough evidence provided to the court that the 2010 prospecting activity affected the 
rights of the communities to the point where they could demand consultation. It was the 
licensing of the activity (which did allegedly cause damage to the salt flat and local 
aquifers),881 however, that required consultation under ILO169 Article 6. The Province 
of Jujuy claimed during the court hearing that they had no knowledge of the unlicensed 
prospecting activity, but did not make it clear if they fined the company for prospecting 
without a licence.  
However, Argentinean mining and environment law together do provide for rights 
to public participation through public hearings following the dissemination of EIAs. 
These EIAs must be requested by the relevant enforcement authority, as they are the 
receivers of the environmental impact report, which must be submitted in advance of 
 
878 Colcha K regional authority official, provincial delegate. Interview with author, Colcha K, 4 April 
2017. 
879 Ibid. 
880 Supreme Court of Argentina, C.1196.XLVI “Comunidad Aborigen de Santuario Tres Pozos y otros 
c/ Jujuy, Provincia de y otros s/ amparo”, Buenos Aires, 18 de diciembre de 2012. 
881 Parallel information for the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with respect to the 
Third Periodic Review for Argentina (UN DOC. E/C.12/ARG/3) under ICESCR, Prepared for the 
Mesa of the indigenous communities of the Basin of Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc for the defence 
and management of the territory, Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 47th session 14 
November – 2 December 2011; 
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any activity – including prospecting. The provincial authorities eventually provided the 
EIAs, but they were incomprehensible to the communities and their lawyer, further 
showing their lack of compliance with indigenous rights law. 
Clear information about what evidence was provided to the courts in this case is 
unavailable. However, evidence was provided to the UN Human Rights Committee in 
2011 of the damage the drilling of 47 holes in the Salinas Grandes caused to both 
freshwater aquifers and the salt,882 in the months before the Supreme Court heard the 
case in 2012. Why this was not considered within the case as sufficient evidence of 
impact is unclear. However, while the communities lost their case, all lithium mining 
activities have since ceased, indicating some success in raising the issue of the 
requirement for consultation with indigenous communities prior to administrative 
measures pertaining to mining at the national level.  
The 33 Communities have exhausted domestic remedies – meaning the Inter-
American regional system can hear the case their lawyers are preparing.883 Furthermore, 
there is evidence that the process has contributed to the creation of the community 
protocol. This appears to have delayed mining until an agreement can be reached about 
consultation. This is a good outcome for the communities, as lithium mining on the 
Salinas Grandes without prior consultation is much less likely. 
Despite there being no motive to seek environmental remedy so far in the 
southwest of Potosí around the Salar de Uyuni, legislation and government rhetoric is 
being used in Bolivia to suppress dissenting voices in regard to mining, reducing the 
right of access to information, participation and justice. Law No.367 criminalises social 
 
882 Parallel information for the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with respect to the 
Third Periodic Review for Argentina (UN DOC. E/C.12/ARG/3) under ICESCR, Prepared for the 
Mesa of the indigenous communities of the Basin of Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc for the defence 
and management of the territory, Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 47th session 14 
November – 2 December 2011; 
883 Lawyer for the 33 Communities. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 3 February 2017. 
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protest against mining,884 for example. But there are more subtle examples. According 
to Postero, cited in Revette, President Morales addressed the population of Uyuni 
following a minor protest regarding the installation of a (much-needed) new bus 
terminal in 2014 in a paternalistic manner, as if he were scolding ungrateful children. 885 
Revette also points out that the passing of Law No.367 (criminalising protest) is ironic 
for a country like Bolivia, which, as the Economist wrote in 2011 in response to the 
TIPNIS conflict is “a country of powerful social movements, its politics played out as 
often on the street as in the legislature”886, and the structure through which arguably the 
President himself rose to power (see Chapter 2).887 
This section has reviewed the case of the 33 Communities attempting to access 
their rights to environmental participation through the courts. While communities in 
Argentina have had access to an Supreme Court hearing on their case, the loss of the 
case on the grounds of a “lack of evidence” that the prospecting activity affected them 
directly, when reports show that it had, limits their access to domestic remedy while 
also bolstering the chances for meaningful consultation. In Bolivia, the criminalisation 
of social protest and the attitude of the President towards the the needs of the local 
population of Uyuni show clearly that access to justice may be limited, should 
environmental damage trigger a future need for legal remedies. 
 
884 Government of Bolivia, Addition to the Bolivian Penal Code Law No.367. This law states that, 
“Whoever occupies a mining area for any reason through violence, threats, deception or any other 
means, preventing the exercise of mining activities or divesting rights to the state and / or holders of 
mining rights that are in legal possession thereof, will be sanctioned with deprivation of freedom from 
four (4) to eight (8) years.” 
885 Nancy Postero " Even in Plurinational Bolivia: Indigeneity, Development, and Racism since Morales." 
in Spaces of Danger, H. Merrill and L. M. Hoffman (eds) (Georgia, AL: University of Georgia Press, 2015). 
886 ‘Road Rage’, The Economist, 1 October 2011, https://www.economist.com/the-
americas/2011/10/01/road-rage. 
887 Ibid. 
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7.3 Water stress and chemical contamination in a drought-
stricken region 
7.3.1 Environmental impacts of lithium mining 
Observing and navigating the geography and extreme climate of the Andean high plains 
was one of the most interesting and challenging aspects of undertaking this study. After 
many hours of travel, up steep mountain roads, arriving in such a dry and mostly arid 
desert, it was quite clear that even slight changes in the availability of fresh water would 
have a huge impact on the natural environment, and therefore those who called it 
home.  
Particularly memorable from the fieldwork therefore were the interviews and 
conversations that showed how difficult it would be for the local population if there 
was any kind of pressure put on water supplies, either on quantity or quality. This is in a 
region where the government is absent and abrogates some of its most basic duties. It 
is clear that where there is a lack of a relationship between a government and an 
indigenous community, numerous rights can be affected. 
The head of the Colectivo Apacheta explained his understanding of the magnitude 
of the environmental and hydrological re-engineering that industrial scale lithium 
mining might bring to the area. He pointed out that it is not just the water leaving the 
region through evaporation from lithium ponds that is a concern to them – “they say it 
uses 200 litres per second” – but also where it goes: “The quantity of water that evaporates here, it 
will fall somewhere else, it will fall somewhere else”.888 He also spoke about his concerns that 
“the contamination stays” in the region: that what the companies bring in (lime, sulphuric 
acid) is absorbed into the soil – “this lime, it disappears!”; “they bring 20-30 trucks of lime a 
 
888 Representative from Colectivo Apacheta, Interview with author, Susques Region, Jujuy Province, 3 
February 2017 
  
301 
day, I don’t know.”889 Guzman’s final “I don’t know” shows his problem clearly: those 
who might one day have to deal with the consequences, severe or not, are not fully 
informed.  
A similar concern is reflected in my interview with a truck driver for the lithium 
plant in Bolivia, who reported that they use “so much lime” in the plant. Here too it was 
interesting that a truck driver was most concerned with the amount of trucks that were 
already being used in the plant and surrounding regions. It is worth reiterating that this 
is only from the activities of the pilot plant – any impacts currently occurring will be 
scaled up once the industrial-scale plant is built. Furthermore, the truck driver’s 
concerns about impacts on his home village serve as a reminder that even those 
working within an industry may not choose such work if other options were available.  
Finally, in Bolivia, one of the most important interviews of this entire project was 
the interview with the anonymous salero in Colchani. He was very careful to read the 
consent documentation, insisted on remaining anonymous, and he refused to be 
recorded. He also took a few hours to decide whether he would participate – perhaps 
because he had to wait for the morning rush of tourists to pass, but also perhaps he 
needed to work out the level of risk to himself. This does indicate some fear around 
talking about the project in Bolivia: it might not be worth the risk to speak out. He 
made clear and repeated assertions that there had been no visit from the lithium 
company or government, and no participation since “the time of Jaime Paz Zamora” (the 
president in the 1990s who tried to negotiate the LITHCO-FMC contract).890 When he 
told me about the impact on his traditional livelihood of the drought, he reminisced 
nostalgically over the quality of the salt thirty years ago – this was a key moment, as I 
realised how crucial it is for communities to have their informed consultation rights 
 
889 Ibid. 
890 Anonymous, Interview with author, Colchani, 16 March 2017; Revette, ‘Extractive Dreams’. 
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respected and fulfilled.  
7.3.2 Lithium mining’s impacts on indigenous economic, social and cultural rights 
While everyone possesses environmental rights, the prevalence of conflict between 
indigenous communities and the extractive industries around the world indicates how 
crucial indigenous environmental interests are for their very survival. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, the substantive environmental rights of Andean indigenous communities 
in these regions will most likely be affected in some way by lithium mining at scale in 
Argentina and Bolivia.  
For many indigenous communities around the world, the fulfilment of immediate 
material needs (and thus economic rights) rely directly on the environment. The 
Saramaka of Suriname, for example, were found to have economic rights to logging, as 
they “rely on timber logging as part of their economic structure”.891 While a direct 
comparison cannot be drawn with the situation of the salt harvesters (as the state is not 
offering concessions to extract salt), there are certainly parallels. In the following 
observation of the Court in Saramaka v Suriname, “when a logging concession is granted, 
a variety of non-timber forest products, which are used by the members of the 
Saramaka people for subsistence and commercial purposes, are also affected.”892 This is 
precisely the dynamic on the salt flats, but it is actually even simpler. When a lithium 
concession is granted, salt, which is used by the members of the Atacama salineros or 
Quechuan Bolivian saleros for subsistence and commercial purposes, is also affected.  
There have already been impacts on salt yields from the drought, according to my 
informants in both Salinas Grandes and Colchani. Does this mean that lithium mining 
companies should therefore be confident that their own operations will not be the key 
 
891 Saramaka People v Suriname, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, IACHR Series C no 
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reason for declines in indigenous salt cooperative incomes? Can the companies (and 
governments that support them) displace the blame for lower salt yields onto the 
“natural” processes of climate change? Either way, it is unsurprising that a salt miner in 
the community of Colchani in Bolivia, without adequate information suggesting 
otherwise, feels that “they [the company] are absorbing all the water from the salar”.893 Climate 
change will likely bring further unpredictable impacts to the region – and perhaps 
already has, in the form of the prolonged drought. Indeed, the great irony of the 
situation is that the region is generally dry, and that hot daytime temperatures and high 
winds are exactly what enable the more economically-viable lithium mining-by-
evaporation to take place.  
7.3.3 The Lithium Triangle as a “sacrifice zone” for the low-carbon energy transition 
My conclusion is that there is little difference between the way lithium is being explored 
for and exploited, between Bolivia and Argentina, and not just in the local experience. 
State participation in the globalised trade in primary commodities favours elite actors 
only: corporations and governments, and the environment (and communities) are those 
that bear the cost.  
In previous research into dam-building in the Brazilian Amazon,894 and in this 
study, I have questioned indigenous rights fulfilment in projects that purport to have 
underlying “green” or “low-carbon” credentials. My conclusion on this point, 
reinforced by the examination of the nascent lithium industry, is that climate change 
action itself has become embedded in the global neoliberal model of extraction and 
infrastructure development. Could there be any way to reconcile the pursuit of 
technological advancement (in the service of tangible climate action) with the fulfilment 
 
893 Anonymous, Interview with author, Colchani, 16 March 2017 
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of the principles of environmental and indigenous peoples’ human rights at the local 
level? 
The mining industry has long relied on a global market, fed by shifting forms of 
extraction that nonetheless have had continued negative impacts on indigenous 
territories and communities. This has enabled capitalist expansion to reach the 
“frontiers” of the natural environment, such as the Brazilian Amazon or Canadian 
boreal forests, in service of a process increasingly “extreme” in its pursuit of sources of 
energy and commodities.895 The threat of climate change has undoubtedly caused an 
upswing in international interest in electric vehicles and renewable energy storage 
technologies, which will require ever larger amounts of lithium. This has driven up the 
price, and consequently the desire for nations possessing reserves to begin a 
programme of exploitation. Climate change has arguably become the motivation for the 
ultimate form of disaster capitalism,896 where elites with accumulated capital (such as 
Elon Musk, the billionaire owner of Tesla) have seen an opportunity in a crisis within 
which to create a new market (luxury electric cars), requiring an abundance of new 
minerals such as lithium and cobalt, both of which have demonstrable environmental 
and human rights impacts. 
As indigenous peoples are commonly not consulted when developments affecting 
their lands and resources are proposed, it follows that the climate change threat has not 
succeeded in changing the model of development. If anything, the old models are 
perpetuated, their effects exacerbated as they lean on “green” credentials. The old 
model externalises environmental effects, promotes the use of the “spatial fix” (moving 
excess capital around the world in order to reinvest it) and enacts “accumulation by 
 
895 Damien Short, Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death and Ecocide (London: Zed Books, 
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dispossession”897 of indigenous peoples of their land in the context of a settler-colonial 
state. The idea that resources must necessarily be drawn into the global commodities 
markets from ever more remote and ecologically delicate environments again recalls 
Calla’s memorable line concept of the Salar de Uyuni becoming a “sacrifice zone” for 
the energy transition for the capitalist centre countries.898 Because the use of the encalado 
has been confirmed, there are grounds to believe that this environmental damage 
caused by its waste will indeed severely pollute the Salar de Uyuni and part of the 
coastal area in the southwest of Potosí. This must be made known to the communities 
through free and informed consultations.  
In Argentina, the surge of global interest in lithium has meant that the government 
has, through tax breaks, invited foreign investment to fuel a lithium boom in the 
northern regions, managed within a classic neoliberal political economy of extractivism. 
The lack of awareness around indigenous rights to consultation has served to create an 
interesting situation where national and transnational advocacy networks have worked 
to develop a case for the 33 Communities, taking it to the Supreme Court, and 
culminating in the Kachi Yupi consultation protocol. The resistance has stayed mining 
on the Salinas Grandes, at least for now, bringing increasing international awareness to 
their case. 
Meanwhile the Bolivian government, still in many ways as Morales lamented “a 
prisoner of the neoliberal laws”, is pursuing lithium industrialisation within a neo-
extractivist framework. It appears that the Bolivian socialist regime is determined to 
generate revenues from lithium (and any added-value products such as batteries and 
electric cars) for redistribution as part of his socialist and anti-colonial promise to end 
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neoliberalism in Bolivia. This determination has led to a lack of transparency over what 
method will be used for lithium mining throughout the testing period (likely due to its 
concerning waste output), and thus increasingly closed-off to scrutiny from both local 
indigenous communities and foreign researchers. Further clues from my fieldwork did 
indeed show increased secrecy surrounding the project: my truck driver informant was 
clearly under instruction to not speak openly to anyone about his workplace – hence his 
initial hesitation and the choice to use a pseudonym. Furthermore, I was promised an 
introduction to the team who could have facilitated a visit to the plant to see for myself 
by the former head of state mining company COMIBOL – but he did not reply to my 
follow up messages, despite knowing I was on a tight schedule.  
The reaction of ex-GNRE head Luis Alberto Echazú to the CEDLA report 
should perhaps be read in this context. The report suggests that the Bolivian 
government’s “anti-colonial” lithium project could effectively turn a natural wonder of 
the world around which indigenous communities live into an industrial “sacrifice 
zone”.899 However, Echazú’s accusations – that CEDLA are repeating an 
“antipatriotic” narrative that seeks to “discredit the project of industrialisation of 
evaporitic resources and generate distrust in the population about its viability”900 – may 
even suggest there are doubts about the viability of the project itself. There is also 
perhaps a worry in government that details of the encalado waste will emerge, stoking 
local resistance and derailing the Bolivian lithium project.  
7.4 Use of the notion of “development” to justify extraction  
I argue in this final part that the legal determination of lithium as “strategic” is a feature 
of the interaction between natural resource law and geopolitics, and that these are used 
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to override community rights’ claims and entitlements in each state. This aids the 
presentation of the finding that, in two of the three sites examined in this thesis, the 
promise of economic development based on extraction has dampened demand for 
consultation rights. This sits in contrast to the case of the 33 Communities, who have 
forced the state to acknowledge their consultation rights. In Bolivia and the Olaroz 
Communities, government rhetoric and corporate activity have served to convince 
communities that extraction will be well-managed, with minimal environmental 
impacts, and furthermore will provide opportunities for work and economic 
development hitherto unavailable in those regions. 
7.4.1 Lithium in national law as a “strategic” mineral owned by the state 
Article 309.1 of the Bolivian Constitution (2009) maintains that the state’s role is “[t]o 
administer property rights over natural resources on behalf of the Bolivian people, and 
to exercise strategic control of the productive chain and industrialisation of these 
resources.”901 In Bolivia, lithium mining is one of its nine “strategic” projects, according 
to the 2025 “Patriotic Agenda”,902 showing a clear commitment to the industrialisation 
of lithium for the benefit of all Bolivians reflected in the 2009 Constitution.  
While Argentina does not have an equivalent designation within its Constitution of 
1853 or national law, there are numerous suggestions that lithium is considered 
important to the nation and worthy of federal investment. For example, there is a 
government programme of research into lithium funded through the national research 
agency CONICET. Furthermore, while it may not receive tax revenues from lithium 
due to the federal tax relief provided to mining, Jujuy Province, through the provincial 
state company JEMSE does hold stakes in the public–private joint venture lithium 
 
901 Bolivian Constitution, 2009. Emphasis added. 
902 Agenda Patriótica 2025 (Ministerio de Autonomía 2012, Bolivia). URL: http://extwprlegs1.fao. 
org/docs/pdf/bol141864.pdf cited in Fornillo, Geopolítica del litio. 
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companies operational in the province.903 Perhaps as a result of these stakes held by 
JEMSE, in 2011 the Province of Jujuy issued a law that declared lithium “strategic”. 
Law No. 5674 is the legislation “by which the mineral reserves that contain lithium are 
declared as a strategic natural resource that generates socio-economic development of 
the Province of Jujuy.”904 
While official definitions of “strategic” are difficult to find in each country, 
Argentinean lithium researcher Fornillo suggests that in Argentina,  
[f]or a natural resource to be strategic, it must respond to the following 
conditions related to its use value, by itself sufficient: a) to be key in the 
functioning of the capitalist production mode b) and/or to be key for the 
maintenance of regional and global hegemony and c) and/or be key to the 
deployment of a green or post-development economy.905 
Alongside this definition, Slipak suggests the resource must be “scarce or relatively 
scarce”, “irreplaceable or difficult to replace”, or “unequally distributed”.906 What these 
definitions suggest is that “strategic” relates specifically to a minable natural resource 
that is economically productive for the country.  
According to Fornillo, mining is prioritised in the Argentinean provinces which 
have natural resources as one of the only independent sources of income (the rest 
comes from federal redistribution).907 This is now occurring in a context of deliberate 
re-neoliberalisation of the economy of Argentina by President Macri, who depends on 
the provinces facilitating investment from transnational companies.908 
Again, the repeated assertion from the Argentinean provincial mining officials that 
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904 Province Of Jujuy, Ley Provincial No. 5674/2011: Aprobacion Del Decreto Provincial Nº 7592/2011 
Declaracion De Reservas Minerales Que Contengan Litio Como Recurso Mineral Estratégico De La 
Provincia De Jujuy. 
905 Fornillo, Geopolítica del litio. 
906 Ibid. It should be noted here that, certainly in the case of Chile, “strategic” also applies to lithium in a 
military sense, due to its use in the development of nuclear weapons. This was raised in conversations 
with the leader of the anti-lithium group Colectivo Apacheta as another reason to be against lithium 
mining. 
907 Fornillo, Geopolítica del litio.  
908 Fornillo. p.17 
  
309 
the “lithium belongs to the state” (and thus there is no right of the communities to 
consultation or participation in its benefits), shows the state control over definitions of 
legality.909 In Bolivia it is the 2009 Constitution, compiled under a socialist government 
which has embedded its neo-extractivist development policies in the Constitution and 
the new national mining law, which demonstrates clearly how Bolivian economic 
development (and political power) depends on extractivism.  
7.4.2 Extractivism of lithium in service of the global low-carbon economy 
The introduction to this thesis emphasised that lithium is an essential element of the 
emerging global low-carbon economy. As Argentinean and Bolivian governments are 
(at least initially) pursuing extraction for export, their focus on the global market for 
lithium exports is key. Lithium mining in Bolivia and Argentina involve many proposals 
and partnerships from international governments and companies – for concessions, 
contracts, memoranda of understanding, and, in the case of Bolivia, a developing 
dependency on China.  
However, the establishing of the new industry occurred in Bolivia has arguably 
occurred on a more geopolitically visible scale than in the northernwestern corner of 
Argentina. The eventual decision to develop the Bolivian industry as a 100 percent 
state-run project may have satisfied communities that might have otherwise opposed 
the plans, through assurances that the state had the communities’ best interests in mind. 
In Argentina, where lithium is geographically dispersed across multiple salt flats and 
provinces, multinational corporate involvement is therefore also spread out, and largely 
hidden from public view. While transnational mining firms erect billboards in the 
desert, there are few clues from in the cities of Salta and San Salvador de Jujuy as to the 
extent of the lithium industry developing in the adjacent mountain range. With 
 
909 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Reprinted (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011). 
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companies already in possession of concessions, who are they advertising to? 
Communities is one answer, but also competitor lithium companies vying for a valuable 
slice of the salares of northern Argentina: the billboards mark Orocobre as the “first” to 
arrive (see Photographs A4 and A5).  
In interviews with both officials and community members (with the exception of 
the 33 Communities’ representative) it appeared innately “logical” that a provincial or 
municipal government, or community would want to permit and facilitate the 
extraction of a valuable resource. This is despite the very different ideological leanings 
of the two states’ governments. As Gudnyas asserts, “the importance of the extractive 
industries persists as a key cornerstone of development policies”.910 I argue that this is 
the case in both Argentina and Bolivia, despite the different regimes and governing 
ideologies, which provide differing motives for extraction.  
7.4.3 The promise of community development and the lack of demand for consultation 
In analysing interviews with government officials in both states, there was a pro-
lithium, pro-“development” thread running through the responses. However, this was 
also evident in communities in Bolivia, and some responses from the Argentinean 
Olaroz Communities. The language of human rights pertaining to development on 
indigenous peoples’ territories, such as the term “consultation” or the concept of FPIC 
was not forthcoming in any material I gathered, apart from those in respect of the 33 
Communities. The lack of information and awareness of the possession of rights to 
consultation in the Bolivian and Olaroz communities contrasts greatly with the 33 
Communities, who were able, provoked by the activities of prospecting company South 
American Salar, to progress a legal case to the Supreme Court. This also precipitated 
the creation of a groundbreaking consultation protocol.  
 
910 Eduardo Gudnyas cited in Acosta, ‘Extractivism and Neoextractivism’. 
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In Argentina, indigenous peoples’ rights were not discussed in detail. However, 
mining officials and experts described numerous legal issues surrounding the mining of 
lithium across three Argentinean provinces – but these were primarily commercial 
concerns. They focused on how provinces and companies would share concessions, 
brines and profits, particularly where concessions and salt flats overlapped with 
company licenses and provincial borders. It was clear from this that lithium to them 
was an important big business opportunity for the region. As such, the Argentinean 
case reflects a more classic model of neoliberal development that ignores indigenous 
communities almost entirely and invites transnational corporations to convert natural 
resources into “investment opportunities”.911 In this classic model, benefits are 
supposed to “trickle down” to communities in the form of jobs and increased 
economic activity in the region. In Bolivia, the motivation for the industrialisation of 
the lithium is a similar stimulation of economic development, but to fulfil the socialist 
aim of the redistribution of revenues. The effects on communities, however, are the 
same: state/corporate control over the resources on the salt flats, no meaningful 
participation in decisions affecting the future livelihoods of quinoa or salt-gathering 
communities, and perhaps even deliberate obfuscation of the details of 
environmentally-damaging extraction.  
Within the Bolivian case, there has been the assumption among researchers 
(myself included) that because FRUTCAS was instrumental in triggering the process 
that led to the start of the project, community support and communication with 
government is ongoing. For example, Fornillo writes (in a 2018 article comparing the 
two states’ lithium industries) that in Bolivia “there is a fluid dialogue between the 
 
911 I was given quite a bit of material when visiting the Mining Ministries of Salta and Jujuy. The leaflets 
were very targeted towards encouraging international lithium “investors” to invest in Jujuy and Salta. 
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executive power and local communities”,912 and because of this, and the state’s 
commitment to a 100 percent state-owned project, the Bolivian government’s project 
cannot be conceptualised as extractivist.913 My findings challenge this view, firstly 
because the “fluid dialogue” has patently broken down, evidenced by responses in 
numerous interviews I conducted. Fornillo’s misinterpretation of these events may be 
attributed in part to his detailed research into the Argentinean communities, which 
have a very different relationship to their provincial and national governments. While 
there may be (or have been) a close political relationship between a local peasant union 
federation and the MAS government, this does not necessarily mean that the local 
organisation represents all of the communities in the region. In fact, a number of my 
respondents did not appear to be FRUTCAS members at all. Finally, even with some 
ongoing dialogue, the dynamics of extraction are the same.  
In terms of the communities, I found that the promise of jobs and of an injection 
of funds for the region promoted pro-mining sentiment, even where mining damage to 
environment was acknowledged as inevitable. This is likely too because the Morales 
regime has delivered benefits for poor Bolivians across the country in the region: 
respondents such as the FRUTCAS president explicitly made clear the communities’ 
right to development, and the presence of numerous, brand new, astroturfed football 
pitches in the villages on our route made the government’s investment in them 
abundantly clear. 
Crucially however, the lack of understanding about the environmental impacts 
might be skewing these pro-mining attitudes. In response to a question I asked across 
the region regarding what the communities need the most, all responses centred around 
jobs and funding for basic services such as roads, water and sanitation. Some 
 
912 Fornillo, Geopolítica del litio. 
913 Ibid. 
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community members responded that their communities wanted support to exploit 
minerals – an example from Bolivia being the San Agustín farmer who told me the 
community had been in talks with a Chinese company to mine copper. “Development” 
is desired, and where governments can take control of the national narrative by 
promising state-run projects guaranteed to deliver increased services, or even “vivir bien” 
in Bolivia, there is little opposition. 
In Argentina, where indigenous communities have been historically marginalised 
geographically, politically and socioeconomically for centuries, it is no wonder that the 
promise of a salaried role with a mining company, providing funds for buying their own 
car, would seem like a positive move – if not for the community, at least for the 
individual. This is the scenario I encountered in the Olaroz Communities, but the 
distribution of these assets appears uneven, and it is obvious that this can lead to 
resentments. The reactions of the leaders and former leaders to my requests for 
interview indicate tensions within the communities, and perhaps in their relationships 
with the companies, following the publication of the Washington Post article, which 
indicated poor deals struck for the signing of the servidumbres by democratically-elected 
leaders.  
In Olaroz Chico, which is closest to the operational mine and with the most 
community members employed by the company, it is easy to see how communities and 
their individual members would have accepted company arguments in favour of 
mining. Accepting vast sums of money for access to water, land, and passage would be 
a sound decision to make for the economic development of the community benefit – 
particularly if there is a lack of information of any environmental risks. The promise of 
jobs and the payments of servidumbres themselves also represent something of a 
conundrum regarding the sustainability of mining more generally. What happens when 
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the lithium company must necessarily cease operations?  
It was difficult to get a definitive answer from company community relations staff 
about the projected duration of the Olaroz-Cauchari lithium operations. On the 
companies’ part, attempting to set up projects that can self-sustain (such as a knitting or 
quinoa industry) are well-meaning and attuned to this goal – but they have had limited 
success.914 As such, they fall into the CSR category of projects, designed partly with the 
goal of achieving a “social license to operate”.915 The Sales de Jujuy communications 
team described their CSR work using the term “Shared Value”. Interestingly, the same 
company implemented a public relations project in the region they called 
“evangelization” – taking political and religious leaders, journalists and educators (but 
notably not community members, according to this account) “to the salt to know the 
project”, naturally leading to the company being “very well positioned in Jujuy”,916 
according to Fornillo.917 The major problem with assuming indigenous support or 
acquiescence for such a project is that true levels of support can only be known if the 
communities were fully informed and consulted from the beginning of the process.  
Conclusion  
This study has found that indigenous communities in Argentina and Bolivia have had 
limited information about lithium mining or opportunities to participate as the industry 
develops in the territories they traditionally inhabit. Prior informed consultations do 
not appear to have taken place in either Argentina or Bolivia. This has led some 
 
914 Community relations executives at lithium company. Interview with author, Salta, 15 May 2017. 
Community relations executive at lithium company. Interview with author, San Salvador de Jujuy, 20 
February 2017. 
915 Syn, ‘The Social License’. 
916 Ibid. 
917 Interview with Jimena Barry of Sales de Jujuy, 2014 cited in Fornillo, Geopolítica del litio. I recognised 
her name as I had to speak with her to confirm with her the topics I wanted to discuss before I was 
allowed to speak with her community relations executives. 
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communities, startled by unannounced prospecting, to demand consultation rights or 
express concern over impacts.  
In the Bolivian case, what is particularly interesting to note is that despite a 
panoply of new laws designed to protect indigenous communities, there is still no sign 
of a meaningful and ongoing consultation process occurring with communities in the 
Salar de Uyuni. And there is little sign of resistance from communities, who have been 
left uninformed about the potential for great damage to the Salar de Uyuni, if and when 
Bolivia begins to produce lithium at an industrial scale. To effect the industrialisation of 
lithium and other neo-extractivist projects in Bolivia, the socialist regime has reduced 
transparency in the lithium project and criminalised social protest against mining. 
Although the communities around the Salar de Uyuni still overwhelmingly support the 
MAS government as the best option following a long line of “neoliberal governments”, 
there is evidence of increasing authoritarianism emerging across Bolivia. This includes 
the repression of dissent by indigenous communities in TIPNIS, and the criticism and 
threats directed at NGOs and research institutes examining mining and 
socioenvironmental damage. Politically, economically, and environmentally, extraction 
continues to reinforce a hierarchy that has been firmly in place across Latin America for 
hundreds of years.918  
Meanwhile in Argentina, the marginalization of communities geographically and 
socially means that there are fewer avenues for them to learn about or access their 
rights. While this may not initially prove problematic, the lack of information about 
lithium mining at scale across multiple salt flats may result in depleted water supplies 
and a degraded local landscape. Although lithium extraction is less complex there than 
in Bolivia, which requires a method such as the encalado to remove magnesium, there is 
 
918 Galeano and Belfrage, Open veins of Latin America; Farthing and Fabricant, ‘Open Veins Revisited’. 
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still a lack of information here about the effects of mining lithium at scale. The 
probability that the mines will become depleted and close soon after communities 
come to rely on jobs and cash payments from companies is also a risk in both 
countries. 
The experience of the 33 Communities of the Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc, 
however, is particularly interesting for several of reasons. First, it shows how a 
transnational mobilization can aid indigenous communities in securing their rights to 
information, participation and consultation. This is particularly useful when such rights 
were unlikely to have been fulfilled by state and corporate actors acting without 
adequate national or regional indigenous peoples’ rights procedures – which is sadly 
common in indigenous peoples’ experiences worldwide. Second, the launch of a legal 
battle for consultation as indigenous communities may encourage state and provincial 
governments to create institutions through which such issues can be handled. This 
occurred in Jujuy with the creation of the role of Secretary of Indigenous Affairs. 
Thirdly, the development of an innovative consultation protocol, the Kachi Yupi 
document, shows that international indigenous human rights law can be leveraged to 
force a participatory dialogue with mining companies, and the governments that grant 
them concessions. The indigenous understanding of their own human rights to 
information and consultation has created a situation where the 33 Communities of the 
Salinas Grandes demonstrate to the government how clear information about the 
impacts of lithium mining can be developed and presented in an environment of 
mutual respect. Finally, these activities have halted progress on lithium mining on the 
Salinas Grandes. Whether the case reaches the Inter-American Court, the 33 
Communities have established their rights to consultation and protected their 
traditional territories and made it clear that any mining activity is subject to their free, 
prior and informed consultation. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Overview of thesis  
This thesis posed the central research question: “To what extent have communities had 
opportunities to participate in decision-making over the lithium industry in Argentina and Bolivia?” 
While the answer is of course complex and multifaceted, here I conclude that in both 
states, participation is generally weak, and communities are poorly informed about 
prospective lithium mining. After a general overview of the thesis, I will conclude by 
presenting a number of associated findings and recommendations for governments and 
lithium companies, and some recommended avenues for future research. 
In the Introduction (Chapter 1), I gave an overview of the study, including 
detailing of the importance of lithium for the emerging global low-carbon economy. I 
also introduced country-cases and sites and the unusual process of mining lithium from 
brine, including potential (and still not well known) environmental impacts mining 
lithium in this way in the Lithium Triangle. Chapter 2 provided the social, political and 
historical background and context to lithium mining in Argentina and Bolivia, including 
a detailed account of the lithium industries developing in each country. Here, 
differences between Argentina and Bolivia in terms of their historical political 
economies, relationships between indigenous peoples and the state, and the geography 
and geology of their respective lithium regions, were introduced and analysed. This 
found divergent development trajectories within which lithium extraction is or would 
be situated, particularly highlighting the determination of the Bolivian state to 
industrialise the resource under a neo-extractivist, socialist model for the purposes of 
redistribution of revenues. Chapter 3 presented my interdisciplinary approach, 
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extensive documentary research, my fieldwork methods of interviewing and 
observations, the ethical considerations and the challenges of conducting the research 
leading to limitations to the study. A substantive analysis of international human rights 
law pertaining to environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights law was then presented 
in Chapter 4. These included analysing the role of land and natural resource rights 
provided for indigenous peoples, before a detailed examination of general and 
indigenous-specific participation rights. Using the three pillars of rights to information, 
participation in decision-making and access to justice, triangulated with indigenous 
rights to free, prior and informed consultation or free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), I presented a robust regime in place for indigenous communities facing mining 
on the territories they inhabit, particularly those with traditions that make use of natural 
resources such as salt. Chapter 5 found a dearth of indigenous rights legislation in 
Argentina, and a lack of compliance with informed consultation rights in Jujuy despite a 
strong mining and environmental protection regime. It also showed how the 33 
Communities were able to access these rights through a transnational network, 
successfully developing a consultation protocol based on indigenous peoples rights 
serving to halt mining on the Salinas Grandes, which some use for the traditional 
practice of salt gathering. Here, I also showed how the Colectivo Apacheta leader 
emphasised the importance of environmental integrity as it relates to water, an 
important resource for survival based on ancestral livelihoods. The Olaroz 
Communities’ case highlighted how the quality and source of mining information 
provided is important, particular to avoid incentivising agreement based on monetary 
gain through jobs and servidumbres. In Chapter 6, I examined the historical and 
geological peculiarities of Bolivian lithium, followed by an analysis of Bolivian law 
pertaining to natural resources, mining, the environment and indigenous peoples’ 
rights. An analysis of responses from communities around the south of the Salar de 
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Uyuni found socialisations has been conducted instead of prior, informed 
consultations, and no information at all had been provided to the salt-gathering village 
of Colchani about the lithium pilot plant, triggering concerns that lithium mining was 
affecting water during a severe drought. Given the likely use of the damaging encalado 
method, increasing restrictions on information about the project and an increasing 
authoritarianism in Bolivian resource politics, this is particularly concerning. Chapter 7 
presented a discussion of the findings, ranging from an analysis of non-compliance with 
domestic and international law in both countries. It also compared the two countries’ 
developing lithium industries, particular in respect of fulfilment of the rights of 
indigenous peoples to informed consultation, finding similar lithium extraction models 
with differing motivations based on historical, political and economic factors. This 
concluding chapter will explore the key findings of the study, propose 
recommendations for the governments of Bolivia and Argentina and lithium-brine 
mining companies, and determine some areas for future research. 
8.2 Key findings 
My conclusion regarding the situation of indigenous communities living near lithium 
mining in Argentina is summarised as follows. There is a “deficit of legislation” for 
Argentina’s indigenous peoples, and they struggle to have their land rights and (as a 
result) environmental rights and rights as indigenous peoples respected and realised by 
the state. This is despite a strong environmental rights regime and strong legal 
institutions. Discrimination against the small minority of indigenous communities is 
pervasive in Argentinean society. Despite this, the 33 Communities have been 
reiterating their demands for consultation over lithium mining in accordance with 
Argentina’s obligations under international law. The inability for the government to 
adhere to these consultation procedures has meant lithium mining has been unable to 
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progress in the Salinas Grandes basin.919 The development of a national and 
transnational network helped to further the demands of the 33 Communities’ in the 
Supreme Court (and perhaps soon it will progress to the Inter-American system), 
develop an innovative consultation protocol, and perhaps the case will now reach the 
Inter-American system.  
In Bolivia, the reconfiguring of national law by the MAS Government to 
thoroughly cover indigenous peoples’ rights, the framework of Mother Earth and vivir 
bien, is considered a radical reframing of the relationship with environment and 
development. Bolivia (along with Ecuador) is known at the international level for 
facilitating and enabling global climate action and indigenous rights movements to 
reimagine the concept of development away from its colonial and neoliberal economic 
foundations. It is not only Bolivia that is struggling to operationalise the rights of 
nature and Mother Earth in the face of competition from valuable oil extraction 
projects: in 2007 Ecuador’s leftist President Rafael Correa pledged to “leave the oil in 
the ground” under the biodiverse Yasuni National Park in exchange for compensation 
from the international community. The scheme was scrapped when less than 10 
percent of the desired amount had been raised.920  
Weak participation in environmental decision-making for indigenous communities 
occurs for a number of reasons, many of which relate to the way government 
authorities and legal, political and business elites perpetuate an economic model 
structured around primary commodity extraction. This is borne out of the commercial–
 
919 Jujuy Al Momento, ‘Comunidades ratificaron su postura contra el litio’, Jujuy Al Momento, 26 March 
2019, http://www.jujuyalmomento.com/post/98744/comunidades-ratificaron-su-postura-contra-el-
litio.html. 
920 Jonathan Watts, ‘New Round of Oil Drilling Goes Deeper into Ecuador’s Yasuní National Park’, The 
Guardian, 10 January 2018, sec. Environment, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/10/new-round-of-oil-drilling-goes-deeper-into-
ecuadors-yasuni-national-park. 
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political pursuit of profit, growth and economic “development”.  
Owing to its explicitly neoliberal resource governance, and a lack of indigenous 
rights law, the Argentinean cases represent the most common outcome in resource 
conflicts involving indigenous communities. In Bolivia, there are many more 
indigenous rights laws codified into national law than most nations (including the 2007 
United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights). As a result, I had 
anticipated a more structured approach to consultations with communities living 
around the Salar de Uyuni. Instead, in the context of the increasing value of lithium as a 
global commodity, and Bolivia’s possession of the world’s largest reserves, lithium 
extraction is being pursued by a secretive state company, ultimately overseen by an 
increasingly authoritarian regime. 
Bolivia continues to be wracked with political–ecological struggles. It is a state that 
will likely continue as a primary commodity exporter in the same subordinate role it has 
had in the global capitalist economy since the 1500s. The country’s first indigenous 
President Evo Morales is currently clinging on to power, even as the electorate 
(narrowly) voted against a constitutional amendment to allow him to run for a third 
consecutive term. The conclusion for Bolivia is that the “lithium dreams”921 of the 
earlier years of the Morales government may well turn towards an ecological nightmare 
if the predictions of the impacts of the encalado method come to pass at the full severity 
anticipated by Calla. 
In both countries, indigenous communities are lacking in ways to access 
information about lithium mining due to geographical and political exclusion from 
those in charge of decision-making. I argue that this is not only an effect of the low 
socioeconomic and political status of indigenous communities living in remote areas of 
 
921 Revette, ‘Extractive Dreams’; Wright, ‘Lithium Dreams’. 
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both Argentina and Bolivia, but a deliberate strategy pursued by successive 
Argentinean, and the increasingly authoritarian Bolivian MAS Government (despite its 
rhetoric), to prioritise economic development based on extraction of this valuable 
natural resource.  
As detailed in Chapter 2, the justification of the extraction of natural resources for 
economic development is known as extractivism, or in a left-leaning political economy, 
neoextractivism. This thesis provides a better understanding of what two Latin 
American governments, on different sides of the political spectrum, seek to achieve in 
an era of both environmental crisis and economic opportunity.  
That lithium will bring prosperity to the countries that possess reserves is a 
narrative propagated by international climate change mitigation finance circles. This 
narrative, comfortably adopted by business and political elites, suggests that lithium 
mining is “clean” because it is for the most part extracted using solar and wind power 
through evaporation, and because it will contribute to the rapid growth of a low-carbon 
economy. This is a convenient narrative for those managing projects in Argentina and 
Bolivia. It frames lithium as a “strategic” asset for the future – one which will continue 
to gain value and that could perhaps one day be as important as oil to global society.  
Of course, some community-members represented in this thesis had a positive 
view of mining generally, as a source of jobs and economic development in a region 
that suffers from a lack of secure employment and basic services. However, the 
destruction of the productive local economies currently providing the communities’ 
livelihoods, such as quinoa farming, salt gathering, and (in Bolivia) tourism, are here not 
being taken into account. This is why environmental participation and the rights of 
indigenous peoples to consultation is an important factor in this situation.  
The extraction of lithium has potentially much broader implications for the wider 
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global economy and environment than many other primary commodities. 
Operationalising the use of lithium in the service of the global neoliberal “climate 
industrial complex” would simply reinforce the same economic model that justifies 
natural resource extraction in perpetuity. It is also worth remembering that lithium is 
not the only element used in lithium-ion batteries. There are numerous types of 
batteries that require numerous types of materials, including manganese, nickel, 
phosphorus, iron, and cobalt. The cobalt industry in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo is currently drawing the most concern from the human rights community due to 
a reliance on child labour for mining.922 
This conclusion seeks to answer a final question, which is: What can be done to 
increase the fulfilment of indigenous peoples’ environmental participatory rights within fledgling lithium 
extractive projects in the Lithium Triangle? The crucial starting point for environmental 
human rights is the right to information, which is severely lacking in the lithium 
industry. In terms of lithium mining information, to suggest that the information on 
environmental impacts was unavailable or unforeseeable at the time the lithium 
extractive projects were first proposed is perhaps correct, but this does not override the 
right to information. The fulfilment of the right to information would require that 
updates or changes, such as the decision to use the encalado method, would be 
communicated to those likely to be affected. 
8.3 Recommendations  
To conclude, I would like to propose some recommendations. These relate specifically 
to the provision of informed consultation for communities in mining in Argentina and 
Bolivia, and in the final section, recommendations for further research. Notably, 
 
922 Amnesty International, ‘“This Is What We Die For”: Human Rights Abuses in The Democratic 
Republic of Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt’. 
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representing the importance of environmental information for the fulfilment of 
environmental human rights, these are interrelated. 
8.3.1 Analysis of socioenvironmental risks to communities 
Firstly, in both Argentina and Bolivia assessing the risk to the water supplies of the 
region as a whole should be of paramount importance. The assessment should account 
for the projections of lithium mining across the whole region, as well as around 
individual salt flat basins. This recommendation is supported by other researchers into 
socioenvironmental impacts of lithium mining who have identified it as a problem.  
In Bolivia, the full parameters of both the encalado and sulfato methods (which will 
be used for 60 percent and 40 percent of production respectively), and the proposed 
mitigation strategies, should be made clear to all the communities living around the salt 
flat. The implications for quinoa agriculture and the salt-gathering cooperatives should 
be made especially clear, with an indication of predicted impacts of lithium mining on 
the tourism industry made available in Uyuni town (as it also relies on use of the salt 
flat and surrounding areas). 
As well as environmental damage, the consultations will have to realistically assess 
the requirements for work for local Bolivians in the lithium mining plant, in order that 
resentments do not build if the technical expertise can only be brought in from abroad. 
In the case where there must be an influx of foreign workers to Uyuni, this should be 
carefully planned and managed for the same reasons. 
8.3.2 Compliance with national and international environmental and indigenous rights 
law  
Both states should take care to analyse compliance of their lithium mining projects with 
national and international law. In Argentina, this will mean furthering the development 
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of new regulations pertaining to indigenous peoples based on their constitutional rights 
to a healthy environment and participatory rights. 
Both governments should facilitate free, prior, and informed consultations, in 
accordance with applicable the applicable international, national and provincial laws. 
The Bolivian government should follow the processes are already stipulated in the 
Constitution and the national law comprising UNDRIP. As the lithium project is still in 
its pilot stage, there is still time for an EIA and consultation process to be implemented 
in Bolivia. 
The Jujuy and Argentinean governments should regularise land rights for the 33 
Communities, and develop procedures that account for indigenous consultation rights, 
as well as environmental participation rights, and implement them according to their 
obligations under ILO169. Kachi Yupi could be used as a template to assist communities 
across the lithium provinces with structuring the consultations.  
Salt gathering communities must be given information about proposed lithium 
mining in a format they can understand, and existing rights to areas of the salt flats used 
for salt gathering should be protected in the event that mining is approved by mutual 
agreement following the correct implementation of the consultation procedures. 
8.3.3 Legal training on indigenous peoples’ rights 
To avoid violations of rights, provincial government officials in the lithium provinces 
should receive training on environmental rights generally and indigenous peoples’ rights 
particularly, and (in Argentina) should make efforts to disincentivise non-compliance 
with domestic law by lithium companies at all stages of establishing a mine.  
Transnational mining companies should ensure best practice principles of 
informing communities at the earlier stages, even before prospecting. The developing 
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international field of business and human rights, which has not been analysed here due 
to space restrictions, may be useful for companies wishing to understand their potential 
human rights impacts at the early stages of a project. 
8.4 Future research agenda 
There are a variety of avenues researchers could pursue as the lithium industry 
develops. In 2018 Agusdinata et al published a socio-environmental research agenda 
“to address the knowledge gaps in terms of specific research topics, methodologies, and 
broader system perspectives”,923 making clear the value of interdisciplinary research into 
lithium mining. It also highlighted a lack of research into the impacts of lithium mining 
on indigenous peoples, which this thesis hopes to begin remedying. 
I propose an interdisciplinary research and dissemination agenda to help 
communities understand the risks of lithium mining in these drought-prone regions, 
and develop strategies to mitigate water stress should it arrive as a result of either 
lithium mining or drought. The provincial government should ensure that companies in 
operation are ready and willing to cease mining should mining-induced water stress 
cause impacts on communities in the region. The government must also set up 
processes that would allow communities to monitor, report and receive compensation 
for damages as a result of the company’s activities. These responsibilities should be 
shared between the companies.  
More broadly, given the global demand for and potential supply of lithium, 
China’s developing relationship with Bolivia and other Latin American (and African) 
nations in which it is investing to secure a supply of primary commodities is also an 
 
923 Datu Buyung Agusdinata et al., ‘Socio-Environmental Impacts of Lithium Mineral Extraction: 
Towards a Research Agenda’, Environmental Research Letters, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-
9326/aae9b1. 
  
 
 
329 
important emerging topic of resource geopolitics. Chinese resource governance in the 
lithium mining regions of Qinghai-Tibet would also be an interesting area to explore: 
understanding damage to the environment or mobilisation of communities in the 
Himalayas, where salt flats similar to the Andean salares are located, would perhaps aid 
an understanding of potential environmental impacts of mining lithium from brine as a 
whole. Although on a much larger and more complex contemporary (and very explicitly 
neo-colonial) scale,924 the distances and political centralisation in a 
corporatist/clientelist communist government might make it comparable with the 
Bolivian situation. Lithium mining sites in Mexico and Nevada would also be 
interesting to visit to understand socio-environmental impacts, and even impacts on 
indigenous locals. 
As a final concluding point, I believe as a result of this study that the lack of 
information about the mining of lithium at scale should therefore be a concern at all 
levels of society, from the independent geological researcher to the end-consumer of 
electric cars. Even more broadly, the lack of information about the environmental 
impacts of any such environmental situation at scale should be a central concern for us 
all. The reason why there is such a high demand for lithium (and the labour of children 
in Congolese’s cobalt mines) is because governments and corporations have left 
environmental participation considerations on the sidelines for too long. Participation 
on what to do to mitigate the impacts of climate change should be central to political 
procedure in parliaments, town halls, and rural community association meetings the 
world over, so the promise of participatory democracy in the service of environmental 
human rights can be effected.
 
924 Lafitte, Spoiling Tibet. 
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